Organizing for competitiveness by Man, A-P. (Ard-Pieter) de
zing 
Competitiveness 
Tiburon 

ORGANIZING FOR COMPETITIVENESS 

ORGANIZING FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
(Concurreren door organiseren) 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR 
AAN DE ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM 
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS 
PROF.DR P.W.C. AKKERMANS M.A. 
EN VOLGENS BESLUIT VAN HET COLLEGE VOOR PROMOTIES 
DE OPENBARE VERDEDIGING ZAL PLAATSVINDEN OP 
DONDERDAG 25 JANUARI 1996 OM 16.00 UUR 
DOOR 
ADRIANUS PIETER DE MAN 
GEBOREN TE DIRKSLAND 
Promotiecommissie 
Promotor: Prof.dr ing. F.A.J, van den Bosch 
Co-promotor: Dr T. Elfring 
Overige leden: Prof.dr C.W.F. Baden-Fuller 
Prof.dr D.J. Eppink 
Prof.dr J.M. Pennings 
Ibo 
s 

CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG 
Man, A.P. de 
Organizing for competitiveness / door A.P. de Man. 
- Delft : Eburon 
Verschenen als proefschrift Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 1996. 
— Met lit. opg. — Met samenvatting in het Nederlands. 
NUGI 681 
Trefw.: strategie, organisatorische innovatie, Fokker, Europese distributie 
Lay-out: Wil Geurtsen 
PhD series in General Management nr 17, Rotterdam School of Management 
© 1996, A.P. de Man, Rotterdam 
Eburon Publishers 
P.O. Box 2867 
2611 CW Delft 
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or 
any other means without written permission from the author. 
ISBN 90-5166-489-3 
Contents 
Introduction: Organizing for competitiveness 1 
1 On competitiveness and organizational innovation 7 
1.1 Introduction 7 
1.2 On cost and innovation 7 
1.2.1 The competitiveness debate: two approaches 7 
1.2.2 Comparative meets competitive: limitations in the 
comparative approach 9 
1.2.3 Competitiveness on the firm and national level 11 
1.2.4 Innovation: technological and organizational 12 
1.3 The competitive impact of organizational innovation 
on a firm level 13 
1.3.1 Theory 13 
1.3.2 Empirical evidence 15 
1.4 The competitive impact of organizational innovation 
on a national level 17 
1.4.1 Theory 17 
1.4.2 Empirical evidence 20 
1.5 Sustainability of competitive advantages rooted in 
organizational innovation: firm level 21 
1.5.1 Theory 21 
1.5.2 Empirical evidence 28 
1.6 Sustainability of competitive advantages rooted 
in organizational innovation: national level 29 
1.6.1 Theory 29 
1.6.2 Empirical evidence 31 
1.7 Summary 35 
2 Demarcation, definition and analytical tool 37 
2.1 Introduction 37 
2.2 Organizational vs. technological innovation 38 
2.3 Unbundling organizational innovation: a conceptual definition 40 
2.3.1 The language of organizational innovation 40 
2.3.2 An overview of definitions 41 
2.3.3 Nodes and links: Grandori's contribution 44 
2.3.4 Organizational innovation in the value chain 47 
2.3.5 Comparing two approaches 53 
2.3.6 Reorganization or innovation? 54 
2.4 Summary 55 
3 Overview of the theory of organizational innovation 57 
3.1 Introduction 57 
3.2 Requirements for a theory of organizational innovation 58 
3.3 Overview of the theory of organizational innovation 59 
3.3.1 Schumpeter 59 
3.3.2 Chandler 62 
3.3.3 Williamson and the transaction cost paradigm 67 
3.3.4 The flexible specialization scenario 72 
3.3.5 Lazonick 78 
3.3.6 Population ecology 80 
3.4 Conclusion 82 
4 From the inside out 85 
4.1 Introduction 85 
4.2 Static and dynamic routines 86 
4.3 Trajectories and paradigms: path dependence in the 
development of new organizational forms 91 
4.3.1 Theoretical background 91 
4.3.2 Trajectories and paradigms: examples form the 
theory of organizational innovation 95 
4.4 On radical and incremental innovation 98 
4.5 Resource-based theory 100 
4.6 Proposition and attribute-table on path dependence 102 
4.7 Conclusion 104 
5 From the outside in 107 
5.1 Introduction 107 
5.2 A general picture: the influence of the business 
environment on organizational innovation 108 
5.2.1 The business environment: a choice for Porter's diamond 108 
5.2.2 Porter's diamond framework 110 
5.2.3 The diamond and innovation theory: demand and 
related and supporting industries 116 
5.3 Related and supporting industries: the influence of 
clustering on organizational innovation 117 
5.3.1 Introduction 117 
5.3.2 Clusters: relevant organizational aspects 118 
5.3.3 Organizational innovativeness of long-term relationships; 
proposition and attribute-table 121 
5.4 The influence of demand on organizational innovation 128 
5.4.1 Introduction 128 
5.4.2 Demand: relevant attributes for organizational innovation 128 
5.4.3 The influence of demand on organizational innovation; 
proposition and attribute-table 131 
5.5 Conclusion 135 
6 Existing empirical evidence on the propositions 137 
6.1 Introduction 137 
6.2 Path dependence in organizational innovation 138 
6.2.1 Toyota: Cusumano's account of the emergence of JIT 138 
6.2.2 ABB: Bartlett and Ghoshal look beyond the M-form 142 
6.2.3 Path dependence in interorganizational relations 145 
6.2.4 Attribute-table on path dependence 147 
6.3 Long-term interfirm relations and their effect on 
organizational innovation 148 
6.4 Demand and its effect on organizational innovation 150 
6.5 Conclusion 153 
Case 1: The Fokker-case 155 
7.1 Introduction 155 
7.2 The Fokker company: recent developments 156 
7.3 Organizational innovation in Fokker: the AtO-system 160 
7.3.1 Prologue: reduction of lead times and other 
developments leading up to the AtO-system 160 
7.3.2 AtO: implementation inside Fokker and attribute-table 
on path dependence 162 
7.3.3 AtO: consequences of its implementation outside Fokker 165 
7.3.4 Overview of organizational innovations in the value chain 167 
7.3.5 The organizational innovation and competitive advantage 169 
7.3.6 Discussion 171 
7.4 Long-term interorganizational relationships and AtO 172 
7.4.1 Introduction 172 
7.4.2 Shorts 172 
7.4.3 Grumman 177 
7.4.4 Evaluation: long-term relationships and organizational 
innovation 179 
7.4.5 Attribute-table on long-term relations and 
organizational innovation in Fokker 182 
7.5 Demand and AtO 183 
7.5.1 Introduction 183 
7.5.2 Quantitative demand 184 
7.5.3 Qualitative demand 185 
7.5.4 Conclusions and attribute-table on demand 187 
7.6 Summary and conclusion 188 
Exhibit I List of persons interviewed 190 
Exhibit II List of consulted Fokker-documents 191 
8 Case 2: European distribution centres: a case in the 
port of Rotterdam 193 
8.1 Introduction 193 
8.2 EDCs as organizational innovation: the general picture 194 
8.2.1 The function of EDCs 194 
8.2.2 Determinants of the development of EDCs 195 
8.2.3 The trajectory of EDCs 196 
8.2.4 EDCs: the general picture of value chain reconfiguration 198 
8.2.5 Competitive advantages connected to EDCs 200 
8.2.6 Conclusion 203 
8.3 Case company: the development of an EDC in a specific firm 203 
8.3.1 Introduction 203 
8.3.2 Inside-out: the history of the case firm as a 
path dependent process; attribute-table 204 
8.3.3 Organizational innovations in the case company 208 
8.3.4 The relation with three important clients 214 
8.3.5 Outside-in: determinants of the development of the 
EDC in the case company; attribute-table on demand 219 
8.3.6 Conclusion on the environmental determinants 
of the case company's EDC 225 
8.4 Summary and conclusion 226 
Exhibit I List of persons interviewed 228 
9 Organizing for competitiveness: summary, conclusions 
and implications 229 
9.1 Summary 229 
9.2 Conclusions on the propositions and attribute-tables 236 
9.3 Implications for research and practice 241 
Appendix: Qualitative operationalizations in case studies 249 
References 259 
Samenvatting: Concurreren door organiseren 275 
Curriculum Vitae 285 
Introduction: Organizing for competitiveness 
"Truly, among man's innovations, the use of organization to accomplish his ends 
is among both his greatest and his earliest", Arrow (1971, p. 224) observed. Since 
man first invented it, organization has developed towards an ever increasing 
complexity and has come to dominate many aspects of human life. In the course 
of time, ways of organizing have not only become more complex, but also more 
varied. Different forms of organization have competed and still do compete with 
each other with alternating degrees of success. The study of organizational forms 
has however been limited to the analysis of the efficiency of existing forms, while 
the way in which new forms emerge has received little attention. Likewise, 
"organizational design tools...are focused on the comparison and choice between 
known alternative organizational forms rather than focusing on how to develop 
these alternatives" (Grandori, 1993, p. 1). Questions like (Grandori, 1993): 
• are there common logical features in organizational innovations; 
• how do they emerge and do they use existing knowledge; 
• how are possible organizational solutions tested; 
• can guidelines be developed on how to create new organizational forms (can 
the process be rationalized); 
have not yet received much attention. Insight in the process of development of 
new forms can eventually contribute to an increased managerial control over 
organizational innovation. Unilever's former CEO for example, stated that the 
transnational structure inside Unilever developed by means of trial and error 
(Maljers, 1992), which may suggest that the managerial control over organizational 
innovation is limited. The question is whether a new organizational form 
necessarily develops in this way or whether the process of organizational inno-
vation can be run more effectively. The limited amount of theory dealing with 
organizational innovation however, prohibits us from answering this question. 
Quite some fundamental research is required before it can be answered. Therefore 
this study will be theory-building and give a detailed look into the process of 
organizational innovation. The core research question is: 
1 
, 
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What are the determinants of organizational innovation? 
In order to answer this question, the process of organizational innovation will be 
described as being subject to determinants inside the firm ("inside-out") and 
outside the firm ("outside-in"). It will be shown that organizational innovation is 
not a clear unidirectional process, but a process of search and trial and error, on 
which many determinants have different impacts. "Causes of change can be endo-
genous or exogenous" (Pennings, 1995, p. 11, translation APdM). Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1993, p. 43) also describe organizational innovation as arising from 
"emerging internal and external environmental demands". In figure 1.1 this 
distinction can be traced in the terminology of outside-in (conditions in the 
business environment influencing firm behavior) and inside-out (firm specific 
conditions as an influencing factor). Winter (1990) refers to this difference as the 
genotype-phenotype distinction: variations among organizations are partly a 
reflection of the different environments they have encountered and partly a 
reflection of inherited characteristics. Figure 1.1 provides a basic analytical schema 
for research into organizational innovation, which enables research to take place 
that is both historically contingent (in the inside-out approach) and context 
dependent (in the outside-in approach). Thereby it begins to make progress in a 
research direction pointed at by Powell (1990, p. 323), who stated that a com-
bination of these two perspectives is a prerequisite for meaningful research into 
organizational forms. 
Figure LI An analytical schema of organizational innovation 
> '
Outside-in 
Inside-out 
i < 
— 
Management Organizational 
Innovation 
Competitive 
Advantage —> 
VN l . 
Diffusion 
Figure 1.1 shows this graphically: elements of the business environment together 
with firm specific conditions determine the way in which management innovates 
in the organization structure. The resulting organizational innovation contributes 
to a competitive advantage. Competitors observing this may want to emulate the 
innovation so that diffusion of the new organizational form takes place. As to the 
role of management it is assumed that it initiates and guides organizational 
innovation. As stated above, little is known about the correct way to manage 
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organizational innovation and consequently detailed ideas about management 
cannot yet be presented. 
There are different feedback loops. Firstly, the organizational innovation will alter 
the firm specific conditions, like the organizational structure and the balance of 
power. Next, the innovation may alter the environment. It can for instance 
influence the competitive process to a considerable degree, change the innovator's 
network or create new demands from clients. The third important feedback loop 
is the one from diffusion to the environment. When more firms adopt the new 
organizational form this means that the original innovator will gradually lose 
competitive advantage. As differences between firms are the source of competi-
tiveness (Porter, 1985) and in the process of diffusion these differences diminish, 
the competitive advantage of the innovating firm will decrease. The change in 
competitive position of the competitors brought about by the diffusion of the 
organizational innovation is an integral part of the business environment of the 
innovator. The diffusion of forms can also change the coalitions against which the 
innovator has to compete. 
The basic analytical schema as presented in figure 1.1 is taken as a point of 
departure in studying organizational innovation. The process of organizational 
innovation will be described as one in which different determinants shaping 
organizational form play a role. In Pelikan's words: "While traditional analysis 
assumes organizational structures to be exogenously given, the main feature of 
the suggested approach is to recognize them as endogenously formed" (Pelikan, 
1987, p. 30). 
Point of departure of this study is that new organizational forms can be viewed 
as innovations. For as far as new organizational forms have been studied, this has 
normally been done by making use of organization theory. Here, it was assumed 
that by applying innovation theory to organizational issues, new insights in the 
development of new organizational forms can be obtained. This choice for inno-
vation theory also serves as a guide in narrowing down the number of deter-
minants of organizational innovation to be looked at. In choosing the relevant 
variables to be studied in the inside-out and outside-in perspective, innovation 
theory will be taken as a guide. 
The relevance of the research question formulated above, is shown in a discussion 
of two approaches to competitiveness in chapter 1. The role innovation plays in 
creating competitive advantage will be analyzed in that chapter. The concept of 
innovation used in the larger part of current theorizing on competitiveness, is 
however a limited one in that it normally excludes innovations of a non-tech-
nological nature. That is why the first chapter provides the background for an 
analysis of organizational innovation: the emergence of new organizational forms. 
It will show that organizational innovations can contribute to sustainable com-
petitive advantages on both a firm and a national level. Hence, research into the 
way new forms of organization come into existence is relevant and can contribute 
to an increased understanding of shifts in competitiveness. 
In order to be able to answer the research question, it needs to be ascertained 
what exactly organizational innovations are. Chapter 2 provides a definition of 
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organizational innovation, which includes not only infra-organizational inno-
vations but also znterorganizational innovations. The latter ones are new 
organizational forms aimed at improving the coordination between organizations 
(like networks and strategic alliances). The same chapter also proposes to describe 
organizational innovations in terms of changes in the activities and linkages 
(coordination mechanisms) of an organization. 
Once the key concept is defined, a review of literature in chapter 3 will show 
which authors have contributed to the inside-out and the outside-in perspective. 
Several contributions to these two perspectives have been made, but no integrated 
framework for studying organizational innovation has emerged which takes both 
these perspectives into account. Above that the pluriformity of organizational 
forms studied is often limited to either intra- or interorganizational forms, while 
both should be incorporated in a theory of organizational innovation. Finally, little 
attention has been given to the role of competitive advantage in organizational 
innovation. By means of using a combination of innovation and strategy theory 
these disadvantages can be remedied. 
Chapter 4 presents a definition of the inside-out perspective by making use of 
theories on technological innovation and recent developments in strategy lite-
rature, viz. the resource based view of the firm. The proposition will be advanced 
that organizational innovation is a path dependent process, which next to change 
exhibits continuity as well: new organizational forms develop out of their 
precursors by means of routine-like changes. The capabilities, resources and 
routines in place in individual organizations steer the development of organi-
zational form in a certain direction. The history of the organization matters a great 
deal in its current way of working. This conclusion matches the ideas on inno-
vation put forth in the first chapter. 
The remaining question is then whether, how and why different determinants in 
the business environment influence organizational innovation. In chapter 5 two 
determinants (taken from Porter's (1990a) diamond: related and supporting 
industries and demand) will be looked at specifically. These determinants are 
chosen because they have been defined in innovation literature. Regarding inter-
firm relations the proposition will be advanced that, contrary to the case of 
technological innovation, long-term interfirm relations do not stimulate organi-
zational innovation, but may be a counteracting force instead. Finally, an analysis 
of demand changes and their influence on organizational innovation will lead to 
the proposition that both qualitative and quantitative changes in demand sti-
mulate organizational innovation. Increased volatility of demand has in the past 
been accommodated by a loosening of organizational principles to the benefit of 
market-like principles, rather than with attempts to exercise increased control over 
a larger number of activities in the value chain. 
In the chapters 6, 7 and 8 empirical material is presented, which illustrates the 
propositions. Existing empirical material is reviewed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 and 
8 present more detailed cases in which organizational innovations are tracked in 
the aircraft industry (Fokker Aircraft) and the distribution sector (in the Port of 
Rotterdam). Interestingly, most of these innovations have interorganizational 
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consequences thus confirming the relevance of incorporating interorganizational 
forms in the definition of organizational innovation. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarizes, concludes and provides questions for further 
research. The general picture on the determinants of organizational innovation 
emerging from this study is the following. New organizational forms develop in 
the course of time in a process in which existing organizational forms are replaced 
by strategically superior (but by no means perfect) ones. The process is path 
dependent because firm specificities on one point in time determine those in the 
subsequent periods. It also is characterized by trial and error: the right solution 
to an organizational problem is seldom found at once, but has to be searched for. 
Sometimes unexpected consequences of a new way of working become evident, 
which have to be remedied. 
At various points the environment impacts upon this development as well. 
Especially the role of demand is noteworthy: the majority of the organizational 
innovations studied can be explained by changes in demand. Interorganizational 
relationships have some elements in them which limit the possibility for orga-
nizational innovation. At the same time however, when an organizational inno-
vation emerges in a network these same forces can enhance its sustainability, as 
they reduce the possibility for emulation. Briefly, the forces inside and outside the 
organization guide organizational innovation in a certain direction. Historical 
contingence and context dependence make it difficult to observe the process of 
organizational innovation and reduce its imitability. 
Figure 1.1 is worked through from right till left. Figure 1.2 presents the basic 
structure of the book. This design emanates in the following contributions to 
existing theory made by this research: 
• it focuses on the dynamics of organizational forms, whereas existing theories 
have mainly used comparative static methods; 
• it shows the possibility and importance of using innovation theory instead of 
organization theory to describe and analyze new organizational forms. Limiting 
the concept of innovation to technological innovation neglects the breadth and 
scope of innovative activity; 
• it incorporates both inter- and infra-organizational forms, while most research 
focuses on either one of these. Inter- and intra-organizational forms do not 
require a different set of tools and analyses, but can be studied by the same set 
of concepts. 
If effective managerial guidelines are to be developed, these conclusions should 
be taken into account. Likewise, further theoretical research into organizational 
innovation should include these findings. 
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Figure 1.2 General structure of the book 
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Chapter 5 
1 
On competitiveness and organizational innovation 
1.1 Introduction 
In the debates on firm and country competitiveness attention has increasingly 
been directed towards the role of innovation in creating and maintaining superior 
performance. In this chapter a specific kind of innovation will be studied, namely 
organizational innovations (new organizational forms). As a basis for discussing 
this subject, section 1.2 will describe the competitive process as one in which a 
constant ebb and flow of innovations enhances the dynamics of competition. At 
the same time this section will prepare the ground for the later chapters in which 
innovation theory will be used to study new organizational forms. In order to 
clarify the nature of competition with innovations (Schumpeterian competition) 
this way of competing is contrasted with competition on cost. 
To show that organizational innovation plays a remarkable role in strengthening 
the dynamics of competition, the sections 1.3 till 1.6 will review the impact of new 
organizational forms on the competitive success of firms and countries. Not only 
the competitive advantages grounded in organizational innovations will be 
analysed (in sections 1.3 and 1.4), but also their sustainability (in sections 1.5 and 
1.6). 
1.2 On cost and innovation 
1.2.1 The competitiveness debate: two approaches 
The rise and fall of nations can be explained from many different historical per-
spectives: political, economic and military considerations have figured promi-
nently as explanatory variables in historical studies into changing power balances 
(e.g. Kennedy, 1987; North and Thomas, 1973; Olson, 1982). Recent research in 
competitiveness has also incorporated a historical perspective looking at a wide 
range of variables to explain a nations competitive advantage (e.g. Nelson (ed.), 
1993; Porter, 1990a). Behind these studies, lies the central idea that innovation is 
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more important for competitiveness than the cost of products and the mere availa-
bility of production factors. More than competing on cost based on an abundant 
presence of production factors, competition on innovation is believed to determine 
the long-run competitiveness of nations. 
These ideas run counter to the dominant tradition in the field of economic com-
petitiveness which has largely maintained its focus on competition on cost. This 
tradition, led by neo-classical economists, usually studies national differences in 
growth, international trade and development by pointing at differences in factor 
endowments (see e.g. Denison, 1970; Krugman and Obstfeld, 1988). The keyword 
in understanding country performance in this line of reasoning is comparative 
advantage. The relative abundance of production factors determines a countries' 
comparative cost advantage and thereby, among others, patterns of international 
trade. 
The criticism on this view has been steadily increasing. Porter (1990a, pp. 1-30) 
brings together some of these critiques and forcefully argues in favour of taking 
a broader view on competitiveness. Constraining premisses and limited empirical 
support are two basic critiques of the neo-classical comparative advantage 
approach. In order to get a more complete picture of shifting national competitive-
ness qualitative studies seem to be a useful supplement to the mainly quantitative 
approach of neo-classical economics (Dertouzos, Lester and Solow, 1989). As a 
reaction to and extension of the dominant neo-classical paradigm, the evolu-
tionary view of economics has emerged, which has the study of innovation as its 
main topic (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1988). The focus of evolutionary 
economics is no longer exclusively at resource endowments, instead it has shifted 
towards the emergence and diffusion of innovations and their impact on the com-
petitiveness of nations. Not the static resource endowments are subject of study, 
but the way superior competitive positions are created and destroyed by means 
of innovations. In this sense competition is seen as dynamic: innovations follow 
each other in time, making and breaking competitive positions. 
The essential difference with the neo-classical position is that in the evolutionary 
perspective innovations enable a country to make better use of the existing 
resource base and thereby strengthen the competitive position of that country. The 
concept of resources in evolutionary economics then, is considerably larger than 
that in neo-classical economics: in the former approach resources can be created 
and upgraded and knowledge has to play an important role in that process. 
Created (or advanced) production factors (for example an educated workforce) are 
difficult to imitate and can provide a country with a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Summarizing (Best, 1990, p. 187-189): the study of comparative 
advantage (in which static resource endowments eventually determine the out-
come of the competitive process) is replaced by the study of competitive advantage 
(in which the actions of innovators change the rules of the competitive game). The 
differences between these two approaches are not merely theoretical, but have 
important and often contradictory policy implications as well. 
So far the national level has been discussed. But also at lower levels of analysis 
like the firm level, the attention is increasingly directed at dynamic competition 
and innovation. As barriers to trade diminish and international competition is 
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strengthened firms are no longer secure behind artificial barriers to competition. 
Instead every competitive position can be destroyed by means of an innovation 
introduced by a competitor. In a world of dynamic competition "input costs are 
neutralized as a competitive advantage and scale economies are continually vul-
nerable to new ways of doing things" (Porter, 1994). A competitive advantage 
which is exclusively based on the low cost of production inputs will therefore not 
be sustainable anymore. On the contrary, it is the constant renewal of products, 
processes, markets and organization, which enables companies to stay ahead of 
competition. The extreme case of this is the case of hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 
1994), in which competitive advantages are constantly being challenged. For firms 
this poses the problem of how to innovate faster and better. The next section will 
provide an analysis of the theories lying behind the two models of comparative 
and competitive advantage which aims to provide a background for the analysis 
of innovation provided in the later chapters. 
1.2.2 Comparative meets competitive: limitations in the comparative 
approach 
Some differences between the two approaches of comparative and competitive 
advantage can be found in table 1.1. Several other models of competition can be 
defined (like Barney, 1986b; Foss, 1994), yet most of these can be related to the 
two basic approaches outlined below. It has traditionally been the most severe 
criticism on theories of comparative advantage that they have not been able to 
incorporate the phenomenon of innovation. Lately however, Romer (1990) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) have made progress in incorporating knowledge 
and innovation in neo-classical models. The theoretical resilience of the neo-
classical paradigm therefore seems to be impressive, but despite these contribu-
tions to the theory of comparative advantage, there are still quite some drawbacks 
to the theory. Most importantly, the concept of innovation is seriously flawed. The 
innovative process is not analysed and the fact that innovations are not static 
blueprints but usually are subject to change in the course of their diffusion (Clark, 
1987), is not taken up (compare for example, Grossman and Helpman's (1991) 
conception of innovation with Dosi, Pavitt and Soete's (1990)). Similarly, the 
consequences of diffusion of innovation for competitiveness are not analysed. 
Instead of the emphasis on the availability of production factors, the competitive 
advantage approach highlights innovation as the explanatory variable behind 
competitiveness. Some studies show for instance, that in countries in which most 
important resources are lacking, a competitive advantage may still emerge. 
Selective factor disadvantages may provide an impetus for innovations, which 
may become the foundations of a competitive position. The Dutch flower industry 
is the quintessential example here (Porter, 1990a). Despite disadvantageous 
conditions in the climate, the Netherlands holds over 60% of the world market of 
cut flowers, among others because of innovations in warehouse horticulture 
(Jacobs, Boekholt, Zegveld, 1990). 
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Table 7.3 Differences between theories on comparative advantage and competitive advantage 
Theoretical differences 
Intellectual roots 
Recent contributors 
Comparative Advantage 
• Relative abundance of 
production factors 
• Firm as a production 
function 
• (Bounded) rationality 
• Equilibrium-
analysis/Static efficiency 
• Heckscher 
• Ohlin 
• Ricardo 
• Samuelson 
• Grossman 
• Krugman 
• Romer 
Competitive Advantage 
• Innovativeness 
• Firm as a unique bundle 
of resources 
• Search/routines 
• Non-equilibrium analy-
sis/Dynamic improve-
ment 
• Alchian 
• Penrose 
• Schumpeter 
• Kogut 
• Nelson 
• Porter 
• Soete 
Source: Extension of De Man (1995). 
Incorporation of the concept of innovation in theories of comparative advantage 
is hampered by the fact that these theories do not pay attention to firm 
differences. In the comparative advantage approach, firms are conceptualized as 
production functions (Seth and Thomas, 1994) that merely transform the pro-
duction factors into homogeneous goods. The competitive approach on the other 
hand conceptualizes the firm as a unique bundle of resources. In this view every 
firm is different and therefore able to produce different products and to innovate. 
Firm discretionary behavior is an integral part of the competitive advantage 
perspective, whereas in the comparative advantage perspective it is notably absent 
(Nelson, 1992). 
Some elements of firm differences have been incorporated in neo-classical theory. 
In international trade theory, Krugman ed. (1986) loosened the assumptions of 
perfectly competitive markets and diminishing returns and in doing so, has made 
an important extension to the neo-classical theory of international trade. Krugman 
points out that strategic trade policies aimed at protecting industries in which a 
learning curve and economies of scale are present, may theoretically benefit a 
country. Even though the beneficial effects of strategic trade policies have been 
shown to be limited (Helpman and Krugman, 1989), the incorporation of econo-
mies of learning and scale does stress some firm differences, albeit not necessarily 
ones that are unique to the companies possessing them. Moreover, the examples 
given in Krugman ed. (1986) are more related to industry specificities than firm 
specificities. 
According to the competitive advantage approach, firm differences are embedded 
in the firm's history. The way in which the firm has searched for solutions to 
problems in the past, determines the way in which a company now functions. 
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Nelson and Winter (1982) point to the existence of such routines, that pose 
cognitive and historical limitations to the process of solving problems. In the 
comparative advantage approach none of these limits are present. The (bounded) 
rationality assumption it subscribes to, is largely a-historical. It assumes decision 
makers are able to act without the historical constraints, set by previous decisions 
and investments. The theory of the firm lying behind ideas on competitiveness is 
not irrelevant, as all theories usually stress that country competitiveness as such 
does not exist, but is rooted in firm behavior. As a result the conception of the 
firm lying behind ideas on competitiveness, influences the policies prescribed in 
different theories (see De Man, 1995; Jacobs and De Man (1995a,b) for an overview 
of governmental policy and strategy guidelines related to the comparative vs. 
competitive approach). 
Finally, the competitive advantage approach is not concerned with the way equi-
librium in economies is reached but focusses on the reasons why non-equilibrium 
occurs. The use of tacit knowledge for instance can enable a company to isolate 
itself from the forces of competition, thus preventing an equilibrium from 
establishing itself. Neo-classical theorizing on comparative advantage still uses 
equilibrium theorizing as a tool. In the latter approach, the attention for dynamic 
improvement is obscured by the analysis of static efficiency (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Hayek, 1945; Porter, 1990b). The focus is more on the efficient use of existing 
production factors within current possibilities, than on the analysis of the 
development of new products and production methods. 
The limitations of the comparative advantage approach, specifically with regard 
to the conception of innovation, have spawned the different literature on com-
petitive advantage in which innovation is put central next to an emphasis on firm 
level processes. These studies have dealt with issues like national systems of 
innovation (Lundvall, 1988; Nelson (ed.), 1993), innovation enhancing govern-
mental policy (Branscomb, 1992), the determinants of innovation (Porter, 1990a) 
and theoretical analysis of innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). There is ample 
room for further research in this area and that is why this stream of thought is 
taken as the background against which the current study is conducted. 
1.2.3 Competitiveness on the firm and national level 
Neither of the two approaches (comparative or competitive) uses the term of 
national competitive advantage as if it is a separate characteristic of a country. 
Indeed, Krugman (1994) and Krugman and Lawrence (1994) forcefully and rightly 
reject such a notion of national competitiveness in the sense of nation competing 
against nation (e.g. as used by Reich, 1991). Instead national competitiveness 
should be seen as rooted in firm competitiveness. Briefly stated: firms in a country 
exhibit similar characteristics, which foreign firms do not posses. When these 
national characteristics lead to a competitive advantage this can be called a 
"national" competitive advantage. 
For example: innovations can bring a firm a sustainable competitive advantage 
when competitors are not able to replicate that innovation. In section 1.6, it will 
be shown that innovations often do spread and that they spread faster within a 
o 
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country than between countries (Kogut, 1991). Firms in a country may therefore 
implement similar innovations, which constitute a country specific element as 
foreign competitors do not possess these innovations. If these innovations lead to 
an increased competitiveness of the firms of that country in comparison to those 
of foreign countries, this can be called a "national" competitive advantage (Kogut, 
1991; De Man, 1995). This is the sense in which the concept of national competi-
tiveness will be used below. 
Hence, national competitive advantage refers to the phenomenon that firms in a 
country implement similar innovations which increase their competitiveness vis-a-
vis their competitors in other countries, because innovations spread faster within 
country borders than across. It follows that national competitiveness is always 
rooted in the behavior of firms. These firms compete nationally and internatio-
nally with their rivals abroad: "Firms compete in industries, not nations" (Porter, 
1990a, p. 619). As a result of the important role played by firms in national 
competitiveness, the level of analysis in this research is the firm. 
1.2.4 Innovation: technological and organizational 
The literature on competitiveness and innovation has mainly focussed on tech-
nological innovation. Different studies have been conducted into the nature and 
impact of product and process innovations. The knowledge of technological 
innovation has accumulated (for an overview see Dosi et al., 1988). Much less 
emphasis has been put on the process of organizational innovation (new 
organizational forms) and its impact on country and firm competitiveness, even 
though this was one of the five kinds of innovation identified by Schumpeter as 
far back as 1911. Nonetheless, the link between competitiveness and organiza-
tional innovation has rarely been researched consistently and explicitly (Kogut ed., 
1993, makes a step in that direction) even though the role of new organizational 
forms has been pointed at in individual studies. 
There are reasons why it may be fruitful to extend the focus on technology. First 
of all the diffusion of technological innovation seems to progress with increasing 
speed. This means that a competitive advantage built on a technology may not be 
sustainable. The ability to innovate continuously may be much more important 
and this is partly determined by organizational aspects. Moreover, organizational 
structures are hard to change, so that they may have an impact over a long time 
period. Secondly, as pointed out above, firm differences are important in a com-
petitive advantage perspective. To limit these differences a priori to technological 
capabilities would be one-sided. A focus on organizational innovation may 
provide a complementary account of the relation between innovation and com-
petitive advantage, thereby simultaneously doing justice to the breadth and scope 
of innovative activity. Some differences between technological and organizational 
innovation will be discussed in section 2.2. 
Williamson (1975, p. 193) identifies three reasons for the limited attention new 
organizational forms have had. Firstly, the economic significance of organizational 
innovations is difficult to assess. It is usually hard to separate the impact of 
organizational renewal from other variables contributing to firm success. 
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Secondly, it is not easy to separate opportunistic, unimportant changes in 
organizational structure from fundamental ones. Finally, organizational inno-
vations are conceptually less tractable because good definitions and analytical 
tools describing new organizational forms, are lacking. Consequently, they have 
not had much attention in research. There is nevertheless an increasing branch of 
literature dealing not only with the analysis of new organizational forms, but with 
their competitive impact as well. 
If organizational innovations are important, the question becomes imperative how 
they come into being. The answer to this question is not just theoretically 
interesting, but may also provide clues as to what kind of policies (governmental 
and managerial) may stimulate the emergence and diffusion of new organizational 
forms. Knowledge of the factors stimulating and inhibiting organizational inno-
vation is still rudimentary, so that further developments in this field are required. 
Before addressing this question of the emergence of new organizational forms in 
detail, the relevance of it will be shown. This will be done in the ensuing sections 
by reviewing literature on the influence of organizational innovations on 
sustainable competitiveness of firms and nations. 
1.3 The competitive impact of organizational innovation on a firm 
level 
1.3.1 Theory 
The capability to organize is of great importance for firm performance (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992). In economic theory, organization 
has been defined as an important factor in production. Changing the organiza-
tional relations may enhance efficiency by making better use of resources. The 
amount of economic literature dealing with this subject should however not be 
overestimated. The reasons for the absence in economic theory of work studying 
organizational structures are that they have been considered unimportant, not 
separable from the role of the entrepreneur, not measurable, not lasting (unstable, 
changeable), and varying little from one firm to another (Tomer, 1987). Tomer 
maintains that these beliefs are not tenable and provides an interesting account 
of the way organization can enhance a firm's performance. Based on Leibenstein's 
(1966) work on X-efficiency, Tomer shows how an increase in what he calls "orga-
nizational capital" represents an outward movement of the production possibility 
frontier. This means that organizational changes can enhance a companies' pro-
ductivity by making better use of available production factors. Organizational 
capital formation in Tomer's conception could involve: 
1. changing the formal and informal social relationships and patterns of activity 
within the enterprise or 
2. changing individual attributes important to organizational functioning, or 
3. the accumulation of information useful in matching workers with organiza-
tion situations. 
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Tomer's approach is rooted in neo-classical economics and provides a theoretical 
underpinning for the idea that organization is an input in the production process. 
Therefore his way of conceptualizing organization is of relevance for management 
as well. It provides the economical background against which organizational inno-
vations can be judged. Unfortunately, Tomer treats the innovation process as a 
black box and has not much to say on the competitive dynamics organizational 
innovations may give rise to. For instance, the observation that not all these 
organizational innovations have spread to other firms (see par. 1.4), makes it 
plausible to assume that some firms have developed firm specific capabilities in 
working with these innovations. These organizing capabilities may constitute an 
important resource in competition, as they can lead to lower costs, more 
customer-specific products, shorter rime-to-market or other competitive 
advantages, which competitors may not be able to match. 
As Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1992, p. 21) put it: "...organizational or coordinating 
capabilities appear to vary across firms. It is these differences which allow some 
firms to earn higher rents than others". They see the superior coordinative (that 
is organizing) capabilities with regard to a set of activities as central to a firm's 
ability to differentiate itself from its competitors. "The set of activities that a firm 
can organize and coordinate better than other firms are its distinctive competen-
ces" (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1992, p. 22). Thus, as Hennart (1994) remarks, 
coordination creates rents. Organizing capabilities have an impact on a firm's 
competitive position. Organizational innovations will alter these capabilities 
(Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992, p. 7), thereby enabling a firm to pursue a new 
strategy or sustain an existing one. 
The relation between strategy and organizational structure was most clearly 
established by Chandler (1962). His views have been summarized in the slogan 
"structure follows strategy". His studies show that the strategy of an enterprise 
determines the way the enterprise is organized. Of course the reverse has also 
been found true: strategy may follow structure (Burgelman, 1983). The interaction 
between strategy and structure has become one of the cornerstones of strategy 
theory. 
The competitive advantages built on organizational innovation are pluriform: 
Sanchez (1993) points for instance to the possibilities for attaining economies of 
scale and scope, learning, speed improvement and risk reduction in networks. 
These can all be part of firm strategy. Some authors have claimed that the success 
of organizational innovations is rooted in transaction cost-savings. Williamson 
(1975, 1985) explains the success of the multidivisional form by claiming that it 
economizes on transaction costs. By reducing uncertainty, complexity, and oppor-
tunism the multidivisional form is better able to cope with bounded rationality 
and small numbers bargaining, than the alternative of market transactions. As a 
result its higher efficiency leads to a competitive advantage. 
Different organizational innovations can be hypothesized to coincide with the 
three generic strategies defined by Porter (1980). These strategies (low cost, 
differentiation and focus: see figure 1.1 for a recent version of the generic 
strategies) may have corresponding organizational forms. Van den Bosch, Van der 
Aa and Elfring (1993, p. 40) provide some examples with regard to characteristics 
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organizational innovations must possess in order to support one of the three 
generic strategies. For example: organizational innovations characterized by 
increasing economies of scale and standardization can be related to the strategy 
of cost leadership. R&D consortia can be an example of this. Other examples may 
include the multidivisional form in relation to differentiation and the strategic 
business unit as an example of the focus strategy. 
Figure 1.1 Generic Strategies 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Broad 
Target 
Narrow 
Target 
Lower Cost 
Cost Leadership 
Cost Focus 
Differentiation 
Differentiation 
Focused Differentiation 
Source: Porter (1990a, p. 39). 
The competitive impact of organizational structures can also run in the direction 
of a competitive disadvantage. Organizational structures are often hard to change 
and adapt to changing circumstances. The implementation of new forms can be 
a costly and difficult process, so that an organization may be stuck with an 
inadequate structure. Where on the one hand a firm can not exist without a 
structure, it can also become locked in it. Summarizing, organizational innovations 
influence a firm's competitive position. 
1.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence of the strategic importance of organizational innovation can 
be divided along two lines: large-scale statistical research and case studies. The 
number of the first kind of studies is limited. Case study based evidence 
supporting the position that the competitive impact of organizational innovations 
is considerable, is plentiful. 
The large-scale statistical studies are limited to the alleged superior performance 
of the multidivisional form. There are many pitfalls in studying the subject of the 
performance of the M-form in this way. The difficulty of ascertaining the right 
performance measure (the notoriously complicated concept of profitability is 
usually used, other outcomes of strategy e.g. market share, have been neglected), 
and the existence of adapted M-forms which may diverge considerably from the 
original form (Clark, 1987), are only two of the difficulties to be overcome. 
The evidence of the studies is mixed. A review of the studies into superior 
profitability showed that of the nine studies reviewed five found evidence for 
superior profitability of the firms that had adopted the M-form (Mahajan, Sharma 
and Bettis, 1988). One of the strongest results was found by Armour and Teece 
(1978) who found a superior profitability of the M-form in oil and gas companies 
of 2 percentage points on the return on equity over a period of 20 years compared 
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to firms with a functional form. Yet, as already mentioned, other studies found 
no relation. One of the studies reviewed by Mahajan, Sharma and Bettis (1988) 
even found a negative relation: the adoption of the multidivisional form resulted 
in a reduction of returns. 
Kogut and Parkinson (1993) explain these mixed results by pointing to the fact 
that these studies were conducted in different countries. They claim that all 
studies pertaining to the M-form in the United States are unanimous in their 
finding of increased profitability associated with the implementation of a divi-
sional structure. It were the adaptations made in the divisional structure as it 
diffused to different countries, that reduced the profitability of the M-form (sec-
tion 1.6.2 will discuss this in more detail). As a consequence, the studies into the 
profitability of the M-form in the United Kingdom and Germany provide incon-
clusive evidence of a superior performance (Kogut and Parkinson, 1993, p. 196). 
The case studies in organizational innovation have usually taken a broader and 
more in-depth look into the competitive advantages resulting from new orga-
nizational forms. The quantity and variety of these studies is considerable and 
here some selection has been made, which is not claimed to be exhaustive but is 
representative of the findings of many other studies. Chandler (1962) was, as 
already mentioned, one of the first to point at the relationship between organiza-
tional structure and strategy. Since, he has consequently developed this frame-
work. Chandler (1990) for instance, found economies of scale and scope to be of 
specific importance in the rise of the modern business enterprise. These economies 
enabled the firms using structures like the multidivisional form to attain and 
sustain superior market positions. Best (1990) finds similar results and adds to this 
a number of fine-grained analyses of how flexible structures enabled focus and 
differentiation strategies to be realized. Organizational aspects of the Just-in-Time 
system and their relation to firm productivity have been studied by Krafcik (1988). 
Miles and Snow (1984, p. 17) "suggest that early fit — the discovery of a new 
organization form — can lead to a sustained excellence". They related some 
broadly defined organization forms to different product-market strategies and 
provide examples of firms using those forms and strategies. Table 1.2 provides 
part of the overview given by Miles and Snow (1984, p. 19). As Miles and Snow 
show, the strategic impact of organizational forms is considerable. The fit between 
an organization form and the environment determines firm success. One of the 
questions that can be raised is to what extent changes in the market, as described 
by Miles and Snow, have provided the impetus for organizational innovation. 
This issue will be taken up in chapter 5. 
Concluding, large-scale empirical studies have presented mixed evidence on the 
superior performance of an organizational innovation, notably the M-form. There 
is however a plausible explanation for this, as the studies have not taken into 
account the possibility of corrupted M-forms in different nations. Qualitative 
studies have been surprisingly uniform in their conclusion that organizational 
innovations do influence organizational competitiveness. They have linked 
organizational forms to strategy and have provided insight in the different 
advantages that are linked up with different forms (e.g. economies of scale, 
enhanced product differentiation). 
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Table 1.2 The relation between strategy and organizational innovation: empirical examples 
Product-market strategy 
Single product or service; 
Local/regional markets 
Limited, standardized 
product or service line; 
Regional/national markets 
Diversified, changing 
product or service line; 
National /international 
markets 
Standard and innovative 
products or services; Stable 
and changing markets 
Product or service design; 
Global and changing mar-
kets 
Organization structure 
Agency 
Functional 
Divisional 
Matrix 
Dynamic network 
Inventor or early user 
Numerous small owner-
managed firms 
Carnegie Steel 
General Motors, Sears-
Roebuck, Hewlett-Packard 
Several aerospace and 
electronics firms (e.g. 
NASA, IBM, Texas Instru-
ments) 
International construction 
firms, global consumer 
goods companies, selected 
electronics and computer 
firms (e.g. IBM) 
Source: adapted from Miles and Snow (1984). 
1.4 The competitive impact of organizational innovation on a 
national level 
1.4.1 T h e o r y 
The question h o w firm level processes can contribute to national competit iveness 
(in the nar row sense defined in section 1.2.3) has not yet received m u c h attention. 
The focus has been more on h o w count ry specific circumstances influence firm 
behavior (e.g. Porter, 1990a; Nelson (ed.), 1993). The w a y in which organizational 
innovations can contribute to shifts in nat ional competi t iveness has been s tudied 
by Nelson (1991), Kogut (1991) and Kogut ed. (1993). Dosi and Kogut (1993, 
p . 249) state for instance: 
"The historical record suggests a cycle of divergence in the performance of 
countries due to the introduction of new organizing heuristics, followed by a 
gradual convergence due to the diffusion of these heuristics across borders". 
And: 
"The implication of these observations is that country cycles in economic 
leadership are tied to the arrival of innovations in a lagging country and the high 
costs of the leader country to switch to the new practices the costs of 
adopting new innovations should be higher for new organizing principles (e.g., 
subcontracting systems) than for new technologies. Contrary to the belief that the 
decline of the United States derives from a fall in the appropriability of American 
technologies, we would suggest that this decline is linked to the diffusion of 
American organizing practices to other countries; at the same time, new and 
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better practices are being introduced and worked out in other countries" (Dosi 
and Kogut, 1993, p. 258). 
Nelson (1991) puts the fundamental issue most clearly. In his view firm diffe-
rences have substantial economic significance. The differences between firms 
reflect different choices made by them. "But almost no attention has been paid to 
the industry or economy wide implications of such different choices" (Nelson, 
1991, p. 61). He describes firm differences along three characteristics: strategy, 
structure and core capabilities. "Structure", Nelson claims (1991, p. 67) "is far more 
difficult to change effectively than is strategy". Indeed he believes organization 
may be more durable than the core capabilities a firm has developed. In relation 
to the country-level, the wide-ranging influence of organizational structures leads 
Nelson to claim that organizational innovation is essential for economic develop-
ment: 
"By organization I mean..., those aspects of a firm that are wider and more 
durable than the particular technologies and other routines it employs at any 
moment, or even its extent core capabilities, and which in effect guide the 
internal evolution of these. It is apparent that change in organization in this 
broad sense, as well as advance in technology, has been an essential feature of 
the enormous economic progress that has been experienced over the last century 
and a half." (p. 70). 
Hence, Nelson makes a strong claim for the relevance of organizational innovation 
for economic development. He does however not identify any mechanism linking 
these two and does not refer to country competitiveness. Despite this limitation 
Nelson's article is of interest for the question raised (what is the impact of firm 
differences on wider economic aggregates?) and for pointing to the role that 
organizational innovation may play in providing an answer to that question. By 
doing so, he forcefully refutes the technological determinism, which claims 
technology to be the major (or even only) engine of progress. 
This last idea of Nelson, is supported by Kogut (1991). Kogut tries to answer the 
question posed by Nelson to the relation between processes on a micro-level and 
processes on a macro-level, as well as the relation to shifts in competitiveness. To 
find an answer Kogut focusses on country competitiveness. The core of his 
argument can be briefly summarized as follows: national competitiveness comes into 
being by innovations spreading less quickly across (national or regional) borders, than 
within borders. The reasons for this will be discussed in par. 1.6.1. where the 
sustainability of competitive advantages based on organizational innovation will 
be analysed. For now this differential rate of diffusion is assumed to be present. 
As Kogut also seems to claim it to be a stylized fact that organizational inno-
V vations diffuse slower than technological innovations (p. 33), the impact of 
organizational innovation on country competitiveness is the most important. 
Kogut's argument runs along the following lines. First of all firms react to stimuli 
in their home market. "The cumulative capabilities of firms, developed in response 
to their home markets, provide the competitive basis for expansion overseas, yet 
at the same time, limit the feasible range of products" (p. 36). As foreign trade and 
investment are the extension of the home market across borders (Kogut refers to 
Linder, 1961), trade and investment will reflect the innovations of the individual, 
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national firms. The most successful innovations will be reinforced by competition 
in the international market. Products of firms in some countries for instance will 
be able to benefit in international markets from having more efficient organiza-
tional structures in the home base. These firms with competitive products will 
increase their exports and investments, the flow of resources to these firms will 
augment, thereby strengthening the existing pattern of innovation (called the 
trajectory of innovation) in a country. "Thus, the well-known property of inter-
national trade tending towards specialization also has the implication of fostering 
the specialization of a country's capabilities" (p. 36). As innovation can be both 
technological and organizational "leadership of a country is not driven alone by 
technological investments, but also by the efficiency of the dominant organizing 
principles" (p. 38). 
In other words, long-term trends in country competitiveness can be understood 
as differences in innovative capabilities of firms in countries, which can be either 
technological or organizational. These latter ones are of prime interest because the 
slow diffusion of organizational innovation makes that "No country can attain 
leadership in absolute advantage (which Kogut defines as higher productivity, 
APdM) without innovation in organizing principles of work" (Kogut, 1991, p. 42). 
The diffusion of innovations firstly within borders, leads to national competitive-
ness. Next the diffusion across borders erodes competitive advantage, as does the 
introduction of a new innovation elsewhere. Because some countries are better 
imitators than others, some countries will learn the best practice faster than others. 
After the best practice innovation has diffused the country in which the original 
innovation was made, will have increased its wealth and claims on foreign assets 
and investments. 
Kogut's reasoning has some vital assumptions. The first one is that in a country 
similar innovations develop. Kogut explains this by pointing at history depen-
dency and lock-in to current practice which go together with localized learning: 
firms are most apt to look for solutions to problems that are near to what they 
have done before (for example near to the technology they currently use). A 
second important idea is that innovations diffuse more slowly across than within 
borders. The reasons Kogut gives for this hypothesis will be discussed in section 
1.6.1. With regard to the especially important effect of organizational forms, Kogut 
does not explain why organizational innovations diffuse more slowly than tech-
nologies. Reasons for the slow diffusion of organizational innovations however, 
will be considered in sections 1.5 . 
Summarizing, some countries have a particular advantage with regard to some 
innovations. Exploiting these internationally, reinforces this trend. As a result a 
national competitive position arises connected to those innovations. Their 
diffusion on the other hand will slowly but increasingly limit the benefits of the 
innovation accruing to the innovating country, signalling a decline in competitive-
ness. 
Related to this issue, section 2.2 will discuss differences between organizational and 
technological innovations. 
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1.4.2 Empirical evidence 
Even though the theoretical work on the impact of new organizational structures 
on country competitiveness is only in its infancy, some studies have touched upon 
the question from an empirical point of view. Some of them focus narrowly (Reich 
and Mankin, 1986), others are more encompassing (Chandler, 1990; Dertouzos, 
Lester and Solow, 1989; Lazonick, 1990). Generally the studies find that "con-
vergence (the process of diffusion of innovations to other countries, APdM) is 
slow and only approximate" (Dosi and Kogut, 1993, p. 251). 
Reich and Mankin (1986) relate the relative decline of American competitiveness 
and the congruent rise of Japan, to the superior ability of the Japanese to make 
use of the organizational form of the international joint venture. They claim that 
new forms of joint ventures emerge, in which the Japanese partner provides 
production in Japan, while American partners do research and marketing. In this 
way the Japanese are able to appropriate American innovations while simul-
taneously developing their manufacturing capability. This reconfiguring of the 
value chain enhances Japan's ability to compete and undermines America's 
competitiveness. In terms of Kogut's theory, international joint ventures speed up 
the diffusion of technological innovations across borders, leading to a deteriora-
tion of America's position. 
Chandler (1990) provides evidence for many of Kogut's ideas. Chandler finds that 
there were different systems of organizing the modern business enterprise in the 
USA, the United Kingdom and Germany in the first half of this century. These 
differences had a profound influence on the competitive positions of the nations 
involved. In England for example, business did not organize itself in a modern 
way (see also Kogut and Parkinson, 1993), but instead remained dominated by the 
owners of the firms. "This commitment to personal rather than professional 
management characterized British industrial capitalism. It was also this commit-
ment that made industrial capitalism less dynamic in Britain than in the United 
States and Germany, in terms of the development of new products and processes 
and of the growth and competitiveness of enterprises and industries" (p. 592). In 
short Chandler found that differences on the firm level had an important impact 
on national competitiveness. 
Dertouzos, Lester and Solow (1989) have looked into more recent developments 
in national competitiveness in manufacturing industries. They relate shifts in 
international (and more specifically American) productivity amongst others to the 
inability of American firms to innovate in their organizational structures (p. 38). 
Especially when cooperative organizational forms would be needed, the American 
industry fails to adjust accordingly and thereby loses strength (p. 95). Of six key 
similarities among best-practice firms, all are organizational or have profound 
organizational implications: simultaneous improvement in cost, quality, and 
< delivery; closer links to customers; closer relationships with suppliers; the effective 
use of technology for strategic advantage (this does not necessarily have 
important organizational implications); less hierarchical and less compartmen-
talized organizations; human resource policies aimed at learning, teamwork, par-
ticipation, and flexibility. They also mirror Kogut's finding that the limited 
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diffusion of best-practice can be a key reason for slipping competitiveness (pp. 
166/167). 
From an economic historical perspective Lazonick (1991) discusses the impact of 
organizational innovation on "the wealth of three nations": Great-Britain, the 
U.S.A. and Japan. Similar to Chandler (1990), Lazonick finds three different 
systems of organizing which he coins, respectively, proprietary, managerial and 
collective capitalism. Based on this distinction he shows both on theoretical and 
empirical grounds that the strategies and structures of private enterprise are "the 
prime determinants of the levels of employment, productivity, output and 
income" (p. 24). Consequently, industrial dominance and decline are found to be 
determined by new firm strategies and structures, enabling firms to produce 
higher quality products at lower prices. Essentially Lazonick's research supports 
the thesis that the decline of a country comes from the rise of a more successful 
combination of strategy and structure elsewhere, that the country is unable to 
emulate because social institutions prevent change. "In the passing of industrial 
leadership from Britain to the United States the institutional character of 
capitalism changed dramatically. In contrast to the small, vertically specialized 
proprietary firms that had characterized Britain's rise to economic dominance, U.S. 
competitive advantage came from managerial enterprises that operated a number 
of geographically dispersed plants and offices and that integrated a number of 
vertically related activities" (p. 14). Similarly, the passing of leadership to Japan 
is accompanied by the emergence of new organizational structures. 
Inzerilli (1990) relates organizational innovation to the performance of regions. His 
analysis of the Italian flexible specialization model as it has developed in the 
central northeast of Italy, shows that the regions in which the model developed, 
outperformed other regions in productivity and employment growth. 
The above mentioned research has supported the thesis that organizational inno-
vation is a cause of shifting national competitiveness. Although the studies differ 
in their explanation of organizational innovation and some put more emphasis on 
market competition and others on institutions, some are longitudinal others 
comparative, they have as a common thread that the role of organizational 
innovation in explaining shifts in national competitiveness is not to be ignored. 
So far, it has become clear that firm level processes are at the basis of wider 
economic aggregates. Country competitiveness as such does not exist, but firm 
level processes are dissimilar between nations and thereby influence country wide 
aggregates. Theoretical and empirical considerations support the thesis that 
organizational innovation plays an important role in national competitive 
advantage, even though the picture is not yet complete. 
1.5 Sustainability of competitive advantages rooted in organiza-
tional innovation: firm level 
1.5.1 Theory 
Having shown the competitive impact of organizational innovation the question 
of sustainability becomes relevant. From a strategic perspective it would be 
22 CHAPTER ONE 
interesting to see whether the competitive advantage emanating from organiza-
tional innovations is short-lived or lasting. As Hall (1994) shows, durability is one 
of the key parts of sustainability. A competitive advantage that is sustainable will 
be of greater influence on the competitive process and the relative position of 
firms than one that is ephemeral. 
Research into the subject of sustainability has been part of the resource-based 
tradition in strategy research. An interesting starting point for the current subject 
is Barney's opinion on the sustainability of organizational culture as a source of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986a). Barney states that a sustained competitive 
advantage based on culture cannot be created purposefully, because if it could be 
created purposefully this would imply that the culture can be imitated and that 
therefore the competitive advantage related to it cannot be sustained. It follows 
that a firm can have a sustained competitive advantage based on organizational 
culture only when the culture cannot be imitated. By implication this means that 
it cannot be consciously created; a firm either has such a culture or it has not. 
Barney also claims that in general cultures are not imitable, because they are 
causally ambiguous, historically grounded and difficult to change. 
Many of the points Barney discussed, are also of interest to organizational 
innovation but the requirements for sustainability as defined by Barney, are very 
strict. No imitation at all should be possible and only a Schumpeterian innovation 
can render the competitive advantage based on the culture redundant. With 
regard to organizational innovation, it will be shown that imitation is possible, 
although it will be difficult. Before entering into a more in-depth discussion on 
the sustainability of organizational forms, three points related to Barney's analysis 
must be discussed which are of relevance for organizational innovation: the role 
of time, the role of upgrading and the role of cost of imitation. The role of time 
is connected to sustainability in that an innovation can be said to be sustainable 
if it leads to a competitive advantage that is lasting (leads to a superior 
performance for a long time). The question is what is a long time? Surely, if a firm 
has a culture that others can imitate but that will take the imitators quite some 
years to establish, it will be difficult to maintain that the advantage is not 
sustainable (Ghemawat, 1991). So, if a culture is imitable this does not necessarily 
mean that it cannot lead to a sustainable competitive advantage: the time needed 
for imitation may be so long that the advantages a firm reaps from its culture are 
just as considerable as when the culture was inimitable. This is certainly so when 
the role of upgrading is taken into account. In the time that it takes imitators to 
obtain the culture another firm possesses, that firm may already have moved on 
to an even more advanced culture, that can be equally hard to imitate. In 
addition, a culture may be imitable in principle, but the costs of imitation may be 
prohibitive: the disruption it creates may be such that it does not weigh up 
against the benefits. 
Barney's view is of relevance when competition is static. In a dynamic context, 
there can be no sustainable competitive advantages, if with "sustainable" is meant 
"ever lasting". In practice, dynamic competition is of greater relevance than static 
competition, as even in mature industries innovations can have a rejuvenating 
effect (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992; Jacobs and De Man, 1995 b,c). When 
competition is dynamic, sustainability is harder to conceptualize, as it means "for 
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a long period of time". Exactly how long this time should be in order for a 
competitive advantage to be sustainable, is an unanswerable question. Neverthe-
less, Ghemawat (1991, p. 82) states that the concept of sustainability for a long 
time is of sufficient interest for companies, because a competitive advantage 
lasting 10 years is of more interest than one lasting for only a year. 
Relating this to organizational innovation, these points are particularly important. 
It will be shown later on that the diffusion of organizational forms usually is a 
long term process and that therefore competitive advantages based on organiza-
tional innovations generally are sustainable: they can provide an advantage for 
a long period of time. Also, it would be a serious misunderstanding to see 
innovations as static blueprints instead of as evolving processes. Put differently: 
upgrading is a very important part of organizational innovation. Cusumano (1988) 
for instance shows that the Just-in-Time system developed in Toyota has been 
continuously changing and only slowly evolved into the extensive system it is 
today. Even thirty years after the first plans related to JIT were implemented, the 
system is still in a process of continuous upgrading. In the time needed by 
y competitors to emulate the system, the original innovator already may have 
upgraded its system and thereby is able to maintain his competitive position. 
Of course there are some important differences between culture and organiza-
tional form. As Barney points out, values, beliefs and symbols may be very hard 
to change. The use of culture as a management instrument is therefore limited. 
For organizational structure the elements to be changed (activities and the 
relations between them) are more clearly defined. The managerial implications for 
a study of organizational innovation may therefore be greater, as the control over 
the development of organizational forms may be bigger than the control over 
culture. For the same reason the imitation of organizational forms will probably 
be less onerous than the imitation of culture. Nevertheless, for organizational 
innovation Barney's reasoning will have to be extended by the elements of time, 
upgrading and cost in order for a clear picture of imitability and sustainability to 
emerge. 
Elaborating on the relation between time and sustainability, both the impact of 
culture and of organizational innovation will only become clear to competitors 
after a considerable time-lag. Chapter 4 will show that the emergence of 
organizational innovations often is an incremental process that is not recognized 
by the outside-world until the accompanying organizational structure has reached 
a certain magnitude. Culture develops in a similar way, probably over an even 
longer time frame. So the first mover advantage of both cultural change and 
organizational innovation may not be unimportant. 
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Table 1.3 Characteristics enhancing the sustainability of resources/capabilities 
Author 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993; p. 39) 
Barney (1991; pp. 106-107) 
Dierickx and Cool (1989; pp. 1507-1509) 
Grant (1991a; p. 124) 
Characteristic 
• difficult to buy, sell, imitate, substitute 
• complementarity 
• firm specificity, durability, scarcity 
• value 
• rarity 
• imperfect imitability because of: 
— unique historical conditions 
— causal ambiguity 
— social complexity 
• limited substitutability 
• non-tradeability 
• non-imitability because of: 
— time compression economies 
— asset mass efficiencies 
— interconnectedness of asset stocks 
— asset erosion 
— causal ambiguity 
• nonsubstitutability 
imperfections with regard to: 
• durability 
• transparency 
• transferability because of: 
— geographical immobility 
— imperfect information 
— firm-specific resources 
— immobility of capabilities 
• replicabiliry 
Sources: as indicated in the table. 
Recent research into sustainability has come up with various characteristics of 
sustainable competitive advantages. These have been assembled in table 1.3. Most 
authors have pointed in the same direction and therefore the main points have 
been assembled in table 1.4, with for each point added how organizational 
innovation relates to it. In table 1.4 also some characteristics have been added 
which have been discussed in relation to organizational innovation specifically. 
These are lock-in and systemic interdependencies (Kogut, 1991) and set up cost 
and organizational disruption and feasibility of incremental change (Teece, 1980). 
In table 1.4 the different characteristics of sustainability are assembled on the left 
E.g.: Dierickx and Cool's time compression economies refers to historical conditions; asset 
mass efficiencies and interconnectedness of asset stocks to systemic interdependencies 
(Kogut, 1991) in table 1.5. Other authors' conceptions of sustainability can be related to 
those discussed in this table as well; e.g. Ghemawat's market imperfections are related to 
tradebility. 
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and the way in which organizational innovation relates to it on the right. For 
instance, table 1.4 shows that important characteristics of imitability are unique 
historical conditions, causal ambiguity and social complexity. The last two factors 
are high in the case of organizational innovation and thus reduce the imitability 
of the innovation. Unique historical conditions are moderately high and may limit 
the imitability as well, although not as much as the other two factors. Below every 
characteristic of sustainability will be discussed in detail in relation to organiza-
tional innovation. 
Table 1.4 The sustainability of organizational innovation on a firm level 
Characteristics of Sustainability 
Imitability 
• unique historical conditions 
• causal ambiguity 
• social complexity 
Substitutability 
Tradeability 
• geographical immobility 
• systemic interdependences 
Lock-in of imitators 
• set up cost and organizational disrup-
tion 
• feasibility of piecemeal change 
Score of Organizational Innovation 
• moderate 
• high 
• high 
• moderate 
• low 
• high 
• high 
• low 
Source: see text. 
Imitability 
Generally, the imitability of organizational innovations will be low. Casson (1990) 
sees organizational innovation as the only source of sustainable competitive 
advantage because of its low imitability: "It is only business strategies devised to 
improve overall coordination between different functions — upstream and down-
stream production, production and marketing, marketing and R&D, and so on — 
which are reasonably sure to lead to permanent benefits, since they are embodied 
in complex institutional arrangements which it is difficult for outsiders to 
understand and imitate" (Casson, 1990, p. 87). 
Although there may also be organizational innovations that spread rather quickly, 
generally an element of learning will be present that will constrain the speed with 
which the innovation diffuses. The existence of tacit knowledge and the limited 
codifiability of organizational mechanisms play a role in this. More specifically 
authors have pointed at unique historical conditions, causal ambiguity and social 
complexity as barriers to imitation. Historical conditions play an important role 
in innovation. These conditions may be external to the firm (Cusumano (1988) for 
example points to the end of the second world-war and inflation in Japan as 
historical conditions that fostered the JIT-system) or internal (again for JIT: 
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Toyota's lack of capital prevented it from buying American technology). As will 
be clear from the examples given, historical conditions not by their very nature 
prevent imitation of organizational forms. This will only be so, when the form is 
really dependent on those historical conditions. It is hard to see why the Just-in-
Time system cannot be implemented in non-inflationary environments, for 
example. When forms are dependent on historical conditions e.g. when a firm 
throughout time has learned to deal with that form, or when government forbids 
the implementation of a certain organizational structure (as was the case in The 
Netherlands with mergers between banks and insurance companies or the 
American National Cooperative Act that restricted collaboration between firms 
(Powell, 1990)) then historical conditions may be a barrier to imitation. 
Causal ambiguity refers to the confusion there may be as to what elements of the 
organizational innovation are the key factors in competitive success. The exact 
way in which organizational structures work, cannot be completely codified, as 
tacit knowledge (identified by Reed and DeFillippi (1990) as one of the central 
characteristics of causal ambiguity) usually plays an important role. Firms aiming 
at imitating a structure may therefore go through a time-consuming trial and error 
process, before they have identified the central characteristics of the innovation. 
The conclusion is that "Since managerial knowledge is tacit, and causal ambiguity 
is significant, imitation is likely to be difficult" (Hennart, 1994, p. 198). Similar 
difficulties play a role in the social atmosphere. The social complexity of 
organizational innovations is usually high: they require a lot of people to 
cooperate in a new way. Before every individual has adapted to the new 
circumstances, a lot of time may have passed. 
Substitutability 
The substitutability of a new organizational form may also be limited. Substitu-
tability is about the question in how far competitors may compete around an 
organizational innovation. The pluriformity of organizational forms seems to 
suggest that there are many viable ways to organize a production process. It will 
however be clear that not every form is viable: some element of JIT seems to be 
a necessity for every car manufacturer to survive, and a lack of transnational 
learning cannot quite be compensated for by mere internationality. How far a firm 
should converge to a certain ideal and how far he can remain distant from it, is 
a topic that has not yet been definitively addressed and perhaps is highly 
situationally determined. 
Tradeability 
The already mentioned absence of codified blueprints and the element of learning 
limit tradeability. There is however not much difficulty in transferring the 
innovation geographically, as they are non-physical sources of competitive 
advantage. However, organizational innovations do have systemic characteristics. 
They are usually part of a larger system and are not easy to isolate. The fact that 
many organizational innovations nowadays are of an interfirm nature (networks, 
regional conglomerations (Best, 1990)) makes this point even more relevant. In 
these cases competitive advantages are deeply ingrained in the system as a whole. 
Imitation of such a system is complicated, perhaps even impossible. Nevertheless, 
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there are some ways in which organizational forms can be "traded". Management 
consultancy for instance, plays a role in this. For instance, it was McKinsey that 
was mainly responsible for the diffusion of the multidivisional form to Britain 
(Chandler, 1990, pp. 618-619). Also business concepts can sometimes be franchised 
or learned by means of a strategic alliance, as in the NUMMI plant in which 
General Motors tries to pick up some of Toyota's systems and Florida and Kenney 
(1991) found that Japanese firms took their interorganizational relations with them 
to America. Yet, these kinds of "trade" are so complex that they hardly resemble 
a normal sale. 
Lock-in of imitators3 
Sustainability of competitive advantage has, among others, to do with the 
difficulty for competitors to imitate the source of competitive advantage. When 
potential imitators are unable to change their organizational structures the 
sustainability of an innovation is enhanced. Teece (1980) identified two reasons 
why competitors may be locked in their old structure. First the set up cost and 
organizational disruption may be high. The introduction of a major organizational 
innovation "requires major reassignment of tasks and responsibilities in a fashion 
which need not leave all personnel unambiguously better off". The disruption 
ensuing the implementation may be considerable. The expected disruption and 
associated costs may provide management with a reason not to adopt the inno-
vation. A second element put forth by Teece, is that it is unfeasible to introduce 
innovations in a piecemeal fashion. Slow adjustment and experimentation on a 
small scale may not be possible in the diffusion process, because the real benefits 
of the new organizational form will not be reaped until the form is installed 
completely (this in contradiction to the original innovation process, which is 
characterized by search and trial and error; it is true however that experimenta-
tion on a small scale is only possible in a limited way). Moreover, the new 
organizational form will not be easy to contain: other parts of the firm will be 
effected by it. 
Concluding this subject, it can be claimed on theoretical grounds that important 
organizational innovations generally are sustainable. Limited imitability, limited 
substirutability, limited tradeability and lock in of possible imitators all work to 
slow down the process of diffusion of a new organizational form. In the time it 
takes a form to be adopted by compering firms, the original innovator has had 
ample time to upgrade his innovation and thereby maintain his competitive posi-
tion. The testable hypothesis emanating from the preceding discussion is that the 
Dosi and Kogut (1993, p. 257) provide a more formal analysis of lock-in effects. They 
distinguish three kinds of lock-in: static switching (in which the cost of switching from one 
way of organizing (A) to another (B) is high enough to prevent switching, even when B is 
a better way of organizing), Competency Trap (in which the accumulated learning in 
working with A, is so high that B is not adopted even if A is inferior, because the firm is 
not willing to let go of its cumulative learning and start-up a new learning process in 
working with B), Hysteresis (in which the benefits of switching are uncertain; on average 
method B may be better than A but there may be a chance element, such that B can 
perform poorer than A). 
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diffusion time of organizational innovations will be long. Some empirical studies 
regarding this hypothesis are reviewed in the next section. 
1.5.2 Empirical evidence 
Empirical research on the diffusion of organizational innovations is scarce. The 
paucity of material is probably caused by the fact that it is hard to identify which 
firms use certain organizational innovations. The fact that organizational 
innovations often must be reinvented by the firms implementing them, gives rise 
to a vast array of adapted forms, of which it is difficult to say whether these can 
really be counted as imitations of the original form (see for example Clark (1987, 
pp. 58 and 340) and Kogut and Parkinson (1993) on the diffusion of innovation 
in general and the diffusion of the multidivisional form in particular). Conse-
quently, large scale empirical studies into the dissemination of new organizational 
forms are fraught with difficulties. A data-base solely based on information given 
by firms as to what form they use, should be interpreted with care. Additional 
research in each firm would be necessary to see if the main characteristics of the 
organization form under scrutiny, have indeed been implemented. Given these 
demands on the data, the observed lack of empirical material is hardly surprising. 
Nevertheless the available data provide ample support for the hypothesis of slow 
diffusion of organizational innovations, even though these data are limited to the 
diffusion of the multidivisional form (M-form). Armour and Teece (1978) and 
Teece (1980) provide evidence for this. Depending on which industry is object of 
study, it took 14 years in the American petroleum industry to 41 years in a 
sample of principal American firms in 17 industries, before half of the firms in the 
sample had adopted the M-form (Teece, 1980). 
Building on a different data-set, Fligstein (1985) studied the spread of the M-form 
over a sixty year period. Mahajan, Sharma and Bettis (1988) using a similar data 
set also found that the diffusion of the M-form was a slow process. Interestingly, 
they found no support for what they call the imitation-hypothesis. The imitation 
hypothesis was developed for research into technological innovation and states 
that a profitable innovation will diffuse relatively fast, because of its profitability, 
and communication between firms. Mahajan, Sharma and Bettis (1988) tested 
various models of the diffusion hypothesis including two which incorporated the 
well-known S-shaped diffusion pattern, but neither of these models was sup-
ported by the data. The authors identified three possible reasons for this result. 
Potential imitators might not have adopted the M-form because of: 
• its unclear profitability potential 
• imperfect communication between firms because of the complexity and 
ambiguity pointed at in the previous section 
• inertia of organizational structures. 
The authors conclude that if the form is profitable than it is likely to be so in the 
long run, because of the difficulty of imitation. 
Fruin and Nishiguchi (1993) discuss the diffusion of the Toyota Production System 
(TPS) and conclude that the system only really spread to Toyota's first tier 
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suppliers, but probably has not reached lower tier suppliers and other car 
manufacturers in Japan. They also point to the fact that the system is constantly 
being upgraded, so that imitation is rendered even more difficult. Hence, the 
sustainability of the system appears to be considerable. 
Subject to all the qualifications made above, the available empirical material has 
corroborated the thesis that the diffusion of organizational innovations is a slow 
process. 
1.6 Sustainability of competitive advantages rooted in organiza-
tional innovation: national level 
1.6.1 Theory 
Not only can organizational innovations play a role in firm competitiveness, also 
national competitiveness is influenced by renewal of organizational forms. If this 
kind of innovation diffuses slowly among firms, the country in which the inno-
vating firm is established may reap benefits from that, when the innovator starts 
exploiting its innovation in international markets. As firms in other countries will 
not be able to imitate the form quickly, monopoly-like gains can be reaped by the 
indigenous firm, thereby benefiting the home country. 
Above that, it is likely that innovations diffuse faster within a country than 
between countries (Kogut, 1991). If this is true then a group of high performing 
firms in an industry may develop inside a country, thereby strengthening its 
international competitive position. The basis of a countries' competitive advantage 
is then no longer limited to the innovating firm, but has a much wider range (e.g. 
a cluster of competitive industries may develop). The implication of this idea is 
that organizational innovation can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage of 
a nation, as long as foreign firms are at a disadvantage in comparison to national 
firms when they attempt to emulate the organizational innovation. This dis-
advantage will generally lie in the slow diffusion of organizing principles; more 
specifically authors have pointed at the difficulty of transplanting organizational 
forms from one society to another, because of the existence of differences of a 
systemic (often institutional) nature. These latter differences inhibit perfect 
imitation of an organizational form. Or as Dunning (1993, p. 206) puts it: "The 
ability of an importing country to absorb and disseminate new resources, tech-
nology, organizational methods, and entrepreneurship rests mainly on the availa-
bility of indigenous complementary resources and the ease with which these 
resources can be efficiently coordinated with the imported resources". 
Kogut (1991) has identified four reasons why diffusion of innovation may be 
easier within a country than between countries, or as he states it, why national or 
regional borders are less permeable than firm boundaries. These are: 
1. Technological opportunities. Firms embedded in networks usually have a higher 
chance of technology spillover. That is, as among others also Porter (1990a) 
has pointed out, related and supporting industries play an important role in 
the diffusion of technologies and in generating new ones. Related firms are 
often geographically concentrated in regions or nations. National industrial 
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networks, according to Kogut, have a higher density than international net-
works. Firms in the same nation interact with each other more frequently and 
intensively than with firms based in different nations. The spillover of 
technology is therefore heavily biased towards firms in the same country. 
Consequently, diffusion of innovation (whether technological or organiza-
tional) is easier within a country than among countries. 
Of course ongoing internationalization may lessen the impact of nationality. 
Multinational activity and cooperative agreements among firms of different 
nationalities may contribute to increased international spillover. The many 
benefits of geographical proximity will however not easily be outweighed (see 
e.g. Bartmess and Cerny (1993) for a discussion of the advantages of geo-
graphical proximity). 
2. Selection forces. "As national markets have, historically, been domestic in 
orientation, the competitive pressures behind selection forces have been 
largely other national firms" (Kogut, 1991, p. 41). National competition will 
force firms to adopt innovations. It is in the home market of the innovator 
that the effects of the innovation are felt stronger and earlier than abroad. 
Consequently, the pressure on national firms to adopt the innovation is 
higher. As a result, the innovation will spread faster within the boundaries of 
the country in which the innovating firm is located than across borders. 
3. Identifiability. The knowledge a firm has of his competitors determines the 
speed with which it is able to identify the key characteristics that make a 
competitor more successful. National firms have an advantage over foreign 
firms in searching for the relevant characteristics of an innovation, as they 
start with a more extensive and in-depth knowledge of the innovator. Kogut 
calls this "signal to noise". "Because of their similarity in organizing principles, 
firms are more sensitive to incremental differences among their domestic 
competitors. Since there are fewer differences it is easier to identify the factors 
responsible for differential performance" (Kogut, 1991, p. 42). Hennart (1994, 
p. 202) provides an example of this concerning Japanese automobile plants. 
The success of Japanese car makers was attributed firstly to cultural factors 
and higher automation. It was not until Japanese car manufacturers became 
successful with American transplants, that the impact of superior design of 
both internal and external relationships got noticed by the American 
producers. 
The advantage of domestic firms is further enhanced by "systemic interdepen-
dencies". Usually in an innovation different elements must be changed at the 
same time. The system in which the innovation is embedded may comprise 
intra- and extra-firm institutions that are more similar within a country than 
between countries (a related idea can be found in the notion of business 
systems (Whitley, ed., 1992)). Also, "the causality between action and outcome 
is highly dependent on the institutional context" (Dosi and Kogut, 1993). It 
goes without saying that domestic firms' knowledge of these interdependen-
cies and causalities is superior to that of foreign firms. 
4. Institutional lock-in. Especially the mentioned systemic interdependencies, 
make that implementation of innovations can have wider societal implica-
tions. Institutions may have to be changed in order to provide the right 
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context for implementation of the innovation. This may not be legally, 
politically or socially feasible. Some innovations demand levels of commit-
ment, productivity and labour mobility that are not acceptable in some 
countries (Kogut, 1991, p. 42). Hence, social institutions play a role in 
determining the speed of diffusion of innovations (Jacobs, 1990, p. 64). 
Many of these factors have also been identified by Clark (1987). Clark's central 
tenet is that Great-Britain and the United States have followed different tra-
jectories in the development of what he calls national systems of organizing. 
These differences on a national level thwart the diffusion of innovation between 
countries. In the long run the structuration of these national systems is influenced 
by existing practices and institutions, the geo-political context (e.g. natural 
resources), economic variables (market structures) and culture. Short run events 
have a discernable impact as well (Clark, 1987, p. 198). Clark's analysis empha-
sizes the role of systemic interdependencies as defined by Kogut. The role of 
institutions is put in the foreground and is analysed extensively. Clark not only 
claims that organizational innovations will diffuse slowly, but also that they will 
undergo considerable transformation when transplanted from one country to 
another. 
This last point is not necessarily disadvantageous. Some changes may very well 
be needed, as different forms may flourish in different environments. An adapted 
innovation may therefore in theory be more competitive than the original inno-
vation. On the other hand the question is how far the original form can be 
changed without undermining the advantages connected to it. Moreover, it must 
be observed that the way the innovation must be adapted will not always be clear 
in advance. A painstaking quest for the right change will be inevitable. So even 
when the innovation is not emulated exactly the diffusion process will be a slow 
one. 
The above discussion points in the direction of sustainability on a national level 
of competitive advantages rooted in organizational innovation. It seems to be 
possible that countries attain superior performance based on organizational 
innovation. There are theoretical considerations underpinning the proposition that 
the diffusion of organization forms across borders is subject to severe constraints. 
Especially because innovations require adaptation to country differences. 
1.6.2 Empirical evidence 
In the previous section sustainability has been related to differences in national 
systems of organizing and slow diffusion of organizational innovations across 
borders. A number of researchers have investigated country differences and rates 
of diffusion. Some are discussed below. 
Empirical research in this field will of necessity be predominantly longitudinal, 
qualitative and comprehensive. Longitudinal because the time-frame needed to 
study cycles in country competitiveness is expected to be long. The slow adap-
tation of institutions and the slow diffusion of innovations lie at the root of this 
slowness. So, historical research is of prime interest. Qualitative research is 
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necessary because the amount and subtlety of influencing factors cannot be caught 
in figures. A numerical approach will obfuscate most of the processes at work. 
Some economic aggregates (like growth and trade figures) may provide support 
for a hypothesis on shifting competitiveness, but they can only be seen as the 
outcome of an innovative process underlying them. As the variety of issues 
discussed in the previous section will have made clear, the historical studies will 
also have to be comprehensive. It will be quite impossible to identify beforehand 
all the factors and processes influencing country competitiveness over the years. 
Only a comprehensive study will contribute to our understanding of the develop-
ments of interest. 
The disadvantages of this approach will be clear. First of all the impact of 
organizational innovation on national competitiveness cannot be completely 
isolated from other developments at work. Secondly, evidence will sometimes 
have an anecdotal character. Nevertheless, the conclusions of empirical research 
are rather unanimous as far as the long term aspects of organizational innovation 
in relation to country competitiveness are concerned. 
Clark (1987) concentrates his historical studies on differences between American 
and English ways of organizing. He finds support for the hypothesis that there 
are sharp and significant differences in the contexts and processes by which 
problems are dealt with in the USA and Great-Britain. A fine-grained analysis 
shows that innovations that were transferred from one country to the other 
underwent considerable change, in order to fit into different national contexts. 
Each country has a distinct historically developed system of organizing, that 
provides the contextual constraints in which organizational forms develop. Some 
forms may be unsuited for application in a different context and therefore require 
modification as was pointed out in the previous section. 
Clark provides cases on the spread of such diverse systems as Taylorism, the 
multidivisional form, the assembly line and rugby. Clark's case studies clearly 
show that a simple imitation of forms is not likely to occur for the reasons given 
in the previous section. As a result it can be concluded that different countries can 
have different sustainable ways of organizing. Clark does however not relate this 
to cycles in country competitiveness. The rise of the USA and the relative decline 
of Britain do seem to match the historical periods discussed, but Clark draws no 
conclusion as to the relation between organizational developments and country 
competitiveness. 
Another scholar with a historical interest also found different ways of organizing 
on a national level. Chandler (1990) provides an account of the rise of the modern 
industrial enterprise in the United States, Great-Britain and Germany, mainly 
focussing on the first half of the twentieth century. Although he does not find 
differences as marked as Clark's, he still found three clearly separate develop-
ments in these nations. The USA developed a system called competitive 
managerial capitalism, in which companies, led by managers instead of owners, 
compete to obtain superior profitability. The British system did not separate 
management from ownership, leading to a system Chandler calls personal 
capitalism. Germany provides a third way of organizing called cooperative 
managerial capitalism, characterized by close interfirm cooperation. Whereas the 
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Americans competed vigorously for markets and profits, the Germans had the 
proclivity to negotiate rather than to compete. 
The general picture that emerges from Chandler's work is one of different systems 
of organizing in different countries existing for long times with different rates of 
success. Where in the USA and Germany managerial capitalism had replaced 
personal capitalism by the 1930s, it wasn't until after World War II that British 
enterprises slowly started changing their structures towards the managerial model 
(Chandler, 1990, p. 592). 
The scarcity of empirical material prevents general conclusions to be drawn. The 
studies by Chandler and Clark seem at different points to corroborate the 
theoretical prediction, that different countries will have different systems of 
organizing in which not every organizational innovation will fit. This may imply 
that the diffusion of organizational innovations across borders is a slow and 
painstaking process and that therefore the firms in the country in which the 
innovation emerged may create a sustainable competitive position based on that 
innovation. 
A larger scale empirical investigation into Kogut's hypothesis on the lesser 
permeability of borders has been conducted by Kogut and Parkinson (1993), 
focussing on the spread of the multidivisional form across borders. They find clear 
evidence for the proposition that organizational innovations spread slowly into 
other countries. "One of the major contrasts between Europe and the United States 
is the later adoption of the multidivisional structure in Europe. In the three major 
European industrial countries — the United Kingdom, France, and West Ger-
many — there were few (if any) firms adopting the multidivisional structure prior 
to 1950" (Kogut and Parkinson, 1993, p. 191). And: "...the pattern of diffusion for 
the United Kingdom, France and Germany is broadly similar to that of the United 
States, with an initial lag of a few decades" (p. 193, italics added). The main reason 
for this slow diffusion across borders, according to Kogut and Parkinson, is the 
relatively low level of competition in the European countries compared to 
America. A new market, technological and legal environment gave the impetus 
to adopt the multidivisional structure in Europe (p. 192). Yet, this finding is 
qualified by the possibility that at least in the United Kingdom, the multidivisio-
nal structure was perhaps only adopted on paper. The absence of strong central 
headquarters and the absence of a clear separation of divisions are indications for 
this (p. 195). For historical reasons (the failure of management to gain control over 
the shopfloor and the absence of consolidation of companies following mergers 
(p. 195)) it was easy for the British firms to put the name-tag of the multidivisio-
nal form on their companies, while in fact not implementing the form. Kogut and 
Parkinson find similar evidence regarding the diffusion of Taylorist principles to 
Europe: the diffusion was slow and the principles were adapted to a large extent. 
These findings corroborate the thesis of slow and only approximate diffusion of 
organizational innovations across borders. As a result it is plausible that 
organizational innovations can contribute to sustainable competitive advantage 
on a national level. 
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There is one reservation to be made regarding Kogut's hypothesis on diffusion 
and the permeability of borders. Table 1.5 summarizes some of the main con-
clusions of literature on the diffusion of organizational innovations. A diffusion 
within a country and inside one company is relatively easy. Diffusion between 
companies is more difficult, but most onerous of all is the diffusion of an 
innovation across both firm and country borders. This kind of diffusion is the one 
Kogut (1991) has focussed on, when claiming that country borders were less 
permeable than firm borders. In the top righthand corner there is another way of 
diffusion between countries, which has not been considered by Kogut: the cross-
country diffusion of a new organizational form inside one company (e.g. a 
transnational or a Japanese transplant in Europe). Perhaps a transnational is better 
able to transfer an organizational innovation developed in one country to another 
country. If this is true, than the transnational organization form would not only 
stimulate innovation in general (Van den Bosch and Van Prooijen, 1992b), but also 
the diffusion of new organizational forms. On this subject of intrafirm, inter-
national diffusion not enough literature is available to draw a definite conclusion 
(some relevant papers here are: Florida and Kenney, 1991; Dunning, 1993). 
Table 1.5 The diffusion of organizational innovation 
inside one company 
between companies 
inside a country 
relatively easy 
difficult 
between countries 
still inconclusive 
very difficult 
Source: based on section 1.5 and 1.6. 
As there is no barrier between firms in this case, much will depend on the 
influence of country specific circumstances. In the car industry some studies have 
been done in relation to this subject. Krafcik (1988) found that the transplant of 
Japanese methods was more successful when done by Japanese firms than when 
done by American or European corporations: "Corporate parentage and culture 
do appear to be correlated with plant performance; the level of technology does 
not". Similarly, Florida and Kenney (1991) found that Japanese car producers were 
quite successful in transplanting Japanese organization forms (sometimes even 
including the transplant of Japanese suppliers) to the U.S.A., but unlike Krafcik 
they conclude that the impact of cultural factors is overestimated. Other studies 
in other countries should be conducted before definitive conclusions can be 
drawn. Further research in this direction is interesting, as the increasing 
internationalization of individual firms may speed up the diffusion of organiza-
tional innovations between countries, thereby increasing the permeability of 
borders. The consequences of this for country competitiveness are unclear. The 
original innovator still increases his wealth and claims on foreign assets (an 
important consequence of competitiveness according to Kogut, 1991). On the other 
hand the receiving country may increase its competitiveness as well, because of 
the fact that the identifiability (see section 1.6.1) of the innovation increases. 
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1.7 Summary 
Two approaches to competitiveness have been defined: one focussing on the level 
of input costs as the determinant of competitiveness (comparative advantage) and 
one focussing on innovation (competitive advantage). This study into organiza-
tional innovation is part of the competitive advantage tradition in research. 
The competitive impact of organizational innovations is not to be neglected. Both 
on a firm level and on a country level new organizational forms can play a role 
in creating competitive advantage. Moreover, this impact appears to be sus-
tainable (durable), as an overview of literature on the diffusion of organizational 
forms suggests. It is the difference in speed and extent of diffusion, that is at the 
basis of shifts in competitiveness. 
The observed relevance of organizational innovation for competitive advantage 
makes the question how organizational innovations emerge interesting. It is this 
question that will be addressed in the ensuing chapters. To answer it, having a 
clear conception of what organizational innovation is, is a necessity. Hence, the 
next chapter will be concerned with defining the subject. 

2 
Demarcation, definition and analytical tool 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown the relevance of organizational innovation for 
competitiveness on both a firm and a country level. So far a definition of organi-
zational innovation has not yet been given. This chapter tries to provide the 
answers to three main questions: 
• How different are organizational innovations from technological innovations? 
• How can organizational innovation be defined from a strategic perspective? 
• Can this definition incorporate recent developments, as networks, strategic 
alliances etc.? 
Firstly, it will be shown in what ways organizational innovations differ from 
technological innovations. Next to considerable interaction between these two, 
there is also ground for treating organizational innovation separately. Secondly, 
a conceptual definition of organizational innovation is developed. The quest for 
this definition simultaneously provides a tool of analysis, by building on an 
extension of the concepts of activities and linkages similar to those used in the 
value chain (Porter, 1985). Such a definition can also incorporate interfirm 
organizational innovations. Moreover, the definition is of a strategic nature, 
because it incorporates the concept of competitive advantage which was shown 
to be of importance in the previous chapter. The analytical tool of the value chain 
can be of help in searching for the determinants of organizational innovation: a 
tool for describing new organizational forms allows specific questions to be 
formulated pertaining to the way in which activities and linkages are configured. 
It also makes it possible to describe in great detail the way in which a new 
organizational form works, which simplifies the search for answers to these 
questions and increases the understanding of he rhe form works. 
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2.2 Organizational vs. technological innovation 
Van Someren (1991) states that organizational innovations in his definition are not 
directly associated with technological innovations, but may arise without being 
induced by a change in technology. Indeed, he claims that the relation between 
organizational innovations and technological innovations may run both ways: 
technological innovations may induce organizational innovations and vice versa. 
Examples of the latter can be the organization of the research and development 
function in a company, the innovativeness of networks (Porter, 1990a) and, on a 
broader scale, the use of an organic form (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Child (1987) 
basically agrees with this idea in a study concerned with the role of information 
technology: "FT is not the determinant of organization, though it certainly extends 
the range of possibilities. Indeed, there are historical precedents, for most of the 
organizing modes discussed here which long pre-date the new technologies". 
Interactions between organization and technology do exist Besseyre des Horts 
(1991) and sociotechnical systems design (Van Eijnatten, 1994) explicitly take these 
interactions into account. But as Lazonick (1990) and Williamson (1980a, 1983) 
point out the degrees of freedom in organizing around technology are consi-
derable enough to warrant separate treatment of organizational innovation. "The 
search for the factors that determine a mapping of a specific technology to a 
specific organizational structure has proved elusive" (Dosi and Kogut, 1993, p. 
254) and they can only be related in a more general way. "The problem is that we 
observe there to be far more internal organization than one could possibly explain 
on technological grounds" (Langlois, 1984, p. 27). Quite some important diffe-
rences between technological and organizational innovation can be found. An 
overview of these is given in table 2.1, which will be discussed below. This table 
is illustrative and by no means exhaustive or applicable to every innovation. 
Table 2.1 Some key differences between technological and organizational innovations 
Technological innovation 
• tangible 
• reverse engineering possible 
• tradeable 
• often patentable 
• relatively fast diffusion 
• inventor and user often differ 
• major reassignments of tasks not 
always necessary 
• uncertainty, but limited 
Organizational innovation 
• intangible 
• no reverse engineering 
• non-tradeable (see table 1.5) 
• usually not patentable (Cole, 1968) 
• relatively slow diffusion (Kogut, 1991, 
p. 33) 
• inventor is user 
• major reassignments of tasks always 
necessary (Teece, 1980, p. 465) 
• greater uncertainty (Nelson, 1991, 
p. 71) 
Source: see text. 
The first difference in table 2.1 is the one between tangibility and intangibility. A 
consequence of the intangibility of organizational forms is that it limits the 
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possibilities for reverse engineering and institutionalized research, which is 
contained in a laboratory. For technological innovation these things are feasible. 
Some of the differences identified in table 2.1 are related to this first difference. 
For instance, because of the fact that most technological innovations are embodied 
in a tangible unit (whether a blueprint or a machine), they are relatively easily 
tradeable compared to their organizational counterparts which are mostly 
embodied in social processes (see also table 1.5 and the related discussion). When 
a firm would like to adopt an organizational innovation, this is more difficult. 
Firstly, because the element of learning to work with an organizational form 
cannot be bought or sold on the market, but takes time to develop. Secondly, 
there is the possible necessity of adaptation of the innovation to firm specific 
conditions, which may also impede tradeability. Whereas most technologies can 
function without its basic characteristics being changed, organizational forms often 
need to be tailored to specific needs. "Trade" of organizational innovations may 
occur by means of management consultants, franchising, or an original innovator 
assisting the adopting firm in implementing the innovation e.g. in a joint venture 
(the GM-Toyota NUMMI plant is an example of this). This form of trade can how-
ever better be compared with the delivery of a service than with the classical 
notion of a sale. 
Whereas technological inventions may be patentable, there is no such facility for 
organizational invention. Cole (1968; quoted in Williamson, 1985, p. 404) already 
observed that "if changes in business procedures and practices were patentable, 
the contributions of business change to the economic growth of the nation would 
be as widely recognized as the influence of mechanical innovations or the inflow 
of capital from abroad". As patents can not be obtained, the full benefit of the 
innovation may not always accrue to the inventor and consequently the true value 
of an organizational innovation may be obscured. 
Empirically it has been established that organizational innovations take a longer 
time to diffuse (Kogut ed., 1993). This issue has been discussed in section 1.6. Both 
theoretical and empirical studies support the relevance of this observation for the 
study of competitiveness. 
The inventor of a technological innovation is not necessarily its main user. Cer-
tainly in product innovation, a large group of consumers will exist outside the 
inventing firm. With regard to organizational innovation on the other hand, there 
usually is no such separation between the inventor and the user. The firm 
inventing the new form is normally also the firm making use of it. One of the 
consequences of this is that in the selection environment (Nelson and Winter, 
1982) the role of the consumer is absent. As a result, no quick and clear market-
based evaluation of the new form can be obtained. A firm may keep investing in 
the form, even though the competitive advantage it generates is limited. Tech-
nological innovations, and certainly the subset of product innovations, have 
clearer evaluations in the market. 
Teece (1980) puts forth the idea that technological innovations do not necessarily 
involve major reassignments of functions and responsibilities in organizations, 
whereas with organizational innovations these are always required. It is therefore 
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perhaps more difficult to contain organizational innovations to small parts of an 
organization. Moreover, the organizational changes may not leave all personnel 
better of, which may mean that organizational innovations are challenged more 
than technological innovations. 
Finally, Nelson (1991, p. 71) conjectures that the uncertainty surrounding organi-
zational innovation is greater than that around technological innovation. One of 
the reasons for this is that new organizational forms may have advantages and 
disadvantages that are not thought of before they are implemented. These un-
expected consequences contribute to the increased uncertainty. 
This by no means complete overview of differences between organizational inno-
vation and technological innovation shows that there is ground for a separate 
treatment of organizational innovation, despite the fact that the interactions 
between technology and organization are plentiful. The observed differences merit 
attention in research as already was shown in the sections dealing with empirical 
evidence on the diffusion of organizational innovations. Before such research can 
start, it will be necessary to focus on organizational innovation with the aim to 
establish a workable definition of it. Next to that a tool to describe organizational 
innovations will be convenient for further research, because it will enable us to 
analyse the process of organizational innovation in more detail. 
2.3 Unbundling organizational innovation: a conceptual definition 
2.3.1 The language of organizational innovation 
Empirical analysis of successful organizational innovations runs into difficulty 
because a conceptual definition of organizational innovations has not yet been 
developed. In the absence of such a conceptual definition, analyzing organiza-
tional innovations becomes a difficult task. Although a conceptual definition is 
missing, the concept of organizational innovation is used widely. For example, 
Chandler (1962, chapter 6) devotes a whole chapter to organizational innovations 
without giving a clear definition. Williamson (1975, p. 193) describes organiza-
tional innovations as "organization form changes" and stresses: "the fact that the 
language for characterizing organization form changes is rather primitive Being 
conceptually less tractable, organization form innovations have received much less 
in the way of formal analysis than have technical innovations". 
This section tries to contribute to this "language" for characterizing organizational 
innovations by way of proposing a conceptual definition based on Van den Bosch 
and De Man (1993). From the strategy perspective chosen in this article, two 
aspects are relevant here. Firstly, the key building blocks of organizational 
innovations are defined. Secondly, a demarcation criterion is developed which 
makes it possible to distinguish between regular changes of organizational forms 
and organizational innovations. 
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2.3.2 An overview of definitions 
Schumpeter already recognized that the concept of innovation has a much broader 
meaning than a purely technological one. As he defines it, innovations are formed 
by new combinations of things and forces. He identifies five cases: new goods, 
new methods of production, new markets, new sources of supply and new orga-
nization of an industry (Schumpeter, 1911). Since Schumpeter conceived of and 
extended his theory, there have been made great advances in the study of tech-
nological innovation. With regard to the emergence of new organizational forms, 
there have also been made some landmark contributions, yet overall the quantity 
of literature in this area of research is modest. Williamson (1975, p. 193) points to 
the absence of good definitions and tools of analysis with which to analyse new 
organizational forms as one of the reasons for this. The absence of a definition 
also hinders our understanding of the process of organizational innovation. It is 
for instance not possible to describe the way a form emerges, if there is no tool 
that allows us to do so. 
Looking at some of the contributions to this field, many different conceptions can 
be found. First, there is a group of authors which defines organizational inno-
vation as "the implementation of an internally generated or borrowed idea 
— whether pertaining to a product, device, system, process, policy, program, or 
service — that was new to the organization at the time of adoption" (Damanpour 
and Evan, 1984). This definition which includes both technological and non-
technological innovations has been in use for quite some time (e.g. Sapolsky, 
1967). Also, there are authors that claim to use this definition, but limit their 
research to only technological innovation (e.g. Baldridge and Burnham, 1975; 
Amabile, 1990). The broadness of this definition is therefore not very distinctive. 
This was already acknowledged by Damanpour and Evan, and therefore they 
pointed out that innovation can be divided in technical innovation and admini-
strative innovation (similar divisions had been used previously by Evan (1966) 
and Daft (1978)). In this view technical innovation is the implementation of an 
idea for a new product, process or service. Administrative innovations are "those 
that occur in the social system of an organization". An administrative innovation 
"can be the implementation of a new way to recruit personnel, allocate resources, 
and structure tasks, authority and rewards" (Evan, 1966). 
The necessity of distinguishing the technological from the administrative, is 
shown in a review by Damanpour (1991) of empirical studies in this field. The 
conclusion of the review was that there were important differences between these 
two kinds of innovation. Predictor variables for the rate of adoption of innova-
tions (e.g. centralization and specialization) had worked out differently for 
technical innovations than for organizational innovations. For instance: centraliza-
tion was positive for the adoption of administrative innovations, but worked out 
negatively for the adoption of technical innovations (p. 561). Similarly, organic 
forms seemed to be better suited for the initiation of technical innovations, 
whereas the initiation of administrative innovations was often surrounded by 
mechanistic conditions (p. 581). But the definition of administrative innovation, 
provided by the authors mentioned, is not satisfactory. The enumeration of 
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examples of administrative innovations is no real definition, no matter how 
helpful in making the concept intuitively clear . 
Table 2.2 gives an overview of other key definitions of organizational innovation 
in the literature. A distinction is made between definitions that are limited to the 
intrafirm level and definitions that also include interfirm relations. Next to the 
main theoretical definitions, table 2.2 also provides an overview of the analytical 
concepts proposed by the authors to operationalize the definition. 
The first thing to be noticed is that most authors have limited themselves to 
discuss organizational innovation as an intra-firm phenomenon. Yet in reality 
many new forms of organizing are of an interfirm nature e.g. networks, regional 
conglomerations (Best, 1990), joint-ventures, some forms of franchising. It is 
characteristic of many new forms of organization that they challenge traditional 
ideas about the firm's boundaries (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992, p. 111). In this 
respect Godfroij (1993) concludes that networks are not fundamentally different 
from individual organizations and that therefore they should be analysed with 
similar techniques. "Organizations and networks are not essentially different 
phenomena; they only show gradual differences along dimensions that measure 
the degree of organization" (p. 77). 
Secondly, many of the definitions are very general and can mean various things. 
Aldrich (1979), for example, is more concerned with the business an organization 
is in and the start-up of new firms, than with the way the organization is struc-
tured. Nelson and Winter (1982) state that organizational innovations can be 
analysed by means of their theory, but concentrate on technological innovation 
(p. 38). Their general description of innovation as "changing the routine" is 
however a helpful one. Following Schumpeter's (1911) identification of innovation 
with the "carrying out of new combinations", Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 130) 
state "Innovations in organizational routine similarly consist, in large part, of new 
combinations of existing routines". This emphasis on both "new combinations" and 
"existing" has to play a key role in a conceptual definition of organizational 
innovation from a strategic viewpoint. Williamson's (1975) framework is focussed 
on transaction cost economics and its application is mainly limited to the multi-
divisional form and questions of vertical integration. Nevertheless, Williamson is 
one of the most influential contributors to the theory of organizational innovation. 
In the terminology of this group of writers the subject of this thesis would be called 
administrative innovation instead of organizational innovation, which in their view, 
encompasses both technological and administrative innovation. In this line of reasoning the 
term organizational innovation is superfluous, as simply using the word innovation would 
cover the same subject. The broadness of this definition, is probably one of the reasons why 
Wolfe (1994) finds that authors, working in this branch of research, hardly build on each 
others results. 
Table 2.2 Overview of contributions to the definition of organizational innovation 
level 
intrafirm 
intra- and 
interfirm 
author 
Evan (1966) 
Cole (1968) 
Mintzberg (1983) 
Williamson 
Aldrich (1979) 
Nelson and Winter 
(1982) 
Chandler (1977) 
Best (1990) 
Van Someren (1991) 
Grandori (1993) 
definition 
"a new way to recruit personnel, allocate resources, 
and structure tasks, authority, and rewards" (p. 51) 
"changes in business procedures and practices" (p. 61) 
"creation of a new configuration, an original yet con-
sistent combination of the design parameters and the 
situational factors" (p. 296) 
"organization form changes" (1975, p. 193) 
"new hierarchical methods of organizing economic 
activity (organization structure) and associated incen-
tive, control and planning instruments" (1980b, p. 183) 
"changes in the activities involved in organizational 
decision-making" (p. 98) 
"change in routines" (p. 128) 
"new ways of doing business between or within enter-
prises" (p. 48) 
"new rules that enable cooperative action" (p. 116) 
"new way of grouping or coordinating firm activities, 
within or between firms" (p. 119) 
"a viable and effective combination of dimensions or 
elements of organizing" (p. 6) 
analytical concepts 
nine design parameters, four sets of situa-
tional factors 
"no agreed upon criteria for identifying 
qualitative breaks between organizational 
forms" (p. 110) 
grouping is the creation, elimination or 
reallocation of business activities (p. 120) 
nodes and links 
Source: as indicated. 
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Thirdly, although definitions of the concept of organizational innovation are 
provided, operationalizations of the concept are scarce. Mintzberg (1983) for 
instance does provide analytical concepts to operationalize, but he limits himself 
to intrafirm changes. Also his concepts prove difficult to use in a dynamic 
situation: in his description of the emergence of the multidivisional form he does 
not use them (p. 233). Van Someren (1991) looks at organizational innovation from 
an economic point of view and does not focus on the way organizational innova-
tions are brought about in practice. His analytical concepts are provided in a 
footnote and not developed further. Yet, the stress in his conception of 
organizational innovation on firm activities holds interesting clues. Especially 
because it can be linked to the value chain concept (Porter, 1985). In section 2.3.4 
the usefulness of the value chain for the analysis of organizational innovation will 
be explored, after having discussed a recent contribution by Grandori (1993). 
Summarizing: the limited view of organizational innovation as essentially intra-
firm, the general unclarity of existing definitions and the lack of workable 
operationalizations provide ample reason for further attempts to define the 
subject. 
2.3.3 Nodes and links: Grandori's contribution 
Grandori (1993) departs from some of the same observations that have been made 
above. She states that the largely static view of organizations that is predominant 
in current organization theory should be replaced. According to Grandori organi-
zation theory has, up till now, been concerned with explaining the efficiency of 
existing organizational forms in individual firms by looking at specialization, 
coordination and power distribution as dimensions of organization form. Gal-
braith (1973, p. 149) seems to agree with her when he states that the drawback of 
his theory is that "it leaves little room for new structures". 
Grandori goes on to observe that this approach is no longer valid because of three 
reasons. First of all in practice new forms of organization have emerged that are 
"external" to the firm (these have been called interfirm organizational innovations 
in section 2.3.2). Secondly, organizations make increasing use of new coordination 
mechanisms that are not typical of bureaucracies. These include among others 
market and cultural mechanisms as well as technical systems (e.g. information 
technology). Finally, there are new organizational forms that not only decentralize 
decision rights, but property rights as well. 
Another objection of Grandori to organization theory as it has developed, is that 
it does not provide the practitioner and researcher with tools for being ahead of 
practice. That is, no new forms can be designed or predicted. Instead, justifying 
and rationalizing existing forms are at the core of research. 
One of the examples of organizational innovation Grandori gives, is the net-
worked form or N-form. In this organizational form the use of property rights 
(joint ventures, cross-partnerships, minority partnerships) as a coordination 
mechanism between firms instead of market mechanisms is remarkable. Owner-
Van Someren's definition is translated from Dutch by the author. 
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ship arrangements are a dimension of organizing that have not been considered 
by organization theory. Another new trait of the N-form is the role information 
technology plays as a coordinating mechanism. Other new forms and their new 
dimensions, identified by Grandori are assembled in table 2.3. Especially the 
broad range of coordination mechanisms is striking. Partnerships (like law firms 
and accountancy firms) use democratic ways of decision making; in flexible 
specialization informal relations are used; in Japan norms and culture play an 
important role in this regard. 
Table 2.3 New dimensions of new organizational forms 
New Organizational Form 
M-form (multidivisional) 
N-form (network) 
P-form (partnerships) 
FS-form (flexible specia-
lization) 
J-form (Japanese) 
New Dimension 
• Market as a coordination mechanism 
• Interfirm coordination by non-market mechanisms 
(property rights/ownership arrangements) 
• Use of information technology as a coordination 
mechanism 
• Democracy as a coordination a mechanism 
• Restricted action rights (specialization) 
• Informal relations as a coordination mechanism 
• Norms as a coordination mechanism 
• Culture as a coordination mechanism 
Source: based on Grandori (1993). 
Based on these observations Grandori turns to organizational components for 
analyzing organizational forms. Grandori proposes two types of organizational 
components: (1) properties of nodes and (2) properties of links. The first 
organizational component, properties of nodes, has to do with the allocation of 
rights to different parts of the organization. One can think of property rights, 
information rights, communication rights etc. These rights are allocated to people 
associated with activities. The second organizational component, properties of 
links (modes of linking nodes), also come in various guises. Prices, contracts, 
social norms, information technology (Huber (1990) argues strongly in favour of 
seeing information technology as related to organizational structure) are only 
some of the properties mentioned by Grandori. Porter (1994) points to geogra-
phical proximity as a coordination mechanism. The way he uses the concept, 
seems to suggest that Grandori's mechanisms of culture and informal relations 
constitute the coordinative capability of geographical proximity. The complete 
overview of links and nodes presented by Grandori can be found in table 2.4. 
Although Grandori (1993) does not give a precise definition of organizational 
innovation, organizational innovations in her conception are described as new 
combinations of the two mentioned organizational components, which lead to 
viable and effective organizational forms. 
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Table 2.4 Organizational components 
Properties of nodes 
• Property rights 
• Action rights 
• Decision rights 
• Communication rights 
• Information rights 
• Reward rights 
Properties of links 
• Prices 
• Contracts 
(people associated with activities) 
(who owns which assets) 
(who is assigned what tasks) 
(who is entitled to define what matters) 
(who can talk with whom) 
(who has access to what information) 
(who should expect what type of reward) 
(modes of linking nodes) 
• Associational and federative agreements 
• Authority 
• Formal rules and procedures 
• Formal integration units 
• Social norms 
• Standardization 
• Informal relations/liaison roles 
• Information and communication technologies 
Source: Grandori (1993). 
Because of the fact that the organizational components can be combined and 
recombined as if they were Lego, Grandori claims that with these components it 
is possible to design organizational forms. This is a big step in the direction of a 
more operational definition of organizational innovation. There is however some 
unclarity in the way she treats the organizational components as building blocks 
of organizational forms. Especially it is not exactly clear what nodes are: people, 
activities, a combination of these two or still something else. Moreover, the nodes 
and links do not seem to be separate entities. Formal rules and procedures for 
instance, usually assign action and decision rights to people, and prices and 
contracts are related to property rights (falling under the heading of nodes). The 
distinction between nodes and links is therefore not always clear. In the next 
section a definition of organizational innovation is given based on the value chain, 
where Grandori's conception of nodes is replaced by a less ambiguous focus on 
activities. 
Furthermore, the demarcation criterium developed by Grandori to distinguish 
between organizational invention and organizational innovation is incomplete 
from a strategic viewpoint; in the next section the idea that an organizational 
innovation should be viable and effective, is redefined from a strategic perspec-
tive. Organizational invention refers to the discovery of a new way of organizing; 
organizational innovation encompasses the discovery and its successful application 
in practice. From the viewpoint of organization theory, viability and effectivity 
may be a sufficient demarcation criterion for the success of the organizational 
innovation. The strategic perspective taken in this paper however, requires a 
stricter criterion, for the viability and effectivity criterion does not exclude many 
very small and incremental changes of which the competitive impact may be 
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negligible. Consequently, a strategic perspective will have to incorporate a stricter 
criterion of success which does say something about the competitive impact. 
2.3.4 Organizational innovation in the value chain 
As was shown in table 2.2 Van Someren relates organizational innovations to the 
grouping of activities. It seems to be interesting to explore this idea further, 
because it can lead to a conceptual definition and an operationalization of organi-
zational innovation based on the value chain concept. Before turning to this, first 
the background of the value chain concept and its position in the work of its 
author Michael Porter will be discussed, specifically in relation to innovation. 
Next it will be argued that an extended conception of the value chain can provide 
empirically identifiable "building blocks" for the analysis of organizational 
innovation, namely activities and linkages between these activities. 
The value chain describes the firm as an interdependent system or network of 
activities, connected by linkages (see figure 2.1). These activities are divided in 
support activities and primary activities. Support activities are those that are 
needed in every primary activity, like human resource management and procure-
ment. Primary activities are those activities that are part of the direct production 
process. With respect to linkages, Porter (1985, p. 48) states: "Linkages are 
relationships between the way one value activity is performed and the cost or 
performance of another". Linkages do not only connect activities inside the firm, 
but create interdependencies between a firm and e.g. its suppliers as well. This 
larger system of interdependent value chains is called the value system. Linkages 
within and between value chains can contribute to competitive advantage in two 
ways: optimization and coordination. Especially with respect to interfirm relations 
it is important to note that: "A company can create competitive advantage by 
better optimizing or coordinating these links to the outside" (Porter, 1990a, p. 43). 
Figure 2.1 The value chain 
SUPPORT 
ACTIVITIES 
FIRM INFRASTRUCTURE 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
PROCUREMENT 
INBOUND 
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS 
OUTBOUND 
LOGISTICS 
MARKETING 
AND SALES 
PRIMARY ACTTVmES 
Source: Porter (1985). 
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The question arises whether the value chain is a useful instrument for operatio-
nalizing the concept of organizational innovation. To answer this question firstly 
it has to be studied whether organizational structure can be defined on a value 
chain level. Secondly the question has to be answered whether both organizational 
innovations within and between organizations can be incorporated in the analysis. 
A third issue is how the emergence of organizational innovations can be described 
by means of value chain analysis. 
The first question is easy to answer. In Competitive Advantage, Porter himself goes 
into the relation between organizational structure and the value chain. As he 
defines organization as the grouping of activities (Porter, 1985, p. 39), he claims 
that every organizational structure can at least in principle be reproduced in the 
value chain. Faulkner and Bowman (1992) even maintain that the appropriate 
level to carry out organizational analysis is the value chain activity level. In their 
view the firm's organizational structure can be adapted on a value activity basis 
to realize a strategy. That's why in their view a higher level of analysis is less 
appropriate for the description of changes in organizational structuring. Similarly, 
Jarillo (1988, p. 35) states: "In order to understand the way firms structure 
themselves (which activities are integrated and which are farmed out) we must 
break up the firm into smaller units of analysis" and "The concept of the value 
chain (Porter, 1985) is very useful in this effort to break up the firm". A practical 
illustration of the versatile possibilities of the value chain, can be found in Wijers 
(1994) who uses the value chain to identify organizational mechanisms that create 
horizontal synergy. 
Harvey, Lefebvre and Lefebvre (1993, p. 482) point to the usefulness of the value 
chain for this purpose as well. In addition they point to four characteristics that 
enhance the usefulness of value chain analysis of organizational forms: 
• comprehensiveness: it includes all important dimensions of organizational 
design, although they claim that interfaces between groups of activities must 
be explored further; 
• it is conducive to both strategic and tactical analysis: it is global enough to 
allow a general evaluation of different configurations of activities to take place 
and detailed enough to allow a detailed design of work; 
• visuality: it makes alternative designs visible and thus allows identification of 
inconsistencies and solutions to these; 
• simple and general applicability: it is not industry specific. 
Regarding the second question, namely whether interorganizational relations can 
be part of Porter's value chain, Porter also provides the answer himself. The 
concept of the value system can be used for this. Different links between value 
chains of different firms can be made explicit with the concept of the value 
system. Also, Porter and Fuller (1986) use a simplified value chain in order to 
describe the various ways in which interorganizational forms in global industries 
can be given substance. They distinguish between X- and Y-coalitions. X-coalitions 
are those in which partners perform different activities (e.g. one partners 
produces, while the other is responsible for marketing). In Y-coalitions partners 
share the activities (e.g. a joint marketing agreement). Different coalitions can be 
described by making use of the concepts of activities that are carried out by the 
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different partners in the coalition and the linkages between these partners. The 
characteristic of the value chain that it can be applied on different levels of 
aggregation is the basis of an almost unlimited flexibility. The building block 
(Lego) approach to organization that is its fundament, provides the freedom and 
possibility to study interorganizational relations as well. 
The third question deals with the issue whether the value chain can also be used 
in a dynamic situation, that is whether it is appropriate for analyzing changes in 
the grouping of business functions. In the literature this subject has not really 
been taken up. Quinn, Doorley and Paquette (1990) provide one example. They 
have used the value chain for the analysis of in- and out-sourcing of services. 
They show that the emergence of the hollow corporation (an example of an 
organizational innovation) can be described in terms of the value chain. In- and 
out-sourcing are examples of, respectively, creation and elimination (Van 
Someren, 1991) of value chain activities. According to Normann and Ramirez 
(1993) new configurations of business activities cannot be described by means of 
the value chain because in their view it is a static instrument. Normann and 
Ramirez claim that consistently changing the value chain, especially in relation to 
a firm's customers, is the key to competitive advantage. Yet, as Lundquist (1993) 
points out, it is precisely the use of value chain analysis that can become a guide 
in deciding where to reconfigure the value chain. In this regard it must be noticed 
that the value chain is a flexible concept that can be adapted to different 
businesses and should not be seen as a static instrument in which every business 
should fit, as Normann and Ramirez seem to suggest. The concepts of activities 
and linkages that constitute the value chain allow sufficient flexibility in this 
regard and do provide ample opportunities to describe the new configurations 
pointed at by Normann and Ramirez. The only claim made by Porter, is that firms 
can be described in terms of linkages and activities. It would be a misinterpreta-
tion to suggest that Porter claims that the picture presented in figure 2.1 holds for 
all firms. Instead, the content of each activity and linkage is firm specific. This is 
clearly illustrated by Harvey, Lefebvre and Lefebvre (1993) who use a slightly 
modified value chain model for describing the organization form of service firms. 
Harvey, Lefebvre and Lefebvre (1993) also incorporate new relationships with 
clients in their value chain model. Especially in service delivery, the client can 
play an important part as a co-producer by means of taking over activities from 
the service provider. Van der Aa and Elfring (1993) stress the importance of the 
client in performing activities. In a study into innovations in services they found 
that clients can a play a role as co-producers, can specify what services they want 
and can even play a role in marketing. Hence, to some extent the role of indi-
vidual clients can be incorporated in the value chain model. Transfer of activities 
and changes in linkages cannot only take place between firms, but seem to occur 
between firms and persons as well. 
Rearrangements of activities can make an organization more efficient (HSkansson 
and Johanson (1992) claim that this is true for networks as well). As stated in table 
2.2, next to creation and elimination as ways of rearranging the value chain, 
reallocation of activities has also been distinguished as a form of organizational 
innovation. Creation refers to adding an activity to the value chain or system, that 
previously was not performed. Elimination is the removal of activities out of the 
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value chain or value system. Reallocation refers to shifting activities inside or 
between value chains. After the reallocation has taken place, the reallocated 
activity is still performed in the value chain or system, but by different persons 
or firms. To this trio of creation, elimination and reallocation can be added 
integration: a novel combination of activities in which two formerly separated and 
different activities are being linked or simultaneously carried out. These four 
categories of changing the configuration of activities in and between value chains 
can be described together as reconfigurations of activities. Reconfiguration of 
activities in and between value chains becomes the first building block for a 
definition of organizational innovation. Some examples of organizational inno-
vations as reconfigurations of activities are shown in table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 Examples of organizational innovations in the value chain and value system 
z 
o 
H 
< 
0 
Z 
O 
u 
w 
« 
examples 
creation 
reallocation 
elimination 
integration 
in value chain 
add quality control to 
incoming logistics 
first sales, then pro-
duction instead of the 
other way around 
hollowing-out (choose the 
buy option in a make or 
buy decision) 
integration design-proto-
typing in the car industry 
(multi-functional teams) 
in value system 
joint marketing consor-tium 
of small companies, where 
previously marketing was 
absent 
distributors taking over 
packaging and labelling from 
producers 
stock of parts in the JIT-
system 
selling insurance and 
financial services through the 
same channel 
Source: see text. 
Important to reconfiguration is the notion of time and place (for a rigorous 
discussion of the role of time and place in economics see e.g. Clark (1987, p. 260) 
and Harvey (1989)). Dicken (1986, p. 212) for example points to the role geo-
graphical reallocations of activities play in the world economy. Time plays a role 
in reallocation of activities in that for example activities that formerly were 
performed successively now are carried out simultaneously or even in a different 
order altogether. In theory every reconfiguration has aspects of time and place in 
it, as in every reconfiguration the question has to be answered where and when 
an activity has to be performed. The where question is especially relevant for 
research into national competitiveness. The location of the central activities 
determines country competitiveness. Porter (1990a) for instance identifies a firm's 
home base as the place where the central value adding activities (in his view these 
are the innovative activities) are performed. Another example is Reich and 
Mankin (1986) who maintain that the division of research and production in 
Japanese-American joint ventures is detrimental to American competitiveness. 
Opposite to Porter's view they suggest that not the innovative activities are of 
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importance to national competitive advantage but the manufacturing capabilities. 
Another example is Dunning (1993, pp. 208/209), who finds differences between 
Japanese and American firms regarding where activities are performed when 
these firms open up transplants in Britain. Hence, there clearly are differences in 
where and when activities are performed. What the determinants of these 
differences are, remains vague. A combination of inside-out and outside-in factors 
may be helpful in clarifying this issue . 
The second key building block of a conceptual definition of organizational innova-
tion are the links already pointed at by Grandori. These are also part of the value 
chain. Links in the value chain are traditionally seen as adding no value; an 
assumption which is changing (Lamming, 1993, p. 91). Grandori's ideas on links 
are an extension of Porter's views on linkages. Porter's "linkages" and Grandori's 
"modes of linking nodes" both relate to coordination mechanisms. Porter's 
linkages are defined as the connections between one activity and the cost or 
performance of another activity. Porter does not go into detail about what kinds 
of linkages there may be, while Hakansson and Johanson (1992) point out that 
there are various ways to link individual activities. Grandori's links seem to be 
a useful extension of the value chain on this point as she makes a subdivision of 
linkages. Activities can be coordinated by mechanisms that are economical 
(prices/costs), legal (contracts), cultural (values), political (democracy), techno-
logical (information technology) etc. (see the bottom half of table 2.4). This 
analysis of the concept of linkages seems to be more in line with the present focus 
on organization form and is more operational than Porter's rather general notion 
of linkages. It also provides an answer to the observation by Harvey, Lefebvre 
and Lefebvre (1993) that the interfaces between groups of activities should be 
explored further. 
So far, it has been shown that the configuration of the two building blocks of 
organizational forms, namely activities and linkages, can describe new organiza-
tional forms. The next and final step of a conceptual definition of organizational 
innovation should be a demarcation criterion which ascertains whether the form 
is indeed an innovation, in the sense defined by Schumpeter (1939, p. 84). Schum-
peter states that invention as such is not interesting, but that the commercial 
application of something new is the interesting feature to study in economics. This 
is what Schumpeter calls innovation. Following this line of reasoning, a definition 
of organizational innovation is inadequate if it does not take into account that not 
only the invention of organizational forms matters, but also the actual successful 
application. It is this successful application that triggers the dynamics of 
competition. So, not only the invention which is internal to the firm(s) is of 
interest but also the impact the invention has in the competitive process. This 
means that in order to be an organizational innovation, the new organizational 
form must also lead to a competitive advantage: it must also have consequences 
outside the innovating firm(s), specifically for its competitors in the industry 
(Baden-Fuller, 1994; Barney, 1991; Hall, 1994). A parallel with Schumpeter's 
Chapter 8 will analyse a spatial transfer of activities in the distribution sector which is 
mainly induced by changes in demand and governmental regulations. 
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creative destruction (1942, p. 83) can be drawn: the new organizational combina-
tion should in principle undermine the competitive position of other firms. 
Preferably, the competitive advantage should also be sustainable. As far as this 
sustainability is concerned, section 1.5 has shown that many organizational inno-
vations are sustainable. 
This also rules out a definition of innovation as being something new to the 
adopting organization. Such a definition may be relevant to organizational 
theorists, but lacks the explicit reference to the outside, which is incorporated in 
the concept of competitive advantage. In the view customary in organization 
theory, when a firm is the last to adopt an organizational innovation, this still is 
considered to be an innovation even though the competitive impact of it will be 
negligible. For the study of organizational change this is not a problem, as it 
studies the process of organizational change and not the strategic impact of this 
process. The strategic perspective endorsed here, however, does require an 
external focus and therefore the innovation must cause a shift in competitive 
position. Hence, innovation will be defined as something new to the industry in 
which the innovation occurs . 
In this demarcation criterion the wider societal impact of a new way of con-
figuring the value chain is abstracted from. It may very well be that a reconfigura-
tion diffuses rather quickly and thereby provides an important impetus for 
economic growth. From a strategic viewpoint however, this is a less interesting 
innovation because the sustainability of such an innovation for individual 
companies is limited. Taking a strategic perspective implies using a relativity 
criterion: only those innovations are of interest that contribute to a stronger 
position of an individual firm compared to its competitors. Grandori's demarca-
tion criterion does not enable researchers to make this distinction. Of course this 
is not surprising, as she does not adopt a strategic perspective, but looks into this 
subject from organization theory. 
The preceding analysis leads to the following conceptual definition of organizational 
innovation: 
. an organizational innovation is a new combination of the building blocks of 
organizational form i.e. of the activities and /or linkages in the value chain 
(system), contributing to a sustainable competitive advantage of the organiza-
tion^) involved. 
This definition emphasizes the form of the configuration of the building blocks. To 
be able to answer the main research question, two other attributes of organiza-
tional innovation have to be taken into account as well. These attributes are: the 
speed with which an innovation is implemented and the extent (importance and 
number) of the organizational innovation (see Wolfe, 1994). The speed with which 
innovations are implemented is an important feature of innovative processes: 
some determinants force a company to implement changes swiftly, other deter-
minants may slow down the implementation. Whereas the extent of the inno-
Of course, it goes without saying that whether an invention leads to a competitive 
advantage can only be determined with hindsight. 
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vation is concerned, it is part of the research question to see which determinants 
limit the number of innovations and which determinants increase this number. 
Moreover some determinants are more influential than others and may require 
more important changes in the value chain. Speed and extent are therefore 
important attributes of organizational innovation: not only the way the value 
chain is reconfigured matters (form), but also the velocity with which the changes 
take place and the number of them. 
2.3.5 Comparing two approaches 
It will be clear that there are some similarities and differences between Grandori's 
approach and the approach developed here (see table 2.6). Grandori's nodes have 
been replaced by activities. Her ideas concerning links are an extension of 
linkages between activities in the value chain and are incorporated in the 
modified value chain approach put forth above. Next, Grandori's view of organi-
zations as being composed of different building blocks as if they were Lego, is 
fully subscribed in the value chain approach. Yet, the value chain approach seems 
to be somewhat more operational than the "nodes and links"-approach, predomi-
nantly because the focus on activities is clearer than the focus on nodes. Finally, 
instead of defining organizational innovations as viable and effective, the 
demarcation criterion of sustainable competitive advantage has a more explicit 
focus on the influence of the innovation on the environment. Therefore it is more 
closely related to Schumpeter's ideas on innovation. 
Table 2.6 Differences and similarities between the nodes and links approach and the (modified) 
value chain approach 
Issues in a conceptual 
definition 
1. First building block 
2. Second building 
block 
3. Applicability of 
Lego-metaphor 
4. Possibilities for 
opera tionalisation 
5. Demarcation crite-
rion 
Nodes and links 
approach 
1. properties of nodes 
(people associated with 
activities) 
2. properties of links/ 
coordination mechanisms 
(modes of linking nodes) 
3. yes 
4. problems with nodes, 
but operational concep-
tion of linkages 
5. viable and effective 
Value chain 
approach 
1. activities 
2. similar linkages 
3. yes 
4. less problems with 
activities, Grandori's 
linkages incorporated 
5. sustainable competi-
tive advantage 
Source: see text. 
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2.3.6 Reorganization or innovation? 
In what does organizational innovation differ from reorganization? Every inno-
vation will change the structure of a firm and will therefore entail a reorganiza-
tion. The opposite is not true: not every reorganization is an innovation, at least 
when the definition of organizational innovation given above is accepted. For 
convenience, the word reorganization will be used here in the sense of organiza-
tional change towards an existing organizational form. 
Defined in this way, the difference between reorganization and organizational 
innovation lies in the degree of novelty of the innovation. A reorganization is not 
necessarily new to the industry. Many firms may have organized or reorganized 
their business in a similar way as a reorganizing firm does. Consequently, such 
a reorganization does not lead to a new organizational form and does not have 
any innovatory aspects, according to the developed definition. 
Chandler (1962, p. 284) distinguished between organizational changes which are 
creative innovations and those that are adaptive responses. Creative innovations 
go "beyond existing practices and procedures", whereas an adaptive response 
"while involving major changes for the individual or firm making the response, 
stayed within the range of current custom". Adaptive responses have many 
imitative features. Reorganizations can be said to belong to this latter category of 
adaptive response. 
Three other differences between organizational innovation and reorganization can 
be found in the literature (see also table 2.7). These are: 
• higher uncertainty with regard to the benefits (Mahajan, Sharma, Bettis, 1988) 
of innovation as compared to reorganization. This effect occurs because no 
examples can be found of organizations that have organized themselves in the 
new way. As Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993, p. 43) show, this phenomenon also 
inhibits a detailed discussion of the benefits of newly arisen organizational 
innovations. Only long after the innovation has been implemented it will be 
clear whether it has led to a competitive advantage or not; 
• a greater need for experimentation in the case of innovation, as the key 
characteristics of the new form are not yet known (search and trial and error 
dominate, see Nelson and Winter, 1982); 
• and connected to the previous two: lack of legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977), which is more relevant in the case of developing a new form of which 
the consequences are completely unclear, than in the case of implementing an 
existing form of which the effects may be better known. Because no examples 
are available to convince people that the new organizational structure should 
be adopted, there is no possibility to legitimize the new form. 
Uncertainty and lack of legitimacy have been known to be endemic to innovative 
approaches since a long time (see for example Machiavelli, 1513). Together with 
the need for experimentation, they make the process of organizational innovation 
more complicated in comparison to reorganization. 
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Table 2.7 Differences between organizational innovation and reorganization 
Organizational innovation 
• creative innovation 
• higher uncertainty 
• importance of trial and error, as basic 
characteristics are unknown 
• lack of legitimacy 
Reorganization 
• adaptive response 
• precursors exist: lower uncertainty 
• lower need for experimentation, as 
basic characteristics are known 
• higher legitimacy 
Source: see text. 
2.4 Summary 
Differences between organizational and technological innovations have been dis-
cussed. Organizational innovations are sufficiently different to allow separate 
discussion of them, even though there are many relations between organization 
and technology. Next a conceptual definition has been developed as a contribu-
tion to the "language" of organizational innovation, as Williamson calls it. The 
building blocks of organizational form, activities and linkages, enable a de-
scription of new organizational forms to take place. Most important in this respect 
is that organizational forms in this definition are not limited to intra-organi-
zational forms, but that interorganizational forms have also been incorporated in 
the definition. In doing so, the growing amount of interorganizational relations 
that have come into being can be studied with the developed tool as well. In the 
definition a strategic perspective has been chosen: the impact an innovation has 
on competitive advantage is the demarcation criterion that not only sifts unimpor-
tant changes from the important ones, but also embeds the definition in Schum-
peterian theory. 
The definition developed in the preceding sections also provides an interesting 
research question. The operationalization of the concept of organizational inno-
vation allows a detailed study to be made of new organizational forms. It enables 
shifts in activities and linkages to be identified, so that it is possible to rephrase 
the key research question in a more operational form, namely by operationalizing 
organizational innovation as shifts in activities and linkages, contributing to a 
competitive advantage. Next to this aspect of the form of the innovation, two 
other attributes of organizational innovation were defined: the speed with which 
the changes take place and the extent (number and importance) of the changes. 
The operationalization of organizational innovation by means of the value chain 
makes it possible to describe changes in organizational forms in great detail. Thus 
detailed propositions on the determinants of innovation and their impact on the 
configuration of activities and linkages can be put forth and tested. Above that a 
better insight can be obtained in the way the new organizational form works in 
practice. The empirical chapters 7 and 8 will show the value of this approach in 
depicting organizational forms and testing propositions. 
The question why firms choose for one reconfiguration of activities and linkages 
over another will be treated in the following chapters by delineating the impact 
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of determinants inside and outside the firm. First of all the next chapter will look 
into the contributions existing theories of organizational innovation have made. 
3 
Overview of the theory of organizational innovation 
3.1 Introduction 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith 
(1776), opens with an account of the division of labour in a pin factory. This 
analysis, by virtue of being the first in what is probably the most classical text of 
economics, has become one of the best-known descriptions of an organizational 
innovation viz. the division of labour. Yet in the many years following the 
appearance of the book, economics has been primarily concerned with formalizing 
Smith's analysis of the working of markets, instead of directing its attention 
towards theorizing about innovation in the organization of labour. The subject has 
however been picked up in the course of this century. In the following subpara-
graphs some key contributions to the theory of organizational innovation have 
been assembled. Only those theories are discussed which specifically discuss 
organizational innovation; chapters 4 and 5 will deal with the question whether 
theories of technological innovation can contribute to a coherent explanation of 
organizational innovation. Hence chapters 4 and 5 will discuss the contribution 
other theories can make to the study of new organizational forms, while this 
chapter reviews existing theories of organizational innovation. 
Section 3.2 will briefly discuss the requirements a theory of organizational 
innovation must meet based on the schema developed in the introduction. The 
literature will be reviewed in section 3.3. Each author's theory will be summarized 
and criticism on the author's viewpoint will be brought forth. Table 3.4 summa-
rizes some of the main points of the literature reviewed. 
The conclusion in section 3.4 will show that some authors have defined building 
blocks for an inside-out perspective, but that these building blocks may be 
combined in a more coherent perspective. Chapter 4 will use innovation theory 
to realize that. Next, even though the influence of the business environment 
(outside-in approach) is discussed by several authors, this has always been done 
ad-hoc. A well-structured and in-depth analysis of the way the business environ-
ment influences organizational innovation is lacking. Chapter 5 will propose 
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Porter's diamond framework (Porter, 1990a) as a suitable tool for such an analysis. 
Briefly stated, the different theories presented provide parts of the picture of 
organizational innovation which have not yet been combined into a coherent 
framework. 
3.2 Requirements for a theory of organizational innovation 
In the subsequent sections different theories related to organizational innovation 
will be discussed in connection to figure LI. Diverse concepts will be presented, 
and evaluated on their contribution to the theory of organizational innovation. 
Special attention will be given to the determinants of organizational innovation: 
those factors that influence the way the value chain is reconfigured. Figure 1.1 has 
shown that a theory of organizational innovation should incorporate both an 
outside-in and an inside-out approach. Chapter 2 has explicitly added two other 
criteria: the theory should explain the pluriformity of organizational forms (both 
the intra- and interorganizational innovations) and more specifically, a competitive 
advantage approach is required. 
Outside-in 
As Powell (1990, p. 323) stated, a theory explaining the diversity of organizational 
forms should be context-dependent. Economical, social, political and technological 
factors can shed light on the reasons why diverging forms emerged. The outside-
in approach refers to this contingent and situational nature of organizational 
forms. 
Different aspects of the business environment may influence the process of organi-
zational innovation. It is not only interesting to know which determinants are of 
interest, but also in what direction the influence of different determinants runs. 
Some factors may be conducive to organizational innovation, others may be prohi-
bitive. 
Inside-out 
Next, Powell (1990) points to historical contingency as important in explaining 
diversity. Even though the business environment has important historical 
backgrounds, it is especially the inside-out approach that can meet this require-
ment. A firm's resource-base and knowledge influence its choice of organizational 
form. The way the organizational form emerges can be understood by investi-
gating the historical process in which these firm specific resources were 
accumulated. 
The characteristics of this process of innovation are incrementality, search for the 
right solution, and trial and error (cf. Nelson, 1991). Lamming (1993, p. 174) found 
such characteristics in interorganizational relations as well, when he speaks of "the 
lumpy, piece-meal and involuntary nature of evolution of relationships". Powell 
(1990) made similar observations for the case of networks. These dynamics of the 
process of organizational innovation should be properly incorporated in a theory 
of organizational innovation. 
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Organizational innovation: pluriformity of forms 
The many different organizational innovations which have come to the fore-
ground, not only in recent times but also at earlier moments in history, should be 
amenable to analysis with the developed framework. Especially the increasing 
amount of interorganizational innovations are of interest in this regard. It will be 
shown below, that some existing theories have not studied this phenomenon at 
all or run into difficulty when they attempt to explain it. 
This point is especially important in connection to the goal a company is assumed 
to have. When this goal is competitive advantage pluriformity is of interest, as 
competitive advantage is rooted in differences between firms (Porter, 1985). 
Competitive advantage 
A strategic perspective has been chosen in the preceding chapters. Chapter 1 
showed that organizational innovations can contribute to competitiveness in many 
ways, hence the choice for competitive advantage as the company goal. This point 
has been elaborated in section 2.3.4 of the previous chapter. Most theories have 
focussed narrowly on cost and efficiency and have for example not incorporated 
effectivity and value creation as being important for the way firms are structured. 
In explaining organizational innovation, the firm should be seen as a strategic 
actor, pursuing a broad set of goals. A focus on competitive advantage is therefore 
appropriate. 
The following sections will discuss the contributions made to these analyses and 
identify the gaps in literature dealing with this subject. Different authors have 
highlighted some of the above mentioned elements, but few have discussed them 
comprehensively or explicitly integrated them in their framework. Especially the 
influence of the business environment is not well incorporated in the analysis of 
organizational innovation and for so far it has been treated, this has not been 
done in a well-structured way. Therefore there remains considerable unclarity 
regarding the question how and which variables in the business environment 
influence the creation of new organizational forms. 
3.3 Overview of the theory of organizational innovation 
3.3.1 Schumpeter 
No account of innovation is complete without Schumpeter. He was one of the first 
to see innovation as central in the economic process. This paragraph will give an 
overview of Schumpeter's ideas with regard to innovation in general, but organi-
zational innovation in particular. His ideas on innovation will be discussed, as 
they are presented in three of his books: The Theory of Economic Development (first 
printed in 1911), Business Cycles (1939) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1942)1. 
The exact editions used here are: Schumpeter (1949), Schumpeter (1986), and Schumpeter 
(1992) respectively. 
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The Theory of Economic Development 
The basic thesis of The Theory of Economic Development is that business cycles like 
the Kondratieff are caused by the simultaneous and discontinuous occurrence of 
innovations. These innovations come in five forms: new goods, new methods of 
production, new markets, new sources of supply, and new organization of an 
industry (see table 3.1). As producing means combining materials and forces, 
innovation is described as creating "new combinations". Essentially, Schumpeter 
is concerned with the economic phenomena to which innovations give rise. His 
focus is not primarily on the genesis of innovations, but on how an economy 
reacts to them and reaches a new state of equilibrium. 
Table 3.1 Schumpeter's five forms of innovation 
1. The introduction of a new good 
2. The introduction of a new method of production 
3. The opening of a new market 
4. The conquest of a new source of supply 
5. The carrying out of the new organisation of any industry 
Source: Schumpeter (1911, p. 66). 
Pertaining to organizational innovation, Schumpeter does not define new organi-
zation of an industry. He only gives two examples, of which he thinks that they 
are included in the definition: the emergence or breaking up of monopoly and the 
emergence of large-scale business. The meaning of the word "new" is clearer: 
"new" is defined on an industry-level. Existing forms of organization that for the 
first time get implemented in a particular industry are new and such an 
implementation is an example of innovation. 
Schumpeter does not make a distinction between organizational and technological 
innovation as far as the way they emerge is concerned. With regard to the 
creation of new forms of organization (and therefore for any other innovation in 
Schumpeter's theory) some points can be noticed. There is no innovation without 
an entrepreneur. The function of the entrepreneur is not only invention but also 
the application of it (the real innovation). The invention will be directed by the 
question what new combination is more fruitful in terms of getting more products 
in the same time by means of the same amount of production factors. The most 
difficult thing for the entrepreneur however, is overcoming the resistance against 
the innovation, in the form of obtaining "workers, trained personnel and the 
necessary market conditions. Innumerable resistances of a social and political 
character work against it" (p. 133). 
A last remark about this coming into being of innovation is that innovations come 
in swarms, simply "because the appearance of one or a few entrepreneurs facili-
tates the appearance of others" (p. 228). The first entrepreneurs remove obstacles 
to innovation, thereby making it easier for less able entrepreneurs to follow their 
example, which leads to more obstacles being removed etc. In this way one inno-
vation, through the acts of entrepreneurs, induces the others. 
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Business Cycles 
In Business Cycles (1939) Schumpeter keeps his theoretical framework intact. There 
are some extensions, which however do not strike at the heart of his theory. The 
first extension is that he now defines innovation as a shift of the production 
function. This seems to be more a theoretical underpinning of his idea of new 
combinations by relating it to mainstream economical theorizing, than a basic shift 
in his ideas. Regarding organizational innovation "organization of an industry" as 
an example of innovation is replaced by "new business organization" (p. 84). 
However, a clear definition of organizational innovation is absent. There is only 
impressionistic evidence as to what Schumpeter considers new organization 
forms: he mentions department stores, mergers, the replacement of craft guilds by 
corporate enterprise. The latter's rise is extensively discussed by Schumpeter. The 
gradual evolution of the corporate form demonstrates the importance of risk, 
specialization and legislative barriers to the genesis of a new structure. Schum-
peter also mentions developments in the railroad field where there were present 
"two leading men (Harriman and Hill). One of them was as much an organizer 
and reformer of administrative routine as he was a stock exchange leader" (p. 
405). Schumpeter's discussion of the growth of railroads however, limits itself to 
merger activity and does not go into the importance or form of the "new 
administrative routines". 
Further evidence on the creation of innovation is scant. Innovation is said to be 
connected to the appearance of new plant, new firms and new men. Like in his 
Theory of Economic Development innovation is considered to be the first application 
of something new in a certain sector. Using this definition, Schumpeter hints at 
some obstacles to innovation. The spread of the corporate form into banking for 
instance, was forbidden by the English government until 1826 (p. 278). Further, 
Schumpeter found evidence that in some sectors the corporate form spread rather 
quickly (like in railroads, public utilities and shipping), while in others like cotton-
manufacturing this form was almost non-existing. Except for the element of risk 
(riskier projects are carried out in a corporation), it does not become clear why 
diffusion of the corporate form differed so much between industries. 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
Finally, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy some new ideas emerge. The first 
one is the idea of Creative Destruction ("the process of industrial mutation -if I 
may use that biological term — that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one", p. 83), which implicitly was present in his earlier work as well. The 
second idea is more implicit: Schumpeter seems to have altered his view that 
innovation is always connected with new firms. The routinization of innovation 
towards which capitalism develops, appears to be connected with existing firms. 
Innovation may occur both in existing and in new firms. Thirdly, innovation is 
not only connected with efficiency in the narrow sense. Quality can be part of 
innovation too, while the goal of innovation is profits. Fourthly, Schumpeter, gets 
less consistent in his terminology regarding organizational innovation. In the book 
he speaks about "new forms of industrial organization" (p. 83), in the preface to 
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the second edition he talks about "new forms of organization" (p. 411 in the 1992 
edition) Perhaps Schumpeter sees both industry structure and organizational 
structure as subject to innovation. The examples of new organizations he gave in 
his two earlier books can be divided along these lines: monopoly and merger 
belonging to industry structure and the corporate form and department stores to 
organizational structure. 
CONCLUSION 
Schumpeter's main contribution is that he puts the analysis of innovation central 
in his theory. He also distinguishes organizational innovation from technological 
innovation, but does not make a difference with regard to the way they are 
created and diffused and with regard to the economic consequences they have. 
The nature of innovation (and thereby of organizational innovation) consists of 
enhancing efficiency by means of new combinations with the aim to reap profits 
and innovation means anything new in a certain industry. As was pointed out in 
sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 the competitive advantage criterion is consistent with this. 
The creation of innovation is dependent on: 
• the entrepreneur 
• other innovations (innovations come in swarms in time and place) 
• external barriers (legislation, labour, finance etc.) 
• competition (creative destruction). 
Innovations in organizational structure ("administrative routine") and industry 
structure (a.o. mergers) are not clearly separated. Schumpeter's focus is mainly on 
industry structure, as is clear from his description of mergers. Concluding, the 
emergence of innovation in terms of the inside-out and outside-in approaches 
largely remains a black box. 
3.3.2 Chandler 
Strategy and Structure 
Chandler studies the rise of the modern enterprise from a historical perspective. 
The basic tenet of his book Strategy and Structure is that structure follows strategy. 
New strategies emerge because of changes in the environment. "Strategic growth 
resulted form an awareness of the opportunities and needs — created by changing 
population, income and technology — to employ existing or expanding resources 
more profitably" (p. 15). Put differently, the possibility of more efficient 
production, noticed by management, led to new strategies. According to Chandler 
there are basically two strategies: vertical integration and diversification. 
Strategy is essentially a means to bring about growth. Firm growth may bring an 
existing organizational structure into difficulty, especially when this growth is 
achieved by the strategy of diversification. This may lead to an overload of 
operational decisions at the top, because of which top managers may neglect long 
term decision making. For the modern enterprise the multidivision form relieves 
managers from the pressure of day-to-day affairs. This enables them to direct their 
attention to strategic decision-making, while division management takes care of 
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daily operations. It is remarkable that the multidivisional form was invented at 
the same time by different companies (GM, DuPont, Jersey Standard, and Sears). 
Next to some exchange of management between these firms, this reflects "changes 
in the over-all American economy", according to Chandler (p. 385). 
Chandler finds that organizational forms do not diffuse to every company. There 
are both firm and industry specific factors that enhance or slow down the spread 
of the innovation. Of the firm specific factors not only the chosen strategy matters, 
but also the administrative history of the company. An example of industry 
specific factors is given in the steel industry, where the production process 
demands tight control, so that decentralized decision making cannot be applied 
there. 
The Visible Hand 
In The Visible Hand Chandler (1977) does not make many changes in the frame-
work of analysis developed in Strategy and Structure. He focusses more strongly 
on technological innovation and changes in consumer demand as determinants 
in the business environment. Furthermore, he claims to have identified three 
propositions2 that "help to explain the initial appearance of modern business 
enterprise: why it began, when it did, where it did, and in the way it did" (p. 12). 
These propositions are: 
1. "modern multiunit business enterprise replaced small traditional enterprise 
when administrative coordination permitted greater productivity, lower costs, 
and higher profits than coordination by market mechanisms" (p. 6); 
2. "the advantages of internalizing the activities of many business units within 
a single enterprise could not be realized until a managerial hierarchy had 
been created" (p. 7); 
3. "modern business enterprise appeared for the first time in history when the 
volume of economic activities reached a level that made administrative coor-
dination more efficient and more profitable than market coordination" (p. 8). 
Whether these 3 propositions are really enough to explain "why, when, where and 
the way" remains to be seen. Point 2 and 3 are conditions which were fulfilled in 
the USA in the beginning of this century (when and where), but probably also in 
other countries. Point 1 is part of the explanation of "why". "The way in which" 
does not seem to follow from these propositions. Even when the propositions are 
satisfied, there may still be many ways of organizing. The answer to the question 
why the specific forms of the business enterprise discussed by Chandler (the 
divisional form and functional form) are chosen, does not follow from these 
propositions. It is exactly this issue that is at the core of the research questions 
identified in section 2.4. In terms of chapter 2 "the way in which" refers to the 
configuration of activities and linkages that eventually comes about. The propo-
Next to these three propositions, Chandler develops five propositions that explain the 
continuing growth of the firm. These are not treated here, as the focus is on the initial 
derivation of new organizational forms. 
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sitions do not identify determinants of such reconfigurations. These are scattered 
throughout Chandler's text and include the already mentioned demand, tech-
nology and the administrative problem of overload at the top. 
Whereas in Strategy and Structure Chandler described organizational innovations 
in four major firms, in The Visible Hand his focus is primarily on organizational 
innovations in railroads. The revolution in transportation together with the 
revolution in production made possible the growth of the modern industrial 
enterprise. The modern industrial enterprise, characterized by managerial 
hierarchies (the "visible hand"), "emerged and spread only in those industries and 
sectors whose technology and markets permitted administrative coordination to 
be more profitable than market coordination" (p. 11). So hierarchy is limited by 
the market: only where it is more efficient hierarchy will occur. 
Scale and Scope 
"It was the development of new technologies and the opening of new markets, 
which resulted in economies of scale and of scope and in reduced transaction 
costs, that made the large multiunit industrial enterprise come when it did, where 
it did, and in the way it did. These technological and market changes explain 
why the institution appeared and continued to cluster in certain industries and 
not in others, why it came into being by integrating units of volume production 
with those of volume distribution, and finally, why this multifunctional enterprise 
continued to grow (though not in all cases) by becoming multinational and 
multiproduct" (Chandler, 1990, p. 18). 
This lengthy quotation from Scale and Scope will make clear that Chandler still 
maintains the basic ideas that have been developed in his previous work. There 
are however also some extensions. First of all, Chandler elaborates about factors 
internal to the firm. Successful firms were first movers, that kept their advantages 
only if they followed a strategy of three-pronged investment in production, 
management and distribution. These investments had to be related to the firm's 
capabilities. The idea of capabilities as the core of the dynamics of industrial 
capitalism, is also new in Chandler's work and will be discussed further below. 
Next, Chandler moves beyond a description of business in the U.S.A. to include 
Germany and Great-Britain. Chandler finds that his analysis also holds in these 
countries, although the exact form of enterprise that emerged in the three 
countries differed. Chandler names these forms: competitive managerial capitalism 
(U.S.A.), personal capitalism (Great-Britain: management and ownership were not 
separated to such an extent as in the other countries) and cooperative capitalism 
(Germany: extensive forms of cooperation, like cartels, were allowed). The 
explanation given by Chandler is that differences in the firm environment are 
responsible for this. He mentions factors like education, markets, legal systems. 
That the way in which enterprise developed is not adequately explained by the 
three propositions in The Visible Hand, now becomes clear. It is the business 
environment that ultimately determines the exact form enterprise takes (the "way 
in which" the form emerges). 
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The "capability articles" 
In Scale and Scope Chandler explains the dynamics of industrial capitalism by 
making use of a capability approach. "These organizational capabilities were the 
collective physical facilities and human skills as they were organized within the 
enterprise. They included the physical facilities in each of the many operating 
units — the factories, offices, laboratories — and the skills of the employees 
working in such units" (Chandler, 1990, p. 594). 
In subsequent articles Chandler expanded on the notion of capabilities (Chandler, 
1992a; Chandler, 1992b). Chandler (1992a) claims that after World War II the 
pioneering firms were not new firms, as was the case in the period before World 
War I, but long-established managerial enterprises. Chandler is not specific on this 
point, but the explanation seems to be that in the mean time more advanced 
capabilities had become more important in the competitive process. A further 
extension of Scale and Scope is that Chandler now also discusses recent develop-
ments. He hints at the possibility of applying his framework to organizational 
innovations in the 1980's. Especially the rise of Japan is claimed to be related to 
the three-pronged investments in capabilities, yet Chandler does not elaborate this 
point. 
In Chandler (1992b) it is stated, that capabilities that have developed over a long 
period of time are powerful barriers to entry and therefore account for long-term 
persistence of profits by the same companies. Next he divides capabilities in 
capabilities learned through exploiting economies of scale and capabilities learned 
through exploiting economies of scope. The move of companies into geogra-
phically distant areas was normally based on the former capabilities and the move 
into related product markets rested on the latter. Capabilities are company- and 
industry-specific learned skills and knowledge. They are "difficult to transfer from 
one industry to another, or even from one company to another, precisely because 
they had been learned within a very specific organizational context" (p. 84). The 
examples of capabilities given by Chandler are mostly of a technological nature: 
Du Pont's chemical capabilities, Dow's salt-based chemicals, electrical equipment 
firms' radios and x-rays, Lever Brothers' margarine etc. Chandler maintains that 
a capability explanation of shifting competitive advantage is insightful. 
CRITICISM 
Chandler's work has been criticized on several points. Perrow (1981) for instance, 
disagrees with Chandler's limited view on the role of labour and his focus on 
efficiency in The Visible Hand. Chandler (1981) acknowledges that many factors 
play a role in the rise of the industrial enterprise, but he believes the factors 
identified by him to be essential. Also it has been pointed out that next to 
"structure follows strategy" there may as well be "strategy follows structure" (e.g. 
Hall and Saias, 1980; White and Hamermesh, 1981; Burgelman, 1983; in the 
preface to a later edition of Strategy and Structure Chandler (1993) maintains he 
has always recognized the interdependency between strategy and structure). 
Organizational structure may limit the strategic options and people lower in the 
organization may act contrary to the strategy developed by top management. 
DuBoff and Herman (1980) in reviewing The Visible Hand, direct their main 
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criticism at the fact that Chandler does not recognize market power as a goal of 
modern enterprise. As minor points they state that government-business relations 
are not adequately incorporated and that technology is seen as exogenous to 
firms, while in practice business is rather influential in shaping technology. 
Methodological objections to Chandler's Scale and Scope have been brought forth 
by Hannah (1991). Firstly, Hannah points out that there is a bias into some of the 
cross country comparisons, because Chandler focusses on the 200 largest firms in 
the U.S.A., Great-Britain and Germany. Yet, the size of the American economy is 
such that the 200 largest American firms are considerably larger than the 200 
largest British and German firms. Secondly, Chandler judges firm success on the 
basis of the "survivor technique". This means that an organizational arrangement 
is seen as efficient when it remains in place for a considerable period of time. This 
method is allowed when looking at the United States and perhaps also in present 
day Britain and Germany, but this method is not to be applied in Britain and 
Germany before World War II. In the prewar period the economies of both 
countries were too small and too much protected for a reasonable level of 
competition to exist. The efficiency of certain organizational structures was 
therefore not really tested and the "survivor technique" not applicable. Thirdly, 
Chandler ignores the possibility of other non-American structures of business that 
have emerged in Europe and which may be equally efficient or even more so (see 
e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984). Best (1990, pp. 8-10) pointed out that Chandler's 
perspective cannot not aptly deal with these organizational forms and seems to 
consider them primarily as precursors of big business. According to Best, 
Chandler makes a distinction between markets and hierarchies that cannot be 
maintained. In the context of the pluriformity of organizational forms which have 
to be explained by a theory of organizational innovation, this observation seems 
to be right. The question is whether Chandler's analysis can also be applied to JIT, 
networks and alliances, which are on the interfirm level (White and Hamermesh 
(1981), Hannah (1991) and Teece (1993) also pointed to the limited scope of the 
structures discussed). 
Harvey and Jones (1992), while admiring Chandler's achievements, point out that 
Chandler mainly focuses on firm internal variables "attaching relatively little 
weight to wider environmental influences on the competitive strength of firms, 
industries and nations" (p. 6). They point to a complementarity between Chandler 
(1990) and Porter (1990a), who sees the environment as central to competitiveness. 
In relation to the outside-in perspective in Chandler's work, Harvey and Jones 
rightly observe that Chandler's main focus is on the firm internally. Although 
Chandler does point to developments in the business environment (like for 
instance demand), there seems to be room for further research into the environ-
mental determinants of organizational innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
Chandler's work has great value for its historical tracking of organizational 
innovation that makes clear the incremental way in which organizational forms 
emerge. The significant role of trial and error in the search for the right solution 
to internal organizational problems is clearly shown. In his latest book the 
incorporation of the capability approach in his framework adds a coherent inside-
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out explanation to his explanation of firm growth, even though it does not 
become clear why some firms made the three-pronged investment while others 
didn't. Nevertheless, Chandler's important contribution is that he clearly shows 
the historical contingency of organizational forms. 
The role of management is put central in creating organizational innovations. In 
figure 1.1 management has been identified as the group which initiates organiza-
tional innovation. Chandler fully subscribes to this viewpoint. 
His treatment of the business environment is a bit ad-hoc and unclear; demand 
and technology seem to be the essential factors but other variables like country 
specific factors can also be found. The outside-in perspective is not adequately 
developed and may be extended. Other disadvantages of Chandler's work are the 
limited number of organizational innovations analysed as well as the narrow 
focus on efficiency as organizational goal. 
3.3.3 Williamson and the transaction cost paradigm 
The basic idea of transaction costs can be found in Coase (1937). The core of 
Coase's thinking has not been fundamentally changed, but it has been extended; 
most clearly in Williamson (1975, 1985), who integrated it with concepts defined 
by Arrow (1971). Essentially, the theory can be summarized as follows: the reason 
firms exist, is that there are market failures that can be dealt with more efficiently 
within the context of a firm. Specific transactions can be internalized for this 
reason. Whether a transaction is to be internalized has to be judged on a case by 
case basis, with efficiency as the discriminating factor. 
For organizational innovation the reasoning is that new forms of organization are 
a response to market failures. In this view efficiency and cost considerations are 
central to the emergence of new organizational configurations. 
Williamson (1970) relates organizational innovations to firm size. Innovations 
"have permitted the corporation to limit the degree of control loss and subgoal 
pursuit that... were consequences of large size". In an article concerning research 
opportunities in Industrial Organization, Williamson (1972) points out that the 
study of organizational innovation is essential to judging market forms. Too often 
in his view, strict competition policy breaks up efficient forms of organization, like 
the multidivisional form (called the M-form) and the franchise. 
In Markets and Hierarchies (1975) the focus is completely on transaction costs. The 
M-form hypothesis states "the M-form favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior 
more nearly associated with the neoclassical profit maximization hypothesis than 
does the U-form (functional) organizational alternative" (p. 150). Internalizing 
transactions and separating strategic decision-making from day to day affairs, 
were the considerations that led to the M-form. Factors enhancing internalization 
of transactions are assembled in the organizational failures framework. These 
factors are: bounded rationality and opportunism (human factors) and uncer-
tainty/complexity and small numbers (environmental factors). Depending on the 
relative importance of each of these factors in relation to the alternative of market 
coordination a transaction can be internalized or not. In developing his framework 
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Williamson draws heavily on Chandler. He tries to develop a rigid economical 
underpinning of Chandler's analysis of the U- and M-form. For "Chandler is more 
concerned with the description than with the interpretation of organizational 
change" (Williamson, 1981, p. 1543). 
In his 1985 book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism the emergence of 
organizational innovations is central in Williamson's analysis as economic 
institutions "are the evolutionary product of a fascinating series of organizational 
innovations" (p. 15) and it are these organizational innovations "that warrant 
reassessment in transaction cost terms" (p. 17). The basic theoretical theme of 
Markets and Hierarchies is maintained. Williamson describes transactions by three 
dimensions: frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. The reasoning remains 
the same: organization (hierarchy) will emerge where it is comparatively more 
efficient than market coordination. Examples of organizational innovations are the 
M-form, the line/staff dichotomy, the conglomerate and the multinational (the last 
two forms are simply different shapes the M-form takes (Williamson, 1981)). The 
main focus is on forward and backward integration (the make or buy decision). 
Williamson acknowledges that especially for this subject transaction cost analysis 
works very well. He claims that for other organizational innovations his frame-
work is suitable too, although he admits that an explanation will remain on a 
rather general level. 
For organizational innovation some of Williamson's articles are very instructive. 
Williamson (1980a) is particularly interesting because six alternative modes of 
organizing the process of pinmaking are compared on efficiency grounds. The 
thing of interest is that in the discussion ensuing this article, Williamson 
establishes the independence of organization from technology to a large extent 
(Williamson, 1983a; Jones, 1983; Williamson, 1983b). Alternative modes of 
organizing are consistent with the same technology, according to Williamson. The 
relative efficiencies of one form over the other will determine which form will 
prevail. In another article (Williamson, 1980b, p. 183), Williamson provides one 
of the few definitions of organizational innovations (see also table 2.2): "Organiza-
tional innovation is used here to describe not only new hierarchical methods of 
organizing economic activity (organizational structure) but also the incentive, 
control, and planning instruments that are associated with new organizational 
forms." 
CRITICISM 
The transaction cost approach has been widely criticized. Grandori (1987) points 
among others to the fact that the transaction cost framework is very difficult to 
operationalize, so that the suitability for empirical research is limited. Perrow 
(1981, 1986) makes two points. Firstly, he claims that Williamson does not 
incorporate in his theory that there are also transaction costs inside the firm. 
Therefore a shift from market to hierarchy may not be as efficient as Williamson 
thinks. This argument can be easily refuted, as Williamson never claims that 
hierarchies are efficient in an absolute way. On the contrary hierarchies only arise 
when they are comparatively more efficient than the market (Williamson and 
Ouchi, 1981). Secondly, the element of the quest for market power is overlooked 
by Williamson, according to Perrow. Williamson and Ouchi dismiss this 
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argument, because it cannot be an explanation for the limits to firm growth, as 
this quest for power is unlimited. According to the market power argument 
forward and backward integration should never stop. 
Some criticism that is connected with organizational innovation specifically will 
now be treated. Firstly, the exclusive focus on efficiency as organizational goal is 
as much a limitation as in Chandler's work. Zajac and Olson (1993) show that 
there are not only transaction costs to be saved, but also transaction values to be 
gained. The focus on cost-saving should be supplemented with one on value 
creation. Hoskisson, Hill and Kim (1993) also have difficulty with the efficiency 
view, as next to efficiency many other factors may play a role in firm structure. 
They specifically refer to agency considerations (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1988; Van der Zaal, 1993). 
Secondly, the business environment is highly stylized and limited to aspects of 
bilateral relations. Only uncertainty and small numbers are part of the business 
environment. This is probably one of the reasons why the pluriformity of organi-
zational forms we observe in reality can be explained by the framework only to 
a limited extent. 
And indeed a third criticism is that Williamson limits his discussion of organiza-
tional forms mainly to the M-form. More specifically Williamson's framework has 
difficulty in explaining organization forms that are between market and hierarchy 
like networks (see e.g. Child, 1987; Beije, 1988). Different authors have tried to 
remedy this (e.g. Nooteboom (1992) by means of social cognitive factors; Zenger 
and Hesterly (1993) by pointing to the role of information technology; Ring and 
Van de Ven (1992) by elaborating on risk and trust; Williamson himself has tried 
to incorporate hybrid forms in his analysis as well (Williamson, 1991)). Schneiberg 
and Rogers Hollingsworth (1990) have shown that in the case of trade associa-
tions, transaction cost economics cannot explain the initial emergence of these 
associations. These associations are cooperations between firms that compete with 
each other and have no transactions going on between them. It is therefore 
impossible for characteristics of transactions to explain the emergence of a 
cooperation, as between the cooperating firms transactions were non-existent. 
Most notably, Chandler (1992b) rejects the framework for the reason that it is too 
limited in explaining pluriformity. This is remarkable as Williamson frequently 
makes use of the analyses provided by Chandler. Chandler, however, presents a 
different explanation for the observed shifts between markets and hierarchies, 
using a capability approach. He puts forth a theory in which for example a firm 
that lacks capable suppliers will develop the capabilities in house, while the 
presence of capable suppliers leads to market governed transactions. 
Lazonick (1991) provides an in-depth analysis of the work of Chandler and 
Williamson and claims that these cannot be reconciled. Table 3.2 gives some 
differences between Chandler and Williamson, as identified by the authors 
mentioned in the table. First of all Lazonick (1991, p. 213) points to the fact that 
Chandler developed a theory of the innovative organization that changes its 
environment, while Williamson developed a theory of the adaptive organization, 
that can only adapt to a given economic environment and not change it (Johanson 
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and Mattson (1987) provide a similar critique). In terms of figure 1.1, in 
Williamson's work the feedback loop from organizational innovation to the 
environment is missing. 
Table 3.2 Some differences between the work of Chandler and Williamson 
Chandler Williamson 
Lazonick (1991) 
• Theory of the innovative organi-
zation (p. 213) 
• Dynamic (p. 216) 
• Explains the initial derivation of 
administrative coordination, vertical 
integration, M-form (pp. 233-261) 
• Theory of the adaptive organization 
• Static 
• Organizational Failures Framework 
does not explain these 
Nelson (1991) 
• Theory about innovation: trial and 
error (p. 66) 
• Theory about choice between different 
existing governance structures (no trial 
and error) 
Foss (1993) 
• Coordination problems (p. 140) • Incentive problems 
Chandler (1992b) 
• Unit of analysis is firm (p. 85) • Unit of analysis is transaction 
Source: see indicated literature. 
Secondly, Williamson ignores "the dynamic interaction between technology and 
organization" and builds a static framework that assumes all enterprises face the 
same cost conditions (Lazonick, 1991, p. 216). This cannot be reconciled with a 
capability approach, because differences in capabilities lead to differences in cost 
curves between firms. 
Thirdly, regarding the empirical material Lazonick shows that Williamson's 
examples do not agree with Chandler's, despite the fact that Williamson claims 
that he made use of Chandler's studies. In this regard administrative coordination 
is not explained by Williamson in the same way as Chandler did. It did not arise 
because of opportunism, but because of safety requirements (Lazonick, 1991, p. 
233); it did not arise between the small railroads, but in the larger ones (Lazonick, 
1991, p. 234); and opportunism between established railroad operators did not 
bring down railroad cartels (thereby forcing companies to grow internally), but 
new speculators did (Lazonick, 1991, p. 235). Next, backward integration between 
production and distribution cannot be explained solely by means of transaction 
costs, as economies of speed were also central to the success of that strategy 
(Lazonick, 1991, p. 240). This integration was not as much cost saving as it was 
value creating. Also, Williamson's account of the emergence of the multidivisional 
form in Du Pont differs in two ways from Chandler: boundaries on rationality 
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were no cause of unknown developments, but were caused by Du Pont's diversi-
fication strategy (p. 253); opportunistic subgoal pursuit by lower level managers 
did not cause the breakdown of the old organizational structure, as in Du Pont 
at that time no goals were set at all, which situation left managers free to act as 
they saw fit (p. 254). In General Motors, Williamson also claims that division 
managers were opportunistically pursuing their own goals instead of the firm's. 
This however was not true, as the division managers were members of the 
executive committee and thus were setting the goals. In fact, the company goals 
and the division goals coincided. 
A fourth objection in relation to the way Williamson's work relates to Chandler's 
is the way in which Williamson treats organizational innovation. He does not 
really go into detail about the question how these innovations arise. Williamson 
assumes that different organizational structures are present, do not have to be 
developed and can be implemented by any company when it wants to. As 
pointed out by Nelson (1991) this is in great contradiction to historical descrip-
tions made by Chandler. Indeed the coming into being of a new organizational 
form is a gradual and incremental process. "Nowhere does he (Williamson) 
recognize explicitly the halting, trial and feedback, often reactive rather than 
thought-through, process that led to the new ways of organizing that Chandler 
describes" (Nelson, 1991, p. 66). The framework may be an ex-post rationalization. 
From an evolutionary perspective, Williamson's organizational failures framework 
can be seen as a description of the selection environment in which a new 
organizational form has to work . It does however provide no explanation of the 
"initial derivation of a system" (Hodgson, 1988, p. 214). 
Fifthly, Foss (1993, p. 140) states that Chandler is more concerned with problems 
of coordination of activities, whereas the Williamson contractual perspective deals 
with incentive problems. Chandlerian perspectives deal with coordination in 
situations of innovation, whereas contractual perspectives are of relevance for 
economic organization when inputs, outputs and technology are given (compare 
with static efficiency and dynamic improvement in section 1.2.2). This is strongly 
connected to Chandler's point (Chandler, 1992b) that the unit of analysis of 
Williamson is different from the one focussed on by Chandler. Williamson studies 
transactions, whereas Chandler studies the firm. Consequently, Chandler claims 
that in Williamson's theory the attention for firm skills and assets is limited in 
comparison to his own work. 
CONCLUSION 
Williamson holds that organizational innovations arise because of market failure 
and problems internal to organizations. Most important seems to be the first 
reason. Efficiency is the key to new organizational forms. The firm sometimes is 
superior as a coordinating mechanism to the market. Although Williamson's 
framework is a remarkable achievement, his ideas have some drawbacks which 
Throughout time this environment may change however. Hoskisson, Hill and Kim (1993) 
claim for instance that the market failures identified by Williamson, may have been lifted 
by new financial instruments and institutional shareholdership. 
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make them less applicable in explaining the emergence of new organizational 
forms (although perhaps not less relevant in explaining their efficiency). The 
absence of the study of historically developed characteristics of a firm (an inside-
out factor), the limited role the environment plays (an outside-in factor) and the 
narrow focus on efficiency, make that the pluriformity of organizational forms the 
framework can explain, is limited. 
The question of how organizational forms emerge out of an interaction between 
different determinants, is the subject of this research. Williamson is concerned 
with a different question, namely the efficiency of existing forms, not the creation 
of new ones. 
3.3.4 The flexible specialization scenario 
The previous sections on Schumpeter, Chandler and Williamson have all pointed 
at the fact that they only discussed a limited amount of organizational innovations 
and were especially weak on explaining interorganizational innovations. In this 
section, literature on a much discussed interorganizational innovation of a more 
recent date than the ones analysed by the mentioned triumvirate, is reviewed to 
see what it can contribute to the theory of organizational innovation, namely 
flexible specialization. Most important for this subject is Best (1990), but one of the 
first books dealing with the subject is Piore and Sabel's The Second Industrial Divide 
(1984), which heavily inspired Best's work. Research into flexible specialization is 
directed at new forms of interorganizational relations, often between smaller 
firms. These interorganizational relations show the relevance of extending the 
concept of organizational form beyond pure intra-organizational forms. 
Piore and Sabel's The Second Industrial Divide 
Piore and Sabel were among the first to point to new and competitive models of 
organizing production by means of flexible specialization. The basic claim of Piore 
and Sabel is "that the present deterioration in economic performance results from 
the limits of the model of industrial development that is founded on mass 
production" (p. 4). As a substitute of mass production Piore and Sabel propose a 
flexible specialization scenario, that goes back to old craft methods of production. 
Both systems are viewed as technological developments initiated and maintained 
by political processes. The authors claim that in the nineteenth century a first 
industrial divide took place in which mass production became the dominant 
method of production, instead of the craft alternative. The choice of technology 
was not primarily based on economical reasons, but depended on the distribution 
of power and wealth and was therefore essentially a political process. Mass 
production was in the interest of the dominant group in society and therefore 
emerged victorious. As it needed stable markets the modern corporation was 
invented as a tool to stabilize mass markets. In conjunction, later, with Keynesian 
governmental policies this was a system that worked well into the twentieth 
century. 
Piore and Sabel discuss this development in a historical cross-country analysis. 
Developments in France, Germany, Italy and Japan are compared. In France and 
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Germany mass production emerged, albeit in a different form; in Italy craft 
production remained the dominant paradigm while in Japan an intermediate form 
of production came into being. The reason for these differences lies in specific 
historical conditions in those countries. The overall picture of the world economy 
in the first sixty years of the century, can be summarized in four points: mass 
production won, market stabilization was necessary, the state played a dominant 
role in creating and stabilizing markets and workers using the same equipment, 
were differently organized in each country (p. 164). 
It are exactly these last differences that determine how each country reacts to the 
crisis, that according to Piore and Sabel became apparent in the mass production 
paradigm in the late 1960's. Social unrest, the oil crises, floating exchange rates 
and the breaking up of mass markets are some of the reasons why mass 
production ran into difficulty. Especially the alleged breaking up of mass markets 
is important. Piore and Sabel claim that once mass markets began to stagnate in 
the 1970's, firms started differentiating products and re-educating customers. This 
strategy eventually made the standardization of the mass production paradigm 
inappropriate. This is the reason that we now are in the middle of a second 
industrial divide, in which craft production (in a twentieth century form called 
flexible specialization) has a chance of becoming the dominant production 
method, as it probably can provide more diversified products than mass pro-
duction. Countries will react differently to the identified crisis; the authors claim 
that in the United States for instance flexible specialization is unlikely to emerge. 
Also flexible specialization is not expected to come up in all industries. It will be 
concentrated in certain segments. 
Flexible specialization can come in four "institutional settings" (p. 265-267), which 
in the terminology developed in chapter 2 are four new organizational forms: 
1. Regional Conglomerations. These are regionally concentrated groups of 
comparatively small companies working in the same industry. No firm is 
permanently dominant; enterprises cooperate in unions; there are trade 
associations and cooperatives for purchasing materials and the productive 
units of the production process are not formally linked. Examples can be 
found in the New York garment district and Emilia-Romagna in Italy. 
2. Federated Enterprises. These are federations of enterprises, holding each 
others stocks and having interlocking boards of directors. The current loose 
federations of Japanese enterprises, coming out of the more strictly coupled 
zaibatsu, are examples of this form of flexible specialization. 
3/4 "Solar" Firms and Workshop Factories. Piore and Sabel do not go into 
specific differences among these forms. Solar firms consist of a core firm 
with a network of suppliers around it. Workshop factories are internally 
decentralized factories. Usually these enterprises have a large size, but their 
internal organization is craft-based. This model of organization reverts to old 
organizational forms from the nineteenth century. 
The basic characteristics of these four forms are flexibility and specialization, 
limited entry of new firms, encouragement of competition of firms against firms, 
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but at the same time limits on competition on especially the procurement of 
production factors. These characteristics have led to a high innovativeness. 
CRITICISM 
Williams et al. (1987) challenges the proposition that mass production replaced 
craft production for the reasons given by Piore and Sabel. Based on an in depth 
case study of Ford, Williams et al. prove that it was the inherent economic 
advantage of mass production that explains its the rise and not the power of a 
dominant group in society. They further point out the limited amount of empirical 
material in Piore and Sabel's book to support the difference between mass 
production and flexible specialization. Next, the alleged breaking up of mass 
markets, is said not to be supported by any data. More importantly, diversifica-
tion of consumer demand does not necessarily lead to a demise of mass pro-
duction, because different variants of products can be mass produced, as is shown 
in the car industry (see Coriat (1991) for a related argument). This amounts to a 
Neo-Fordist account, in which mass production becomes increasingly flexible, as 
opposed to a Post-Fordist account, in which the end of mass production is 
expected to be near (Dunford and Benko, 1991). 
Teague (1990) agrees with these points and adds that Piore and Sabel have 
stressed the extremes, thereby neglecting the pluriformity of business strategies 
and accompanying organizational forms that have existed throughout history 
(Winch (1992), Amin (1993) and Best (1990, p. 9/10) put forth similar critiques). 
The specific examples used by Piore and Sabel have been criticized as well. Winch 
(1992) provides a different analysis of the construction industry than Piore and 
Sabel. Yet there have also been identified other empirical examples that support 
their ideas and provide similar examples of regionally concentrated flexible 
specialization (e.g. Karlsson and Wiklund, 1992; Herrigel, 1993). 
With regard to the theory of organizational innovation Piore and Sabel do 
incorporate the business environment as an explanatory factor of the emergence 
of new organizational forms. One of the core determinants they identify is 
demand. Several chance elements like the oil crisis and the decision to let 
exchange rates float are mentioned as well. Their analysis however does remain 
on a rather general macro-level. Next, Piore and Sabel have a clear focus on 
technology as a dominating factor, not withstanding their claim that people 
working with the same technology can be organized differently. Furthermore, the 
development of new forms is not traced back in any great detail. 
Best's The New Competition 
The main contribution of Piore and Sabel lies in the fact that they have brought 
to the foreground some interesting forms of organization that were ignored before 
they wrote their book. Especially their emphasis on interorganizational innova-
tions is of interest. 
Also, as may be evident from the discussion above, their work has led to an 
amount of follow-up studies that have expanded their theory. One of the people 
who draw heavily on Piore and Sabel but avoids some of the pitfalls of their 
analysis is Best (1990) in The New Competition. Best does not try to give an overall 
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historical account of the developments of entire economies. Some points of 
criticism of Piore and Sabel are thereby avoided. For instance strict interpretations 
of the breaking up of mass markets are not presented in Best's work. His work 
differs from Piore and Sabel in four ways relevant for organizational innovation: 
1. Firstly, more than Piore and Sabel he puts the analysis of organizational ideas 
central in his analysis as opposed to technology. As was shown in table 2.2, 
he develops a definition of organizational innovation: "Firms that develop 
new rules that enable cooperative actions are engaging in organizational 
innovation" (p. 116). 
2. Secondly, the firm is seen as a strategic actor striving for competitive 
advantage by means of organizational innovation (p. 10). Therefore Best is 
capable of analyzing more forms of organization, than Piore and Sabel, whose 
division in mass and craft production is too general. The pluriformity of 
organizations is a central point in Best's analysis. In this regard Best's work 
is also an improvement over Chandler and Williamson, who ignore recent 
developments as networks, regional conglomerations etc. and limit themselves 
to the one organizational goal of efficiency. 
3. Thirdly, Best also draws heavily on Chandler's work. In depth analysis of the 
emergence of organizational forms not only underlines the environmental 
influence on organizational innovation, but also the evolutionary way in 
which these innovations come about. Pertaining to the role of the environ-
ment, Best does not give an overview of the relevant elements constituting an 
outside-in approach. Government, competition and country specific factors all 
have an impact at one time or another, but a rigorous analysis of how, why 
and when these determinants are important is lacking. 
4. Finally, Best incorporates an inside-out perspective of the learning firm based 
on Penrose. Resources owned by the firm and knowledge developed in the 
firm play a role in this inside-out perspective. 
Best claims that a new form of competition has emerged in the last years, which 
is named the New Competition. "The idea of the New Competition is of pro-
ductive systems oriented to continuous improvement in product and process, 
whereas the Old Competition is a productive system geared to minimize cost for 
a given product and process" (p. 227). In other words innovation has replaced 
efficiency. This observed shift, underpinned by some fascinating case studies, 
enables Best to include both Piore and Sabel's work as well as Chandler's in his 
analysis. The way in which organizational innovations come about in both forms 
of competition are analysed in a Chandlerian way: organizational innovations 
come into being by a process of incremental change in existing organizational 
forms in which many factors identified by Chandler play a role (see for instance 
Best's account of the Springfield Armory and the Just-in-Time system). 
Best identifies four characteristics of the New Competition: 
1. The firm is a collective entrepreneur. This kind of firm "seeks strategic 
advantage on the basis of Schumpeterian innovation in product, process, or 
organization" (p. 11) instead of seeking profit maximization by minimizing 
costs, as in the Chandler and Williamson frameworks. 
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2. Consultative coordination in the production chain. In the New Competition 
an analysis based on a dichotomy between markets and hierarchies does not 
hold. "Allowance must be made for consultative coordination or cooperation 
amongst mutually interdependent firms each of which specializes in distinct 
phases of the same production chain" (p. 15). 
3. A balance between competition and cooperation in the sector. Cooperation in 
the New Competition does not come in the form of cartels, but in the form 
of "a variety of inter-firm practices and extra-firm agencies such as trade 
associations, apprenticeship programs, labor education facilities, joint 
marketing arrangements, and regulatory commissions" (p. 17). But care must 
be taken that competition is not stifled. This is done by creating the 
cooperative institutions in such a way, that price (Neoclassical) competition 
is restricted, while Schumpeterian competition (competition on innovation) is 
maintained by keeping it outside these cooperative institutions. By using 
marketing associations or combined purchasing, costs are the same for every 
firm. This means that firms will have to find another way to distinguish 
themselves from each other. This way is innovation. 
4. A strategic industrial policy. Government's purpose is not to substitute 
planning for markets but it is "to shape and use" markets. Industrial policies 
are not used for distributional purposes, but promote the New Competition 
e.g. by maintaining the balance between competition and cooperation along 
the lines laid down in the previous paragraph. Also policy is strategic, in that 
it targets sectors for growth with the goal to increase the value added to 
resources. 
Best applies this framework to Japan and the Third Italy (so called because it 
provides an alternative to the industrial north and agricultural south of the 
Mediterranean country). Best identifies a variety of Italian organizational 
innovations ranging from industrial parks to all sorts of interfirm consortia. 
CRITICISM 
One cannot escape the feeling that Best has focussed on extremes in defining the 
old and new competition, whereas both organizational models co-exist (Tomlin-
son, 1992). This is a bit surprising because next to marked differences there also 
is a considerable amoirht of continuity between the two. The question can be 
asked whether the JIT system (belonging to the New Competition) would have 
been developed without the assembly line (belonging to the Old Competition). 
The way in which these organizational innovations come about points to a 
continuity in history that is largely overlooked by Best. This alleged discontinuity 
between Old and New may be accounted for by time-gap there is between the 
examples Best gives of the Old Competition (which mainly plays before the 
Second World War) and the New Competition (the examples of which are mainly 
drawn from the 1970's and 1980's). 
Finally, Perrow (1992) in a praising review of Best's book points to the fact that 
organization theory plays a limited role in his analysis. Yet, Perrow states, Best 
comes a long way and it seems that the contribution organization theory can 
make to his theory is limited. The only limitation in this regard is that Best 
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ignores recent developments in the tradition of research into theories of the firm, 
started by Penrose. Here, Perrow probably refers to the resource-based tradition 
and evolutionary economics (see chapter 4), which might have provided an even 
stronger underpinning of Best's theory of the firm. 
The case of the Third Italy has become an exemplar (Kuhn, 1962) in literature on 
competitiveness and organizational innovation. Detailed studies have been 
assembled by Inzerilli (1990,1991) and include Becattini (1991), Dei Ottati (1991) 
and Fua (1991). Bianchi and Gualtieri (1990) question the viability of the Italian 
scenario. In the 1970's and early 1980's the Third Italy was successful as small 
companies filled in the gaps in the market left open by inflexible hierarchical mass 
producers. Now these producers have restructured to more flexible organization 
types and therefore are able to outcompete small companies, also in the niches. 
As a reaction to the increased competition by large firms in the late 1980's a 
merger wave took place in Emilia-Romagna, especially in foodstuffs and the 
machine industry. Consequently, the small scale characteristics of production in 
the region are changing. Yet, the social relations developed in the region retard 
the restructuring of the district. Herrigel (1993) reasons in the opposite direction. 
In the case of Baden-Wurttemberg he found that the flexible specialization 
scenario could develop exactly because of the implementation of more flexible 
structures in large firms. The contracting out that was connected to flexibilization 
of large firms provided the possibilities for small firms to develop in the direction 
of the flexible specialization scenario. 
Hence, the viability of flexible specialization is still subject to debate, mirroring 
the debate on the much predicted decline of big business. All this merely confirms 
the idea implicit in Best (1990) that organizational forms are not static but 
dynamic. They evolve constantly. 
CONCLUSION 
Concluding, the flexible specialization scenario has been analysed most clearly by 
Best. Best also incorporates other organizational innovations in his analysis. The 
empirical support given by Best and Piore and Sabel, may not justify the con-
clusion of a large scale shift into the flexible specialization scenario. The stress on 
two extreme ways of organizing is another drawback of Best's analysis. 
Best does take competitive advantage as an organizational goal and discusses a 
wide range of pluriform organizational forms. Best's contribution is that he 
analyses both intra- and interfirm organizational changes as organizational 
innovations. Moreover he shows that the trial and error character of intra-
organizational innovation also applies to interorganizarional innovation. Together 
with the stress on resources and firm-specific knowledge, this combines to an 
inside-out perspective that incorporates historical contingency. 
The outside-in perspective is present as well, but again in a rather unstructured 
way. Different environmental determinants have an impact on organizational 
innovation, but no overview of the determinants is given. Neither is a fullblown 
discussion presented of the way in which these determinants influence the 
emergence of new organizational forms. 
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3.3.5 Lazonick 
Lazonick believes that the way work is organized, plays a central role in national 
competitiveness. He provides an analysis of the relative economic decline and rise 
of countries in relation to the organizational forms in use in those countries. As 
part of this analysis, he touches upon the subject of how the various 
organizational forms come into being. The discussion of Lazonick's work below, 
will mainly highlight this latter part of his work. 
Lazonick (1990) puts the relation between labour and management central in his 
analysis of national shifts of competitive advantage. Labour-management relations 
determine the organization of work on the shop-floor. Central to this is the 
relation between effort and pay: effort must be sufficiently remunerated, in order 
to develop cooperative relations. Effort-saving technology is a key to these 
relations as it enlarges profits, out of which higher wages can be paid. This will 
induce workers to keep up their efforts. Rising productivity will mean higher 
profits, lower prices, higher wages and eventually industrial dominance for firms. 
Once workers observe that their efforts are sufficiently rewarded, they will be 
cooperative. 
Lazonick's account is historical and starts by analyzing the rise of England as an 
industrial power in the 18th and 19th century. English cotton manufacturers rose 
to dominance by means of a system of production that required many skills on 
the shop floor. Gradually, through a series of strikes and negotiations, a system 
developed in which management lost power to workers. This labour control 
meant that no investments in effort-saving technology took place and that no 
managerial elite developed. As a consequence productivity did not rise and 
England gradually lost out to American competitors. 
The Americans developed a managerial elite that took skills of the shop floor and 
invested in effort-saving technology. Next to higher wages, made possible by the 
realization of economies of spged embodied in the new production technology, 
American managers offered security of employment to workers. These develop-
ments led to cooperative relations between management and labour, which 
provided the basis for rising productivity and thereby America's economic 
dominance. This system collapsed in the 1960's (p. 280) because of tightening 
labour markets (increasing turnover and absenteeism of workers) and social 
unrest. 
It was then, that the Japanese took over. By putting skills back on the shop floor 
and promising employment stability, cooperative relations developed. This 
enabled them to reap the benefits of new effort saving technology. What Lazonick 
tries to show is that long term commitments between management and workers 
are the source of lasting competitive advantage. 
The empirical support for his ideas is broad as far as the English situation is 
concerned. Lazonick does however not elaborate on the collapse of the American 
system and his analysis of the Japanese system is very limited (French, 1992). It 
would also be interesting to know whether Lazonick's ideas are equally applicable 
to other industries then those discussed (cotton spinning and car manufacturing). 
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It may for instance be questioned whether his framework holds for service 
industries. 
In Lazonick (1991), Lazonick meets some of these criticisms. Again, the firm (and 
specifically its organization structure) is seen as the engine of economic 
development: "Because capitalist economies ultimately rely on the strategies and 
structures of business enterprises to create value, the analysis of the process of 
value creation requires an explicit conception of the value-creating business 
organization" (p. 15). In Lazonick's view, the capitalist economy is not so much 
a market economy as an economy guided by organizations. He considers three 
countries (Great-Britain, the U.S.A and Japan) and defines three forms of capitalist 
development that prevailed in these countries and were at the basis of the 
countries' economic success. The first form is proprietary capitalism that was in 
use in England. It was replaced by managerial capitalism that emerged in the 
U.S.A. and made America the number one economic power in the world (the 
proprietary and managerial form are similar to Chandler's (1990) personal and 
competitive managerial capitalism). The third form, collective capitalism, is the 
Japanese form that threatens the dominance of American managerial capitalism. 
The word "collective" refers to the considerable amount of cooperation inside 
firms, between them and between firms and government. In short Lazonick's 
thesis is that the relative economic demise of a country is related to the rise of a 
more successful model elsewhere that the country is unable to emulate, mainly 
because social institutions prevent adaptation to new organizational models. 
According to Lazonick, next to institutional barriers which inhibit organizational 
innovation there is another determinant which stimulates it: competition. 
Competitive uncertainty pressures firms to restructure in such a way that 
competitive uncertainty is replaced by productive uncertainty (p. 246). Productive 
uncertainty is the uncertainty in the firm's production process (or productive 
capabilities (p. 199)) and its human resources. Productive uncertainty is easier 
manageable than competitive uncertainty, Lazonick claims. One of the ways in 
which competitive uncertainty can be replaced by productive uncertainty is 
vertical integration, which can guarantee stable markets or insure the flow of 
resources into the production process. Hence, Lazonick defines two outside-in 
factors (competitive uncertainty and institutional barriers) and one inside-out 
factor (productive uncertainty consisting of capabilities and human resources). 
Lazonick (1991) is not so much concerned with developing a theory of organiza-
tional innovation, as with criticizing the dominant theories of the firm in use in 
mainstream economics. His analysis of organizational forms is aimed at showing 
that Williamson's theory of the adaptive enterprise as he calls it, is not sufficient 
to explain economic developments and shifts in competitiveness (see table 3.2 for 
Lazonick's critique of Williamson). Instead, he develops a theory of the innovative 
enterprise in which competitive uncertainty is converted into better manageable 
productive uncertainty and higher-quality products can be generated at lower unit 
costs. In this theory the organizational form used, is of prime importance in 
explaining the dynamics of capitalism on a national scale. Again however the 
pluriformity of organizational forms discussed, is limited. Lazonick mainly 
concentrates his arguments on vertical integration. 
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His contribution to the theory of organizational innovation lies in the fact that he 
delineates the role of competition (an outside-in factor) in relation to productive 
uncertainty (an inside-out factor consisting of capabilities and human resources). 
Both elements play a role in shaping new organizational forms but exactly how 
they do so remains unclear. The importance Lazonick attaches to new organiza-
tional designs, stresses the need for further research into the way new organiza-
tional forms emerge. 
3.3.6 Population ecology 
As was pointed out in chapter 2, surprisingly little is said about organizational 
innovation by organization theorists. They mainly study the characteristics of 
existing organizational forms (Grandori, 1993) and the relation to their environ-
ment, but pay hardly any attention to the coming into being of new ones. 
Organizational innovation, in the scarce instances when the word is used, is 
equated by them with reorganization (the implementation of an existing 
organization form that is different than the form that was in use by the firm 
before the reorganization took place). As Perrow (1992) pointed out, Best (1990) 
was able to contribute a theory of organizational innovation without making use 
of organization theory. Yet it would be an audacious claim to suggest that 
organization theory has nothing to say on organizational innovation at all. 
Contingency theory (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pugh, 
Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1969; Lawrence and Dyer, 1983) for example broke 
the ground for the outside-in perspective which is relevant for the current subject. 
Without its insight that the environment and the organization form are connected, 
the question how the environment influences organizational innovation would 
probably not have been asked. 
Nonetheless, Grandori and Perrow's observations contain a large amount of truth. 
One of the exceptions however is population ecology theory, that has looked into 
the emergence of new organizational forms. Its contribution will be discussed 
briefly. In the next chapter, the related evolutionary view of economics will be 
used to construct an inside-out perspective on organizational innovation. In order 
to clarify the differences between these two perspectives, they are compared here. 
The population ecology theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Aldrich, 1979) 
studies the organizational form at the population level. Not the way individual 
firms interact with their specific environment is object of study, but the way 
groups of similar firms fit in their environment. The environment selects the 
optimal form (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Aldrich (1979) summarizes his 
position in the words variation, selection, retention: a variation in organizational 
form is subject to environmental selection and if it survives, it retains its 
characteristics. 
For the subject of organizational innovation there are several points of interest. 
First of all, organizational innovation is not treated as a process. The influence of 
selection on organizational forms is subject of research, not the reasons how and 
why these forms emerge. Of course the level of analysis in population ecology 
precludes such an analysis. Furthermore, in Aldrich (1979) organizational 
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innovation is not so much defined as a new way of coordinating activities (which 
is the focus here), but as the establishment of a new firm. Next, it does not seem 
possible for organizations to influence their environment. Although this idea does 
not by necessity mean that the population ecology view is a deterministic theory 
(Grandori, 1987), it does limit an organizations' strategic choices. Competitive 
advantage as organizational goal is not incorporated in this view. Aldrich (1979) 
by integrating resource-dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in his model has 
incorporated some more voluntaristic elements in his theory. 
Nevertheless, the population ecology has some interesting ideas on organizational 
innovation. Even though the innovative process is not treated, Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) clearly establish the influence of environmental constraints on 
organizational innovation: new organizational forms arise when extra constraints 
emerge (p. 944). Consequently, according to population ecology theory, the need 
for an outside-in approach when explaining organizational innovation, is obvious. 
Unfortunately, the conceptualization of the business environment provided by 
Hannan and Freeman is not very operational. 
Also interesting for organizational innovation however, is the treatment of 
structural inertia. Hannan and Freeman (1977,1984) give an analysis of the factors 
prohibiting firms to change, from both an inside-out and an outside-in per-
spective. These inertial pressures are a cause of the selection process. Firms are 
selected for their reliability and accountability. These two factors limit the 
possibility for a firm to change. 
In chapter 4 an evolutionary perspective on organizational innovation will be 
developed. Because both the evolutionary and the population ecology view make 
use of a biological metaphor, there may be some confusion as to what the 
differences between these views are. In table 3.3 some of the differences between 
population ecology and evolutionary theory have been assembled, as defined by 
Winter (1990) and Grandori (1987). 
Table 3.3 Differences between population ecology and evolutionary theory 
Population ecology 
• No intra-population variation 
• Emphasis on legitimacy 
• Size does not matter 
• Adaptation at the population 
• Optimal forms 
Evolutionary theory 
Winter (1990) 
level 
• Firm differences 
• Emphasis on competence 
• Size matters 
• Adaptation at firm level 
Grandori (1987) 
• Superior forms 
Sources: based on Winter (1990, pp. 286-292), Grandori (1987, p. 106). 
Because in population ecology, "intra-population variance in (genotypic) fitness 
is not among the variables considered" (Winter, 1990, p. 286), it is not concerned 
82 CHAPTER THREE 
with explaining the pluriformity of organizational forms. As Douma and 
Schreuder (1991, p. 164) put it, in population ecology "the organization is a 
relatively empty box". Furthermore, the perspective taken is not a strategic one, 
as in the competence view of evolutionary theory. Instead, legitimacy is the factor 
that makes a firm survive. Organizational size is not deemed of much importance 
in population ecology, whereas in evolutionary theory it is. Population ecology 
mainly studies the number of firms in an environment, without looking at the 
impact that big firms can have on the business environment. Fourthly, in popu-
lation ecology adaptation takes place at the population level. In the evolutionary 
view on the other hand, firms adapt their routines. Finally, Grandori (1987, p. 106) 
points out that Hannan and Freeman (1977, p. 939) state that "it is the environ-
ment which optimizes". The notion of optimal organizational forms can however 
be criticized: "Indeed, the mere fact that the environment helps to select 
organizational forms as well as decisionmaking processes in firms themselves 
does not necessarily imply that both these processes are governed by an 
optimizing logic. Both the firms and the environment may simply select organi-
zational arrangements that are superior to other current arrangements at that time 
in that environment rather than select optimal arrangements" (Grandori, 1987, p. 
106). The next chapter will show that Grandori's opinion is supported by evolu-
tionary economics: no optimal forms emerge, only superior ones. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Table 3.4 gives an overview of some of the theories discussed so far. The table 
presents the motive firms have, the means with which they try to achieve their 
goal and the determinants (inside-out and outside-in) that influence the means 
used. The unit of analysis is given and the specific contribution the author made 
to the schema of analysis in figure 1.1. 
Based on the requirements for a theory of organizational innovation presented in 
section 3.2 the following conclusions apply: 
• especially the outside-in view of organizational innovation has been under-
developed. Although there seems to be agreement among the authors reviewed 
that organizational innovation is context dependent, a well-structured 
discussion is lacking. The way different elements from the business environ-
ment influence organizational innovation has not been discussed. For instance 
the question whether, how and why different determinants in the business 
environment influence organizational innovation is not treated. Chapter 5 will 
make a start in dealing with this subject. 
• the inside-out approach has been filled in by Chandler and Best. Some further 
conceptualization may take place in this area and the next chapter will extend 
some of Chandler en Best's observations and try to provide a stronger con-
ceptual basis to their views, by connecting them to the theory of innovation. 
• pertaining to the pluriformity of organizational forms, existing theories have not 
really dealt with that. Chapter 4 will show that the concept of routines can deal 
with this subject, while chapter 5 will show that the environment is a 
determinant of pluriformity as well. None of the theories discussed related the 
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determinants identified to specific reconfigurations of the value system: the 
theories did not link the determinants of innovation to specific changes in 
linkages and activities. 
• the goal of competitive advantage has been studied in relation to organizational 
innovation by Best and Lazonick. Chapters 1 and 2 have also discussed this 
issue. The different forms of competitive advantage, extending far beyond 
efficiency, can be related to different forms of organization. 
Table 3.4 Views on organizational innovation summarized t± 
Author 
(section) 
Schumpeter 
(3.3.1) 
Chandler 
(3.3.2) 
Williamson 
(3.3.3) 
Best 
(3.3.4) 
Lazonick 
(3.3.5) 
Hannan and 
Freeman 
(3.3.6) 
Motive 
net present 
value of profits 
efficiency/cost 
efficiency/cost 
competitive 
advantage 
competitive 
advantage 
survival 
Means 
new combinations 
administrative coor-
dination (manage-
rial hierarchy) 
internalization 
organizational 
innovation 
organizational 
innovation 
strategy 
DETERMINANTS 
Inside-out 
technological 
capabilities 
internal organiza-
tional problems 
bounded rationality 
opportunism 
resources 
knowledge 
productive 
uncertainty 
(capabilities, human 
resources) 
inertial pressures 
Outside-in 
other innovations 
external barriers 
competition 
technology 
consumer demand 
country specific factors 
uncertainty/complexity 
small numbers 
government 
competition 
country specific factors 
competitive uncertainty 
institutional barriers 
increasing constraints 
inertial pressures 
Unit of 
Analysis 
firm 
firm 
transaction 
firm (intra-
and inter) 
firm 
population 
Specific contributions 
to the theory of orga-
nizational innovation 
• distinction between 
organizational and 
technological 
innovation 
• historical con-
tingency and trial 
and error (mainly 
inside-out) 
• management as actor 
• efficiency of new 
organizational forms 
analysed 
• interfirm relations 
incorporated in the 
theory 
• inside-out view 
based on Penrose 
• competitive advan-
tage as organiza-
tional goal 
• relation between an 
outside-in and an 
inside-out deter-
minant 
• necessity of outside-
in perspective clearly 
established 
Source: see indicated sections. 
4 
From the inside out 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the influences on organizational innovation comes from within organiza-
tions. The characteristics acquired by firms in the course of their existence 
influence the process of organizational change. Hence, the process of organi-
zational innovation is historically contingent. In this chapter, this historical 
contingency is analyzed by means of an evolutionary and resource-based per-
spective on the emergence of new organizational forms based on among others 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and associated literature. The perspective developed by 
Nelson and Winter (known as neo-Schumpeterian or evolutionary theory) is 
related to the resource-based approach, developed in strategic management, which 
will be briefly discussed as well. The method followed in this chapter is to apply 
concepts from the theory of technological innovation to organizational innovation. 
Some of the basic mechanisms applying to technology also hold for organization, 
while other concepts have to be adapted. 
An approach to organizational innovation based on what has come to be known 
as the Nelson/Winter/Dosi-paradigm and resource-based theory, fills in two of 
the requirements given in section 3.2. Firstly, it is well suited to fill in the inside-
out part of a theory of organizational innovation. The concepts developed in 
evolutionary economics and the resource-based approach incorporate a historical 
view on the internal development of firms. The perspective taken by both 
approaches is dynamic, in that they show how circumstances and decisions of one 
period of time, influence a firm's behavior in later time periods. As organizational 
innovations usually evolve over time such a dynamic perspective is a prerequisite 
for studying innovative phenomena. 
Secondly, both theories (evolutionary and resource-based) are able to cope with 
the pluriformity in organizational forms. The historical perspective taken by 
evolutionary and resource-based views contributes to an explanation of these 
differences, which are central to competitive advantage. Hence, evolutionary 
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theories are capable of providing a coherent inside-out view on organizational 
innovation that meets the demands discussed in section 3.2. 
The idea of applying evolutionary theory to organizational innovation is not new, 
but has not yet been worked out consistently. Williamson (1985, p. 404) for 
instance already stated that linking the Nelson and Winter approach to organiza-
tional innovation might be especially instructive. Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 38) 
hinted at the possibility that their evolutionary view might not be restricted to 
technological innovation: "in principle, an evolutionary theory can treat 
organizational innovation just as it treats technical innovation". This chapter will 
largely corroborate that statement, be it that some changes to the theory of 
technical innovation will be proposed in order to be able to analyze organizational 
innovation adequately. As far as the resource-based view of the firm is concerned, 
it was shown in section 3.3 that Chandler and Best had incorporated some aspects 
of it in their theories. Some elaboration of their views will take place in section 
4.5. 
The main aim of the chapter is to show that organizational innovation is a path 
dependent process. The search for new organizational forms is directed by existing 
organizational forms: "the general organizational concepts that one uses in 
designing a firm — such as the idea of the M-form studied by Chandler (1962) — 
certainly develop in an organic way from earlier forms" (Langlois, 1986, p. 19). 
Moreover, the process of development of organizational forms can be character-
ized as a search for the right solution. The uncertainty connected to this search 
process is the cause of the fact that the process is characterized by trial and error. 
Unexpected consequences of organizational changes, lack of knowledge of the 
way the structure works, imperfect foresight of organizational and environmental 
developments all contribute to this uncertainty. 
Firstly the evolutionary perspective will be discussed, emphasizing the notions of 
routines, trajectories and paradigms, with their respective applications to 
organizational innovation. Next, a short outline of the resource-based view will 
complement this discussion. In total three elements will be identified which make 
up the inside-out view on organizational innovation: routines, capabilities, 
resources. These attributes of path dependence guide organizational developments 
in a certain direction. The attributes are operationalizations of the variable path 
dependence and simplify empirical research. 
4.2 Static and dynamic routines 
The evolutionary approach "emphasizes the inevitability of mistaken decisions in 
an uncertain world, and the active, observable role of the economic environment 
in defining "mistakes" and suppressing the mistakes it defines" (Winter, 1991, p. 
187), hence search and trial and error are characteristic of evolutionary processes. 
Input for evolutionary economics mainly comes from Schumpeter's work, that can 
be read as a biological metaphor of economic developments. Alchian (1950) was 
one of the first to further develop this biological metaphor. His idea was that 
conscious profit maximization is unlikely to occur because of incomplete 
information and uncertain foresight. Instead, firms which by chance show good 
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results are selected by the environment to survive (environmental adoption as 
opposed to organizational adaptation). The biological metaphor of evolution and 
natural selection has since then proved to be a fruitful one for economic research. 
Hirshleifer (1977) provides numerous interesting parallels between biology and 
economics. This chapter will show that management research can benefit from an 
evolutionary view as well. 
Hayek (1979) provides an account of the evolution of institutions that is more or 
less a precursor of the account of organizational innovation given below. Hayek 
(1979, p. 154) stated: "What has yet to be more widely recognized is that the 
present order of society has largely arisen, not by design, but by the prevalence 
of the more effective institutions in a process of competition". These institutions 
came about by a process of incremental, evolutionary change (North, 1990). Here 
the focus will be narrower than Hayek's. Not institutions in general, but organi-
zational innovations will be analyzed. Moreover, an analysis of the role of the 
environment in organizational evolution will be postponed to the next chapter. 
Instead, the focus here is on those aspects of the evolutionary view which have 
contributed to an inside-out perspective. 
Well-structured ideas on evolutionary economics can be found in Nelson and 
Winter (1982), who use the concept of routines to explain innovation. Routines are 
"regular and predictable behavior patterns of firms" (p. 14) and as innovation is 
non-regular, it can be concluded that "innovation, involves a change in routine" 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 128), which often is a "combination of existing 
routines" (p. 130). Routines enable organizations to function, as they are the basis 
of the skills (at other places Nelson and Winter speak of "organizational capa-
bilities") that firms need in order to attain their goals. In short, Nelson and Winter 
claim that firms search for solutions to problems on the basis of routines that 
embody a firm's previous experiences. This means that innovations can not only 
be described as changes in routines, but routines direct the search for these 
changes as well. 
So in fact there are two different kinds of routines at work: one kind in which the 
innovation takes place and one kind which initiates the innovation and steers it 
in a certain direction. To distinguish between these two aspects, Nelson (1991) 
makes a distinction in lower order routines and routine-changing routines. In 
Nelson and Winter (1982) the former were referred to as operating characteristics, 
which govern short-run behavior (p. 16) while the latter were defined as "routines 
which operate to modify over time various aspects of their operating characteris-
tics" (p. 17). A hierarchy of routines can be constructed in which routine-changing 
routines act to judge or modify lower order routines. As lower order routines 
refer to processes in which there is no change and similar tasks are performed in 
similar ways and routine-changing routines refer to a situation of change and 
innovation, Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1992), coin them static and dynamic routines 
respectively. "Static routines embody the capacity to replicate previously performed 
tasks" (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1992, p. 28), whereas dynamic routines are directed 
at establishing something new (breaking the static routines). The conclusion to be 
drawn from this distinction, is that routine behavior is not necessarily inert 
(Vromen, 1994): dynamic routines guide and enable change. 
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The concept of routines had been developed before Nelson and Winter gave their 
account of routine behavior. Simon (1945) already used it to indicate that 
organizations are only rational in a limited way and regularly stick to fixed ways 
of working ("standard practices" as Simon (1945, p. 102) called them), that have 
proven successful in the past. Other authors, working in the field of organizatio-
nal change, have used similar ideas to explain firm behavior (e.g. Cyert and 
March (1963) use the concept of standard operating procedures). Later, routines 
have been related a.o. to organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1990) and 
corporate renewal (Mezias and Glynn, 1993). The concepts of industry recipes 
(Spender, 1989) and dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) are examples of 
standard practices on a higher level of analysis. 
Some characteristics of routines are (see table 4.1): 
• routines have a tacit dimension (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 76), which means 
that it is not always clear to the person performing the routine, precisely what 
conditions enable him to perform it. This tacit dimension inhibits other firms 
to easily imitate a competitor's routines. Consequently, a successful routine may 
lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (see table 1.5). 
• routines have a paradoxical characteristic: on the one hand they enable firms 
to act and change; they are the memory of an organization, without which an 
organization would be unable to function. On the other hand routines constrain 
firms in the activities to be performed: it is difficult for a firm to look for 
solutions beyond the prevailing routines, as the set of routines in use only 
allows a limited magnitude of change to take place. The reason for this may be 
that a firm does not have the required capabilities to go beyond current practice 
or is locked into its routine of problem solving and thereby is unable to 
perceive other approaches to dealing with problems. 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of Routines 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Tacit 
Enabling and restraining 
Repetitive 
Embodied in human and 
Easy identifiable 
physical assets 
Source: Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter (1990). 
• repetitiveness (Winter, 1990). Firms will tend to do those things which they 
have done successfully in the past. This means that change is often incremental: 
new routines will resemble the old so that change builds on past successes. 
There is therefore an element of path dependence in firm behavior (for the 
concept of path dependence see further below). Search for the solution of 
organizational problems is localized: one looks for solutions near to current and 
successful practice. This is a cognitive element of routines (Reve, 1990). 
• routines are embodied in human and physical assets (Winter, 1990). Hence, 
changing routines always comes at a cost as it requires the learning of new 
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ways of working, the unlearning of old ones and sometimes a considerable 
amount of new investment. It follows that routines are difficult to change. 
• similar routines are easy to identify as belonging to the same class (Winter, 
1990). This characteristic is especially relevant when detailed empirical research 
into routines and innovation is required. 
Path dependence 
Routines are a way of coping with uncertainty in the search for solutions to 
problems. It is impossible for firms to look at all possible solutions to a problem 
and retrieve the substantial amount of information that plays a role in dealing 
with this problem, so that satisficing behavior on the basis of routines takes place. 
As existing routines are the point of departure for solving problems, the way a 
problem is solved will reflect the original routines. This is called path depen-
dence : "Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link 
decision making through time" (North, 1990, p. 98) and "A path-dependent 
sequence of economic changes is one in which important influences upon the 
eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happe-
nings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces" (David, 1986, 
p. 30). Put differently, at the organization level firm specific circumstances at one 
point in time, can influence firm specific circumstances at a later point in time 
(path dependence will be discussed elaborately in section 4.3). The choice set of 
an organization can be limited by temporary events. The reaction to such a chance 
event can become embodied in routines so that long after the event took place it 
can still influence organizational decisions, because of the impact it had on the 
routines. 
Routines and organizational innovation 
Although various authors pointed to the possibility of analyzing organizational 
innovation in terms of the evolutionary view, it wasn't until Nelson (1991) that 
a first step in the application of this theory to the emergence of new organiza-
tional forms was made. In this article, Nelson begins to extend the Nelson and 
Winter framework with concepts taken from Chandler's work. Nelson however 
does not yet study organizational innovation as a separate phenomenon. In his 
view it is "usually a handmaiden to technological change" (p. 70). Miner (1994, 
p. 85) separates the organization from technology and claims that studying 
"recombination of administrative routines may yield more fundamental results" 
than studying technical routines. The possibility of studying the first routines is 
limited because the advance made in the theory of organizational innovation since 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1990,1995) have criticized the notion of path dependence, focusing 
on that kind of path dependence which researches the possibility of lock-in into suboptimal 
product standards. This is not to be confused with the concept of path dependence used 
here: in the present case it refers to patterns in the way changes follow each other in time. 
Here it is about dynamic processes instead of static market positions of product standards. 
It must be observed that this distinction (as well as other distinctions pointed at by 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995)) is not always recognized in the various papers dealing with 
the topic. 
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Nelson and Winter first provided their analysis of routines is limited, so that 
according to Miner the routines which define organizational innovation are less 
tractable than those defining technical innovation. In chapter 2 the value chain 
concept has been put forth in order to make organizational innovations more 
tractable in practice: routines can be distinguished by looking at shifts in activities 
and linkages. 
It is not that there has been no progress at all in the analysis of organizational 
innovation. There is widespread agreement that organizational forms can be de-
scribed in terms of routines. Winter (1990) for example uses the M-form as an 
example of a routine. When the terminology of static and dynamic routines is 
applied to this example, the M-form can be said to consist of different static 
routines, like reporting and control routines, which are performed regularly and 
according to a relatively fixed pattern. Changes in these static routines are 
organizational innovations. In addition, dynamic routines can be helpful in 
explaining the way in which static routines are changed2. In practice a change of 
routines can be attained by a reshuffling of activities and linkages in the value 
chain. Detailed analysis of changes in routines can take place by making use of 
the value chain concept as reconfigurations of the value chain cause people to 
work differently: that is they cause them to start a new static routine. Following 
Nelson and Winter, these reconfigurations will probably be near to the previous 
configuration of activities. 
In summary: 
Dynamic routines are historically grounded mechanisms, that partly direct the 
reconfiguration of the value chain. The fact that each firm has its own history and 
therefore its own dynamic and static routines, is one of the reasons for the existing 
pluriformity of organizational forms. 
Routines grounded in historical experience can contribute to an explanation of the 
way organizational forms evolve. This evolution has a path dependent character, 
as the organization form in time t co-determines the organization form in time 
t+1. "The past is retained in rules that guide the present" (March, 1994, p. 41). This 
element of path dependence will now be discussed more elaborately. 
In conclusion, dynamic routines guide organizational innovation in a certain 
direction. Moreover, their repetitive nature stimulates changes in the value chain. 
Illustrations of static and dynamic routines related to the value chain will be given in the 
empirical chapters, specifically sections 6.2.1 on JIT and 8.3.2 on European Distribution 
centers. 
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4.3 Trajectories and paradigms: path dependence in the development 
of new organizational forms 
4.3.1 Theoretical background 
Paradigms and trajectories in technological innovation 
In research on technological innovation path dependence can be found back in the 
concepts of technological paradigms and technological trajectories. The terms were 
coined by Dosi (1982) who points at the analogy of the technological paradigm 
concept with the concept as developed in epistemology (Kuhn, 1962). Dosi defines 
a technological paradigm as a ""model" and a "pattern" of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences 
and on selected material technologies" (p. 152). A technological trajectory is defined 
as "the pattern of "normal" problem solving activity (i.e. of "progress") on the 
ground of a technological paradigm" (p. 152). 
As among others Van den Belt and Rip (1984) point out, Dosi gives many 
examples of technological paradigms which unfortunately are not always com-
patible. Although the theory of paradigms has been extended since Dosi first 
noted the possibility of analyzing technology in terms of paradigms, there has 
been more concern with finding new paradigms (e.g. techno-economic paradigms 
(Freeman and Perez, 1988)) than with fundamentally defining what a paradigm 
is (Wijnberg, 1995, is an exception to this rule). The same holds for trajectories. 
Neither is it clear that paradigms can always be neatly distinguished in practice 
(Van den Belt and Rip, 1984, p. 34). Furthermore, even though paradigms can 
explain innovation within paradigms, Van den Belt and Rip claim that the 
emergence of a new paradigm cannot be explained. 
Despite these drawbacks, the notion of paradigms and trajectories is interesting 
for two reasons. First of all, the path dependence element inherent in it provides 
an explanation for innovation. The emergence of an innovation is explained by the 
fact that there is some logic in the innovative process, namely that innovations 
build on each other by means of reproduction of routines. Arthur (1988, p. 10) 
suggests four causes for this self-reinforcement: large set-up or fixed costs, 
learning effects, coordination effects (advantages to going along with others 
implementing an innovation) and adaptive expectations (one expects a successful 
innovation to spread further). These may lead to path dependence, next to 
multiple equilibria, possible inefficiency and lock-in. 
The second interesting feature of trajectories and paradigms is that they may 
explain shifting competitiveness. Companies and countries working in one 
paradigm may not be able to shift to a more successful paradigm, as routines 
have become entrenched (cf. the lock-in identified by Arthur). Being locked in a 
certain paradigm or trajectory may lead to an erosion of competitive advantage, 
when a new more successful paradigm or trajectory emerges elsewhere. 
Technological versus organizational paradigms and trajectories 
Can the idea of trajectories and paradigms be applied to organizational inno-
vation? Nelson (1991) and Kogut (1991) suggest that it can. As Kogut (1991, p. 37) 
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puts it: "There is, of course, no reason to limit this notion of a trajectory spreading 
within an economy to a narrow definition of technology. Changes in the organi-
zation of work, either at the factory, corporate, or industry level, can also follow 
a natural trajectory". He proceeds by giving three examples of organizational 
trajectories: the division of labour within the factory, the american system of 
manufacturing, the just-in-time system. Langlois (1984, 1986) also subscribes to 
such a viewpoint. 
In this regard, North (1990, p. 95) argues that Arthur's (1988) four causes of self-
reinforcement apply to all decision making in organizations. For organizational 
innovation, large setup costs are present: changing an organizational structure 
usually means a considerable disruption, and the costs associated to that can be 
immense. Learning effects can also be found: the longer an organization works 
with a certain structure, the smoother it will function, as the different pitfalls and 
drawbacks of the structure become known. As to coordination effects, it is easier 
(inside as well as between organizations) to change a structure in a direction near 
to current practice than in a radically new direction. Adaptive expectations can 
be found where a successful organizational innovation leads to the expectation 
that a similar innovation will be successful as well. Above that, the spread of a 
new organizational form to other firms acts as a legitimating force for further 
changes in the direction of that form, thus strengthening its trajectory of 
development. 
The idea of organizational paradigms has also emerged. Piore and Sabel (1984) 
use the paradigm concept to analyze historical developments. For instance, they 
describe the craft paradigm as a production model of which small companies form 
the basis. Pascale (1990) points to the usefulness of using the concept of 
paradigms in business. Not only prevailing conceptions on organizational forms, 
but also ideas on management in general can be analysed by means of the para-
digm concept. He specifically refers to hidden assumptions in the way manage-
ment operates. These two approaches do not pertain to organizational forms 
alone, but include some other variables as well. 
Zenger and Hesterly (1993) relate the idea of organizational paradigms to the 
development of organizational forms exclusively, when they attempt to explain 
"The "New Paradigm" of Organization", as the title of their paper is. In this new 
paradigm economic activity is "converging towards exchange involving either 
internal (within-firm) or external (between-firm) networks of small, autonomous 
production or service units" (p. 2). Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1993, p. 101) 
following Cooke and Morgan refer to this as the network paradigm. 
Following the authors mentioned above, the idea of paradigms and trajectories, 
will be used as an analogy for what can be observed in organizational innovation. 
Of course no analogy is a direct translation, but nevertheless it can be insightful 
to see whether the theory of technological innovation can be applied to organi-
zational innovation as well. It will be shown that though the concepts are not 
The idea of organizational paradigms used here is different from the one Grandori (1987) 
ascribes to Argyris and Schon (1978). Here it refers to organizational form, Grandori refers 
to knowledge and theories shared and used by organization members. 
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entirely similar, some of the basic mechanism do apply to both technological and 
organizational developments. Table 4.2 provides an overview of definitions of 
technological paradigms and trajectories together with the application to 
organizational forms. 
Table 4.2 Paradigms and trajectories: analogy with organizational innovation 
Paradigm 
Trajectory 
Technological paradigms and 
trajectories 
• "model" and a "pattern" of 
solution of selected technologi-
cal problems, based on selected 
principles derived from natu-
ral sciences and on selected 
material technologies" (Dosi, 
1982, p. 152) 
• examples given pertain to 
relatively narrowly defined 
technologies 
• contains several trajectories 
(Dosi, 1982; Utterback and 
Suarez, 1993) 
• "the pattern of "normal" 
problem solving activity (i.e. of 
"progress") on the ground of a 
technological paradigm" (Dosi, 
1982, p. 152) 
• "advance seems to follow 
advance in a way that appears 
almost inevitable" (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982, p. 258) 
• "are specific to a particular 
technology" (ibid) 
Organizational analogies of these 
concepts 
• organizational problems and 
organizational principles play a 
role and patterns can be 
discerned, but they are not so 
much derived from science and 
neither are they material, but 
social 
• examples given are broader in 
scope 
• idem (see table 4.5) 
• idem for organizational tra-
jectories 
• path dependence is also present 
• specific to a particular organi-
zation form (configuration of 
activities and linkages) 
Source: based on Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi (1982), Utterback and Suarez (1993), 
also see text. 
The definition of a technological paradigm given by Dosi (1982) may apply to 
organizational innovation in so far that organizational paradigms also are patterns 
of solutions. These solutions may incorporate selected organizational principles. 
The analogy seems to stop as soon as the role of science gets into play (although 
Grandori (1993) would like to invent organizational forms in an almost scientific 
way). Moreover the role of material technologies is absent in organizational 
paradigms (also see table 2.1). 
The examples given of technological paradigms usually refer to rather narrowly 
defined technologies. Van den Belt and Rip (1984, p. 35) assembled some of them: 
organic chemistry technologies, the internal combustion engine, semi-conductor 
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technologies etc. The organizational paradigms which can be defined are much 
broader in scope (in section 4.3.2 three paradigms will be defined). In relation to 
this, Dosi does not refer to exemplars (Kuhn, 1962) in paradigms, which according 
to Kuhn are exemplary achievements that serve as examples and reference points 
to scientists. For organizational innovation exemplars would be "best-practice" 
firms, using a certain organizational form and they can be found at the level of 
trajectories . 
From the broad range of possibilities present in a paradigm only a few mate-
rialize. These are called trajectories and every paradigm contains several of these. 
The paradigm only defines the "outer boundaries" (Dosi, 1982, p. 154) of the 
possible developments. Table 4.5 will show that within organizational paradigms 
various trajectories can be found as well. Trajectories (both technological and 
organizational) are the patterns of actual problem solving within the boundaries 
of the paradigm (Dosi, 1982, p. 152). Interesting in this pattern is its path 
dependence: advance builds on advance (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 258). 
The connection with routines and search 
The ideas of dynamic and static routines and paradigms, trajectories and inno-
vation can be combined as in table 4.3. In this table the relation between the 
different kinds of routines on the one hand and organizational paradigms, tra-
jectories and innovations on the other, is made clear. As higher order routines are 
needed to invoke the lower order ones (Nelson, 1991), it will be the dynamic 
routines that initiate change in the static routines. A change in static routines is 
an organizational innovation (if it also contributes to a competitive advantage). 
Dynamic routines can be defined on the trajectory level. As different kinds of 
routines are easily identifiable (see table 4.1), the definition of trajectories and 
innovation in terms of dynamic and static routines, simplifies it to distinguish 
trajectories and innovations in practice. In this way the difficulty and arbitrariness 
of distinguishing paradigms, trajectories and innovations (Van Someren, 1991) is 
partly remedied. 
Table 4.3 Evolutionary aspects of organizational innovation 
Evolutionary aspects of innovation 
Organizational paradigm 
Organizational trajectory 
Organizational innovation 
Related changes in 
Broad conceptions about organizing 
Dynamic routines 
Static routines 
Source: see text. 
Table 4.3 will define some trajectories. Some exemplars of the different trajectories are (or 
were) GM's M-form, Unilever's Transnational structure, the Toyota JIT-system, Benetton 
as a Strategic Center, ABB as a Federated Enterprise. These companies are the exemplary 
achievements which are always referred to in management literature, when the correspond-
ing organizational forms are discussed. 
FROM THE INSIDE OUT 95 
The elements in table 4.3 are hierarchically related from the top down. A change 
in paradigm entails a change in trajectory and therefore is an organizational 
innovation. An organizational innovation however, does not have to lead to a 
change in trajectory. Instead it can confirm and extend the developments within 
a trajectory. Usually, changes in paradigms and trajectories can be discerned only 
with the benefit of hindsight. The reason for this is that because of the path 
dependence of organizational innovations changes towards new trajectories or 
paradigms build on elements of existing paradigms/trajectories. Consequently 
new organizational paradigms/trajectories may develop gradually out of existing 
ones. Furthermore, for organizations in the middle of such a row of consecutive 
organizational innovations, it is often not clear in which way the developments 
head: "With the benefit of hindsight, the development can be described relatively 
clearly In the midst of this development it is much more a chaotic search and 
trial, than a planned and structured development Looking back there seems to 
be a structure in the process of change. In the midst disorientation prevails." 
(Mastenbroek, 1993, p. 66; translation APdM). This view is subscribed to by 
managers as well. The former CEO of Unilever explicitly recognizes the 
unplanned and trial and error nature of the discovery of the transnational 
structure (Maljers, 1992). 
Hence, whether a new trajectory or paradigm has formed out of an initial orga-
nizational innovation, can only be determined long after the innovation took 
place, when a new organizational form has crystallized. Nelson's (1991) view that 
it is exactly this incremental and experimental character of organizational 
innovation that is not acknowledged by authors like Williamson, is largely 
consistent with the ideas developed above. 
4.3.2 Trajectories and paradigms: examples from the theory of organiza-
tional innovation 
In table 4.4 some examples of organizational paradigms have been assembled. 
Although the phrasing may differ, there is a remarkable similarity between the 
authors: all of them offer varieties on the theme craft-unitary-network. Some of 
the authors (Best, Piore and Sabel, Lazonick) do not focus exclusively on orga-
nizational forms. However, as was shown in chapter 3, they do relate their 
concepts to organizational innovations. Piore (1992) explicitly states that connected 
to the paradigm of mass production and flexible specialization, are the organiza-
tional forms of hierarchy and networks. Zenger and Hesterly (1993) and Winch 
(1992) do limit their views on organizational developments to organizational 
forms. 
Based on the different approaches assembled in table 4.4, Winch's terminology 
will be used here. Hence, here his discussion of the developments in organiza-
tional forms will be followed. Consequently three different paradigms can be 
found: 
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Table 4.4 Paradigms of Organizational Innovation 
Author 
Best (1990) 
Zenger and Hesterly 
(1993) 
Lazonick (1991) 
Piore and Sabel 
(1984) 
Piore (1992) 
Winch (1992) 
Paradigms of Organizational Innovation 
Proprietary 
Capitalism 
Craft 
Craft 
Old Competition 
Managerial Capi-
talism 
Mass Production 
Hierarchy 
Unitary 
New Competition 
Network Paradigm 
Collective Capita-
lism 
Flexible Specializa-
tion 
Network 
Networked 
Source: see table. 
• craft paradigm: skilled men produce customized products. The craft paradigm 
has a low productivity and firms produce in and for regional and national 
markets. It lost its dominance in most industries and (western) countries in the 
course of the 19th century. 
• unitary paradigm: the firm is a clear separate entity, which is vertically 
differentiated in clearly defined functional units. The unitary paradigm 
prevailed in regulated national markets, in (roughly) the period 1910-1970. 
• networked paradigm: lateral communication (often by making use of informa-
tion technology) within firms of which the boundaries become increasingly less 
clear is the core of this form. Not only do firms become more and more 
embedded in interfirm relationships, also firms themselves start to look more 
like networks. The network paradigm is of increasing relevance in unregulated 
and global markets, appearing in the course of the 1970's. 
Winch (as well as the other authors mentioned) claims that these three broad 
conceptions of organizing have succeeded each other in time. Even though Winch 
does not go into the subject, there does not seem to be a reason why organiza-
tional forms belonging to different paradigms, cannot co-exist. Depending on 
firm-, industry- and context-specific factors, different paradigms may be viable in 
different and perhaps even similar industries. Because of the broadness of the 
identified paradigms, such an observation does not undermine the usefulness of 
the paradigm concept. Specifically in the 1980's a move into the networked 
paradigm is widely believed to have taken place (e.g. Zenger and Hesterly, 1993). 
Of course, these are very general statements that do not do justice to the 
pluriformity of organizational forms. These broad statements do however shed 
light on general developments in the field. Based on Best's (1990) and Lazonick's 
(1991) views on national competitiveness, the proposition can be advanced that 
paradigms are connected to country competitiveness. The craft paradigm is then 
connected with British dominance in the 19th century; the unitary paradigm is 
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related to American dominance in this century and the networked paradigm 
correlates with Japanese (and partly Italian) success in the last decades of this 
century (compare Kogut's (1991) and Dosi and Kogut's (1993) views on country 
competitiveness which corroborate this idea). 
Within every paradigm a multitude of forms can be found, which can be called 
organizational trajectories. Organizational trajectories can be distinguished by the 
fact that they have different dynamic routines. The dynamic routines which define 
an organizational form are similar to the dominant designs (Utterback and 
Abernathy, 1975; Utterback and Suarez, 1993), that are used to distinguish 
separate technological trajectories. Once these organizational forms have 
established themselves they may provide a strong converging pull: individual 
organizations can and do use the dominant design as a benchmark for their own 
organizational change. 
As mentioned before, each paradigm consists of a number of organizational tra-
jectories. To illustrate this, different organizational trajectories in different 
paradigms have been assembled in table 4.5. In some instances, the difficulty of 
ranking these separate forms will be clear. The matrix for instance has some 
networked properties (transnational structures often make use of matrix-like 
structures as well) and seems to be an intermediate form. This may be an 
illustration of the idea that paradigms may emerge from each other. Nevertheless, 
the different forms mentioned have proven rather easy to identify, thus 
illustrating Winter's claim on the ease of identification of routines (see table 4.1). 
The existence of trajectories may mean that inefficiencies in organizing exist 
because of the lock-in in a certain direction of organizational change. Other 
possible ways of organizing may not get noticed or, if noticed, not be imple-
mented. Along a trajectory superior forms replace their precursors, but there is no 
inherent reason why these superior forms should be perfect. In short: no optimal 
forms exist, only superior forms which replace less effective ones (Gould, 1988). 
Table 4.5 Some examples of organizational trajectories in organizational paradigms 
Craft 
• Single craftsmen 
• Guilds 
(Schumpeter, 1939) 
• Industrial Districts 
(Marshall, 1890) 
• Cooperatives 
• Commission Mer-
chant (North and 
Thomas, 1973) 
Unitary 
• Functional Form 
(Chandler, 1977) 
• Multidivisional Form 
(Chandler, 1962) 
• Multinational Enterprise 
(Dunning, 1981) 
• Matrix 
(Davis and Lawrence, 
1977) 
• Conglomerate 
(Williamson, 1985) 
Networked 
• Federated Enterprise 
(Handy, 1992) 
• Transnational 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989) 
• Just-in-Time (Cusumano, 
1988) 
• Spider's web 
(Quinn, 1992) 
• Strategic Center 
(Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller, 1995) 
Source: see text. 
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There is a longitudinal element in the table, in that the paradigms succeed each 
other in time: the craft paradigm preceded the unitary paradigm which in its turn 
was succeeded by the networked paradigm. One important qualification is that 
the paradigms did not replace each other completely: they co-exist. Vertically, the 
trajectories have not been arranged along a chronological line, even though 
further research might suggest that there is a succession of trajectories. In relation 
to the research questions posed, the table shows that part of the pluriformity of 
organizational forms can be explained by an inside-out perspective based on 
routines, trajectories and paradigms. What the table does not show, is the path 
dependence of the individual forms. Chapters 6 and 8 will give some examples 
of path dependence inside trajectories. 
4.4 On radical and incremental innovation 
A much used distinction in literature on technological innovation is the one 
between radical and incremental innovation. Radical innovations are usually 
defined as those that break away from established routine and may lie at the basis 
of new paradigms or trajectories (Dosi, 1982, p. 158). Interestingly, existing 
routines are the reference point of many radical innovations (Winter, 1990) so that 
a completely new way of working will never occur: the existing routines have the 
new routines enclosed in them somehow, even when they are their mirror image. 
For strategy research, the distinction between radical and incremental innovation 
is of limited use. The two types of innovations are only based on the characteris-
tics of the respective innovation and not on their competitive impact. It can very 
well be that a radical innovation meets with a quick and sudden death in the 
market place, while an incremental innovation or a series of incremental inno-
vations, can have a radical competitive impact. "It implies we cannot deduce the 
original scale of managerial intervention from the scale of impact" (Miner, 1994). 
As this is not recognized in the discussions around radicality and incrementality 
strategy research will not benefit from these concepts very much. This is of 
relevance because organizational innovation has been defined as a strategic 
change in chapter 2. 
Henderson and Clark (1990) have distinguished two other types of innovation 
next to radical and incremental, namely modular and architectural innovation (see 
figure 4.1). They propose two dimensions along which innovations can be 
classified: firstly, whether the core concepts are reinforced or overturned and, 
secondly, whether the linkages between the core concepts are changed or not. 
Incremental innovations reinforce the core concepts, while maintaining the 
linkages; modular innovations overturn the core concepts and maintain the 
linkages; architectural innovations reinforce the core concepts but change the 
linkages and radical innovations overturn both concepts and linkages. Though this 
is an insightful extension for technological innovation, it does not completely 
remedy the criticisms given above. For example, Henderson and Clark only 
discuss the competitive impact of architectural innovations. 
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Figure 4.1 Henderson and Clark's framework for defining innovation 
LINKAGES BETWEEN 
CONCEPTS AND 
COMPONENTS 
Source: Henderson and Clark, 1990. 
CORE CONCEPTS 
Unchanged 
Changed 
Reinforced 
Incremental 
innovation 
Architectural 
innovation 
Overturned 
Modular 
innovation 
Radical 
innovation 
Organizational innovations can usually be described as a number of successive 
reconfigurations of the value chain, as the preceding sections have made clear. Of 
the M-form it can clearly be said that the competitive impact was radical, but 
from this does not follow that it emerged in a radical way. The separate divisions 
in the M-form for instance, still have preserved many characteristics from the 
preceding functional form and Lazonick (1991, p. 261) stresses the M-form's path 
dependence. Hence, it is impossible to tell how much change is necessary in order 
to call a particular innovation radical. The process of innovation is both 
continuous and discontinuous: some concepts and linkages may be changed while 
others are strengthened at the same time. 
In addition, innovations that on first sight look "radical", on closer scrutiny appear 
to consist of many incremental innovations. This is for instance the case with the 
JIT-system (see chapter 6 for an elaborate analysis), as described by Cusumano 
(1988). The JIT-system as it functions today, is radically different from the 
traditional way of building cars. But with knowledge of the slow, incremental 
process by which it emerged, one can not judge it to be a radical innovation in the 
sense of Henderson and Clark or any other of their types. This is precisely 
because innovation is a process in which at any moment in time either one of the 
types of Henderson and Clark may prevail, only to be replaced by one of the 
others in another period. 
It is therefore a fallacy to take current differences among forms or longitudinal 
differences of forms as prove of the alleged fact that an innovation is either 
radical, incremental, modular or architectural (compare with Darwin (1859) who 
goes to great length in order to show that the observed differences between 
species do not justify the claim that these species are independently created and 
hence unrelated). Even though considerable discontinuity exists in organizational 
innovation, too often differences are taken as a "prove" that there is radical 
change. In reality however, historical research finds considerable continuity in the 
process as well. Because organizational innovation is a process of different 
changes, in the course of time all four types of innovation defined by Henderson 
and Clark may occur and in combination they may lead to a new organizational 
form. In this process of change however, continuity is important as well. 
These empirical difficulties, which may be greater in organizational innovation 
than in technological innovation, make that the concepts of radical and incremen-
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tal innovation are of limited use for organizational innovation. Above that, the 
fact that such a distinction bears no relation to the competitive impact of the two 
forms of innovation limits the relevance of these concepts for strategy research. 
From a strategic perspective radicality versus incrementality of an organizational 
innovation is not the interesting point: most organizational innovations are to 
some degree incremental, as they are continuations of previous forms. Next, more 
than the extent of the change, the external consequences of the innovation are of 
interest. As Baden-Fuller (1994) seems to imply it is not so much the magnitude 
of change as the magnitude of the impact the change has on the competitive 
process that determines whether an innovation is radical or incremental. Hence, 
the forms of innovation identified by Henderson and Clark (1990) are not 
applicable to organizational innovation because they lack a strategic perspective 
and because organizational innovations may emerge over time as a combination 
of these forms, while simultaneously continuity can be observed as well. 
4.5 Resource-based theory 
The resource-based theory of the firm (rooted a.o. in Penrose, 1959) explains firm 
behavior on the basis of the resources a firm has at its disposal. The concept of 
resources has broadened considerably in the trajectory of development of 
resource-based theory and a bable-like confusion is going on with regard to the 
meaning of different concepts as capabilities, competences, resources, assets etc. 
The key ideas are, first of all, that organizations exist because in firms knowledge 
is embodied which is more effectively combined and developed inside the firm 
than in the market and, secondly, that organizational decisionmaking is influenced 
by the resources accumulated throughout an organization's existence (for an 
example see Elfring and Baven, 1994). Table 4.6 provides some definitions of 
capabilities and resources. 
Foss (1994) divides the resource-based tradition in a formal (e.g. Peteraf, 1993) and 
appreciative school (including Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1990). The former is rooted in neo-classical equilibrium analysis and will 
not be considered further. The latter is firmly rooted in evolutionary theory (Foss, 
1994). The concept of dynamic capabilities put forth by Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1990; 1992) explicitly acknowledges this intellectual background. 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993, see table 4.6) make a distinction between resources 
and capabilities. Resources are mainly non-firm specific and tradeable goods 
(occasionally knowledge), needed in a firm's production process. Next to 
resources, firms also have developed firm specific and nontradeable knowledge 
(sometimes goods), which Amit and Schoemaker call capabilities. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and Nelson (1991) show that the latter ones are grounded in 
routines. Likewise, Grant (1991a) defines a capability as follows: "A capability is 
the capacity for a team of resources to perform some task or activity" (p. 119), but 
also "A capability is, in essence, a routine, or a number of interacting routines" (p. 
122). 
The separate word capability is only used to denote those routines that the firm 
performs more effectively than its rivals (Grant, 1991a, p. 115). Teece, Pisano and 
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Shuen (1992, p . 21) stress the impor tance of capabilities and especially those that 
pertain to organization: "organizational or coordinating capabilities appear to vary 
across firms. It is these differences which allow some firms to earn higher rents 
than others". Similarly, Kogut and Zander (1992) state that all capabilities are 
essentially organizational. 
Those capabilities that are hard to imitate and lead to a competit ive advantage can 
be called "core", "distinctive" or "strategic" capabilities. The aspect of inimitability 
etc. has been discussed in chapter 1, section 1.5 and will not be analysed further 
here. It is however an important par t of the resource-based view of the firm. 
Neither will the concept of routines, which underl ie capabilities, be discussed here 
as it has been dealt with in section 4.2. 
Table 4.6 Different definitions of resources and capabilities provided by various authors 
concept definition 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993, p. 35) 
capabilities 
resources 
• information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm 
specific and are developed over time through complex inter-
actions among the firm's resources 
• stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the 
firm 
Barney (1991, p. 101) 
• all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information knowledge etc. controlled by a firm that enable the 
firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve effi-
ciency and effectiveness 
Grant (1991a) 
capability • the capacity for a team of resources to perform some task or 
activity (p. 118) 
• a routine, or a number of interacting routines (p. 122) 
• inputs into the production process (p. 118) 
Kogut and Zander (1992, p. 384) 
capabilities • capabilities rest in the organizing principles by which relation-
ships among individuals, within and between groups, and among 
organizations are structured 
Source: see table. 
In an inside-out view on organizational innovation these capabilities can be of 
importance in directing the reconfiguration of the value chain. This was shown 
by Chandler (1990, 1992b) w h o claims that forward and backward integration 
"should be seen in terms of the enterprise 's specific capabilities" (Chandler, 1992b, 
p. 89). When a producer lacks certain capabilities he will try to obtain them by 
either forward or backward integration. Foss (1993) uses a similar a rgument in 
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which the competence of firms to communicate and understand knowledge, deter-
mines the extent of vertical integration. It can therefore be concluded that not only 
organization guides the development of capabilities (Nelson, 1991, p. 70), but also 
vice versa: capabilities guide the development of organizational form. 
Likewise, it seems to be a plausible proposition that the presence or absence of 
resources (financial, technological, etc.) can stimulate firms to reconfigure their 
activities and linkages in a certain way. The various organizational implications 
emanating from the analyses given in resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) are an example of this. As Grant (1991a, p. 122) states: "...resources 
available to the firm have an important bearing on what the firm can do since 
they place constraints upon the range of organizational routines that can be 
performed...". 
Other examples of the relation between resources/capabilities and organizational 
form can be found in Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter (1994) and Grant (1996). 
Teece et al. advance the proposition that the boundaries of the firm are, next to 
technological opportunities and the selection environment, determined by 
learning, path dependencies and complementary assets. Based on this view 
several hypotheses are developed which are aimed at explaining different 
organizational forms. Allocative, transactional and administrative competence play 
a role in determining the relevant organizational form. The approach taken by 
Teece et al. is static in that it looks at the efficiency characteristics of existing 
forms and not at the development of new ones. They explain how existing forms 
can be understood in terms of the firm's existing competences and do not go into 
the question how existing forms have evolved out of previous settings. Neverthe-
less, their idea that competences co-determine organizational forms does offer 
support to the ideas developed here. 
Likewise, Grant (1996) proposes to study organizational structures from the 
perspective of knowledge. This knowledge is, according to Grant, embedded in 
capabilities. Integration of capabilities is one of the functions of organizational 
structures: "the architecture of capabilities must have some correspondence with 
the firm's structure of authority, communication, and decision making, whether 
formal or informal" (p. 6). 
Concluding, the inside-out view of organizational innovation not only exists of 
dynamic routines, but also incorporates capabilities (which basically are routines 
which are of strategic importance) and resources. These can play a role in 
determining the reconfiguration of value chains. 
4.6 Proposition and attribute-table on path dependence 
The next proposition can summarize the main findings of the inside-out per-
spective: 
The process by which organizational innovations come about is path dependent, 
in that new organizational forms to a large extent build on their precursors. The 
reason for this lies in such firm specific attributes of path dependence as dynamic 
routines, capabilities and resources. 
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This does not mean that innovation is always a slow process. Instead the propo-
sition highlights the idea that innovation is not only a process of breaking with 
the established order, but that a considerable continuity is present as well. Or as 
Galbraith (1973, p. 74) puts it, new organizational forms "are resurrections of 
previous forms that need to be perfected". 
Furthermore the proposition implies that the process of organizational innovation 
is one of search for a tailored solution to organizational problems. It does not have 
a Williamsonian view of the process of organizational innovation as a choice 
between discrete organizational forms. "Which mode (of organization, APdM) we 
observe will depend not only on its a priori superiority over other known modes 
but also on the specific historical sequence that the evolutionary process followed" 
(Langlois, 1984, p. 39; also see David, 1986). Note that this is not a deterministic 
process: in the way routines are used to reconfigure the value chain there is ample 
room for strategic choice. 
Table 4.7 presents an overview of the influence of path dependence on organiza-
tional innovativeness. For this purpose the dependent variable (organizational 
innovation) and the independent variable (path dependence) have been opera-
tionalized by means of attributes. These attributes make it easier to observe the 
role of the variables in practice. Organizational innovativeness has been 
operationalized in three attributes as in chapter 2, section 2.3.4: form (do the 
independent variables influence the way the form looks), speed (do they speed 
up or slow down the process of innovation) and extent (do they lead to more 
important innovations or do they limit the number of reconfigurations in the 
value chain). These attributes are arranged vertically in the column completely at 
the left. Path dependence has been operationalized with the attributes dynamic 
routines, capabilities, and resources which can be found in the top row of the 
attribute table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Theoretical attribute-table on path dependence 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Dynamic Routines 
Y 
+ 
Capabilities 
Y 
Resources 
Y 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = The independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
The hypothesized relations between the attributes have been denoted by the 
symbols "Y" and "+", explained by the legend under the table. If no relation can 
be hypothesized based on the theory, no symbol is given. In the chapters 6, 7 and 
8, similar attribute-tables will contain entries based on results of empirical 
research. By comparing these empirical tables with the theoretical tables, a 
conclusion can be reached as to the relevance of different relations (a task done 
in the final chapter 9). The method of attribute-tables simplifies the testing of 
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propositions in theory-building studies. A detailed discussion of the ins and outs 
of the method of attribute-tables can be found in the Appendix. 
The relationships between the different variables have been hypothesized, based 
on the theoretical discussions given in this chapter: 
• dynamic routines influence the form of the organizational innovation because 
they direct the search for value chain reconfigurations in a certain direction: 
namely in the direction of previous successes; 
• the repeated application of a dynamic routine leads to an accumulated change 
over time, so that a completely new organizational form can emerge. Hence, 
dynamic routines influence the extent of organizational innovation positively. 
Repetitiveness was among others discussed in table 4.1; 
• based on the discussion in section 4.5, capabilities and resources do seem to 
have an impact on steering organizational form in a certain direction, but 
whether they enhance or limit the speed and extent of the innovation cannot 
be ascertained beforehand. Sometimes a lack of capabilities and resources can 
stimulate organizational innovation; sometimes an abundant amount of 
capabilities and resources can help in innovating. Authors do however agree 
on the idea that the current resources and capabilities influence the organiza-
tional form chosen and hence the "Y" in the boxes relating resources and 
capabilities to form. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The inside-out factors which determine the reconfiguration of the value chain are 
resources, capabilities and dynamic routines. Analogical to technological inno-
vation, different authors have used the concepts of trajectories and paradigms to 
explain organizational innovation, building on the idea of routines. These concepts 
show the path dependence inherent in the emergence of new organizational 
forms. Dynamic routines are specifically interesting. They are historically 
grounded mechanisms, that partly direct the reconfiguration of the value chain. 
The fact that each firm has its own history and therefore its own routines, may 
be one of the reasons for the existing pluriformity of organizational forms. 
The method of applying the theory of technological innovation to the subject of 
organizational innovation showed that especially the role of routines is similar for 
both technology and organization. The ideas of trajectories and paradigms can be 
applied to organizational innovation as well, even though the concepts have to 
be adapted (see table 4.2). By relating the concepts of innovation and trajectories 
to the distinction between static and dynamic routines, it becomes easier to define 
trajectories empirically. Finally, the distinction between radical and incremental 
changes is proposed to be of little use for organizational innovation because of its 
neglect of the strategic impact of the innovation and because of the fact that 
organizational innovation exhibits both continuity and discontinuity, thus making 
it hard if not impossible to distinguish incremental change from radical change. 
If the inside-out perspective developed here is incorporated in the basic schema 
of analysis, figure 4.2 results. The remaining blind spot in the figure is the 
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outside-in approach. The next chapter will show a way of reasoning that can 
begin to fill this in as well. 
Figure 4.2 Routines, Resources, and Capabilities in the Analytical Schema of Organizational 
Innovation 
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5 
From the outside in 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 it has been shown that the literature on organizational innovation has 
paid relatively little systematic attention to the role of the business environment 
in shaping new organizational forms, even though there seems to be widespread 
agreement that such an influence exists. No structural research has been done into 
the question what the key environmental determinants of organizational 
innovation are. As far as environmental determinants have been identified, there 
have been no detailed analyses of the way in which they influence organizational 
innovation. As a consequence there is much unclarity on the question which 
environmental determinants are conducive and which are inhibitive to organiza-
tional innovation. For these reasons the focus in this chapter will be on the 
outside-in part of figure 1.1. 
It will be impossible to deal with all environmental variables in this chapter, yet 
a beginning will be made. In order to create some structure in the bewildering 
amount of elements that together form the business environment, in the next 
section (5.2) a choice will be made to use the determinants of Porter's (1990a) 
framework and evaluate them on their impact on organizational innovation. The 
aim is to show that this is a fruitful approach to analyse the context dependence 
of organizational innovation. The following sections (5.3 and 5.4) will look into 
more detail to the role of interfirm relations and demand conditions. These two 
are picked because they have proved to be relevant in innovation research. The 
research question will be whether demand and related and supporting industries 
are conducive or inhibitive to organizational innovation. To answer this question, 
three subquesrions will be dealt with: 
1, Do demand and interfirm relations influence organizational innovation? 
Important for this question is whether different kinds of demand/interfirm 
relations have an impact on the emergence of new organizational forms. 
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2. If so, why do these determinants effect organizational innovation? Of 
relevance here is what the mechanisms are that explain this influence. 
3. How do they influence organizational innovation, that is: do they have a 
positive or a negative effect? 
5.2 A general picture: the influence of the business environment on 
organizational innovation 
5.2.1 The business environment: a choice for Porter's diamond 
In the outside-in perspective the key question is what elements in the business 
environment determine firm level processes. Different frameworks have been 
developed to describe the business environment. The overview of theories in table 
3.4, also provides an overview of which determinants have been identified in 
different theories as key characteristics of the business environment. Next to these 
theories, approaches specifically aimed at environmental analysis have contributed 
to this field (e.g. Fahey and Narayanan, 1986). 
One of the most recent and elaborate contributions has been Porter (1990a), whose 
diamond of national competitive advantage identifies several factors in the 
business environment which stimulate innovation. This framework will be taken 
as a point of departure for identifying factors that may influence the process of 
organizational innovation. 
Next to the fact that Harvey and Jones (1992) observed that there is a complemen-
tarity between the Porter (1990a) framework and Chandler's work on organiza-
tional innovation, there are five other reasons to choose Porter's framework. These 
are: 
1. Suitability for theory-building studies 
2. Integration of theories 
3. Right level of analysis, related to competitive advantage 
4. Focus on innovation 
5. Theoretical consistency with inside-out approach. 
ad. 1 Porter's framework is well-suited for the theory-building approach adopted 
here. It specifies factors in the business environment, which can be related 
to the process of organizational innovation. Operationalizations of the 
business environment made for large scale empirical studies (as for 
example can be found in contingency theory), are of less relevance if one 
wants to make an in-depth study of the way the environment influences 
organizational innovation. What are needed are not variables that are 
helpful in finding correlations, but variables that allow a study into causal 
relationships to take place. Porter's determinants do allow such a detailed 
scrutiny of variables and thereby provide a good basis for the current 
analysis. 
ad. 2 Porter draws together different strands of literature. The need for this kind 
of integrative frameworks in business administration, crossing the 
boundaries of theories and integrating them, has been pointed out before 
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(Van den Bosch, 1989; Porter 1990a, p. 29/30). For the study of innovation 
it is especially important to look from different perspectives (see for 
instance Van de Ven, 1986). Porter's framework meets this requirement to 
a large extent. A brief discussion of the theoretical background of Porter's 
framework can be found in section 5.2.3. 
ad. 3 Analysis of problems in business administration can take place on many 
levels, for instance a macro-level (Fahey and Narayanan, 1986), industry-
level (Porter, 1980), population level (e.g. Aldrich, 1979), firm level (e.g. 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), transaction level (e.g. Williamson, 1975). 
Levels of analysis can also be defined geographically: world level (e.g. 
Ohmae, 1985; 1990), national level (Reich, 1991), regional level (De Smidt 
and Wever, 1990), city level (Porter, 1995). Care must be taken that 
questions playing on a certain level of analysis are not studied by 
instruments developed for another level of analysis. Relating different 
levels of analysis can shed light on interesting issues, however. The level 
of analysis in Porter's diamond (see section 5.2.2) is useful for the current 
study of innovation. Porter's diamond deals exactly with the issue of 
interest namely: the influence of the business environment on firm level 
processes or as he puts it "the way in which a firm's proximate "environ-
ment" shapes its competitive success over time" (p. 29). As the level of 
analysis required for study of organizational innovation is the firm, this is 
consistent with Porter's diamond. 
ad. 4 Porter's framework is meant to explain innovativeness and it is one of the 
very few frameworks for environmental analysis that put innovativeness 
central. Despite the drawback identified by McKelvey (1991), that Porter 
conceptualizes innovations as static blueprints and not as emerging 
trajectories and paradigms, the focus on innovation is interesting because 
Porter takes an outside-in view of innovation instead of the inside-out 
view which is incorporated in the notion of routines, capabilities and 
resources. This focus on innovation naturally leads to the question how the 
framework relates to organizational innovation. Are the factors defined by 
Porter of importance for all kinds of innovation and is the direction of 
influence similar for all these factors? 
This question is of relevance because Porter, though recognizing 
explicitly that innovation is much broader than technological change 
(Porter, 1990a, p. 45), focuses on the technological aspects of innovation. 
He does claim that new ways of organizing are innovations (p. 579), but 
in his cases few examples of them can be found and neither does he 
address the question whether there are significant differences between 
these two kinds of innovation. His main focus seems to be on technology. -
Take for instance his statement on the factors of influence in the competi-
tive process: "A new theory must reflect a rich conception of competition 
that includes segmented markets, differentiated products, technology 
differences, and economies of scale. Quality, features, and new product 
innovation are central in advanced industries and segments. Moreover, cost 
advantage grows as much out of efficient-to-manufacture product designs 
and leading process technology as it does out of factor costs or even 
economies of scale" (p. 20). Organizational form is absent in this statement. 
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Looking at the case study of the Third Italy described by Porter and 
comparing it to Best's description of the same case, the lack of attention for 
organizational innovation becomes even clearer. In chapter 3 it has been 
shown that Best (1990) emphasized the farreaching influence of organiza-
tional innovations in the competitiveness of this region. Two questions are 
of relevance here. First of all, does Porter mention organizational innova-
tion and secondly, if so, does he explain them in the same way as he 
explains technological innovation, namely as emerging from an interaction 
of the determinants of competitive advantage (section 5.2.2 will discuss 
these determinants in more detail)? 
Porter's analysis can be found on pp. 210-225. With regard to the first 
question, Porter does not really elaborate on the organizational aspects of 
the Third Italy. For instance, at p. 220 where Porter discusses continuous 
innovation, all the examples given are product or process innovations: 
material handling equipment, continuous process technology, the third-
firing method, designer tiles. The only reference to an organizational 
innovation is Assopiastrelle (p. 216), an industry association that coordi-
nated some of the activities of the firms. He does however not explain the 
emergence of Assopiastrelle as an interaction between the different 
innovation enhancing determinants he identified. On a broader level, 
Porter does point to some specific organizational forms in Italy in general 
(see pp. 421-453). He describes the high level of contracting out (p. 443), 
and the lack of formal structures in small firms (p. 445; on this page Porter 
limits his discussion of organizational structure mainly to organizational 
size). Again, he does not relate these characteristics to his determinants of 
innovation. In conclusion it is clear that Porter has not incorporated 
organizational innovation as a separate subject in his research, but has 
focussed on studying technological innovation. Hence the question whether 
his framework is also applicable to organizational innovation is relevant. 
ad. 5 Finally, on a theoretical level Porter's approach in The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations is similar to the inside-out approach defined in 
chapter 4. The inside-out approach builds on a neo-Schumpeterian 
perspective. Whereas Porter's (1980) work is grounded in the industrial 
organization tradition, Porter (1990a) appears to subscribe to a neo-
Schumpeterian/resource based perspective (Grant, 1991b; De Man, 1994a). 
The inside-out and outside-in approach used in this thesis are therefore not 
theoretically inror.imensurable, but have common roots. In Porter's 
diamond some inside-out elements are present (Van den Bosch and 
Warmerdam, 1995), but the approach put forth in chapter 4 facilitates more 
detailed research and is specifically aimed at organizational innovation. 
5.2.2 Porter's diamond framework 
Porter's The Competitive Advantage of Nations deals with the following question: 
"Why do some firms, based in some nations, innovate more than others?" (p. 20). 
To answer this question, he directs his attention to the elements in national 
business environments that determine the innovativeness of firms. 
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The core of Porter's book is a dynamic analysis of the way firms improve their 
competitive position by constantly upgrading their products, production processes 
and resources. Porter gives a historical account of how competitiveness has grown 
throughout history by the interaction of four determinants in the business 
environment, which are influenced by two influencing factors. This system is 
called the diamond of national competitiveness (see figure 5.1). 
The elements of the diamond influence the process of innovation at the firm level. 
Each element will now be discussed separately. Next to a discussion of these 
elements some of the main criticisms on Porter's framework will be discussed and 
propositions will be advanced as to the relation between the determinants and 
organizational innovation. It should be noted that Porter does not see the 
determinants and influencing factors as a collection of separate elements. Instead 
he points to many interactions between them. The core is however in the 
determinants. 
Figure 5.3 The Diamond Framework 
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Factor conditions 
Firstly, innovativeness is influenced by factor conditions. Porter distinguishes two 
kinds of production factors: basic and advanced. Basic production factors are e.g. 
natural resources and labour. More important for the sustainability of competitive-
ness are the advanced factor conditions. These are factor conditions that have 
required considerable effort to build. Infrastructure, knowledge and an educated 
workforce (as opposed to the mere availability of people mentioned as a basic 
factor condition) are examples of this. These advanced factor conditions are 
difficult to imitate and often take decades to construct. Therefore a country 
possessing them has a lasting advantage, provided that it does not stop main-
taining and developing them. 
Usually the availability of factor conditions stimulates innovativeness. There are 
however also instances in which a shortage of factor conditions has created a 
competitive advantage. An example of this is the case in which firms have had 
to compete around a shortage of resources in their environment and in doing so 
found considerably better methods of production. Using these methods firms may 
be able to beat the competition. 
PROPOSITIONS ON FACTOR CONDITIONS 
There is no reason to assume that this determinant works out differently for orga-
nizational innovation. Selective scarcity may stimulate organizational innovation. 
When resources are abundant there is no need for a firm to change, when all 
resources are scarce there may be no possibility to change. 
Pertaining to advanced factor conditions, Grandori (1993) pointed at the role of 
information technology. Child (1987), Huber (1990) and Zenger and Hesterly 
(1993) claim that the use of information technology will make hierarchy obsolete 
and lead to a disintegration of the value chain. A well-developed telematics infra-
structure may therefore strengthen the networked paradigm. 
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
The second factor determining innovativeness lies in the behavior of firms. Firm 
strategy and structure may or may not be geared to innovation and change. 
Important in the way strategies and structures are shaped is the rivalry in the 
home base. According to Porter international competition usually is no substitute 
for a lack of competition in the home base itself1. Indeed, he found domestic 
rivalry to be the most important factor stimulating innovations, as in order to stay 
ahead of their competitors firms will innovate. 
Porter does not provide an explanation for this result. An explanation may lie in the fact 
that competition for resources is important. When there is fierce rivalry in the home base, 
resources will become scarcer and more expensive. This will force firms in the home base 
to innovate in order to make more efficient use of those resources. When competition in the 
home base is lacking, firms do not have this incentive. Strong international competition 
cannot fully remedy this, as international competitors draw their resources form a different 
home base and therefore do not influence resource scarcity in home bases of other firms. 
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The elements of strategy and structure are inside-out elements in Porter's 
framework (Van den Bosch and Warmerdam, 1995). Firms are not only influenced 
by the determinants in the business environment, but can also influence their 
environment by means of their strategy. In the diamond deterministic aspects are 
combined with strategic choice elements. In this thesis one strategic choice, viz. 
the choice for organizational innovation, is studied in relation to environmental < 
determinants. 
PROPOSITIONS ON FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND RIVALRY 
Strategy and structure have been discussed in chapters 1, 3, and 4. The interrela-
tionship between strategy and structure has been clearly established in literature 
(starting with Chandler, 1962). The role existing organizational structures play in 
organizational innovation has been discussed in chapter 4. Existing structures act 
as a reference point for organizational innovation. There is path dependence: 
history matters. 
As to the role of competition, Lazonick's competitive uncertainty discussed in 
section 3.3.5 has made clear that competition can influence the reconfiguration of 
the value chains of firms. Moreover, Nelson stated that "Monopoly, or tight 
oligopoly with strong barriers to entry, can be seen as a serious economic problem 
because they are unlikely to generate the variety of new routines, and the 
attendant shifts in resource allocation on which economic progress depends" 
(Nelson, 1991, p. 72). Following from this last statement and from the observation 
made in chapter 4 that routines are important to organizational innovation, the 
proposition can be put forth that competition stimulates organizational innova-
tion. 
Related and supporting industries 
The third determinant is the presence of developed networks of suppliers, 
distributors or otherwise related industries, like specialized banks or service firms. 
Often innovations are developed in such networks, rather than by one single firm. 
Also interfirm relations may stimulate the diffusion of innovations between 
different firms and provide rapid access to information located at differ ;nt places 
in the network. 
In a more elaborate form the determinant of related and supporting industries can 
be found back in Porter's concept of clusters. The cluster concept refers to the 
presence of related and supporting industries in a certain industry as a w' ole, 
whereas related and supporting industries as a determinant are connected t > a 
specific product within that industry. It could be stated that clusters are one lc A 
of analysis higher than related and supporting industries, but the concepts overL -
to a large degree. 
PROPOSITION ON RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES 
Embeddedness in a cluster of related and supporting industries works out 
positively for technological innovation, but it is questionable whether this is always 
the case for organizational innovation. Long-term interorganizational relationships 
may inhibit organizational innovation, because when such relationships have 
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developed, organizational innovations may require not just a change in one firm, 
but in two. Section 5.3 will study this problem more extensively leading to the 
following proposition: the presence of long-term interorganizational relations (in 
related and supporting industries) does not enhance the process of reconfiguring 
the value chain both within and between firms. 
Demand conditions 
The fourth and final determinant of national competitiveness is formed by the 
nature of demand faced by firms. Size of the home market is of less importance 
than its quality. Sophisticated and demanding consumers are an impetus for firms 
to innovate, whereas easy-to-please, non-critical customers may slow down the 
innovative process, no matter how many of them there are. One thing to be noted 
in relation to the international dimension of country competitiveness, is that buyer 
needs in a home base must be anticipatory of needs in other countries, as national 
idiosyncrasies rarely come to conquer the world. 
PROPOSITION ON DEMAND CONDITIONS 
There are various reasons to assume that changes in demand are an important 
cause of organizational innovation. Section 5.4 will elaborate on this point and 
show that there is ground for formulating the next proposition: Other things being 
equal, increasing volatility of demand will lead to a diminishing use of organiza-
tion-like linkages, to the benefit of market-like linkages in the configuration of the 
value chain. 
For completeness also the influencing factors defined by Porter will be discussed. 
As, according to Porter, they have no direct effect on innovation, no propositions 
will be defined pertaining to organizational innovation. The influencing factors 
are: 
Government 
Government's role in creating competitive advantage is an important one. 
Although Porter maintains that governments cannot create a competitive advan-
tage on their own, their role in stimulating and challenging business can be 
considerable. Porter points to a plethora of measures taken by governments that 
influence competitive advantage. These measures never influence competitive 
advantage directly, but are mainly aimed at the determinants. Governments, tor 
instance, can set quality standards and thereby upgrade demand. 
Van den Bosch and De Man (1994) have criticized Porter's view on government 
on three grounds. Firstly, they point to the fact that Porter has not incorporated 
local and regional governments in his discussion of government's role, but has 
limited himself to national government. Secondly, there is a shift in governmental 
policy from macro policy making towards policy directed at meso- and micro-
levels (Branscomb, 1992; Ostry, 1990), which Porter does not account for. The 
more government will play a role on these lower levels, the more it will become 
intertwined with the diamond and the less clear it will be that government should 
be an influencing factor in the diamond and not a determinant. Thirdly, Porter 
does not relate the role of government to the industry life cycle. Porter does claim 
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that in different stages of national competi t ive development , government plays 
a different role. Yet, the same effect can also be observed wi th regard to different 
phases of the industry life cycle. A government may be very active in the early 
phases of development , diminish in influence when the industry matures and may 
come back to play an important role in restructuring the industry in the decline 
phase. Incorporating these extensions in the Porter framework, wou ld contribute 
to a more balanced unders tanding of the impact of government on competit ive-
ness. 
Chance 
The other influencing factor is the e lement of chance. Chance elements like 
breakthrough technologies, wars or s u d d e n shifts in demand , can give oppor tuni -
ties for one nation's industries to supplant another 's . It mus t however be noticed 
that the chance event only gives the oppor tuni ty for change. It is the w a y firms 
react to it that will determine the final outcome. 
Some critiques and extensions, as far as not ment ioned above, of Porter 's d i a m o n d 
model have been assembled in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Critiques and extensions of Porter's diamond 
Van den Bosch and Van Prooijen (1992a) 
Van den Bosch and Van Prooijen extend Porter's analysis of culture as a determinant 
of competitive advantage. They find that culture has an impact on every determinant 
of the diamond. 
Dunning (1992) 
Dunning adds transnational business activity (TBA) as an influencing factor to the 
diamond. He consistently works out the influence of TBA on every determinant. 
Grant (1991b) 
In an encompassing discussion by Grant, one of the drawbacks of the diamond 
pointed at, is the vagueness and broadness of some of the determinants. This limits 
the clarity of the framework. 
Jacobs and De Jong (1992) 
An important extension of the Porter model is given by Jacobs and De Jong with 
regard to the geographical scope of the framework. They make a distinction between 
the geographic scale of the production network and the geographic scale of the 
market. They show that Porter's notion of clusters can include crossborder clusters. 
Rugman (1992) 
Rugman directs his critique a.o. to the geographical level at which the diamond has 
to be applied. He defends a so-called "double-diamond" approach (see also Rugman 
and D'Cruz, 1993) to study Canadian competitiveness. As Porter and Armstrong 
(1992) point out, this approach fails to distinguish between the geographic locus of 
competitive advantage and the geographic scope of competition. Jacobs and De 
Jong's framework offers a better solution to this problem. 
Source: based on the indicated literature. 
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5.2.3 The diamond and innovation theory: demand and related and 
supporting industries 
The four determinants described in the preceding paragraph have ample relations 
to theory. Firm strategy, structure and rivalry is incorporated in literature on 
strategy (e.g. Porter, 1980; Chandler, 1990) and Industrial Organization (e.g. Bain, 
1968; Scherer, 1980). The importance of home demand for national competitive-
ness has been pointed out by Linder (1961) and Vernon (1966). Rosenberg (1982) 
and Von Hippel (1988) suggested that demand can play a major role in the inno-
vative process. Literature on the influence of related and supporting industries is 
e.g. Hirschman (1958), Lundvall (1988), Jacobs and De Man eds. (1995) and again 
Von Hippel (1988). Factor conditions have been subject of many analyses (e.g. 
Denison, 1970), yet in the context of innovation their impact has rarely been 
looked into. 
Another source of inspiration for Porter was Ergas (1984). Ergas already defined 
demand, technological opportunity (defined as access to personnel, and links 
between industry and science) and industrial structure (competition, cooperation, 
entry of new firms) as factors determining innovative performance. On the level 
of the determinants this is rather similar to Porter (1990a). Technological 
opportunity is related to the determinant factor conditions; cooperation from the 
factor industrial structure is part of Porter's related and supporting industries, as 
are the links between industry and science. Ergas thereby is probably one of the 
first to assemble different competitiveness enhancing factors in one "checklist". 
Already some propositions have been defined in the preceding section as to the 
influence of the diamond on organizational innovation. In the following sections 
two determinants will be further analysed on this point: demand and related and 
supporting industries. The first reason for choosing these is that, as was shown 
above, they have the strongest background in research into technological inno-
vation. That's why, in order to see whether these factors can also encompass 
organizational innovation, they are of specific interest because they can show 
whether the literature on technological innovation is also applicable to organiza-
tional innovation. The second reason is that the preliminary propositions related 
to these determinants point to contrasting results: demand is supposed to enhance 
organizational innovation, related and supporting industries have been identified 
as possibly inhibitive. It will be interesting to point at some differences and 
similarities between these two possibly conflicting determinants of organizational 
innovation. 
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5.3 Related and supporting industries: the influence of clustering on 
organizational innovation2 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The increasing role of interorganizational collaboration has been identified as one 
of the major trends in business today (Grandori, 1993). Firms which have 
developed a competence in building interorganizational structures may have a 
sustainable competitive advantage over those that don't. Networks (Jarillo, 1988), 
regional conglomerations (Best, 1990) and strategic alliances (Hamel, 1991) are 
only some of the multitude of forms of interfirm cooperation. Porter (1990a), 
elaborating on his notion of related and supporting industries, has developed the 
concept of clusters of related firms and institutions to provide for the broad range 
of possible interorganizational relations. Even though various definitions of the 
cluster concept have been developed 0acobs, 1995 gives an overview), the 
emphasis has mostly been on geographically concentrated interfirm relations and 
their influence on technological innovation. 
It is widely accepted that clusters have an influence on technological innovation in 
two ways. Firstly, clusters are innovative: the relations between different firms 
and between firms and consumers stimulate the development of new products, 
production processes and other technologies. Secondly, technological innovations 
diffuse faster within clusters. The strong competition and swift dissemination of 
information in clusters are the root causes of this effect. This was already known 
to Marshall who stated: "Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and 
improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the 
business have their merits promptly discussed; if one man starts a new idea it is 
taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus 
becomes the source of yet more new ideas" (Marshall, 1890, p. 332). 
The question researched here is whether clusters stimulate organizational 
innovation, like they stimulate technological innovation. The quote from Marshall 
seems to suggest that clusters do have an impact on organizational innovation (if 
this is what Marshall meant by "general organization"), at least as far as the 
diffusion of them is concerned. As the present focus is on the emergence of 
organizational innovations, the diffusion question will not be subject to elaborate 
discussion. Instead, the next subsections will deal with the effect of interorganiza-
tional relations on the emergence of new organizational forms. 
In order to tackle this problem, firstly the organizational aspects of clusters will 
have to be defined. The way in which interfirm relations play a role in organizing 
production in a cluster is discussed in section 5.3.2. This discussion not only 
makes clear that clusters consist of many different interorganizational relations, 
it will also lay the foundation for the discussion of the organizational innovative-
ness of clusters. Special attention will be given to long-term interorganizational 
relationships in section 5.3.3. 
This section is based on De Man (1994b). 
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5.3.2 Clusters: relevant organizational aspects 
The most noticeable organizational feature of a cluster is the wide and pluriform 
range of interorganizational relations. Three types of interorganizational 
relationships can be distinguished. Foss and Eriksen (1995), drawing on game 
theory, distinguished between cooperative and non-cooperative relationships in 
clusters, depending on the fact whether firms work together in creating new 
resources and capabilities or whether they don't. Within cooperative relationships, 
some will be short-term and others long-term. Lorange and Roos (1992, p. 10) for 
instance point to the time for which a strategic alliance is formed as one of its 
basic characteristics. Some alliances are temporary, aimed at reaching a specific 
goal and once that is reached the alliance is dissolved. Other alliances aim at a 
relation for the long-term and do not have a specified lifetime or a goal, the 
fulfillment of which entails the obsolescence of the alliance. Ibarra (1992, p. 181) 
also distinguishes "enduring, stable relationships" from "the more fluid constella-
tions of relationships". Hence, there are 3 interorganizational relationships in 
clusters (table 5.2): 
1. Long-term relationships 
2. Short-term relationships 
3. Non-cooperative relationships. 
Table 5.2 Interorganizational relationships in clusters 
Cooperative 
Non-cooperative 
Long-term 
1 
Short-term 
2 
3 
Source: De Man, 1994b. 
Long-term relationships 
The first kind of relationships are especially characteristic of clusters and are 
closely related to Porter's "related and supporting industries". Characteristic of 
these relations is their intertwinedness (Hakansson and Johanson, 1993, p. 39/40). 
In the course of time there will be a building up and intensification of linkages 
between the firms involved in the relationship. Firms get tuned to one another 
and become related on different activities in the value chain. 
One important qualification is that the organizational skills required to manage 
such interorganizational relationships are considerable. Firms possessing them 
may have an important competitive advantage. Firms not possessing them and 
entering into such relations may undermine their competitive positions. Reich and 
Mankin (1986) issue a warning in this respect, so do Hamel (1991) and Comman-
deur (1994, p. 100) who provides an overview of drawbacks of long-term 
cooperation. 
In section 5.3.3 the characteristics of these relationships and their organizational 
innovativeness will be under more detailed scrutiny. It will be shown that there 
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is reason to assume that these relationships can form an inhibiting factor for 
organizational innovation. 
Short-term relationships 
Next to long-term relationships, there are various short-term relationships in 
clusters as well. These can consist of simple deliveries, the provision of less 
important parts for the manufacturing of a good, the use of management 
consultancy etc. In these relationships there can be a lot of dynamism: firms can 
make use of different suppliers and may shift suppliers as well (Jacobs, 1995). 
Hence, there is no ongoing contact between the firms, but irregular contact. 
The fact that there is no certainty in short-term relationships for a supplier that 
he can continue to deliver goods in the future, is a strong impetus for him to 
deliver quality at reasonable cost and thereby contribute to the competitive 
advantage of its client and the cluster. These forms of collaboration play a role in 
maintaining the overall efficiency of the cluster, but will seldom lead to important 
innovatory technological breakthroughs. The reason for this is that technological 
innovation requires long-term interaction between cooperating firms (Oerlemans 
and Meeus, 1995). 
The organizational innovativeness of this kind of relationships is unclear. As these 
relationships will be more competitive than long-term relationships, they may 
stimulate organizational innovation. The competition in these short-term 
relationships may lie in the bargaining power of the suppliers (one of the five 
competitive forces identified by Porter (1980)). The attempts of suppliers to 
appropriate some of the surplus of the client is a form of competition. 
On the other hand, the presence of short-term interorganizational relationships 
may inhibit organizational innovation for the same reasons as in the case of long-
term relations (see section 5.3.3). Despite the fact that the relations are only for the 
short-term, the upheaval an innovation causes for short-term suppliers may still 
be prohibitive. The influence of a network of short-term relations on organiza-
tional innovation is therefore unclear. 
Non-cooperative relationships 
A third feature of clusters is of interest. Organizing clusters does not necessarily 
mean that there has to be a deliberate coordination of firm activities in which the 
firms are in actual contact with each other. Coordination by means of other non-
deliberate and non-cooperative mechanisms can play a role as well. Non-
cooperative relationships do not require considerable interaction between firms 
(the communication of price may often be sufficient), but may be enhanced by the 
geographical concentration of a cluster. They are not necessarily antagonistic. 
First of all the presence of a large group of firms in a similar industry can give 
rise to the growth of supporting industries or specific resources with which no 
direct relation has to be maintained, but of which the advantages are nevertheless 
clear. Specialized schools and dedicated infrastructure are examples. These can 
contribute to the organization of production in a cluster, without the direct 
involvement of individual firms. 
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Rules of conduct in an industry can also develop without cooperation, and help 
to organize the industry (Foss and Eriksen, 1995). Similar examples include 
knowledge spill-over, benefits of standardization and employees changing 
companies and the culture of the region in which the cluster is based. This 
coordination by means of non-cooperative relations may not seem to be 
specifically organizational, but in fact does play a role in the organization of 
production in clusters. Indeed these elements of what may be called non-
deliberate or non-planned (Foss and Eriksen, 1995) organization have often been 
claimed to be of great importance in the spatial organization of clusters (You and 
Wilkinson, 1994). Deliberate attempts to reap the benefits of these mechanisms can 
be found in the fashion of creating parks for related firms (industrial parks, 
science parks, Distriparks etc.). 
In section 5.2.2 the proposition has been advanced that competition stimulates 
innovation. As the competitive element in non-cooperative relationships is 
considerable and may even be enhanced by the geographical concentration of 
firms, they will, if the proposition on competition (section 5.2.2) holds, enhance 
organizational innovation. 
As Miles and Snow (1992) point out non-cooperative relations may become 
cooperative ones, when hollowing-out occurs. If a variety of specialized firms is 
present in a cluster, firms will sooner resort to using suppliers. They will 
eliminate those activities from their value chains, which can be satisfactorily 
performed by other firms in the cluster. In this way non-cooperative relations can 
stimulate organizational innovation as well , by strengthening the networked 
paradigm. 
Table 5.3 Organizational aspects of clusters 
Relationship 
Long-term 
Short-term 
Non-cooperative 
Characteristic 
• cooperation: is elaborate and takes place on several parts of 
the value chain; the firms are intertwined 
• limit organizational innovation (see 5.3.3) 
• cooperation: limited, on few parts of the value chain and 
temporary 
• effect on organizational innovation uncertain 
• cooperation: none or non-deliberate coordination 
• competitive, and thereby innovation enhancing 
Source: see text. 
Table 5.3 summarizes the organizational aspects of clusters along the specified 
dimensions of long-term, short-term and non-cooperative relationships. As has 
been pointed out in the previous section, especially the presence of long-term 
relationships, is seen as an impetus for technological innovation. These also 
Miles and Snow do not believe this is a positive tendency. It may lead to hollow 
corporations, which may end up having no capabilities themselves. 
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possess the most interesting organizational characteristics in terms of activities 
and linkages. For this reason the next section will focus on these long-term 
relationships. It will be shown that though the level of technological innovation 
may be high in these interorganizational relations, their organizational innovative-
ness may be lower. 
5.3.3 Organizational innovativeness of long-term relationships; proposi-
tion and attribute-table 
The previous section has shown the relevance of long-term interorganizational 
relations for clusters. In this section evidence will be reviewed to support the 
proposition that long-term relationships work against organizational innovation. 
Next to the well-established idea that networks stimulate technological innovation, 
this may be one drawback of networking. As will be shown below, the proposi-
tion is not a completely new one, but summarizes the work of some authors in 
a growing stream of literature, in which next to benefits some drawbacks of 
networks are formulated (Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990; Buchko, 1992; Grabher, 
1993a,b; Hakansson and Johanson, 1992, 1993; Tushman and Romanelli, 1990; 
Wassenberg, 1995). 
Miles and Snow (1992) have described two possible drawbacks of networks. The 
first one is that networks can lead to hollowing out of value chains when a firm 
decides to contract out more of its activities to the network. The second 
disadvantage they point at is that parties may become overdependent on each 
other, thus limiting the possibility to break the relationship. This "can constrain 
the primary strength of the dynamic network — its ability to efficiently allocate 
member firms, uncoupling and recoupling them with minimum cost and mini-
mum loss of operating time" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p. 67). The drawback of 
networks described below is related to the latter idea: changing the relation 
between firms in networks can be a difficult task. The focus is a bit different 
though: Miles and Snow have in mind the difficulty of breaking relationships. 
Here the argument is made that in continuing relationships change can be 
impeded as well. 
Long-term relationships as in related an supporting industries have been 
identified as technologically innovative, but from an organizational viewpoint 
embeddedness in a network of interorganizational relations may have some 
drawbacks. In literature on networks for instance, the proposition has been 
advanced that change in networks is unlikely to occur and that networks display 
a strong tendency towards inertia. In this regard Tushman and Romanelli (1990, 
p. 145), whose description of a network is equivalent to Porter's (1990a) definition 
of clusters, observe: 
"As webs of interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers and financial 
backers strengthen, and as commitments to internal participants and external 
evaluating agents are elaborated into institutionalized patterns of culture, norms, 
and ideologies; the organization develops inertia, a resistance to all but 
incremental change." 
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Similarly, Hakansson and Johanson (1992, p. 34) state: 
"Changes of the network must be accepted by at least large parts of the network. 
Therefore all changes will be marginal and closely related to the past." 
As organizational innovation is a subcategory of change, it is interesting to look 
at the reasons which have been provided to support the claim of limited change 
in networks and see if these claims also apply to organizational innovation in 
firms with long-term interorganizational relationships. It will be especially 
interesting to see whether in the case of organizational innovation (change 
towards a new way of organizing), these reasons are of more importance than in 
the case of "normal" organizational change (change to known or standard ways of 
operating). In order to analyse the impact of long-term relations table 5.4 gives an 
overview of attributes of long-term relations which inhibit change in long-term 
interorganizational relationships. Grabher (1993a, p. 26) pointed to the fruitfulness 
of studying factors that foster lock-in in networks in a more systematic way. Table 
5.4 brings together some arguments pertaining to this. 
Table 5.4 Attributes of long-term interorganizational relations inhibiting change 
• Lock-in because of externalities in intertwined relations 
— costs fall on other firms than the innovator 
— other impediments 
• Entrenched routines 
• Independence 
Source: see text. 
Externalities 
First of all organizational innovation inside a company can be effected by the 
presence of related and supporting industries. Intra-organizational innovation can 
be limited, because the implementation of a new organizational form may have 
consequences for organizations outside the innovating firm. When for instance a 
firm wants to change its production process, this may require its suppliers to 
change their way of working as well. Hakansson and Johanson (1992, p. 31) for-
mulate this effect as an externality "...changes are associated with costs of 
adjustment which are not, however, necessarily born by those performing the 
activities". The more a firm is embedded in a network, the more interfirm linkages 
between activities there are, and the sooner this effect of lock-in because of 
externalities will occur. Firms may thus lose the ability to dictate their own future 
(Powell, 1990, p. 305). As intertwinedness is one of the characteristics of long-term 
relationships, this point is of particular interest in this case. 
This does not mean that long-term relations are irrational, as Hakansson and 
Johanson rightly state (1993, p. 39). The idea put forth here is that next to the 
known advantages of networks there can also be drawbacks attached to them. The 
claim is not that networks are negative in general, but that they work out nega-
tively in the specific situation of organizational innovation. Hakansson and 
Johanson however do not distinguish these various forms of innovation (empirical 
research into Hakansson's framework has focused exclusively on technological 
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innovation (e.g. Oerlemans and Meeus, 1995)). In the case of organizational 
innovation the drawback of externalities may be particularly relevant because it 
is more difficult to contain its effect to a small part of a company (see Teece, 1980 
and table 2.1). As organizational innovation will always involve several activities 
and linkages, externalities will occur sooner than in technological innovation. 
Related to the previous point, the relationship between firms can become more 
difficult to change, because more than one firm is involved. A change in the 
linkages between firms, does not only require a change of routine in cooperating, 
but often also a change of routine in the cooperating firms themselves. As 
hierarchies are difficult to change (Williamson, 1975, p. 121; Mariotti and Cainarca, 
1986), a change in a relationship between two hierarchies may be even more 
difficult to accomplish. 
The possibility for cooperating firms to change their routines may be limited 
because of other impediments as well, for example when they lack the capability 
to work according to a new system. A new organizational form may require a 
flexible production process or additional activities in the value chain. If a firm in 
a network does not possess the ability to adjust to the requirements of the new 
form, the implementation of a new organizational form can be delayed. Of course 
other impediments for example in the environment of the cooperating firms may 
cause a similar barrier to innovation. 
Next to these inhibiting factors there may also be stimulating factors. For instance, 
in interorganizational relations ideas can come from two sides, so that organiza-
tional problems may be solved (and perceived) quicker. In literature on 
organizational innovation this effect has not been discussed, whereas for 
technological innovation it is wellknown (Oerlemans and Meeus, 1995). 
In short, externalities refer to the phenomenon that intra-organizational change 
will have interorganizational consequences the more companies are intertwined. 
These consequences can refer to costs (another company has certain costs 
connected to the change and as a consequence is not willing to implement 
changes) and to other impediments (the other company is unable to work with 
the change). 
Entrenched routines 
Reasons for entrenchment of routines can be found in organization theory, 
especially in DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) concept of isomorphism and Hannan 
and Freeman's (1977) concept of inertia. These concepts overlap to a considerable 
degree. 
Coercive isomorphism has already been discussed above. One form of isomor-
phism identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that according to Buchko (1992) 
is of interest in interorganizational relations, is normative isomorphism. The 
development of a network and increasing formalization of relationships create a 
way of working in a network that may become the standard way of operating. 
Buchko relates his views to the concept of linkages and activities, defined in 
chapter 2: "As firms within an organizational network interact with one another, 
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over time there develop specific mechanisms for the coordination of activities 
among firms within the network" (Buchko, 1992, p. 11) and "...to the extent that 
such linkages are codified, formalized, or form the taken-for-granted assumptions 
of a complex interfirm network, organizations will experience increased pressure 
for conformity and higher barriers to transformation" (Buchko, 1992, p. 23). So 
linkages between activities of different firms may become a powerful force for 
conformity and isomorphism and prevent firms from engaging in alternative ways 
of performing activities that may be seen as lying outside the norms of conduct. 
As innovation by definition is a change away from established norms and away 
from isomorphism, the conformitive pressures (grounded in historically developed 
routines of cooperation) to be overcome by an innovation can be substantial. 
This latter historical constraint on change has also been defined by Hannan and 
Freeman (1977), in their discussion of inertia and bears a strong resemblance to 
Nelson and Winter's double-edged concept of routines: the history of firms on the 
one hand provides a justification for the present way of working and on the other 
hand precludes a consideration of alternative ways of working (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, p. 931). Whereas Hannan and Freeman identify this mechanism 
on an intra-organizational basis, Buchko (1992) applies it to inter-organizational 
relations as well. 
This phenomenon of lock-in (Kogut, 1991; Dosi and Kogut, 1993) in relationships 
because of entrenchment of routines, has been identified by Bianchi and Gualtieri 
(1990, p. 101) in the case of the restructuring of the organization of production in 
the Third Italy. They find that the social rules which have developed in industrial 
districts inhibit change towards a new (in this case larger scale) organizational 
model. Imai (1989) points to a similar effect in Japanese networks, where the 
historical process by which the networks have come about, limit organizational 
change to slow and gradual adjustments. Both the speed and extent of organiza-
tional innovation are limited in this way by entrenched routines. 
As an illustration the other forms of inertial pressure identified by Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) have been assembled in table 5.5. Summarizing these paragraphs, 
entrenched routines refer to the difficulty of breaking through standard patterns 
of behavior. They become manifest when behavior is continued despite attempts 
to change it. 
Table 5.5 Pressures toward inertia 
Internal pressures 
• Difficulty of transferring assets 
• Constraints on information 
• Political constraints 
• Historical constraints 
External pressures 
• Legal and fiscal barriers 
• Constraints on information 
• Legitimacy constraints 
• Collective rationality (a successful 
adaptation of one firm is not neces-
sarily successful for another) 
Source: based on Hannan and Freeman, 1977, pp. 931-932. 
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Independence 
An example of independence between firms in long-term relations is given by 
Best (1990, p. 206-207). He puts forward the idea that when clusters have come 
to full development and a considerable equality among the constituent firms of 
the cluster is present (as in the case of the Third Italy), it will be hard for a cluster 
to restructure itself. The absence of a managerial hierarchy (a formal power 
structure as Commandeur (1994, p. 102) calls it) which is able to design, guide, 
coordinate or even dictate interorganizational change, may be prohibitive in this 
regard. Daft (1978, p. 208) already found that high centralization was a require-
ment for implementing administrative innovations. As in many long-term rela-
tions there is no central authority, there is a considerable degree of independence 
and hence change may be a difficult process. 
The consortia in the Third Italy (Best, 1990), provide an example of an organiza-
tional innovation in relationships with independence. The reasons why they have 
come into being are also pointed at by Best. From the outside-in perspective these 
are government intervention and intense competition in the districts. From the 
inside-out perspective he identifies lack of resources of individual firms to do the 
activities performed by the consortia themselves and the will to maintain suffi-
cient capabilities in order not to be reduced to subcontractors and maintain 
independence (see Best, 1990, p. 225). Independence was maintained despite a lack 
of resources by means of consortia. What this means, is that the absence of a 
hierarchy in egalitarian networks does not eliminate the possibility for organiza-
tional innovation. Instead, it is just one of the counteracting forces. Other 
determinants, both in the business environment and inside firms may tip the 
balance the other way (see the systemic nature of Porter's diamond: the mutual 
influence of the determinants is very important). 
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1993) distinguish several degrees of dependence from 
the independence discussed above to interdependence and dependence. Not much 
research has shed light on these latter two. Hence, for independence it is 
concluded that organizational innovation can be difficult because of the absence 
of hierarchy. 
Importance of these factors for organizational innovation 
Some theoretical reasons supporting the view that change in interorganizational 
relationships is a difficult task, have been discussed (see table 5.4 for an 
overview). These are also applicable to organizational change in general. The 
question is whether the identified forces also hold in the case of organizational 
innovation. As organizational innovation is a subset of organizational change, it 
can be concluded that this is indeed the case. Buchko's (1992) research was expli-
citly concerned with strategic transformation, and as organizational innovation has 
been defined as a strategic transformation in chapter 2, his views certainly apply 
to this subject. 
As for the other considerations presented, there is a possibility that in organiza-
tional innovation the identified problems will be magnified. The differences 
between reorganization and organizational innovation identified in table 2.7 can 
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shed some light on this. For example, the legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) 
of innovations is always questioned. If change from one organizational structure 
to another known organizational structure is difficult in long-term relations, than 
certainly a change from an organizational structure to an organizational inno-
vation is a more complicated matter, for the characteristics of the organizational 
innovation are not known precisely in advance and therefore there is considerable 
insecurity with regard to the benefits to be obtained. Moreover, because of the 
novelty of organizational innovation, a trial and error process (see chapter 4) of 
searching for solutions to problems connected to the new organizational form, can 
usually not be avoided. Such an experimental trial and error process requires 
ongoing interaction which is more difficult to realize between than within firms. 
Also, there is no example of how the intended organizational form works in 
practice, which may legitimize the change. The inclination to accept a new form 
of organizing will be enhanced by the presence of firms which have proven the 
effectiviry of the new form. As in the case of innovation, no such precursors exist, 
the effectivity of the new form and the legitimacy of change will be questioned. 
Hence, three specific aspects that distinguish organizational innovation from 
reorganization, strengthen the effect of the barriers to change in interorgani-
zational relationships discussed above. These are insecurity with regard to the 
benefits, the need for experimentation and the lack of legitimacy (see section 
2.3.6). 
The question is how serious the drawback of possible lower innovativeness in 
long-term relationships is. Aldrich (1979, p. 199) claims that for individual firms 
in a network the necessity to change may be limited. The reason for this is that 
other companies in a network can absorb possible shocks. This claim, however, 
only holds when there are no externalities to the changes that those other firms 
have to make. When this is not the case, Aldrich's contention does not hold. 
Moreover, if each firm in a network reasons this way, no change at all will occur. 
The discussion in Chapter 1 on the competitive impact of organizational innova-
tion has shown, that the strategic implications of organizational innovations are 
important. A limit on the degree of organizational innovativeness can therefore 
be an important drawback of interorganizational relations. If on the other hand 
an organizational innovation in which more than one organization is involved, 
comes into being it can bring a sustainable competitive advantage, for it will not 
be easily imitated. 
All this of course does not mean that organizational innovation in long-term 
interfirm relations is impossible. The foregoing merely shows that there are extra 
complications in interfirm organizational innovations as compared to intra-orga-
nizational innovations. The relative strength of the different influencing forces 
(outside-in and inside-out) determines the outcome of the innovative process. 
Conclusion 
Concluding, the proposition seems to be warranted that both intra- and interorga-
nizational innovations can be effected by the existence of long-term interorganiza-
tional relations in clusters. Embeddedness in an elaborate network of such 
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interorganizational relations, next to limiting the options for change of the 
interorganizational relations themselves, may also hinder the organizational 
innovativeness of individual firms. There seems to be a trade-off between the high 
level of technological innovativeness of interorganizational relations and a lower 
level of organizational innovativeness. Whereas technologies flow easily through 
established organizational forms, changing the forms may be a more complicated 
matter. Theory predicts that organizational innovation as opposed to technological 
innovation is not enhanced by the presence of long-term relations in related and 
supporting industries. 
The following proposition can be advanced: 
The presence of long-term interorganizational relations does not enhance the 
process of value chain reconfiguration both within and between firms. The reason 
lies in the following attributes of long-term relationships: externalities, entrenched 
routines and independence. 
The proposition advanced is not a general statement on the disadvantages of 
networks, but a specific one for a specific situation and a specific kind of 
innovation. Whether this drawback of long-term relations outweighs the known 
and proven benefits of networks for technological innovation as shown in among 
others Porter (1990a) can not be ascertained on the basis of this proposition, but 
requires further theoretical and empirical research. 
When the different attributes of longevity of the relationship (externalities, 
entrenched routines, dependence) are related to the attributes of organizational 
innovativeness (form, speed, extent) the following relations can be hypothesized 
(table 5.6): 
• building on the work of various authors it can be stated that because of exter-
nalities organizational innovation can be limited. The costs for other firms 
associated with the implementation of the innovation may limit the will of these 
firms to cooperate. Firms may also be unable to work with a new organiza-
tional form. Hence the minuses in the boxes relating externalities to speed and 
extent; 
• Buchko (1992) and Imai (1989) discuss entrenched routines as a barrier to 
transformation. Entrenched routines are hypothesized to limit the speed and 
extent of organizational innovation because changing an existing way of 
working may difficult, if not impossible; 
• based on Best (1990) and Daft (1978) independence is hypothesized to limit the 
speed and extent of organizational innovation, because the absence of hierarchy 
in that case hinders the ability of one firm to guide or dictate change. 
Neither of the authors mentioned, with the exception of Imai (1989), distinguish 
between the speed and extent of the innovation. They refer e.g. to barriers to 
transformation (Buchko, 1992). These barriers can either limit speed or extent of 
the innovation, hence here the boxes are filled in accordingly. 
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Table 5.6 Theoretical attribute-table on the influence of long-term relations on organizational 
innovativeness 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Externalities 
-
-
Entrenched routines 
-
-
Independence 
-
-
— = the independent variable influences the dependent variable negatively. 
Source: see text. 
5.4 The influence of demand on organizational innovation 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The influence of demand conditions on various aspects of firms is widely 
accepted. Indeed, this would be stating the obvious if in the case of organizational 
innovation there would not be a lack of well-structured analyses of what aspects 
of demand are relevant. The how and why questions of the influence of demand 
on organizational innovation have not been posed. It is the aim of this section to 
bring together some ideas on the role of demand, that can be traced throughout 
the literature. This will emanate in a proposition. 
5.4.2 Demand: relevant attributes for organizational innovation 
Porter (1990a) distinguishes the quantity of demand (size and pattern of growth) 
from the quality of demand (nature of buyer needs). In relation to organizational 
innovation changes in these two kinds of demand have been identified by diffe-
rent authors (for example Volberda (1992) for the flexible form) as being of 
relevance in the emergence of new organizational forms, but most emphasis has 
been on the role of changes in the latter. The quantity of demand is usually 
regarded as a short-term factor providing the initial impetus for change, whereas 
changes in the nature of demand are considered to be long-term and lasting 
developments, influencing the way in which value chains are reconfigured. 
A third element of demand pointed at by Porter is the internationalization of 
domestic demand. When a firm creates a certain innovation for a specific domestic 
demand, the firm will be able to profit even more from this innovation if the 
domestic demand anticipates the demand in other countries. The firm is then able 
to exploit its innovation in more than one market. In the literature so far this 
element of demand has not yet been discussed for organizational innovation. As 
the aim of this section is first of all to create some overview in the existing 
literature on the subject of demand and organizational innovation, the internatio-
nalization of demand will not be discussed here. This does not mean that it is 
without relevance: it can certainly be true that organizational innovations are 
modified or implemented by managers in order to profit from further internatio-
nalization of domestic demand. Whether and how this may influence the form of 
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the innovation is a question that will be left for further research. Here the focus 
will be on the elements of quantitative and qualitative developments of demand. 
Pertaining to short-term, quantitative changes in demand, Child (1987, p. 34) 
discusses the role of demand risk in the choice of organizational forms. He defines 
demand risk predominantly in terms of fluctuating demand, for instance a 
collapse of the quantity of demand in recessions. Quantitative shifts, according to 
Child, will (among other things) lead to an increased use of subcontracting and 
less vertical integration. 
Piore and Sabel (1984) emphasize the role of long-term, qualitative changes of 
demand. They claim that a similar pressure away from strictly hierarchical 
organizational structures as identified by Child, is caused by the breaking-up of 
mass markets. Increasing product differentiation in their view lessens the 
effectivity of hierarchical and unitary forms of organization. As Amin (1993, p. 
282) summarizes this viewpoint "the irreversible growth in recent decades of 
consumer sovereignty, market volatility, and shortened product lifecycles, requires 
production to be organized on an extremely flexible basis" and "the market is said 
to require decentralized coordination and control". 
Empirically, Chandler (1962) identifies both short-term and long-term changes as 
important in organizational innovation. Yet, the importance of the long-term 
changes seems to override that of the short-term. Short-term changes provided the 
initial shock that made firms look for different markets, which strategy of 
diversification required a new organizational form. DuPont for instance lost a 
large part of its market because of anti-trust policies (Chandler, 1962, p. 79) and 
the possibility of overcapacity made DuPont look for different markets. Likewise, 
Chandler (1962, p. 302) points to shocks in the quantity of demand for Sears 
(decline of demand from farmers), the Standard Oil Company (facing swiftly 
growing demand) and General Motors (also facing growing demand). 
The real organizational difficulty for these firms, was not dealing with these initial 
changes. Instead it were the problems that arose from the reaction to these shocks 
(that is the strategy of diversification), that ultimately were solved by an orga-
nizational innovation. This strategy of diversification meant that firms faced 
different markets. "The wants of different customers varied, and demand and taste 
fluctuated differently in different markets. Such changing market demands and 
the actions of competitors brought a growing differentiating of the manufacture 
and procurement of raw materials for the various product lines" (p. 393). It was 
this long-term development of increasing differentiation demanded by customers, 
that eventually made existing organizational structures obsolete and required the 
divisional form to cope with. This form enabled firms "to meet both changing 
short-term market demands and long-term market trends" (p. 385). In short: the 
shock made firms perceive the need for changes, while the long-term trends 
steered the direction of change. 
Likewise, Cusumano (1988, p. 31) defined an interplay of short-term and long-
term trends which influenced the emergence of the Just-in-Time system. The 
short-term shock was the disappearance of the military market in Japan, which 
required Japanese firms to shift their production process from buses and trucks 
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towards passenger cars. Simultaneously, there was a tendency towards more 
variety, styles and model changes in passenger cars which represented a long-
term trend. These two changes made that Toyota, frustrated with the level of 
obsolete inventory left by the short-term shock and to be expected by the long-
term trend, sought to reduce inventory and embarked on a trajectory of organi-
zational innovation that has become known as the Just-in-Time system (see the 
next chapter). 
Hence, both short-term and long-term demand changes can play a role in organi-
zational innovation. Based on the cases given above it may be concluded that 
especially the long-term trends are of interest in shaping organizational forms, but 
that short-term shocks serve as a trigger in pointing firms to the necessity of 
organizational innovation. Most emphasis in the literature has been on qualitative, 
long-term changes in demand. 
The long-term changes that have been identified for the last decades are diffe-
rentiation and fragmentation. Piore and Sabel (1984, p. 189) discuss the trend to 
diversity. It is their claim that mass markets are breaking up, but that this trend 
is not so much initiated by consumers, but by the firms themselves which have 
actively pursued differentiation strategies. This is a more important tendency in 
their view, than the one pointed at by Best (1990, p. 264), who identified the rising 
level of incomes as the main source of differentiation of demand. This, Best 
claims, is in its turn a pressure for decentralization of production. Likewise, 
Powell (1990, p. 319), points to shortening product life cycles connected to 
differentiation, as an impetus for the growing use of network organizations. What 
ever the exact reasons for increasing differentiation, there seems to be agreement 
that such a trend exists. 
Williams et al. (1987) attack Piore and Sabel's thesis of the breaking-up of mass 
markets. They claim that a more important trend is to be found in fragmentation: 
trade is breaking up mass markets in individual countries. The area of trade has 
widened and hence producers are no longer the only sellers in a national market, 
leading to a loss of market share in their respective home bases. This trend 
however can be compensated by these firms when they start to export themselves. 
If they do so they may still be able to produce on a massive scale, without having 
to resort to product differentiation. 
According to Miles and Snow (1984) both trends, differentiation and fragmenta-
tion, have had their impact on the emergence of organizational forms. Table 1.2 
has shown different product-market strategies, which correspond with different 
organizational forms. The tendency towards differentiation can be traced in their 
description of products, which started out as custom made in the 19th century, 
became increasingly standardized in the course of that century, and are expected 
to swing back to becoming designed for individual consumers in the near future. 
Fragmentation can be traced in their view of markets, being local/regional in 1800 
and developing to global and changing in the course of the 1990's. Winch (1992, 
p. 18-19) relates his view on the development of organizational forms to the 
characteristics of markets (becoming more global and less regulated) and the 
wishes of consumers. Organizational forms are said to be designed "to respond" 
(p. 18) to the wishes of this differentiation and fragmentation. 
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Naturally these trends are not general ones in practice. In some industries 
fragmentation and differentiation may have been the rule for a long time. In 
others the extent to which differentiation occurs is limited. In again other 
industries, like perhaps cyclical ones, the influence of short-term trends may by 
far outweigh the long-term trends. This may be part of the explanation, why 
different organizational paradigms can co-exist (section 3.3.4 pointed to the 
alleged sequentiality of paradigms without the provision of the possibility of their 
co-existence as a drawback of Best (1990)). In non-turbulent markets strict unitary 
ways of organizing may be superior. With this qualification we can arrive to the 
following conclusions. 
Both long-term market trends (qualitative changes which for the last decades of 
the twentieth century are claimed to be differentiation (tailoring products to 
specific needs) and fragmentation) and short-term developments (quantitative 
shocks) have an impact on organizational innovation (figure 5.2 gives an overview 
of these attributes of demand). The quantitative shocks can be structural 
(permanently higher or lower demand) or cyclical (temporary fluctuations in the 
level of demand). From Chandler's work, it can be observed that demand shocks 
may make clear the need for change to management, while long-term trends steer 
the direction of change. Following Rosenberg's (1982) theory, it is not sufficient 
to point to demand conditions to explain innovations. Rather changes in demand 
must be looked for as an explanatory factor. The question is in what direction 
these changes steer the development of new organizational forms, and what 
mechanisms are of relevance in this. 
Figure 5.2 Attributes of demand 
Demand 
quantitative qualitative 
fundamental cyclical differentiation fragmentation 
5.4.3 The influence of demand on organizational innovation; proposition 
and attribute-table 
Compare the next two statements: 
"But in many trades the ever-growing variety of commodities, and those rapid 
changes of fashion which now extend their baneful influence through almost 
every rank of society, weight the balance even more heavily against the small 
dealer, for he cannot keep a sufficient stock to offer much variety of choice, and 
if he tries to follow any movement of fashion closely, a larger proportion of his 
stock will be left stranded by the receding tide than in the case of a large 
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shopkeeper. Again in some branches of the clothing and furniture and other 
trades the increasing cheapness of machine-made goods is leading people to buy 
ready-made things from a large store instead of having them made to order by 
some small maker and dealer in their neighbourhood" (Marshall, 1890, p. 347). 
and: 
"The efficiency of the H-mode of coordination may become problematical, 
however, when diverse consumers' tastes come to demand a variety of products, 
when demands shift in a volatile fashion from one variety to another, and when 
the need to deliver ordered products without delay becomes imperative for 
gaining a competitive edge" (Aoki, 1990, p. 4). 
Exactly one century separates these statements. The first one presages the rise of 
big business, the second one its decline. Yet it seems that both identify the same 
mechanism (fashion) as being responsible for the emergence of new but different 
organizational paradigms. The apparent contradiction can of course easily be 
reconciled by pointing to the fact that there are considerable qualitative 
differences between fashion in the 1890's and fashion in the 1990's. The fact that 
fashion is no longer considered to be "baneful" may hint in that direction. More 
importantly however, fashion in Marshall's terminology lead to the standardiza-
tion of goods, as can be established by the benefit of hindsight and as the last 
sentence in the quotation may imply, whereas Aoki refers to the customization of 
goods (compare with Miles and Snow's ideas on developments in standardization 
and customization of products discussed in the previous section). Marshall also 
stresses the efficiency of production, whereas Aoki stresses the role of product 
innovation (see the discussion of static efficiency versus dynamic improvement 
in chapter 1). 
Both statements claim the existence of a relation between demand and organiza-
tional form. Even though this relation has been established in the previous two 
statements, the mechanisms relating demand and form have only been studied by 
a limited amount of authors. 
Mariorti and Cainarca (1986, p. 355) study this subject form a transaction cost 
perspective. In their view fully integrated plants will have difficulty in keeping 
the balance between demand variations and their product mix. "With irregular 
final demand the transactional advantages of full vertical integration can be 
compromised by increasing production inefficiencies" (Mariotti and Cainarca, 
1986, p. 355). 
Child (1987) and Best (1990) point to resources and capabilities as an important 
determinant in this process. Shifting customer preferences can make resources, 
skills and capacities obsolete. The use of subcontracting and cooperative 
agreements can reduce the risk of being stuck in one strategic territory (Child, 
1987, p. 37). Likewise, Best (1990, p. 263) refers to the advantages of vertical 
specialization, which can reduce the risk of a company being stuck with a 
technology, process or product. 
Chandler (1962) makes a similar link to resources, but includes internal organi-
zational problems and a change in strategy as a consequence of demand changes 
and a cause of organizational innovation. The demand shocks discussed in the 
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previous section, forced firms to find new ways of using their existing resources 
(Chandler, 1962, p. 302). This they did by differentiating their products. This 
change in strategy meant that firms came to face different markets, leading to 
internal organizational problems, because it became hard to identify where the 
responsibility for different product lines in different markets lay. The organiza-
tional innovation of the division solved this by making managers of divisions 
responsible for the coordination of activities for separate product lines (p. 393). 
This takes care of the short-term allocation of resources. The long-term allocation 
(deciding between expansion, maintenance and contraction of firm resources in 
different areas) was done by the head office. Thus, activities were split between 
head office and division. 
In Chandler's view then, shifting demand has caused firms in the beginning of 
this century to look for new ways of using their resources (that is: shifting 
strategy). This they did by diversification, which meant they had to face different 
markets with different demands. The problem of coordinating the allocation of 
resources to meet these different demands, was solved by the organizational 
innovation of the divisional form. 
Based on the observations made above, a general reasoning might be the fol-
lowing. The more varied demand, the more activities will gain independence and 
the more interfirm linkages will become of interest. The reason for this is that 
firms will want to avoid the risk of having obsolete resources and capabilities in 
the face of shifting demand. Also, for a firm to be an effective player in 
increasingly turbulent markets it will have to concentrate on those product market 
combinations in which it can obtain a competitive advantage. Hence, they will not 
only want to reduce the risk of obsolescence in some areas, but also upgrade their 
capabilities and resources in other ones, in order to be able to meet increased 
difficulties of the specific segments served and lay the foundation for flexibility 
and product differentiation (Commandeur, 1994, p. 117). There will therefore be 
a tendency towards increased specialization on core activities. 
This means that firms will tend to prefer cooperation in those activities that are 
non-core, and bring their core activities closer to the market. Hence, there will be 
an increase of interfirm cooperation and a lessening of hierarchical patterns within 
firms. In the terminology developed by Imai and Itami (1984): organization-like 
principles are replaced by market-like principles. In short: the networked paradigm 
is better suited to deal with unstable and changing demand. Examples of this 
trend can be found in the organizational trajectories identified in the networked 
paradigm in table 4.5. Porter's (1990a) description of the organization of Italian 
firms as not hierarchical and contracting out important parts of their production 
process (p. 443 and 445), can be related to this as well. It so happens that the 
firms he described in this way, face a demand in which design (p. 434) and 
fashion (p. 440) are of overriding importance. Yet, Porter did not make that 
connection between demand and organizational form which confirms the idea that 
Porter's attention for organizational innovation is limited. 
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Concluding, the following proposition can be advanced: 
Changes in demand stimulate changes in the value chain. The relevant attributes 
of demand are fundamental and cyclical changes in the quantity demanded and 
fragmentation and differentiation as qualitative changes of demand. Increased 
volatility of demand will lead to an increased use of market-like linkages over 
organization-like linkages in the value chain. 
As stated in the proposition, increasing volatility of demand (both quantitative 
and qualitative) will lead to a diminishing use of organization-like (intrafirm, 
hierarchical) linkages, to the benefit of market-like (interfirm and non-hierarchical) 
linkages in the configuration of the value system. If this latter proposition holds, 
than in differentiated markets the organization of production will develop 
towards flatter organizations and networks. The proposition is somewhat counter-
intuitive as increasing turbulence would intuitively be answered with attempts to 
increase control mechanisms instead of diminishing it. 
The proposition is a more specific form of Hodgson's (1988, p. 263) claim that 
internal structural variety may match the variety from outside, as according to the 
proposition the variety in the value system will augment. On an even more 
general level the proposition could be seen as an application of Ashby's law of 
requisite variety (Ashby, 1958, p. 207). Yet, even though Hodgon's statement and 
the advanced proposition reflect Ashby's law it would be a mistake to claim that 
they are identical. Ashby's law is mathematically firmly grounded in a well-
defined, strictly numerical situation, whereas in the proposition given above this 
is far from being the case. 
Most importantly, according to Ashby (p. 245), the law may not be applicable 
when the quantity of control is limited. When the range of possible outcomes is 
larger than the range of control mechanisms the law will not hold. Usually in 
social and economic situations, this is the case. Ashby (p. 245) claims that in such 
situations it might be better to focus on a few parameters instead of trying to 
control the entire situation. Nevertheless, even though the proposition is not a 
direct translation of the law of requisite variety, the inspiration taken from 
Ashby's work will be clear. 
Summarizing the discussion, table 5.7 presents the attribute-table of demand: 
• among others Chandler (1962) pointed to fundamental changes in the quantity 
of demand, which speed up the process of organizational innovation, hence a 
plus links fundamental changes to the speed of development of a new 
organizational form; 
• Child (1987) referred to cyclical changes, which influence the form because they 
steer the organization in the direction of diminished vertical integration. So the 
form of the organizational innovation is determined by cyclical changes in 
demand, accordingly a "Y" has been entered in table 5.7; 
• a number of authors have discussed the influence of differentiation (Best (1990), 
Mariotti and Cainarca (1986), Powell (1990)) and fragmentation (Miles and 
Snow (1984) and Winch (1992)) on the form of the innovation. The relative shift 
in the direction of market-like linkages is caused by an increased influence of 
these two attributes of demand. 
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Table 5.7 Theoretical attribute-table on the influence of demand on organizational innovative-
ness 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Fundamental 
+ 
Cyclical 
Y 
Differentiation 
Y 
Fragmentation 
Y 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter a beginning has been made with developing an outside-in 
approach of organizational innovation. Porter's diamond framework has been 
used to identify key factors in the business environment, which might be of 
influence on the emergence of new organizational forms. Two of these factors 
have been studied in depth based on their relevance for innovation theory: long-
term interorganizational relations and demand. It can be concluded, based on a 
review of literature that both have an impact on organizational innovation, albeit 
in a different way. Frequent demand changes stimulate organizational innovation, 
whereas the presence of long-term ties with other firms is an extra complication 
for the implementation of a new organizational form. 
Table 5.8 Overview of the hypothesized impact of demand and long-term relations on 
organizational innovation 
Whether 
Why 
How 
Long-term Relations 
Yes, long-term relations influence 
organizational innovation 
Because of the presence of exter-
nalities, entrenched routines and 
independence 
Negatively: long-term relations 
limit the speed and extent of 
organizational innovation 
Demand Conditions 
Yes, demand changes have an 
impact on organizational innova-
tion 
Because of the effect on resources 
and capabilities (these may become 
obsolete and must be kept up-to-
date) 
Positively: changes in demand sti-
mulate reconfigurations of the 
value chain 
Source: see text. 
In table 5.8 an overview and summary is given of the influence of demand and 
long-term relationships on organizational innovativeness. This has been done 
along the lines laid out in section 5.1, where the question was asked whether these 
determinants influence organizational innovativeness, why they influence it and 
how they influence it. Based on the analysis of two determinants of Porter's 
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diamond, organizational innovation can be described as being subject to many 
counteracting forces in the business environment: some stimulating, some 
inhibiting. Just like in Porter's framework, which factor turns the scale is an 
empirical question. 
6 
Existing empirical evidence on the propositions 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter existing empirical material will be reviewed connected to the 
propositions developed in chapters 4 and 5 (assembled in table 6.1). As the several 
chapters so far have shown, there are quite some descriptions of new organiza-
tional forms available. Most of them however have the drawback that they are 
only aimed at describing the forms and not at analyzing the process of develop-
ment which lies behind them (they are static instead of dynamic analyses). 
Literature which can be used for corroborating the propositions is still relatively 
scarce. In the empirical chapters 7 and 8 new cases on organizational innovation 
will be described with the tools developed in the previous chapters. The 
terminology of routines, activities and linkages will be applied to the various 
cases and the outside-in perspective will be discussed as well. The current chapter 
will review existing empirical studies into organizational innovation in as far as 
they relate to the propositions summarized in table 6.1. These studies will also be 
related to the concepts developed in the previous chapters. 
The method followed is again the method of the attribute-tables, which was also 
used in the previous chapters. The attribute-tables will now contain entries based 
on empirical research of the propositions. In chapter 9 the empirical attribute-
tables will be confronted with the theoretical attribute-tables. 
The following sections are split up according to the propositions: section 6.2 
discusses path dependence, section 6.3 discusses long-term relations and section 
6.4 gives an overview of authors who have studied demand side factors and their 
impact on organizational form. Each section will end by summarizing the results 
in an attribute-table. Some good case analyses have been published recently that 
after some analysis along the lines laid down in chapter 4, show the path 
dependence of organizational forms. On the influence of networks and demand 
on organizational innovation only a limited amount of research has been 
undertaken. Some indications on the tenability of the propositions can however 
be found. 
137 
138 CHAPTER SIX 
Table 6.1 Overview of the propositions 
Path dependence 
The process by which organizational innovations come about is path dependent, in 
that new organizational forms to a large extent build on their precursors. The reason 
for this lies in such firm specific attributes of path dependence as dynamic routines, 
capabilities and resources. 
Long-term interorganizational relations 
The presence of long-term interorganizational relations does not enhance the process 
of value chain reconfiguration both within and between firms. The reason lies in the 
following attributes of long-term relationships: externalities, entrenched routines and 
independence. 
Demand 
Changes in demand stimulate changes in the value chain. The relevant attributes of 
demand are fundamental and cyclical changes in the quantity demanded and 
fragmentation and differentiation as qualitative changes of demand. Increased 
volatility of demand will lead to an increased use of market-like linkages over 
organization-like linkages in the value chain. 
Source: see chapters 4 and 5. 
6.2 Path dependence in organizational innovation 
6.2.1 Toyota: Cusumano's account of the emergence of JIT 
The phenomenon of path dependence of a trajectory will now be illustrated for 
the case of the Just-in-Time system (from now on abbreviated as JIT). The JTT-case 
also shows the gradual evolvement of a trajectory belonging to one paradigm into 
a trajectory belonging to another one. JIT namely, evolved from the mass 
production of cars in the unitary paradigm towards the networked paradigm. The 
dynamic routines of the process will be defined in order to show how repeated 
similar changes direct the process of reconfiguration of the value chain. 
Cusumano's account of the emergence of the Just-in-Time system in Toyota will 
be used (Cusumano, 1988). His history of JIT will be interpreted with the tools 
developed in the previous chapters and the terminology of organizational inno-
vation and dynamic routines will be applied to his case description. A Toyota 
manager, Taiichi Ohno, started the system in 1948 with an organizational inno-
vation: he introduced a pull system in the production process of cars. In the pull 
system parts are not pushed along a production line according to a master 
schedule, instead a worker has to retrieve work-in-process from the previous 
station. In the push system work-in-process was offered to the next station 
regardless of the fact whether the next station was ready to receive it. This led to 
inventories. In the pull system on the other hand, the worker at a station 
determines whether the previous station can deliver work-in-process to him. The 
pull system was an innovation in car manufacturing, but other sectors had already 
been working with this routine for some time: Ohno knew about the system from 
an article on aircraft production and supermarkets (Cusumano, 1988, p. 34). 
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Different organizational innovations can be distinguished in the course of 
development of the JIT system, sometimes connected with technological innova-
tions. In table 6.2 those innovations are listed that were organizational or had 
specific organizational consequences. The only technological innovations in the 
table pertain to the synchronization of parts of the production process and the 
lowering of change-over times of stamping presses. 
Table 6.2 The trajectory of JIT inside Toyota 
1947 ' 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1953 
1955 
1957 
1961 < 
1962 ' 
1963 
1965 
1971 
1973 
' Workers operate two machines instead of one 
• Introduction pull system in the machining shop 
1
 Quality inspection on the line 
• Workers operate 3 to 4 machines 
> Pull system extended to marketing 
' Synchronizing engine and transmission machining 
' Indicator lights introduced on engine lines 
' Introduction kanban inside machining shop 
• Synchronizing body and final assembly shops 
• Controls on parts deliveries 
• Introduction line stop button 
' Indicator lights on all production lines 
• Introduction kanban to some suppliers 
• Introduction kanban in entire company 
» Lowering change-over times 
» Workers operate five machines 
• Introduction kanban to all suppliers 
» Workers put on assembly line where and when needed 
' Lowering change-over times 
' Suppliers linked directly to assembly line 
Source: based on Cusumano (1988, pp. 34-35). 
The most important organizational innovation was the gradual introduction of the 
kanban and pull system throughout the company's value chain and value system. 
In 1948, 1949, 1950, 1953, 1961, 1962, 1965 and 1973 parts of this system were 
implemented. The gradual evolution of the system will be clear: it took Toyota 25 
years before it was completed. The impact of the environment on these develop-
ments is clearly discernable: in 1948 the collapse of the military market (demand) 
and the high level of inflation induced Ohno to lower the level of inventory. 
Furthermore, in 1950 financial difficulties prompted Toyota to extend the pull 
concept to marketing by limiting production to orders received. 
In terms of the value chain the main changes are: an elimination of the stock in 
Toyota's value chain, the introduction of a new coordination mechanism called 
kanban, integration of the quality control activity with the production activity. 
These changes were not limited to the firm, but in the course of time were 
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implemented in the relation with suppliers as well. Hence the JIT-system is a 
mixture of changes in activities and linkages in the value system. 
This evolution can easily be rephrased in terms of static and dynamic routines 
(the latter ones are summarized in table 6.3; also see chapter 4 for a discussion of 
the routine concept). In this case, problem solving was done by replicating the 
successful kanban (pull) routine. The dynamic routine which determines the 
reconfiguration of activities and linkages, can be described as "introduce kanban"; 
the static (lower order) routine was kanban: "the use of paper tags to signal 
processing operations or parts production" (Cusumano, 1988, p. 35). The "kanban" 
routine was used internally in the 1950's, in the early 1960's it was introduced by 
Toyota to some outside suppliers (1961) and in the entire company (1962). Finally, 
halfway the 1960's all outside suppliers implemented the kanban routine. In the 
late 1960's the subsidiaries followed. 
Table 6.3 Dynamic routines in the trajectory of ]IT 
• Introduce kanban 
(1948, 1950, 1953, 
• Synchronize 
(1950, 1955) 
• Enrich jobs 
(1947, 1949, 
parts 
1950, 
1961, 1962, 1965, 1973) 
of the production process 
1955, 1957, 1963, 1971) 
Source: based on Cusumano (1988). 
Another dynamic routine, synchronization of parts of the production process in 
order to reduce inventory, is not discussed in any great detail by Cusumano. It 
did require coordination of different activities and consequently had some 
organizational aspects connected to it. In how far technological innovations were 
used in this process remains unclear in Cusumano's account. Whether this is a 
completely separate routine is the question: in order to eradicate inventory in the 
kanban system synchronizing parts of the production process seems to be a 
necessity. 
A third dynamic routine can be found in the flexibilization of job assignments by 
means of job enrichment. From 1947 till 1971 the constraints on job assignments 
were gradually loosened, as workers had to be able to work at more than one 
machine. The influence of demand in creating this routine is noticeable: workers 
had to operate several machines "because demand was low" (p. 34). In terms of 
the value chain, this might be interpreted as a standardization of labour (a 
linkage) leading to integration of activities: everybody had to be able to do the 
same job, so that the boundaries of separate activities became less marked. 
Connected to this, the use of indicator lights and the introduction of a line-stop 
button, are a delegation of authority (a linkage, see table 2.4) to workers on the 
production line. Because of the simplicity of the technologies used, they can 
hardly be called technological innovations. The key idea behind them is of an 
organizational nature: the identification and solution of problems should be done 
as close to the production line as possible. 
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Table 6.2 gives two examples of the creation of activities in the value chain in 
1949 and 1955. The use of quality control on the line and even before assembly 
of cars begins, are original innovations: they were not yet present in the pull 
concept in aircraft production and supermarkets which inspired Ohno. 
Finally, the main technological innovation described by Cusumano was the 
reduction of stamping-press changeover times for dies in 1962 and 1973, which 
was achieved by automation. Next to that this reduction in time was achieved by 
some organizational innovations as for example the creation of teams specialized 
in setting-up (p. 35). So, in fact this was a mixture of technology and organization. 
One of the main features of the development of JTT is the use of dynamic routines 
(see table 6.3). Most innovations implemented seem to be part of a pattern: similar 
changes in the value chain reoccur. This application of the concepts of routines 
and trajectories to an organizational innovation, makes clear that the JIT form 
emerged gradually, by means of routinely implementing similar changes in static 
routines. This confirms the idea that the concepts of routines and trajectories can 
be applied to organizational innovation. It is however only with the benefit of 
hindsight that JIT can be defined as a separate trajectory. As the time it took to 
develop the system was longer than 25 years, it is implausible to assume that the 
key characteristics of the JIT form were already clear at the beginning of this 
trajectory. The number of changes is so large that it is improbable that they have 
all been planned a quarter of a century in advance. Instead, the form seems to 
have emerged slowly. 
Diffusion of JIT 
An interesting pattern can also be found in the diffusion of the form (summarized 
in table 6.4). The pattern of diffusion largely confirms the pattern sketched in 
chapter 1: a rather slow diffusion inside Japan, and the diffusion outside Japan 
does not start until a very late date. Moreover, Cusumano states that none of the 
adopting firms were as effective as Toyota in implementing the JIT-system, among 
others because of the adaptations made to the system. Nissan for example always 
put more emphasis on computerization than Toyota did. 
Table 6.4 The diffusion of JTT and Kanban 
1962 
end 50's/ early 60's 
late 60's 
mid 70's 
late 70's 
1982 
• Introduction kanban in entire Toyota-company 
• Nissan starts implementing JIT-like systems 
• Kanban implemented in Toyota subsidiaries and affiliates 
• Mazda starts to implement the system 
• Nissan starts implementing kanban with suppliers 
• U.S. companies start experimenting with a limited just-in-
time concept 
Source: Cusumano (1988, p. 36). 
The example of JIT shows the path dependence in the development of organiza-
tional innovations. It is clear that there is both continuity and discontinuity in the 
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development of the form: on the one hand Toyota did not opt for a technological 
approach to innovating in the production process but stuck to the traditional 
assembly line idea and built on that. After a short flirtation with higher levels of 
automation in the beginning of the 1990's, Toyota soon reverted to lower levels 
of technological innovation in improving its production line (The Economist, 
1995a), because the scope for further development was limited. On the other 
hand, the traditional assembly line system was so much improved upon in the 
course of time that the system today is completely different from what it was in 
the 1950's: the differences on the level of the dynamic routines show that JIT is 
a new trajectory (also see table 4.3). 
Conclusion 
The case developed by Cusumano on the emergence of JIT illustrates how organi-
zational innovation can be described as a path dependent process in which 
dynamic routines are used, as described in chapter 4. In the process both con-
tinuity and discontinuity can be observed. 
In the case of JIT the dynamic routines influenced the form of the innovation. The 
introduction of kanban for example altered the form of the linkages between the 
activities. The extent of the innovation is influenced positively by the repeated 
application of the dynamic routines. This becomes evident in table 6.3 which 
shows how similar dynamic routines were applied over a number of years, thus 
increasing the number of changes in the value chain. On various points develop-
ments in the environment have stimulated these routines, so that the characte-
rization of organizational innovation as not only a historically contingent but also 
a context dependent process (see section 3.2) is confirmed by this case. 
6.2.2 ABB: Bartlett and Ghoshal look beyond the M-form 
Another form of path dependence can be found in the development of the M-form 
towards the N-form (Networked-form) in the case of ABB. Lazonick (1991, p. 261) 
claimed that the formation of the M-form itself can also best be understood as a 
path dependent process in which the M-form emerges out of its predecessors. 
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) the M-form in its turn has led to another 
organizational innovation which has been most drastically developed by ABB. 
Different terms have been coined for this organizational form: federated 
enterprise, N-form and transnational are terms which all refer to the form 
implemented by ABB. 
Table 6.5 summarizes the continuity and discontinuity of the ABB organization 
structure in terms of activities and linkages. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) describe 
the new organizational form of ABB as emerging form the M-form. "Some of the 
structural elements on which Barnevik (ABB's CEO) built ABB's new organization 
follow the design principles of the classic M-form" (p. 26). 
These principles include the use of market like linkages. The divisions or units are 
evaluated on their performance as if they are separate companies. For example, 
in ABB every separate company is responsible for its complete balance sheet. 
Likewise, in the M-form separate divisions may be evaluated on their ROI. 
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Another linkage which remains is the vertical flow of information supporting the 
hierarchy in the firm. In ABB a computer system fulfills this function. The creation 
of reliable vertical information flows was a key issue in the M-form as well. 
Table 6.5 Beyond the M-Form: continuity and discontinuity in the configuration of activities 
and linkages in the M-form and ABB 
Continuity 
Linkages 
• Use of market linkages (p. 28) 
• Reliable information flows (p. 26) 
Activities 
• No functional form at headquarters (p. 26) 
• Decentralization (p. 26) 
• Divisions in a matrix form (p. 27) 
Discontinuity 
M-form 
Linkages 
• Hierarchy; rules; on average 8 
layers of management 
• Emphasis on vertical communica-
tion 
Activities 
• Activities grouped in independent 
divisions with sufficient capabilities 
to serve a market independently 
• R&D centralized 
• Resource allocation centralized; core 
activity of management is allocation 
of resources 
ABB 
Linkages 
• Embedded performance standards (p. 
31); policy bible (p. 31); 3 management 
layers (p. 28) (E) 
• Horizontal communication as well: 
information technology links everybody 
(p. 33); personal networks, teams, task 
forces, committees (p. 34, 35) (H) 
Activities 
• Activities grouped in small entities with 
insufficient capabilities (p. 35) (H) 
• R&D decentralized (p. 28) (E) 
• Financial independence of the units; 
core activity of management is the 
management of information flows (p. 
32) (E) 
Source: based on Bartlett en Ghoshal (1993). (E) refers to linkages and activities showing the extent 
of decentralization and delegation; (H) refers to horizontal integration. 
Pertaining to activities there is a continuity between the ABB structure and the M-
form on three levels (see table 6.5): 
• like the M-form ABB does not divide its activities according to the functional 
area to which they belong. Instead, the move away from the functional form is 
continued. 
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• the M-form is characterized by a large extent of decentralization of assets, as is 
ABB's form. The independence of units (divisions) is an example of this. Bartlett 
and Ghoshal however find that the extent to which this principle is imple-
mented in ABB is higher than in the traditional M-form (more on this below). 
• ABB uses a matrix, which form is not used in the M-form, but according to 
Bartlett and Ghoshal in ABB this form is "simply a more complex form of the 
same basic divisionalized model described by Chandler" (p. 27). 
The differences between ABB's structure and the M-form are summarized by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal in two points: 
• the extent of decentralization of assets and the extent of delegation of 
responsibilities are higher (p. 27); 
• there is an emphasis on horizontal integration (p. 33). 
As will be clear from the aspects discussed under the heading of continuity, only 
the latter difference is completely new. Bartlett and Ghoshal acknowledge the first 
point was already present in the M-form and that the difference is indeed only a 
matter of extent: ABB was far more radical than the M-form in decentralizing and 
delegating. The principle however remained the same. In chapter 4's terminology 
these two differences can be interpreted as dynamic routines. Reallocating assets 
and responsibilities to lower levels is the first dynamic routine and the implemen-
tation of mechanisms which enhance horizontal integration is the second one. 
The main points of difference between the M-form and ABB have been split up 
in the lower part of table 6.5 according to the linkages and activities in which they 
become clear. The extent of delegation of control becomes evident in the creation 
of linkages based not on hierarchy but on embedded values. More than top 
management dictating events, managers at the lower level are expected to 
evaluate decisions based on values which are laid down in the policy bible. These 
embedded performance standards allow the number of management layers to be 
cut to three. 
Next to linkages aimed at vertical communication, horizontal integration is 
achieved by a number of linkages for horizontal communication. These linkages 
(involving the static routines of communicating by means of information tech-
nology and various discussion groups to coordinate activities) aim at transferring 
knowledge and integrating capabilities across business activities. Contrary to this, 
in the M-form horizontal integration was achieved (if at all) by top management. 
Horizontal integration is connected to the way in which activities are grouped. 
These have been divided in such a way that each separate entity can never 
develop all its required capabilities itself. It therefore always needs to resort to 
other parts of the company in order to be able to function satisfactorily. This gives 
a strong impetus to horizontal integration. It is also different from divisionaliza-
tion in the M-form: in the M-form a division was defined by the fact that it could 
itself provide all the necessary knowledge and resources for its product-markets. 
Whereas most of the changes between the M-form and ABB are a matter of extent, 
the division of resources and capabilities is completely opposite in the two cases. 
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The extent of decentralization of activities becomes clear in the last two 
reallocations of activities: R&D and financial responsibilities. Both these activities 
have been decentralized to the individual units. Management's core activity is no 
longer the allocation of resources, but has become the management of information 
flows. 
The development of ABB's organizational form is a continuation of the M-form 
as well as a departure from it. It has many originalities (especially the emphasis 
on horizontal integration and the radicality of decentralization and delegation) 
that allow it to be called an organizational innovation, as Bartlett and Ghoshal 
make clear. "What we hope to show, however, is that while each of the elements 
of the new model can be obtained through adjustments of emphasis within the 
M-form organization, taken together they imply a management system that is sub-
stantially different from the system described by Chandler, Bower and Cyert and 
March" (p. 25, Bartlett and Ghoshal base their description of the M-form on 
Chandler, Bower and Cyert and March). The words "adjustments of emphasis" 
refer to the routine-like behaviour and continuity in the transition from the M-
form to the ABB-structure. 
Conclusion 
Like in the case of JIT presented in section 6.2.1, the description of the emergence 
of a new organizational structure in ABB given by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) 
corroborates the proposition that the process of organizational innovation is path 
dependent in that it exhibits both continuity and discontinuity. An analysis of the 
M-form and the ABB organization structure shows that despite the fact that the 
time passed between their original conception is about 60 years, there are some 
clear similarities between the forms. As far as there are differences, these are for 
a large part explained by the fact that they are caused by continued and 
reinforced application of the dynamic routines of decentralization and delegation, 
which were introduced with the M-form. The M-form structure in many ways 
acted as a point of departure for the changes made in ABB. This, once more, does 
not mean that ABB has not brought forth an innovation. The differences with the 
classic M-form are still clearly identifiable and the reinforced application of the 
M-form's dynamic routines influenced the extent of the organizational innovation 
developed in ABB positively. 
As to the role of resources an capabilities, the idea that these should be divided 
over various units shaped the organizational form as well. The effect on speed 
and extent of resources and capabilities cannot be ascertained in this case. 
The analysis presented in table 6.5 also shows the usefulness of the value chain 
analysis developed in chapter 2. Activities and linkages have been identified and 
differences among the M-form and the ABB-form can be seen right away. 
6.2.3 Path dependence in interorganlzational relations 
Next to path dependence on the intra-organizational level, there can also be path 
dependence in the way interorganizational relations are restructured. Imai (1989) 
described the development of networks in Japan as such a path dependent 
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process. He identifies three forms of interfirm relations in Japan which succeeded 
each other in the course of time: the Zaibatsu, the Business Group and the 
Network Industrial Organization. One of the main characteristics of the develop-
ment of these interfirm relations is that in the course of time the linkages between 
these firms loosened: in the zaibatsu, companies controlled other companies by 
stock ownership and assigning directors whereas in the network industrial organi-
zation interfirm relations are characterized by more voluntary cooperation 
(p. 143). 
Imai stresses the point that the three mentioned forms emerged out of each other 
in an evolutionary way: the zaibatsu organization determined the way the 
business group was organized and the business group in its turn to a large extent 
laid the foundations for the network industrial organization. Imai calls the process 
of restructuring the boundaries of the firm "self-organization". He emphasizes the 
path dependence in the process of self-organization when he states: "Self-
organization proceeds within a framework or structure which has already been 
established, and the characteristics of this structure influence the nature of the 
self-organization. Although the transition from zaibatsu to business groups was 
brought about by the intentional dissolution of the zaibatsu, the subsequent 
process of forming business groups included a considerable element of self-
organization. However, the direction and extent of self-organization was still 
influenced by the traditional structure inherited from the zaibatsu." (Imai, 1989, 
p. 145). "...when self-organization progresses within a certain structure, the scope 
of the structure is broadened and the structure itself changes until soon a new 
structure is established. Self-organization then begins again with the new structure 
as its initial framework. To put this in abstract terms, the writer (Imai, APdM) 
conceives the process of "structure —> self-organizing —> structure" to be the 
organizational evolutionary process" (Imai, 1989, p. 146). 
This analysis of path dependence of organizational innovation in interfirm 
relations is grounded in Imai's empirical analysis of the development of interfirm 
cooperation in Japan since the Meiji Restoration. The continuity and discontinuity 
in this development is illustrated empirically by Imai's description of the 
evolution of the three interorganizational forms. 
Another example of path dependence in interorganizational forms can be found 
in Pennings and Harianto (1992) with regard to the organizational form firms use 
in implementing technological innovations. Pennings and Harianto found that 
previous experiences determined the way this implementation was organized. 
Firms with extensive prior networking experiences were more likely to innovate 
with strategic partners. The authors conclude that some firms seem to have 
developed organizational "design skills" (similar to routines) in the course of their 
development, that influence the way activities are organized in a way that cannot 
be explained by means of technological or environmental requirements (p. 377): 
"the range of design options is not only dictated by technological or environmen-
tal requirements, but also by the repertoire of design skills which firms have 
accumulated". Some firms seem to have developed a routine of solving problems 
by means of interorganizational innovations, even though an intra-organizational 
solution might have been used as well. 
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Conclusion 
This section has given two examples of path dependence in the development of 
interorganizational forms. They show that path dependence is not only present 
in inrra-organizational relations, but on the interfirm level as well. Reference is 
only made to the form of the innovation, and not to the speed and extent of its 
implementation. Apart from the design skills mentioned by Pennings and 
Harianto (1992), no reference is made to dynamic routines. Capabilities and 
resources were not mentioned at all. 
6.2.4 Attribute-table on path dependence 
In table 6.6 the conclusions of the various studies have been summarized in the 
attribute-table: 
• the relation between routines and form was established in the JIT- and ABB-
cases, in which the dynamic routines determined the reconfiguration of the 
value chain. The ABB case showed that the radical application of existing 
routines led to a far-reaching organizational innovation: this is a connection 
between dynamic routines and extent. Also the repeated application of dynamic 
routines in Toyota, led to a system of car production that radically differed 
from existing practice and thus influenced the extent of the organizational 
innovation. Hence, dynamic routines indeed influence the form of the inno-
vation (hence the "Y" in the box relating these attributes) and increases the 
extent of the innovation (which justifies the "+" in the box relating dynamic 
routines to extent). 
• an example of how capabilities determine organizational form is given in the 
ABB case, where the specific division of units was determined by the capa-
bilities (therefore a "Y" has been entered in the specific box). No influence of 
capabilities on the speed and extent of the innovation was found. 
• as to resources, it is clear that these influence the organizational form: the 
financial difficulties of Toyota prompted it to extend the pull concept to 
marketing. It was not possible to clearly establish the influence of resources on 
speed and extent. 
Table 6.6 Attribute-table of path dependence based on existing empirical material 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Dynamic Routines 
Y 
+ 
Capabilities 
Y 
Resources 
Y 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent one positively 
Source: see text. 
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6.3 Long-term interfirm relations and their effect on organizational 
innovation 
Long-term interorganizational relations are part of networks of firms. So far the 
study into networks has mainly focussed on kinds of networks, their organiza-
tional characteristics and their role in technological innovation. Research on the 
drawbacks of networks is of a relatively recent date, as was shown in chapter 5. 
The proposition developed in chapter 5 defines a possible drawback of networks. 
In table 6.7 some empirical research is presented which relates to this proposition. 
However, not all of the authors mentioned specifically focus on the longevity of 
interorganizational relations as a separate force in organizational innovation. 
Buchko (1992) comes closest to this subject, but he has not limited his study to 
organizational innovation and studies strategic change in general. 
Bianchi and Gualtieri (1990) find an example of entrenched routines in the 
industrial district of Emilia-Romagna. The organization of production in Emilia-
Romagna has been stabilized on the basis of social rules, which are not change-
able in the short run. The social linkage which has developed in the course of 
decades thus hinders swift change to new forms of production, which according 
to Bianchi and Gualtieri are required for the Emilian district to respond 
adequately to a changing environment. 
Table 6.7 Research on the influence of networks on organizational innovation 
Author 
Bianchi and Gualtieri 
(1990, p. 101) 
Buchko 
(1992) 
Daft 
(1978, p. 208) 
Grabher 
(1993b, p. 261) 
Finding 
Social rules hinder speedy adaptation of organizational 
form 
Firms depending on networks are less likely to indicate an 
intent to strategic transformation 
Organizational innovation requires centralization 
Different forms of lock-in in the Ruhr area are caused by 
long-term relations 
Source: as indicated. 
Buchko (1992) is one of the first to research the possibility of strategic change in 
networks with the aim to find out whether this kind of change (which Buchko 
explicitly relates to a.o. changes in organizational form) is inhibited by the 
presence of interorganizational relations. Based on the theory of isomorphism 
Buchko develops some hypotheses which are confirmed by means of a large scale 
empirical study (p. 14). One of them deals with externalities: "The greater the 
professional network ties among firms within an interorganizational network, the 
greater the barrier to strategic transformation and the less likely firms will be to 
indicate an intention to change strategy" (p. 14). This result is an example of 
externalities: the empirical material shows that the more firms are intertwined 
(Buchko measures the number of linkages) the lower the intention to implement 
strategic changes. Buchko's work has two disadvantages: it is not confined to 
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organizational innovation only, and it measures intentions to change, not real 
changes. Although his work points in the direction of confirming the proposition 
on long-term relationships, because of these two disadvantages it will not be used 
to fill in the attribute-table. 
Daft (1978) shows that organizational innovations are easier implemented when 
there is a high level of centralization. This indirectly confirms the propositions 
about independence (see table 5.4). In case of independence, centralization is low 
and thus organizational innovation is made more difficult. An important quali-
fication is that Daft's finding emanates from research within individual firms and 
hence may not necessarily be applicable to situations in which more than one firm 
is involved. Nonetheless, his research can be taken as an indication that 
independence (low centralization) limits organizational innovation. 
Grabher (1993b, p. 261) presents several empirical examples of the way routines 
can become entrenched in long-term relationships. Grabher refers to this as the 
weakness of strong ties. His case study of developments in the German Ruhr-area 
identified a.o. personal connections which developed in long-term relations as an 
obstacle to change in general. "Personal ties of long standing resulted in mutual 
orientations involving a common language regarding technical matters, con-
tracting rules, and knowledge on which the parties could draw in communicating 
with one another... This unchallenged groupthink interpretation prevented a 
reorganization of the regional economy in an early period of decline, when the 
region was still well equipped with resources for innovation" (p. 262). Grabher 
concludes that the long-term relations worked out positively in a stable situation 
as in that case they reduced transaction costs, but in a situation of change the 
lock-in in long-term relations hindered change. 
Conclusion 
Looking over these studies, it will be clear that the evidence of the proposition on 
the influence of long-term interorganizational relations on innovativeness is scant. 
Several authors have hinted at the possibility that there may be a negative 
influence, but detailed studies specifically focussed on the issue are almost absent. 
Bianchi and Gualtieri's study for instance only touched at this subject in the 
margin of analyses dealing with other topics. Moreover, the distinction between 
long- and short-term interorganizational relations is not always explicitly made. 
Yet, the findings of the various authors can be related to the concepts used in 
chapter 5. The studies assembled in table 6.7 cover the two aspects of speed and 
extent of organizational innovativeness: Bianchi and Gualtieri focus on speed 
while Daft's and Grabher's work mainly refers to the extent of organizational 
innovation. 
Only three boxes of the attribute-table in table 6.8 can be filled in (also see table 
6.7): 
• Bianchi and Gualtieri (1990) discuss speed in relation to entrenched routines 
and find that these slow down the process of renewal. The relation between 
entrenched routines and speed is negative; 
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• Grabher (1993) relates entrenched routines to the extent of organizational 
innovation and finds that they limit the number of changes made. The relation 
between entrenched routines and extent is negative; 
• Daft (1978) finds that centralization is needed for organizational innovation so 
that independence (meaning low centralization) has a negative effect on extent. 
Table 6.8 Attribute-table of long-term relations based on existing empirical material 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Externalities Entrenched routines 
-
-
Independence 
-
— = the independent variable influences the dependent variable negatively 
Source: see text. 
6.4 Demand and its effect on organizational innovation 
Even though demand is frequently recognized as one of the most important 
elements in the business environment also with regard to innovation, there is a 
limited amount of detailed analyses of the influence of demand changes on orga-
nizational innovation. The available studies, however, give similar results. In 
chapter 5 Chandler's detailed case studies were used to formulate the proposition 
that increased turbulence on the demand side leads to an increased use of market-
like linkages in the configuration of the value chain. In table 6.9 Chandler's other 
main findings are summarized. 
Table 6.9 also shows some research in which the relation between demand and 
organizational form has been explicitly incorporated. Best for instance in 
enumerating the determinants of the success of the decentralized mode of pro-
duction in industrial districts states that "A third pressure for decentralization 
comes from the demand side" (Best, 1990, p. 264). He continues to observe that 
"Small geographically dispersed firms are more able to respond to fragmented 
demand by supplying tailor-made products". He qualifies this finding however, 
by limiting his claim to the primary activities in the value chain. Best is not able 
to conclude whether the support activities as "strategic planning, marketing, 
distribution, R&D, design, and managing supplier networks" (p. 264) also exhibit 
this tendency towards decentralization . Nonetheless Best's opinion provides 
some empirical underpinning for the thesis that product differentiation leads to 
an increased use of market-like linkages or, put differently, differentiation leads 
to form changes. 
Research by Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) into the strategic center model of 
organization suggests that these activities are often centralized. 
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Table 6.9 Research on the influence of demand on organizational innovation 
Author 
Best (1990, p. 264) 
Chandler (1962) 
Imai (1989, p. 129) 
Mariotti and Cainarca 
(1986, p. 368) 
Powell (1987, p. 78) 
Finding 
Demand is a pressure for decentralization 
Quantitative shocks initiate change; qualitative develop-
ments direct organizational innovation as well 
"severe depression acts as a trigger for organizational 
change" 
Fashion leads to deverticalization 
Demand changes lead to decomposition of large integrated 
firms and the rise of smaller ones 
Source: as indicated. 
Imai (1989) focusses on quantitative shifts in demand as a trigger for organiza-
tional change in Japanese networks. He identifies the Meiji Restoration, the period 
of postwar reconstruction and the oil crisis as major causes of shifts in demand. 
These three historical events initiated a trajectory of organizational development 
which eventually led to the rise of the three forms of interorganizahonal relations 
discussed in section 6.2.3: respectively the Zaibatsu, the Business Group and the 
Network Industrial Organization. This research result is analogical to the 
Chandler approach to quantitative shifts in demand: demand shocks speed up the 
process of organizational innovation. 
Mariotti and Cainarca (1986) have researched developments on a larger scale in 
the Italian textile-clothing industry. They research shifts in the organizational 
structure of the thirty largest Italian firms in this industry from a transaction cost 
perspective over the period 1971-1981. Specifically they look at the extent at which 
quality and fashion policies are adopted by these firms and at the volatility of 
final demand. Their conclusion is summarized as follows: "With irregular final 
demand the transactional advantage of full vertical integration can be compro-
mised by increasing production inefficiencies" and hence under certain circum-
stances "disintegration can improve economic efficiency" (p. 355). When quality 
and fashion policies are implemented Mariotti and Cainarca expect to find a low 
level of internal vertical integration. Their research results confirm this proposition 
(p. 368): 
• all firms which dropped out of the top thirty between 1971 and 1981 were 
vertically integrated, and unable to follow the shifts in demand; 
• new entries in the top thirty mainly occurred in the less vertically integrated 
categories; 
• and internal transformations in firms which remained among the thirty largest 
firms were exclusively oriented toward diversification and vertical disintegra-
tion. 
The conclusion drawn from this is that "The structural evolution of the cotton 
industry confirms the relation between deverticalization, environmental turbulence 
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and adoption of quality/fashion policies" (p. 368). As deverticalization means an 
increased use of market-like linkages this finding largely confirms the proposition 
that increased demand turbulence leads to a clear shift from organization-like to 
market-like linkages. This corroborates the proposition that demand influences the 
form and extent of the organizational innovation. 
Finally, Powell (1987) identifies trends in demand, especially the trend in favour 
of diversity. The effect of qualitative shifts on organizational form is a "decompo-
sition of large integrated firms and the rise of smaller specialized organizations 
and new hybrid forms" (p. 78). Again this finding (though presented more as a 
casual empirical observation than as the result of in-depth analysis) corroborates 
the proposition in a general way. 
Even though the empirical material presented corroborates the proposition to a 
large extent, some further research is needed. First of all, most of the authors 
discussed (except for Mariotti and Cainarca) make their observations about 
demand and organizational innovation in the margin. Secondly, the detail of the 
analyses is limited. For instance the trends of fragmentation and differentiation 
are not always separated, but simply lumped together under the heading of 
increased "turbulence" or "diversity". Thirdly, the effect of demand on capabilities 
and resources is not clearly established, except for Best's and Mariotti and 
Cainarca's research. Further research may suggest whether this relation (described 
in section 5.4.3) holds. Finally, the attribute-table will show that there are still 
many gaps to fill in, especially pertaining to quantitative changes and fragmenta-
tion of demand. 
Conclusion 
In table 6.10 the attribute-table for demand is presented, based on the discussion 
given. The number of empty boxes shows that there is ample room for further 
research in this field. Empirical studies have found support for the following 
relationships: 
• Chandler (1962) and Imai (1989) pointed to fundamental demand shocks as 
speeding up the process of organizational innovation; 
• Best (1990) and Mariotti and Cainarca (1986) showed that differentiation has an 
impact on the form of the new organizational structure as well as on the extent 
of organizational innovation. Increasing differentiation leads to an increased use 
of market-like linkages in various parts of the value system. 
Table 6.10 Attribute-table of demand based on existing empirical material 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Fundamental 
+ 
Cyclical Differentiation 
Y 
+ 
Fragmentation 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = The independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The review of empirical studies into the propositions shows that a limited amount 
of empirical work has been done in the field of organizational innovation. This 
becomes evident in the many empty boxes which had to be filled in in the 
attribute tables. Some of the empirical material presented points in the direction 
of support for the propositions, but this finding must be qualified by the fact that 
the level of detail of most studies is too limited to reach a definite conclusion. 
Most studies, for example, do not analyse organizational developments at the 
level of activities and linkages. 
Summarizing the main conclusions on the individual propositions: 
• path dependence has been found by several authors, both on an intra- and an 
interfirm level. Dynamic routines, capabilities and resources were found to play 
a role in organizational innovation, as predicted. 
• the longevity of interorganizational relations and its effect on organizational 
innovations has rarely been studied separately. Some studies can be related to 
the attributes of long-term relations and research on networks has started to 
look at the drawbacks of them as far as innovative behavior in general is 
concerned. Organizational innovation is however seldom a separate subject in 
these studies. To the extent that it has been studied, parts of the proposition are 
confirmed. 
• likewise on demand, the evidence is not detailed enough to connect it to all the 
attributes of demand proposed in chapter 5. General trends in organizational 
innovation in relation to demand changes have been found, which are in 
agreement with (or at least do not contradict) the proposition. Yet, this is 
mainly so for differentiation. The effect of the other attributes of demand on 
organizational innovativeness has not been researched. 
In conclusion, there is a need for detailed studies into the propositions. The next 
chapters will provide two cases in which detailed analyses are given of the 
determinants of path dependence, long-term relations and demand. An attempt 
will be made to fill in the attribute-tables empirically, based on these cases. Each 
of the chapters will mainly focus on one outside-in determinant: chapter 7 will 
look especially at interorganizational relations while chapter 8 will focus 
predominantly on demand conditions. Aspects of path dependence will be traced 
in both cases. 

7 
Case 1: The Fokker-case1 
7.1 Introduction 
Fokker Aircraft is a Dutch producer of aircraft in the size class of 50-100 seats. 
Similar to other aircraft producers Fokker encountered severe problems in the 
beginning of the 1990's due to a fall in demand. The financial position deterio-
rated rapidly among other things because an inventory of finished airplanes put 
severe pressure on Fokker's balance sheet and because the low dollar exchange 
rate annihilated the firm's profitability. One of the reactions to the company's 
crisis was the introduction of a pull system in aircraft manufacturing, called AtO 
(Assembly-to-Order). This new organizational system was in essence a more 
radical application of the process of lead time reduction initiated by Fokker to 
reduce its work-in-process inventories in the 1980s. This chapter will analyse the 
organizational innovation of the AtO-system. Attention will be paid to its history 
(viz. lead time reduction as a precursor; the nature of the financial crisis), the 
various goals it had to reconcile (lower work-in-process, lower number of white 
tails, lower production times) and the impact of demand and Fokker's network 
on the organizational innovation. 
That the search for solving Fokker's problems was directed towards the organiza-
tion was indeed a break of routine for Fokker. Traditionally, Fokker was tech-
nology-oriented and tended to pay less attention to the organization of the firm 
and its production process. That this focus on technology had to be balanced by 
a focus on organization was publicly recognized in 1995, when the member of the 
board responsible for production and engineering, J.C. Kroon, stated that the 
technological lead of Fokker was insufficient for it to maintain its competitive 
This case is based on interviews, company documents and designated literature; see Exhibit 
I and II at the end of this chapter for an overview of the first two sources. The case was 
presented to a group of Fokker managers and the facts were checked by Fokker. The inter-
pretation is the author's responsibility. Special thanks are due to Mr. Gerard Pronk of 
Fokker, for his recommendations and comments on the final version of this chapter. 
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position and that considerable improvements could be made in Fokker's way of 
organizing: "There is still a tremendous amount to be earned there"2. According 
to Mr. Kroon outsourcing to low wage countries and aiming at a technological 
lead are no viable strategies for a smaller aircraft producer: the first strategy has 
quite large set-up costs and proved to have limited success in other cases, and the 
second strategy is expensive with a limited chance of success. A smart organiza-
tion on the other hand can lead to cost savings and faster product development: 
"By integrating design, engineering and manufacturing in one process, the 
teething troubles are eradicated in advance while productivity is immediately 
higher than before", says Kroon. 
Mr. Kroon limited his ideas on organization mainly to the internal organization 
of the firm. He mentions "making use of shorter communication lines in order to 
tie the thinkers to the doers. The design process and the production process must 
be tuned". Relations with the network of suppliers however, are important as 
well. The ArO-system focusses specifically on these relations: it required a new 
way of working with suppliers and a reorganization of the relation with them. As 
such the ArO-system is a precursor of the shifting emphasis on organization 
advocated by Mr. Kroon. 
The Fokker-case is predominantly used to build theory based on the hypothesis 
on long-term interorganizational relations put forth in chapter 5, but some of the 
other elements of organizational innovation can be traced in this case as well. 
Section 7.2 will give some general background, section 7.3 will describe the 
organizational innovation: the reconfigurations in the value chain and the com-
petitive advantage it brings. Several elements of path dependence are discussed 
there as well. These are analysed and table 7.5 gives the attribute-table on path 
dependence for the situation of Fokker. Section 7.4 will analyse the influence of 
long-term interorganizational relations on the innovation process by first 
describing them and next relating them to the concepts developed in chapter 5 
(table 7.15 presents the attribute-table). Finally section 7.5 will explore the 
influence of demand conditions on organizational innovation culminating in the 
third attribute-table, table 7.16. 
7.2 The Fokker company: recent developments 
The Fokker aircraft company (founded in 1919) is a producer of two short and 
medium haul airplanes (the Fokker 100 (a smaller version of which is called the 
Fokker 70) and Fokker 50). It is also a supplier to the space and military aircraft 
market. Until 1993 the Dutch state was the majority shareholder of Fokker, as a 
consequence of the considerable financial help Fokker had received in order to 
finance the simultaneous development of the Fokker 100 and Fokker 50 in the 
1980's. The funding provided by the government was given under the condition 
that in the near future, Fokker was to look for a partner which could provide the 
financial backing required to work in the highly volatile aircraft industry. This 
partner was found in 1993: the German firm DASA, part of the Daimler-Benz 
Financieel Dagblad, 31 January 1995; translation by the author. 
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group, after a long and often emotional round of negotiations obtained 51% of the 
Fokker shares, with the agreement that the 22% left in hands of the Dutch state 
would be transferred to DASA in 1995. The remaining 27% are traded on the 
stock exchange (Wassenberg, 1995). During the negotiations with DASA, Fokker's 
financial position deteriorated (see table 7.1 for turnover and profit figures) 
principally as a result of the collapse of demand for new planes and the decision 
taken in the 1980's to install production capacity for a very large number of 
planes. The capital invested by DASA in Fokker and a combined new capital 
injection in the course of 1994 by DASA and the Dutch state, could not prevent 
that in February 1995 the fourth major reorganization of Fokker in four years was 
announced. After this reorganization, the number of employees, which in 1990 
amounted to 13,314 people, will be reduced to 6,700 in 1996 . 
Table 7.1 Turnover and profits Fokker (in million guilders) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Turnover 
1,339 
1,403 
1,056 
2,055 
2,799 
3,202 
3,813 
4,083 
3,698 
2,348 
Net profits 
33 
19 
-107 
13 
42 
83 
77 
20 
-460 
-450* 
including a one time revenue of 427 mln. from a sale and 
leaseback construction. 
Source: annual reports Fokker. 
The most prestigious of Fokker's products is the Fokker 100 aircraft. In 1983 the 
project to build this plane was announced. November 30th 1986 the first test flight 
was done, followed by the first delivery (to Swissair) on February 29th 1988, after 
considerable delay. Production capacity aimed for an eventual production of 67 
planes a year. This rather high number was to a large degree inspired by a mega-
order of American Airlines in 1989. In 1990 this aim was still maintained: "Con-
siderable investments are made in the production companies to enable a pro-
duction volume of 67 Fokker 100's from the year 1993 onwards" (Annual report, 
1990). This estimate proved to be too optimistic. In 1991 the annual report stated 
that the recession, exacerbated by the Gulf War, had substantially reduced the 
number of orders. In 1992 a reduction of production volume to 40 planes a year 
in 1995 was announced, followed by the annunciation of another reduction to 30 
in the annual report of 1993. Meanwhile the number of white tails (airplanes 
NRC-Handelsblad, January 27th 1995. 
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which have not been sold or leased) had increased dramatically to 24 (see table 
7.2). Table 7.2 presents orders, numbers produced and delivered of the Fokker 
100. The numbers actually delivered have lagged constantly beyond the number 
produced until 1993. Early 1993 it became clear that Fokker was heading towards 
a financial disaster: 
• it was impossible to finance the growing number of white tails; 
• the fixed costs emanating from the strategy to produce large numbers of planes 
were too high to be recovered by the low level of planes produced; 
• airplane prices had diminished because of the fierce competition in a shrinking 
market, with the direct competitors Boeing and British Aerospace. The fact that 
airlines changed to leasing instead of buying aircraft and that the exchange rate 
of the dollar continued its decline against the guilder, aggravated the situation. 
Table 7.2 Orders, numbers produced and delivered Fokker Jetline 
Year 
1983-1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Orders 
73 
99 
33 
10 
18 
52 
29 
Production 
12 
26 
32 
60 
53 
47 
29 
Deliveries 
11 
24 
28 
50 
46 
66 
34 
Number of 
white tails 
1 
3 
7 
17 
24 
5 
0 
Source: Fokker (number of orders is net, that means inclusive cancellations and exclusive options; 
since 1993 Fokker's Jetline also offers the Fokker 70; first delivery and production of the 
Fokker 70 took place in 1994). 
One of the reactions to these problems was an organizational innovation in the 
assembly line of the Fokker 100. In 1992 the annual report already hinted at a 
study to be undertaken into the possibility to introduce a flexible production 
system mainly to reduce the number of white tails: "A study will be conducted 
into the possibility of completing planes only in the case when they have been 
sold" (Annual Report 1992, p. 6). The situation deteriorated so dramatically in the 
course of that year, that Fokker was forced to introduce this flexible system in 
1993; it became known as the Assembly-to-Order system or AtO. As table 7.2 
shows, in this year the number of aircraft delivered surpassed the number of 
aircraft produced leading to a substantial reduction of white tails in the course of 
1993. In 1994 the last Fokker 100 white tails were sold. 
The implementation of AtO however was an onerous task. AtO required a 
number of substantial organizational innovations, especially in relation to Fokker's 
suppliers. In the terminology of chapter 4, Fokker is organized along the lines of 
the networked paradigm, as are all other aircraft manufacturers. The introduction 
of a major new way of building airplanes will have important consequences for 
Fokker's suppliers so that for a study of the influence of interfirm relations on 
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organizational innovation, Fokker is an interesting case (see section 7.4). The role 
of demand is worth noting as well (section 7.5), because not only the quantity of 
demand plays a role, but there are many qualitative developments in demand 
which had an impact on AtO as well. Some other factors in the diamond in-
fluencing the AtO-system have been incorporated in figure 7.1. Pertaining to the 
supply of labour: because of the low number of orders, there was an abundant 
amount of free man hours available when the AtO-system was introduced. Even 
though this was a drain on Fokker's finances, it also enabled Fokker to experiment 
with the new system: if anything went wrong there was enough personnel 
available to work on solving the problem. Capital shortage, fierce competition and 
the strategy to produce high volumes have been discussed above. The strategy of 
producing high volumes is an inside-out factor and has therefore been depicted 
separately in the lower part of the determinant firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
(cf. Van den Bosch and Warmerdam, 1995). 
Figure 7.1 Determinants of Porter's diamond influencing AtO 
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The success of AtO in reducing the number of wnite tails, led to substantial cost 
savings, but Fokker's problems were far from over. Demand remained low, some 
parts of the company still produced inefficiently, the companies overall structure 
was intransparent and the exchange rate of the dollar (in which Fokker is paid) 
against the guilder (the currency in which Fokker calculates) reached a very 
unfavourable point in 1993 and 1994. These factors led to further losses and 
restructurings in 1995. Despite the low number of orders in 1994, the Fokker 70 
and Fokker 100 still had a combined market share in 1993 and 1994 of 50 percent 
(Annual report 1994, p. 9). The period studied below is 1988-1994 and the study 
is limited to the Fokker 100 assembly line. The introduction of AtO took place in 
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7.3 Organizational innovation in Fokker: the AtO-system 
This section describes organizational innovations in the production of the Fokker 
100 aircraft. The main focus will be on the implementation of the Assembly-to-
Order system (AtO) in the assembly line of the Fokker 100 (and Fokker 70), which 
is a pull system: the assembly of planes is not finished unless there is a client for 
the machine. More specifically, attention will be paid to the way the relationship 
with suppliers is managed in this system, by means of the organizational 
innovation of the "Strategic Supplier Meeting" (SSM). In order to understand what 
led up to the AtO-system and how it was possible to implement it, the story starts 
with a discussion of lead time reduction in the Fokker 100 programme. Lead time 
reduction broke the ground for the implementation of AtO. 
7.3.1 Prologue: reduction of lead times and other developments leading 
up to the AtO-system 
Whenever a new aircraft programme is launched (as the Fokker 100), the first 
priority is to assure the product is of high quality. Once this goal is attained, 
attention is directed at the reliability of deliveries. Finally, the aircraft manufac-
turer can look towards control of his production process, first by focussing on cost 
control and consequently and finally by reducing lead times. Hence, reduction of 
lead times is a sign of maturity of the production process. In 1988 Fokker made 
a start with reducing the lead time of the Fokker 100. 
The most important reason for lead time reduction, was the reduction of capital 
invested in work-in-process (the reasons for lead time reduction are summarized 
in table 7.3). The financial burden of work-in-process on the assembly line is 
considerable, as many expensive parts as wings and engines are built in there. 
The shorter the time needed for assembly, the shorter Fokker has its capital tied 
up in work-in-process. A second way of reducing the work-in-process inventory 
was found in building in the most expensive parts of the airplane at a later stage 
of the assembly line. 
Secondly, lead-time reduction is necessary to obtain flexibility in the specification 
of the aircraft, which can differ substantially according to the wishes of the 
customer. The shorter the time needed to build a plane, the better customer 
specific wishes can be realized. This ability to incorporate customer wishes fastly 
and cheaply, is called specification flexibility. 
The third and final reason for lead-time reduction lay in limitations of space. 
Originally the lead time of the assembly line was budgetted at 140 days. It became 
clear however, that with the planned production of 67 planes a year the capacity 
of the production halls would be insufficient. In order to remedy this, it was 
decided that lead time reduction should not stop at 140 days but should continue 
to drop as far as possible. A short lead time would reduce the extra investments 
in new halls and machines Fokker needed to realize the high production volume. 
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Table 7.3 Reasons for Fokker to reduce lead times 
• Reduce the cost of work-in-process 
• Enhancing the specification flexibility 
• Limitations of space 
Source: based on Fokker document "Doorlooptijd-
reductie eindlijn". 
The reduction of lead time is a dynamic routine consisting of a mix of organiza-
tional and technological innovations. An example of the first is executing activities 
simultaneously instead of consecutively; an example of the latter is the introduc-
tion of new tooling. In practice the reduction of lead time was an application of 
the same routine (e.g. searching for activities that can be done simultaneously) 
over and over again. It was more a cumulation of relatively small changes, than 
a result of major reconfigurations of the production process. Suppliers had to 
make some changes in their ways of working as well, e.g. the design of parts had 
to be altered or the delivery of some subassemblies had to take place at a later 
period of time. 
The result of these actions is shown in figure 7.2. The lead time of the assembly 
line which was 222 days in the beginning of the Fokker 100 programme and 
budgetted at 140 days, amounted to only 80 days at the end of 1994, while a 
further reduction to 56 days is the goal. Such a lead time should make it possible 
to have a total delivery time of four months (including the preparatory work). 
This reduction of lead times is shown along the horizontal axis of the figure. 
Vertically the amount of value invested in the plane is shown. The figure shows 
that the larger jumps in value are now taken at the end of the assembly process 
(see the nearly vertical line c in figure 7.2), instead of the more gradual build-up 
in value that was planned for originally (line a). In this way payments to 
suppliers can take place later and the time that capital is tied up in the assembly 
process is reduced. 
The reduction of lead times was well under way when in 1991 the demand for 
airplanes collapsed. In the wake of the Gulf War (1991), there was a sharp 
reduction in air travel which was one of the causes of this effect. For Fokker this 
resulted in a crisis situation, as Fokker built up an inventory of 24 finished Fokker 
100's which could not be sold (in the aircraft industry these are called "white tails" 
because they are not painted in the colours of an airline that is going to use 
them). Because of the high level of production a further increase in the amount 
of white tails was to be expected. As Fokker was unable to finance this inventory, 
it ran into acute financial problems. This was aggravated by the fact that the 
financial position of airlines was such that they could no longer finance the 
production of airplanes up front, as was customary. In this connection the shift 
towards leasing instead of buying aircraft enhanced the financial squeeze as well. 
In the search for cost savings, the costs of work-in-process and the capital 
invested in it, continued to be the most important problem. A third problem, that 
already had been emerging for some time, was that those airlines that did order 
planes required shorter times to delivery. This posed problems for the speed with 
which Fokker could react to market demand and for the specification-flexibility. 
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Normally, this first problem would have been met by the inventory of white tails 
which enables speedy delivery, but the shortage of capital made this solution 
unfeasible. Hence, another strategy was devised. 
Figure 7.2 Lead time reduction in Fokker Aircraft 
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Source: Fokker document Doorlooptijdreductie eindlijn, p. 10. 
7.3.2 AtO: implementation inside Fokker and attribute-table on path 
dependence 
This situation was one of the reasons why Fokker implemented the Assembly-to-
Order system early 1993. The system is an attempt to deal with the three 
problems mentioned (see table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 Reasons for Fokker to implement AtO 
• Reduce the capital in and cost of work in process (financial problems) 
• Reduce number of white tails (demand collapsed) 
• Reducing production time: 
— enhance specification flexibility 
— shorter delivery time 
Source: based on the Fokker document "Assembly-to-Order binnen de Fokker Jetline". 
In Fokker internally the AtO-system was implemented by the introduction of 
what is called an "uncoupling point" in the assembly-line. After this point, planes 
are no longer assembled further, until there is a buyer for the plane. In practice 
the uncoupling point is the moment when the plane's fuselage is finished. If there 
is a buyer for the plane than the fuselage is moved down the assembly line; if 
there is not, it is stored. The result is that no white tails are built and thus a 
considerable financial saving is achieved. Furthermore, the uncoupling point is 
chosen in such a way that, depending on the exact configuration of the final 
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plane, between 60 and 80 percent of the plane's value is added after the 
uncoupling point. This value mainly consists of parts delivered by suppliers: 
engines, wings, avionics, etc. By postponing the addition of value, the cost of 
work-in-process is lowered considerably, as is the capital invested in it. 
For the AtO-system to be a success, the assembly time after the uncoupling point 
must be short enough to allow delivery within the time period demanded by the 
client. The realized lead time reduction contributed to Fokker's ability to do so. 
In order to secure the specification flexibility an AtO standard options list has 
been developed, which contains those client specific options that can be built in 
after the uncoupling point. This enables Fokker to construct a rather standard 
configuration before the uncoupling point and build in client wishes later. Hence, 
the AtO-list coordinates the client demands with Fokker's production process and 
can be seen as a new linkage in the value system. Formerly client requests either 
had to be given early in the production process (leading to long delivery times) 
or had to be built in in a white tail (this altering of white tails lead to extra costs 
for Fokker, as this meant that some parts of the white tail had to be removed or 
replaced). The AtO-list is still being extended and the aim is to build in as many 
client specific items as possible, as late as possible. Perhaps even more important 
is that the AtO-system also enables Fokker to vary its production quantity faster 
than before. Thus, a faster reaction to market demand is possible (this will be 
shown later in figure 7.3). 
Before turning to the relationship with suppliers (which is one of the most 
important keys to the functioning of the AtO-system), there are three issues 
internal to Fokker that merit some extra attention: the role of labour, the role of 
lead time reduction and the sudden implementation of AtO. 
As to labour, fluctuations in the level of activity that result from the introduction 
of Assembly-to-Order make it difficult to ensure that there is enough work at all 
times for all personnel. Because the number of orders determines the workload, 
some flexibility in the number of people occupied is unavoidable. This labour 
flexibility can be external or internal. Externally, Fokker has negotiated a system 
of flexible working hours with the unions. There are now possibilities for working 
longer or shorter hours, without increased costs. More interesting from an 
organizational innovation point of view, is that a contract has been made with the 
airline KLM to exchange personnel. Fokker personnel can work on the mainte-
nance of the Fokker 100's and Boeings owned by KLM and KLM-personnel can 
work on the Fokker 100 assembly line. In this way some smoothing of the fluc-
tuations in the demand for labour can be realized, by means of linking the value 
chains of KLM and Fokker (Boekholt (1995) observed that these types of interfirm 
linkages are relatively rare in the Dutch aviation cluster). Internal labour flexibility 
is being introduced by teaching people to work on different parts of the assembly 
line. Fokker increasingly turns to working with multifunctional employees. This 
enhances the breaking down of functional barriers and makes it possible for one 
man to perform different activities on the assembly line. Whereas formerly 
different people were needed to coordinate these activities, now they can be done 
by one individual. 
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Another point worth noticing is the role of lead time reduction. In the AtO-system 
a plane must be assembled in a short time. The dynamic routine of lead time 
reduction developed in the years preceding the introduction of the AtO-system, 
was one of the reasons why Fokker was able to introduce AtO. Without this 
dynamic routine implementing the AtO-system would have been much more 
difficult. Notice however, that one of the original aims of lead time reduction has 
lost its relevance completely. The original aim was to realize a high level of 
production while keeping the investments low, while now a low level of pro-
duction is facilitated by the lower lead times. Concluding, the existing dynamic 
routine made the organizational innovation possible, but it was not known 
beforehand that it would have this effect. With the benefit of hindsight it can be 
concluded that the two other aims of lead time reduction (specification flexibility 
and lower work-in-process) are the cause of this effect. Moreover, in many ways 
AtO is the radicalization of lead time reduction: e.g. where with lead time 
reduction expensive parts are built in as late as possible, with AtO they are not 
built in at all. 
So the dynamic routine of lead time reduction was used for something different 
than it was originally meant for. This "messy" characteristic of organizational 
innovation (that was described by Chandler and has been discussed in chapter 4) 
becomes even more clear when the implementation of the AtO-system is studied. 
The system was introduced under the pressure of a crisis. In practice this meant 
that the AtO-system has been introduced almost from one day to the next. As a 
manager of the Fokker 100 programme put it: "Under the pressure of time we 
pulled on the handbrakes"." It has been learning by doing, but sooner or later we 
would have had to do so anyhow". Another manager even claimed that the 
pressure of time speeded things up. "If we would have had the time, it wouldn't 
have succeeded", because if all the implications of the system were thought 
through in the beginning, the overwhelming amount of difficulty and organiza-
tional disruption to be expected would have scared people away from implemen-
ting the AtO-system. So instead of planning the system, it simply was imple-
mented and formalized later on. In fact this was the only way to do it, as all 
consequences of the system could not have been known in advance. Search for the 
right solution was a necessity. Formalization in a structure of consultative bodies 
deciding on which plane fuselages to store and which to finish and how, came 
later: it followed what happened in practice; it did not dictate practice4. The 
structure gradually emerged to what it is today. 
Attribute-table on path dependence and organizational innovation in Fokker 
So far the case shows that AtO was less a static structure than a developing 
trajectory. The lead time reduction which started long before AtO, played a role 
in it as well. The history of AtO dates back to a time before its implementation: 
AtO is a continuation and a radicalization of lead time reduction. One of the latest 
A comparison between the descriptions given of the AtO-process in the documents 
"Assembly-to-Order binnen de Fokker Jetline" (January 1994) and "AtO-beslisstructuren" 
(May 1994) shows some of these changes: the descriptions follow practice. 
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additions is the internal flexibilization of labour, which was still under way early 
1995. 
When the facts of the case are filled in in the attribute-table on path dependence, 
table 7.5 is the result. The dynamic routine of lead time reduction influenced all 
three attributes of organizational innovation: 
• it influenced the form of AtO, because AtO was to a large extent the radicaliza-
tion of lead time reduction. In AtO the object is still to reduce lead times and 
to lower work-in-process by means of performing some activities later 
(especially building in expensive parts); 
• next, speedy implementation was secured because of the existing low lead 
times resulting from the dynamic routine of lead time reduction; 
• and finally the low lead times made it possible to be so radical that the 
uncoupling point could be chosen early in the assembly line. The decision to 
introduce a pull system entailed a major reconfiguration of the value chain. 
Pertaining to resources and capabilities, no clear conclusion is possible in this 
case. 
Table 7.5 Attribute-table on path dependence in Fokker's AtO-system 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Dynamic Routines 
Y 
+ 
+ 
Capabilities Resources 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
7.3.3 AtO: consequences of its implementation outside Fokker 
A similar process of trial and error describes the developments in the relationship 
of Fokker with its suppliers. Here only a general discussion will be provided; in 
section 7.4 the relationship with two suppliers will be studied in depth. 
The AtO-system has important consequences for suppliers. First of all they were 
confronted with the building-up of an inventory of subassemblies in their own 
organization, because Fokker no longer produced according to the expected 
schedules. The 60-80% of value of the aircraft that is added after the uncoupling 
point consists mainly of subassemblies produced by suppliers (e.g. engines, wings, 
avionics, etc.). It were these products that now ended up in the suppliers' stock. 
Moreover, Fokker rearranged its payment schedules. Whereas previously Fokker 
would finance these subassemblies beforehand, with the implementation of AtO 
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suppliers are not paid until the subassemblies are really needed at the assembly 
line5. So suppliers are confronted with a logistic and a financial aspect of AtO. 
The logistic aspect is dealt with via the organizational innovation of the Strategic 
Supplier Meeting (SSM), which aims at coordinating Fokker's fluctuating 
production schedules with the suppliers. Previously, the relationship with the 
suppliers was coordinated by means of a contractual linkage and long-term 
planning. The introduction of AtO made this situation untenable and the con-
tractual linkage was abolished. It was replaced by the quarterly SSM meeting of 
10 major suppliers, that are most affected by the AtO-system. In the SSM the 
suppliers are informed about the planned production in the next quarters and the 
sales cases (possible aircraft sales in the coming time). Based on this information 
an estimated production is given (the "carrier"). Production is allowed to fluctuate 
around this carrier with a maximum of 25% (the "flexibility window"). Figure 7.3 
depicts this: for the present quarter and the next one (Ql and Q2) production is 
fixed. For the four quarters after that, the system with carrier and flexibility 
window operates. By means of this system the suppliers are able to make a 
planning, although not such a good one as before AtO was introduced. It will 
however be clear that quite some flexibility in the production quantity of planes 
can be achieved by means of this system. Specification flexibility is not incorpo-
rated in this picture, except for the fact that the shorter planning horizon 
improves specification flexibility. 
Figure 7.3 Production planning in the SSM 
Number of 
planes 
Fixed orders Guaranteed purchases 
flexibility 
window 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Time (in quarters) 
>• 
Source: adapted from the Fokker document Trapped between supplier and buyer. 
Company document "Assembly-to-Order binnen de Fokker Jetline". 
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The old contract was relinquished as it was impossible to foresee all eventualities. 
The contractual linkage has been replaced by the SSM. The uncertainty surroun-
ding the implementation of the AtO system required such a drastic move. As one 
manager stated it: "We have no contracts for AtO, as we are still looking for the 
precise form of the system. It takes some experimenting". Exactly like the 
implementation of AtO internally, the coordination with suppliers required a trial 
and error search for the right solutions. 
With the SSM the level of information exchange between Fokker and its suppliers 
has increased substantially. In the old situation it would have been unthinkable 
to discuss sales cases with the suppliers6. The shift in the relationship is quite 
drastic. The aim is to sever the slightly competitive relationship with the suppliers 
and to replace it with cooperation. Fokker was the first aircraft manufacturer to 
implement such a system with its suppliers. Several other consequences for 
suppliers will be discussed in section 7.4, where their position will be considered 
in more detail. 
7.3.4 Overview of organizational innovations in the value chain 
Based on the foregoing discussion, table 7.6 summarizes the major organizational 
innovations introduced in the assembly of the Fokker 100 aircraft. The value chain 
perspective developed in chapter 2 has been used. The core of the Assembly-to-
Order system lies in the uncoupling point (leading to a new inventory of 
fuselages and the elimination of white tail inventory) and the SSM. Some 
connected innovations can be found in table 7.6 as well: the integration of 
activities by multifunctionality, parallel performing of activities for lead time 
reduction, the AtO-standard options list for coordination with clients and the 
labour contract with KLM. Graphically, the changes are depicted in figure 7.4. The 
core elements are the introduction of the uncoupling point, which entails the 
elimination of white tail inventory and alterations, and the SSM, aimed at 
coordinating the relation with suppliers. When the innovations in table 7.6 are 
divided according to their intra- and interorganizational nature, all innovations 
in activities are intra-organizational and all innovations in the linkages are 
interorganizational. This is a coincidence: of course there are many relations 
between the innovations in activities and the innovations in linkages. The 
introduction of the uncoupling point for example, required intensified communi-
cation in the SSM. 
Most suppliers have contacts with other aircraft manufacturers as well. The risk of sales 
information falling in their hands through the suppliers is not imaginary. The names of 
potential clients are not disclosed; only the size of the possible order and the country/ 
region they come from are given. 
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Figure 7.4 Main organizational innovations in the value system 
Before AtO 
supplier Fokker client 
KLM 
LEGEND FIGURE 7.4 
Activities 
1. planning supplier 
2. planning Fokker 
3. production process supplier 
4. inbound logistics Fokker 
5. inventory white tails 
6. sales 
7. alterations white tails 
8. procurement client 
9. inbound logistics client 
10. planning supplier 
11. planning Fokker 
12. inventory supplier 
13. inventory fuselages (uncoupling point) 
14. sales 
15. assembly 
16. human resource management Fokker 
17. procurement client 
18. inbound logistics client 
19. human resource management KLM 
Linkages 
a. contract 
b. delivery from supplier 
c. order 
d. delivery to client 
e. SSM 
f. delivery from supplier 
g. order 
h. delivery to client 
i. agreement personnel exchange 
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Table 7.6 General overview of organizational innovations connected to the implementation of 
the AtO-system in Fokker (upto 1994) 
Activities 
• Introduction of the uncoupling point: inventory of fuselages (creation); 
related to this there is a reallocation: sales come before assembly instead of after 
• Elimination of white tail inventory 
• Elimination of white tail alterations 
• Integration of activities through multifunctionality of employees 
• Lead time reduction a.o. by performing activities parallel (reallocation and 
integration) 
Linkages 
• Strategic Supplier Meeting: 
— carrier and flexibility window instead of contract 
— parts delivered when needed, not according to long-term plan/cash-on-
delivery 
• List with AtO standard options 
• Contract with KLM to exchange personnel 
Source: based on interviews and company documents. 
7.3.5 T h e organizat ional i n n o v a t i o n a n d c o m p e t i t i v e advantage 
The effects of the organizational innovat ions assembled in table 7.6, on competi-
tive advantage are given in table 7.7. The AtO-system has increased the possibility 
for building in client specific opt ions in a later phase of the product ion process: 
specification flexibility has augmented . Similarly the flexibility w i n d o w makes it 
easier to react to quantitative changes in market demand . It allows Fokker to react 
swiftly when demand fluctuates: d e m a n d s can be met faster in an upswing and 
overproduct ion is reduced when d e m a n d falls. Of course this only holds w h e n 
product ion is below max imum capacity. Once m a x i m u m capacity is reached there 
is no u p w a r d volume flexibility. Specification flexibility however , remains in that 
case. The reduction of invested capital in whi te tails and work-in-process is 
substantial. Interest savings for the latter have been calculated by Fokker to 
amount to 75% per plane . These consequences of AtO can also be traced in the 
annual report. Table 7.8 shows that in 1992 there was a considerable growth in 
work-in-process, followed by a sharp decline in 1993. The rise of work-in-process 
in 1992 "is predominant ly caused by a smaller amoun t of planes delivered than 
produced in the Fokker 50 and Fokker 100 programme" (Annual Report, 1992). 
The decline in the following year is, a m o n g other things, "a consequence of the 
fact that more Fokker 100 planes were delivered than produced" (Annual Report, 
1993). In other words: the number of whi te tails diminished in 1993 . Next to this 
Fokker document "Het FEBS in een veranderende omgeving", p. 3. 
Of course when work is put at a standstill the same effect would have been achieved, but 
in that case the other advantages of the AtO-system (viz. volume and specification 
flexibility) would not have been realized. 
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cost saving on work-in-process, the prepayments on goods to be received (which 
predominantly consist of goods for the Fokker 100 programme), also showed a 
significant decline in 1993 because as part of AtO the agreements about these 
prepayments were altered as well (see also table 7.8). On the negative side, the 
system increases the cost of labour on the assembly line by about 10%. The 
interest savings more than compensate this: there is a substantial net cost saving. 
Table 7.7 Effects of AtO on competitive advantage 
ADVANTAGES 
Flexibility 
• Increased specification flexibility, 
with shorter delivery rime 
• Increased volume flexibility (from 5-
10% a year to 25% a quarter) as long 
as capacity is not fully used 
Cost 
• Reduction of capital invested in num-
ber of white tails and work in process 
(estimated cost savings amount to 75%) 
• No costs of white tail alterations 
• Other payment schedules suppliers 
(cash-on-delivery) 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Higher labour costs on the assembly line (10%) 
Source: based on interviews and the Fokker document "Assembly-to-Order binnen de Fokker 
Jetline". 
Table 7.8 Work-in-Process and Prepayments for goods to be received, in millions of guilders 
Work-in-Process 
Prepayments 
1991 
2.729 
447 
1992 
3.556 
459 
1993 
2.814 
353 
Source: annual reports Fokker. 
The sustainability of the system is not easy to judge beforehand. In table 7.9 the 
characteristics of sustainability of table 1.4 have been related to some elements of 
the AtO-system. Imitation of AtO is inhibited by the fact that lead time reduction 
has a long history and the lead Fokker has, cannot easily be caught up with by 
competitors. Secondly, the learning that has taken place in the last years (both 
inside the company and externally, with the suppliers) contains tacit knowledge 
(causal ambiguity). Thirdly, as figure 7.4 has shown, there is a large number of 
new and advanced relationships in the value system. AtO is socially complex. It 
requires many simultaneous and consecutive changes in the value system, like 
new work schedules, multifunctionality etc. Moreover, AtO is not easily 
substituted. The alternative of white tails allows volume flexibility, but it is more 
expensive and specification flexibility is lower. As to tradeability, it is no problem 
to transfer AtO to another company as far as geography is concerned, but there 
are considerable systemic interdependencies. The effects on first and second tier 
suppliers, makes that the system cannot be "sold" (transferred) from only Fokker 
to another company: the innovations and learning of other firms of the Fokker 
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network will have to be part of a transfer of the AtO-system as well. Likewise, for 
the firm adopting AtO, these systemic interdependencies are relevant too: it will 
have to involve its own network in the implementation. Pertaining to lock-in, the 
organizational disruption caused by AtO was enormous. This has not been dis-
cussed yet, but a high price was paid in terms of frustration and stress. The effort 
to get everybody to cooperate and to overcome the unexpected problems has 
taken its toll on the organization and its people. Piecemeal change, finally, is 
difficult in that AtO cannot be contained to a small part of the organization. There 
was some experimenting inside the Fokker assembly line before AtO was defi-
nitely introduced, but in order to reap the full benefit of it, suppliers had to be 
involved as well. 
It is not easy to trace where the competitors stand. End of 1994, the biggest 
competitor British Aerospace had not implemented an AtO-system; Boeing (also 
a direct competitor) and Saab do have a similar system, but Saab has no advanced 
mechanism for coordination with its suppliers. Boeing introduced its pull system 
in the early 1990s (The Economist, 1995b). Pull systems are not widely used in 
aircraft manufacturing. Fokker and Boeing are the frontrunners. 
Table 7.9 The sustainability of AtO 
Characteristics of Sustainability 
Instability 
• unique historical conditions 
• causal ambiguity 
• social complexity 
Substitutability 
Tradeability 
• geographical immobility 
• systemic interdependencies 
Lock-in of imitators 
• set up cost and organizational disrup-
tion 
• feasibility of piecemeal change 
Application to AtO 
• lead time reduction 
• learning 
• many simultaneous/consecutive 
changes, new work schedules etc. 
• limited 
• not applicable 
• effects on first and second tier 
• considerable: high prices in terms of 
stress, frustration etc. 
• change cannot be conained to one 
company 
Source: the attributes of sustainability can be found in table 1.4. 
7.3.6 Discussion 
This section has described the background, reasons and form of an important 
organizational innovation in Fokker Aircraft: the AtO-system. Some points are 
worth noticing, before turning to a detailed discussion of some aspects of the 
system. First of all the importance of search and trial and error in organizational 
innovation has become clear. This does not mean that the goals have shifted. 
Some of them have remained rather constant: lowering work-in-process and 
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enhancing specification flexibility have figured among the goals consistently. 
Furthermore, different routines, especially those of lead time reduction have been 
applied over and over again. Hence, in some respects the AtO-system is not so 
much a breaking away from lead time reduction as it is its radicalization. For 
instance, where in the period of lead time reduction expensive parts were not 
built in till late, in the AtO-system they are not built in at all in the absence of a 
client. This example also makes clear how much lead time reduction has prepared 
the ground for AtO. The capability of lead time reduction was a prerequisite for 
it. Hence, some inside-out characteristics fit in rather well with the ideas 
developed in chapter 4 (see table 7.5). More important in this case are however 
the outside-in characteristics notably the influence of the network and demand. 
7.4 Long-term interorganizational relationships and AtO 
7.4.1 Introduction 
The conjecture in chapter 5 was that the presence of long-term interorganizational 
relations would inhibit organizational innovation. Fokker's network of suppliers 
abounds with such relationships. The high cost of developing a new airplane 
make it impossible for a single company to carry the risk and investments on its 
own. The complete network of Fokker includes a few hundred suppliers. The 
major ones are the partners and major vendors. Together these are the 10 sup-
pliers that form the Strategic Suppliers Meeting. The partners are Deutsche Airbus 
(DA) and Shorts. They participate in the Fokker 100 programma at their own risk: 
they must recoup their fixed costs themselves and share in the development costs 
of the Fokker 100. The 8 major vendors include a.o. Grumman, Rolls Royce, 
Dowry and Honeywell. Their involvement in the programme is usually less than 
the partners' in that they have less Fokker-specific machinery, tooling and design 
investments. 
The next two sections will describe two cases in more detail: the relationship with 
Shorts, a company in Northern Ireland that builds the wings for the Fokker 100, 
and Grumman a U.S. company that builds the engine-casings. The organizational 
innovations in these relationships will be described and the factors stimulating 
and inhibiting their cooperation in the AtO-system will be analysed. An overview 
of the factors stimulating/inhibiting organizational innovation in the Fokker 
network will be given and related to the theoretical considerations discussed in 
chapter 5. 
7.4.2 Shorts 
Fokker's relationship with wing manufacturer Shorts dates from the sixties, when 
Shorts joined in an earlier Fokker programme, the successful Fokker 28. As one 
of the two partners in the Fokker 100 programme, Shorts develops wings for the 
Fokker 100 completely by itself based on specifications given by Fokker with 
regard to interfaces, aerodynamics and weight. This way of operating is common 
in aircraft manufacturing and has been taken very far by e.g. Boeing (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1994). The fact that Shorts is responsible for the development of the 
wings, entails that Shorts also is the owner of drawings and tooling. Consequent-
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ly, Fokker is tied to Shorts for a long period of time as breaking-up the relation 
would require Fokker or the partner replacing Shorts, to buy up the drawings and 
tooling. This requires a substantial financial investment. Moreover, a possible new 
partner will not be able to take over the part of the learning curve Shorts has gone 
through. A change of partner would therefore mean that in the beginning cost 
would be higher and delivery irregular. This is not an imaginary disadvantage as 
learning curves in aircraft manufacturing are known to be quite steep. Here the 
fact that Shorts and Fokker's operations are geared to one another (Fokker makes 
up 30% of Shorts' turnover) plays a role as well: with a new supplier Fokker has 
to start from scratch. Finally, the product support of the Fokker 28 programme 
still runs through Shorts: a severing of the link in the Fokker 100 programme 
would certainly have its consequences on that. 
Table 7.10 Intertwinedness Fokker and Shorts 
• Shorts possesses Fokker-specific tooling and drawing 
• Learning Shorts not transferable to other parties 
• Operations geared to each other 
• Shorts still supports previous Fokker-programme 
Source: based on interviews. 
In short (as table 7.10 makes clear): in the course of time the firms have become 
increasingly intertwined. This has as a consequence that a change in Fokker, often 
has many implications for Shorts as well. This certainly is the case with the ArO-
system as a chronological overview of Shorts' involvement in the Fokker 100 pro-
gramme will make clear: 
• 1985-1989. In the first phase of the Fokker 100 programme Shorts had some 
difficulty with the required high production speed. Also it lacked control over 
its recurring costs. The British government had subsidized these costs, which 
lessened the necessity for Shorts to maintain the capability to reduce them. 
Fokker aided Shorts in bringing this capability back to life. Likewise, Fokker 
advised Shorts on the reduction of lead times. As a palliative unfinished wings 
were transported to Fokker and completed by a third party. A maze of 
deliberation structures came into existence as a result of the help Shorts 
received. 
• 1990. The relationship with Shorts had been normalized: Shorts was capable of 
delivering complete wings on time. It still worked on lead time reduction 
independently and even moved ahead of Fokker in this respect. As a conse-
quence of this the price of wings could be lowered. 
• 1993. The decision is taken to implement the AtO-system. The deliberation 
structures dating from the first years of the Fokker 100 programme are replaced 
by a multi-functional group, mainly aimed at discussing general policy issues. 
Concerning AtO, Shorts' management was prepared to work with Fokker as 
Shorts agreed that prediction of market demand was fundamentally impossible, 
so that other ways of dealing with cyclical demand had to be invented. Even 
though the willingness of Shorts was not lacking, the ability of Shorts to work 
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with AtO was limited. The main problem is that the short-term volume 
flexibility of Shorts is low. That is why Shorts always has to produce at the 
high end of the flexibility window. If Fokker's production is lower than that, 
a stock of wings is created. 
Essentially there are two reason why Shorts is not able to work flexibly. The 
first one is technological: implementing an AtO-like system in Shorts is difficult. 
There is no point after the assembly of a wing has begun at which an 
uncoupling point can be introduced. Moreover, there is no economic reason for 
Shorts to do so, as the build up of costs of a wing is rather gradual. Unlike the 
case of an airplane, there are no abrupt changes in value added which may 
provide ground for uncoupling. A second problem lies in Shorts' environment. 
The unions are not prepared to cooperate with the external flexibility of labour 
needed in an AtO-system. 
The limited flexibility of Shorts has as a consequence that the costs of the 
Fokker 100 are not as low as would be theoretically possible, because of the 
costs connected to having an inventory of wings. Moreover, there are some 
coordination problems connected to this storing of wings, as fuselage and wings 
are built in combination. If Fokker decides to store a fuselage, while Shorts 
decides to finish the assembly of a wing, a mismatch may occur when at a later 
date the fuselage's specification is changed as result of a customer's request. To 
alleviate this mismatch Fokker has created a new activity, viz. detecting and 
alleviating differences in fuselage and wing. The costs of this are paid for by 
Fokker. In reality this problem is not so big, as the wing is one of the most 
standard components of a plane. 
• 1994. Even though Shorts' volume flexibility is not yet perfect, the mentioned 
organizational innovations of an inventory of wings and the tuning of wing and 
fuselage, allow Shorts to work according to AtO-norms. The most important 
current problem is the specification flexibility. Shorts' quite long lead time 
reduces its ability to build in client specific parts. A further lead time reduction 
with 50% is planned and may alleviate this problem. Fortunately the number 
of client specific parts that may be built into the wing is limited to only 5. 
Currently, Fokker tries to deal with this problem by taking over some of Shorts' 
activities. For instance, certain moving parts of the wing can be painted in 
different shades of grey and white, upon customer request. As painting usually 
occurs rather late in the production process, Shorts did not always know in 
what colour to deliver the wing. In order to avoid the use of the wrong colour 
of paint, the painting of these parts is now done by Fokker. Fokker would like 
to realize such transfers of activities with other suppliers as well. Usually 
however suppliers are not keen on doing so, as it reduces their workload. 
Another way of coping with the AtO-standard options list, is that Shorts has 
introduced a simple manual system which describes the way the standard 
options should be constructed in the wing. This way of working allows Shorts 
to achieve some specification flexibility as well. Even though this system may 
seem rather primitive, it works quite well. Some other suppliers, including the 
other partner DA, have not installed such systems because they object to 
working with standard options. 
Finally, in October 1994 a "low cost flexibility"-meeting has been installed, in 
which DA, Shorts and Fokker discuss possibilities for improvement of the 
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production process and knowledge is transferred among the three. It is possible 
for instance that one partner helps the other in implementing new flexible 
production arrangements. 
An important factor improving Shorts' ability to cooperate was that Shorts was 
taken over by Bombardier. Bombardier has invested heavily in Shorts' technologi-
cal capabilities and thus contributed to the transition to new ways of working. 
Table 7.11 contains the organizational changes in the relation with Shorts in terms 
of the value chain. Figure 7.5 depicts this graphically. All innovations in activities 
are intra-organizational, excluding the reallocation of wing painting. All linkages 
are of an interorganizational nature, accept for Shorts' internal system for dealing 
with standard options. 
Table 7.11 Organizational innovations in the relation Fokker-Shorts 
Activities 
• Creation of activities: 
— inventory of finished wings (in case the Fokker production 
maximum allowed by the flexibility window) 
— tuning the wing-fuselage configuration at Fokker 
• Reallocation of activities: 
— transfer of painting of parts of the wing 
• Diverse changes in activities connected to lead time reduction 
Linkages 
• Multifunctional deliberation structure 
• Strategic Supplier Meeting 
• Low cost flexibility meeting 
• Shorts' system for dealing with standard options 
is lower than the 
by Shorts 
Source: based on interviews and company documents. 
Some general tendencies can be found. First of all meetings to transfer knowledge 
have been created repeatedly. The first meetings were held in the 1980's and 
formalized in the multifunctional group. In 1994 next to this bilateral structure the 
trilateral structure of the low cost flexibility meeting has been introduced. This 
together with the SSM, seems to imply a trajectory of linkage renewal in the 
direction of increased knowledge- and information-sharing in the relationship 
between Fokker and Shorts. The advantages of such information-sharing and 
knowledge transfer have received widespread attention (Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller, 1995). The changes in activities seem to be more reactive. They are 
responses to specific problems which were not foreseen. The relationship between 
the two companies is not a static but an evolving one. The desired situation can 
be approached by further organizational innovations. 
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Figure 7.5 Organizational innovations in the relation Shorts-Fokker 
Before AtO Shorts . Fokker 
After AtO Shorts Fokker 
LEGEND FIGURE 7.5 
Activities 
1. planning Shorts 
2. planning Fokker 
3. assembly wing 
4. inbound logistics Fokker 
5. alterations wing 
6. assembly wing (partly) 
7. inventory wings (optional) 
8. inventory fuselages 
9. tuning wing-fuselage (optional) 
10. assembly 
11. paint wing parts 
Linkages 
a. contract/long-term planning 
b. delivery of complete wing 
c. SSM 
d. delivery from inventory (optional) 
e. delivery wing with loose parts 
f. AtO-standard options list 
In general Shorts is willing to cooperate with the AtO-system. This is an 
important advantage as the relationship be tween Fokker and Shorts is very strong: 
the fate of the one company is inextricably intertwined wi th the fate of the other 
company. The result of these strong ties be tween Fokker and Shorts was that the 
AtO-system did not stop at Fokker's firm boundary , bu t had repercussions for 
Shorts as well. In practice this meant that the introduction of a new w a y of 
cooperating between the two firms became necessary. The full benefits of AtO 
cannot be reaped by Fokker until the interorganizational relationships function 
smoothly as well. To accomplish this, an array of other organizational innovations 
(inside Shorts and in the relation between Fokker and Shorts) has been intro-
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duced. This confirms the description given in chapter 4 of organizational 
innovation as a messy process of search and trial and error along a trajectory of 
development, in which one innovation (AtO) gives rise to others. 
7.4.3 Grumman 
Grumman, which makes the protective plates around the engines, has been 
involved in the Fokker 100 programme since its start halfway the 1980s. 
Grumman was intensively involved in the design of the parts it had to construct. 
In the course of time it has built up a collection of knowledge and patents of 
which it is not clear whether the ownerships lies with Fokker or Grumman. This 
situation leads to lock-in of the relationship: unclarity over the ownership of 
knowledge complicates a possible break in the relationship. 
With the introduction of the ArO-system the relation between Fokker and 
Grumman has come under severe pressure. There are several reasons why the 
relation with Grumman was not easy to change (table 7.12). Most importantly, the 
patterns of behavior that had been developed in the past were hard to break. 
Grumman and Fokker have a history of tough negotiating about contracts, prices 
and deliveries. From both sides the relationship was characterized more by 
antagonism and competition than by cooperation. The ArO-system however is 
aimed at the latter. Fokker and Grumman were not able to make this reversal in 
the relationship. Grumman did not agree to break the existing contract and is the 
only supplier that falls back on it in case of problems. "It takes a considerable 
effort to switch to more open cooperation", one of the managers remarked about 
the relationship with Grumman. As was noticed before, the contracts with other 
suppliers have been dissolved. 
Next, Grumman has a low strategic stake in Fokker. Fokker makes up only 3-4% 
percent of Grumman's turnover. Moreover Grumman's position in negotiating is 
strong, because of the difficulty of breaking the relationship and the limited 
amount of competitors Grumman has. Both points limit Fokker's possibility to 
change supplier. 
Finally, there are some differences in the industries in which both companies 
work which do not enhance their mutual understanding. Grumman mainly works 
in the defense-industry and has limited knowledge of the civil market. An 
example is that Grumman is not familiar with the problem of cyclical demand. A 
similar problem occurs in Fokker's relation with DA. DA has always worked as 
a supplier and it has never had direct contact with companies in which the 
problems were so clear. This in contrast to other suppliers who knew from their 
own experience could understand the necessity of giving up long-term planning 
and working according to AtO. Hence, the attitude of the firms vis-a-vis the ArO-
system is influenced by their own history and industry background. 
Another industry difference is that the financial way of working in the defense-
industry differs from that in the civil market. Companies in the defense industry, 
working with governments, have always been able to obtain more lenient 
financial conditions from their customers. When Fokker introduced new financial 
conditions for its suppliers, it was Grumman that had most difficulty in accepting 
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that. Previously, Fokker would finance the production of parts provided by 
Grumman, whereas under the AtO-system suppliers are not paid until the part 
is used in the assembly line. Prepayments have been replaced by "cash-on-
delivery", as airlines have stopped making prepayments to Fokker as well. 
Grumman did not accept this, because of its focus on cashflow management. 
Under pressure it has agreed to a lower level of prepayments than before, so that 
part of the financial risk of market fluctuations is now shared with Fokker. 
After Fokker had given Grumman free advice on the reduction of lead times, 
Grumman did not pass on the financial benefits this brought it. As far as the 
logistics is concerned, Grumman builds up an inventory out of which on Fokker's 
request deliveries take place. Internal flexibilization enables Grumman to follow 
AtO to a satisfying extent. Grumman also takes part in the SSM. 
Table 7.12 Factors impeding the implementation of the complete 
AtO-system in the relation Grumman-Fokker 
• Entrenched routines: 
— sticking to the contract 
• Industry differences: 
— no cyclicity in defense-industry 
— strong cashflow management at Grumman 
• Independence of Grumman: 
— Fokker is a minor client 
— few alternatives for Fokker 
Source: based on interviews. 
An interesting fact is that Grumman's suppliers have had to change their way of 
working as well in order to meet the logistic conditions of AtO. As a consequence 
the shocks in demand are now absorbed throughout the entire network: part of 
it is dealt with by Fokker, part is absorbed by Grumman and part is absorbed by 
Grumman's suppliers. Formerly the burden fell on Fokker exclusively, currently 
Fokker is able to pass on part of it to the rest of the value system: the AtO-system 
has external effects beyond the first tier suppliers into the second tier. The 
innovation in the linkages are all interorganizational; the creation of an inventory 
is intra-organizational. 
Table 7.13 Organizational innovations in the relation 
Fokker-Crumman 
Activities 
• Inventory of parts 
Linkages 
• SSM, but contract is maintained 
• New financial linkage partly implemented 
• Flexibility in second tier 
Source: based on interviews. 
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Figure 7.6 Organizational innovations in the relation Grumman-Fokker 
Before AtO Grumman „ Fokker 
After AtO Grumman Fokker 
LEGEND FIGURE 7.6 
Activities 
1. planning Grumman 
2. planning Fokker 
3. production process Grumman 
4. inbound logistics Fokker 
5. inventory plates 
6. inventory fuselages 
7. assembly Fokker 100 
Linkages 
a. contract 
b. delivery plates 
c. SSM (limited) 
d. delivery plates 
Table 7.13 gives an overview of the organizational innovations implemented by 
Grumman (see also figure 7.6). Briefly: the logistics are not optimal but Grumman 
is able to work according to AtO. The financial aspect of AtO has however not 
been accepted by Grumman so that the benefits for Fokker (and the entire Fokker 
100 programme) have remained limited. 
7.4.4 Evaluation: long-term relationships and organizational innovation 
If the AtO-system is to realize its full potential a cooperative attitude from the 
current suppliers is a prerequisite. If a supplier is not willing to cooperate or not 
capable of doing so, the cost of switching to another supplier will be prohibitive. 
As a result Fokker will be locked in a suboptimal situation. 
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Table 7.14 Factors inhibiting cooperation with suppliers 
Factors inhibiting coopera-
tion 
Externalities 
Costs: 
• loss of beneficial position 
Impediments: 
• internal obstacle 
• external obstacle 
Entrenched routines 
• normative isomorphism 
Independence 
• absence of hierarchy 
• low strategic dependence 
Industry environment 
• differences in industry 
Examples 
• Vendors less protected from demand fluctuations 
(higher stock) 
• No prepayments to vendors 
• Loss of position extends to second tier 
• Shortage of vendor's knowledge of lead time 
reduction and flexibilization 
• Unions unwilling to accept labour flexibility at 
Shorts 
• Sticking to contracts 
• All suppliers are independent companies 
• Low percentage of turnover comes from sales to 
Fokker 
• Grumman operates mainly in defense industry 
• Lack of affinity with civil market 
Source: see text. 
The two cases presented describe two long-term relations with firms of which one 
is willing to cooperate, but is (temporarily) limited in its possibilities and the other 
firm may be able to cooperate but is less willing to. Consequently the potential 
benefits are not yet realized to the extent possible. Based on table 5.4, table 7.14 
summarizes the factors inhibiting smooth cooperation with suppliers in the AtO-
system. 
Externalities 
First of all, externalities are clearly present. The strong connection between Fokker 
and its suppliers is the cause of the fact that the effects of AtO are not limited to 
Fokker alone, but have important repercussions for the suppliers as well. They are 
forced to make organizational changes. Hence, the distinguishing characteristic of 
externalities that cost and benefits do not fall in the same organization is present 
and not only with regard to the costs incurred by the suppliers of changing the 
organization, but also by the loss of other beneficial positions. The main point in 
this regard is that whereas formerly the suppliers were to a large extent shielded 
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from fluctuations in market demand both financially and logistically, currently 
they are exposed to them. Pertaining to externalities there is one more interesting 
point worth noting: the externality is not limited to the first tier of suppliers, but 
affects the second tier as well, as the case of Grumman shows. This may further 
complicate the situation. Suppliers also face a shorter planning horizon. To 
remedy this and to lessen the burden of the AtO-system on the suppliers' 
organization, Fokker installed the SSM. 
Next, there may be other impediments inhibiting firms to cooperate. Both 
Grumman and Shorts did not possess the capabilities to implement a way of 
working in their organizations that could deal with AtO. The implementation of 
an organizational innovation is therefore not just dependent on the will of 
suppliers, but also on the question whether those suppliers possess the required 
know-how and resources to deal with it. More flexible firms, as the firms 
delivering the avionics, had no problems with AtO at all. The cure for the 
impediments to change was found in the transfer of knowledge about flexibiliza-
tion and lead time reduction from Fokker to the suppliers. 
Another obstacle hampering the ability of suppliers to implement AtO, was found 
in the business environment. In the case of Shorts, the unions were unwilling to 
accept the further flexibilization of labour, which was required to deal with the 
expected increased fluctuation of production. 
Entrenched routines 
As discussed in section 5.3.3 entrenched routines are caused by isomorphism and 
inertia. The Fokker case shows that normative isomorphism plays an important 
part in the relation Fokker has with Grumman. Precisely as was shown in section 
5.3.3, the interaction over time has created a way of working from which it is 
difficult to break away. A rather antagonistic relationship developed between 
Fokker and Grumman. Replacing this with a more open and non-contractual 
relationship proved to be impossible at short notice. Grumman's reaction when 
changes have to be made is the same as it was in the past: Grumman takes the 
conditions of the contract as a point of departure. It is not possible to explain this 
by other variables than the history of the relationship: Grumman is the only party 
which has not accepted some of the major elements of the AtO-system. 
Independence 
That the absence of hierarchy has slowed down the implementation of the AtO-
system is made clear in the relationship with Grumman. When Grumman 
appeared to have a negative attitude towards the AtO-system, there were no 
means to force Grumman to comply. Instead lengthy negotiations were needed 
to entice Grumman to accept relatively small changes. With regard to other 
suppliers this problem has occurred as well (for example with the partner DA). 
On the other hand firms that are more dependent on Fokker have been more 
willing to cooperate (30% of Shorts' turnover depends on Fokker, compared with 
3-4% for Grumman). The less dependent on Fokker firms are, the less amenable 
they are to give up their beneficial position and the harder they will defend the 
status quo. 
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Industry environment 
Related to normative isomorphism but important enough to be mentioned 
separately, is that Grumman's norms and ways of working are determined by the 
norms in its own industry. The norm in the defense-industry with regard to strict 
cashflow management is different from the norm in the civil aircraft industry; in 
addition, Grumman has never had direct contact with the market but has always 
worked as a supplier to other firms. These differences in norms hinder mutual 
understanding. Hence, normative isomorphism has two sides to it: on the one 
hand replacing old norms by new ones is difficult (a longitudinal element 
surrounding norms). On the other hand dissimilarity in norms can thwart 
cooperation between firms coming from different industries (a cross-sectional 
element). 
7.4.5 Attribute-table on long-term relations and organizational innovation 
in Fokker 
Looking at this analysis in more detail, the attribute-table on long-term relations 
(table 7.15) summarizes the findings: 
• externalities influence all three attributes of organizational innovation. The form 
of the innovation is influenced because the SSM is aimed at mitigating the 
effects of AtO on the suppliers; also inventories of finished products come into 
existence in the suppliers's value chain. The speed with which the innovations 
were implemented was lowered by impediments as the lack of flexibility of 
Shorts. It takes some time before Shorts will be able to work with the system 
fully. The extent of the organizational innovation was influenced negatively as 
well: in neither of the cases of Shorts and Grumman the AtO system was 
completely implemented, because they were not prepared to give up their 
beneficial positions completely. Grumman, for example, has not accepted the 
new financial linkage of AtO (see figure 7.6); 
• no effect of entrenched routines on the form of the innovation was found. 
Entrenched routines did influence the speed negatively: it took some time 
before Grumman was willing to make some changes in the contract. When 
these changes were made, they were limited. For the larger part Grumman 
remained with the old contract; hence the minus in the box relating entrenched 
routines to extent. The entrenched routines of working according to contracts 
and long-term planning proved hard to change, as Grumman always took the 
old contract as point of departure when changes had to be negotiated; 
• independence was not found to influence the form of the innovation but in the 
case of Grumman it certainly influenced the speed of implementation nega-
tively. Lengthy negotiations about the contract were needed between Grumman 
and Fokker. The absence of a centralized power dictating change, does not 
stimulate the implementation of an organizational innovation in long-term 
relations. Grumman was not only independent formally, it was also de facto 
independent in that its financial dependence on Fokker is low: only 3-4% of its 
turnover depends on Fokker. Compared to Shorts, which is a partner in the 
Fokker 100 programme and realizes 30% of its turnover from Fokker, 
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Grumman's dependence on Fokker is very low and thus it can afford to be less 
disposed to cooperate with AtO. 
Table 7.15 Attribute-table on the influence of long-term relations on Fokker's AtO-system 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Externalities 
Y 
-
-
Entrenched routines 
N 
-
-
Independence 
N 
-
Y = Yes, the dependent variable influences the independent variable 
N = No, the dependent variable does not influence the independent variable 
— = the dependent variable influences the independent variable negatively 
Source: see text. 
The presence of extensive, long-term interfirm relations has slowed down and 
limited the implementation of the AtO-system. To translate Fokker's internal 
planning to the external parties the Strategic Supplier Meeting has been devised 
as part of the AtO-system. The attribute-table shows that at various places the form of 
the organizational innovation is influenced by the suppliers, while the speed and extent 
of its implementation is in most cases negatively determined by the presence of long-term 
relationships. Externalities, absence of hierarchy, and entrenched routines can all 
be traced in the cases, thereby largely confirming the hypothesis that long-term 
relations may have a negative impact on organizational innovation. Especially 
externalities seem to be interesting in this connection (see table 7.14). One other 
variable which was found to play a role is the industry background of the firms 
concerned. When both firms work in a similar industry, organizational innovation 
is easier than when the industry backgrounds differ. 
Because of those inhibiting factors the AtO-system has been implemented only 
partly, despite the pressing reasons (demand shocks, financial crises) for 
implementing it. The competitive advantages of a shorter reaction time to market 
changes, increased specification flexibility and lower costs, had in 1994 not (yet?) 
materialized to the extent possible even though important progress was made. 
The trajectory of development was however not finished at that date: the system 
was still evolving. On the positive side, the complexity of dealing with suppliers 
will make the benefits obtained so far, harder to replicate for competitors. 
7.5 Demand and AtO 
7.5.1 Introduction 
Some aspects of demand are present in this case, especially the role of cyclical 
demand and differentiation. These two attributes will be looked into in this 
section. As to quantitative developments in demand, these have been discussed 
quite elaborately at various places above. That is why section 7.5.2 will give only 
a brief overview of quantitative developments in demand. In section 7.5.3 
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qualitative changes and their effect on organizational innovat ion will be analysed. 
The attribute-table on d e m a n d can be found in 7.5.4. 
7.5.2 Quant i ta t ive d e m a n d 
The role of changes in the quanti ty of d e m a n d has been amply discussed above. 
This will not be repeated here. It will be clear that the d e m a n d shock in the early 
1990's was the trigger for the implementat ion of the AtO-system in Fokker. The 
goal of the implementat ion of AtO is: "to improve control on the effect of the 
changing pat tern of market d e m a n d on the required capacity (in m a n hours and 
money) inside the enterprise"9 . 
Next to that the AtO-system takes into account the cyclical na ture of d e m a n d for 
Jet aircraft. In fact the flexibility-window, which allows product ion to deviate from 
the carrier is present exclusively to deal wi th changes in the quanti ty of demand . 
The cyclical na ture of d e m a n d for airplanes is illustrated in figure 7.7. Demand 
peaked in the years 1965,1978 and 1989. The corresponding deliveries took place 
three years later. 
Figure 7.7 Business cycles in jet aircraft manufacturing 
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Source: Fokker document Trapped between supplier and buyer. 
The flexibility-window has two advantages in such a cyclical market. First of all 
if demand increases, it enables Fokker to raise its product ion more swiftly. When 
demand decreases Fokker is not stuck wi th an old product ion schedule based on 
higher demand , but is able to lower its product ion, thus prevent ing the expensive 
Company document "Assembly-to-Order in de Fokker Jetline", p. 3, translated from Dutch 
by the author. 
Deliveries 
— Orders 
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build up of a stock of white tails. Concluding, quantitative demand not only 
induced the organizational innovation (because of the collapse of demand), but 
also influenced the form of the innovation: the flexibility-window is an attempt 
to cope with the uncertainty of cyclical swings. It increased quantitative flexibility 
from 5-10% a year to 25% per quarter. This can be described as a shift from a 
linkage with organization-like characteristics (long-term planning), towards a 
linkage in which the movements of the market are incorporated. 
7.5.3 Qualitative demand 
Two qualitative changes can be traced in the demand Fokker has faced. First of 
all time-based competition (Stalk, 1988) has made an entrance in aircraft 
manufacturing. As Fokker lacked the capital to finance an inventory of white tails 
out of which speedy deliverances could be made, another way had to be found 
to deliver in a relatively short time. The "four months" AtO-plane provided the 
solution. As on average an airline needs six months for its own set-up (e.g. 
training pilots etc.) the delivery time is preferably less than that. Hence, time 
based competition has played a role in AtO from the start. A second qualitative 
change is one that is of specific importance in the long run: namely fashion 
changes in aircraft interiors. Although these changes are not too fast, over the 
entire length of an aircraft-programme they do have an important impact. Firstly, 
the influence of time will be discussed, next the role of fashion will be studied. 
TIME 
The shorter delivery times demanded by the market are specifically troublesome 
for those parts of the plane that are client specific. Non client specific parts can 
largely be built and put in an inventory (like aircraft fuselages). There are only 
three standard forms of aircraft fuselages (called the export configurations A, B, 
and X, which differ with regard to the kind of door they have). Optional features 
however come in a variety of forms and can only be added to the aircraft when 
the client has formulated his wishes. 
A list of AtO standard options has been developed to deal with the problem of 
having to build in the client specific options at a late stage in the production 
process. The list gives an overview of those options that can be built in after the 
uncoupling point. An information system provides all the necessary information 
for building in the chosen options. The list is still being extended as a.o. 
technological redesign of the options and further client wishes combine to increase 
Fokker's ability to deal with the phenomenon of building in options after the 
uncoupling point. 
The AtO standard options list is an illustration of the remarks made in chapter 5 
about the role of demand in organizational innovation. A qualitative shift in 
demand is the cause of the replacement of an organization-like linkage (dictated 
by the standard production process of aircraft) by a market-like linkage. The AtO 
standard options list is a market-like linkage because clients can directly pick 
options from the list and in this way influence the production process. The 
construction of the aircraft is dictated by clients' wishes to a larger degree than 
before. In one minor case (painting wing parts) the customer was better served 
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by temporarily bringing the activity to Fokker but the overall picture confirms the 
proposition. 
FASHION: THE CASE OF C&D10 
As aircraft programmes run for some decades, changes in style and taste can be 
expected. This is especially true for the interior of a plane, as it is one of the parts 
which is most subject to client wishes. Most sensitive to client demands are the 
galley, the colours used and the length of the centersection. Even though the 
fashion changes in the design are not so frequent, during the lifetime of a 
programme they do have an important impact. Next to that there are client 
specific wishes that have to be built in in the interior so that some differentiation 
between clients occurs. The AtO-goal of enhancing specification flexibility is 
clearly a result of this demand for differentiation. 
The requirements of fashion, combined with the element of shorter delivery times, 
has led Fokker to decide to stop with the own production of interiors in 1994 and 
buy them from an American company called C&D instead. The costs connected 
to following fashion were thus too high. Again, an organization-like linkage 
(building the interiors inside Fokker) is replaced by a linkage with market 
characteristics (a contract with C&D). 
An internal Fokker-report "Make or buy policy and vertical integration" found 
that interiors were an important bottleneck in the production of the Fokker 100 
aircraft. The production lead time was too long. Usually clients had to give the 
specifications of the interior 16 months before the aircraft was delivered. With the 
increasing pressure for shorter delivery times this situation was unacceptable. Of 
course, Fokker also found that the long lead time was troublesome for the AtO-
system. With such a long time between specification and delivery AtO would not 
be able to work and the idea of a four months plane would be illusory. 
Moreover, changes after the 16 months period were extremely expensive: things 
as simple as replacing a coathook could cost thousands of guilders. Larger scale 
redesigns of interiors were even more cumbersome, with lead times of up to 18 
months from design till construction. The Fokker-report concluded "Our interiors 
do not keep up flexibly with fashion trends" (p. 12). The causes of this situation 
lie in rigid drawing structures (which cause minor changes to absorb a lot of time 
and cost, which could not be spread out over high production volumes), design 
capabilities which are behind the times and out-of-date production techniques. 
Hence Fokker found that there was a "lack of cost effective state-of-the-art 
production technology and progressive product definitions" (p. 16). 
Reason for these old fashioned capabilities and techniques is that Fokker designs 
an interior only once a decade. Consequently, hardly any learning and innovation 
in design and production takes place. When a demanding (possible) customer 
(SAS) wanted the standard yellowish interior which was fashionable in the early 
1980s to be replaced with a white one, this took 1600 hours of development and 
The case on C&D is based on the Fokker-report "Make or Buy-beleid en vertikale integrate" 
and interviews. 
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drawing-office activities. When Fokker tried to incorporate white as the standard 
colour in all aircraft, the cost was too high and capacity too low to put this idea 
into practice. 
Based on this analysis, Fokker decided to contract out the production of the 
interior. The firm C&D acquired the contract and is now largely responsible for 
the interiors. Some styling and assembly activities are still being done by Fokker, 
but in essence C&D has system responsibility. As C&D works for several aircraft 
manufacturers it has kept up with production technology. Moreover, C&D's 
design capabilities are well-developed as it designs a new interior annually. 
The benefits of contracting-out are considerable. Costs can be reduced by 35%; 
depending on the exact specifications, lead times for the interiors are 3-6 months 
where Fokker itself took 8-15 months for comparable specifications. So the 
requirement of shorter delivery times is also met. 
7.5.4 Conclusions and attribute-table on demand 
Most organizational innovations discussed have been induced by demand. Both 
quantitative and qualitative changes in demand have influenced Fokker's 
organization, as is shown in table 7.16 which presents the attribute-table on 
demand: 
• regarding cyclical changes, the drop in demand forced Fokker to implement the 
AtO-system fastly (speed is positively influenced). As part of that system, the 
flexibility-window allows Fokker to react better to the demand cycle in the 
aircraft industry. Hence, quantitative changes also influenced the form of the 
organizational innovation. The depth of the demand crisis influenced the extent 
of the innovation as well: AtO is a major reconfiguration of the value system. 
• in relation to differentiation, AtO also allowed Fokker to react to the demand 
for shorter delivery times. In order to organize for shorter delivery times, two 
organizational innovations are of relevance: the AtO standard options list and 
the contracting-out of the interior. The latter was not only needed to reduce 
delivery times, but was also induced by fashion. So, differentiation influences 
the form and the extent of organizational innovation. The C&D case also 
corroborates the findings in chapter 5 on qualitative changes in demand. Both 
fashion and the demand for shorter delivery times have induced Fokker to 
replace an organization-like linkage by a market-like linkage11. The reason for 
this is that Fokker was unable to keep up the investments in its capabilities (e.g. 
design) and resources (e.g. technology). An effect of differentiation on speed 
was not found: the trend towards differentiation existed already for quite some 
time before the innovations were implemented. 
The transfer of painting of wings in the Shorts case seems to follow a different direction. 
This is however a temporary thing, once Shorts has reduced its lead time sufficiently this 
activity may return to Shorts. 
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Table 7.16 Attribute-table on demand and Fokker 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Fundamental Cyclical 
Y 
+ 
+ 
Differentiation 
Y 
+ 
Fragmentation 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
7.6 Summary and conclusion 
At various places in the foregoing chapter the different propositions of chapter 5 
have been corroborated or extended. The conclusions will not be repeated here in 
detail. They can be found at the separate sections. In general however the 
following points about organizational innovation are noticeable: 
• there is path dependence in the process and it is characterized by search. That 
search for the right solution is of importance becomes explicit in the fact that 
Fokker consciously avoided to come up with a fullblown plan for a new orga-
nizational structure, because it recognized that not all aspects of the 
organizational innovation could be planned. It therefore chose to let the system 
crystallize in practice. Unexpected consequences were for example, the inability 
of partners to cooperate, the too long production time of interiors, the painting 
of wings. This is in accordance with the main points in chapters 4 and 5 that 
characterized the process of innovation as "messy", with both internal and 
external factors impacting on it on different occasions. Path dependence is 
evident in the fact that AtO was not a completely new system, but clearly built 
on lead-time reduction. Hence, the process of innovation exhibited both 
continuity and discontinuity. 
• on various points longevity of the relation had a negative effect on the speed 
and extent of implementation of AtO. Hence the benefits of the system have not 
been realized to the extent possible. The network has also influenced the form 
of the organizational innovation: the SSM is especially directed at translating 
the internal Fokker-planning to the external parties. Particularly externalities are 
a relevant attribute of long-term relations; they were found to limit organiza-
tional innovativeness on various points. 
• both quantitative and qualitative demand changes have influenced the orga-
nizational form. The quantitative change embodied in the collapse of market 
demand pointed at the need to innovate. Furthermore, the form of the organi-
zational innovation has been influenced by the cyclical nature of demand. The 
conjecture that qualitative changes may lead firms to replace organization-like 
linkages with market-like linkages has been illustrated by the AtO standard 
options list and the C&D case. 
Figure 7.8 presents the analytical schema developed in the introduction, but now 
filled in with elements as they play a role in the AtO-system. In the inside-out box 
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these are capabilities (of lead time reduction and design capabilities for the 
interior) and the resource shortage of money. In the outside-in box demand (the 
demand shock, cyclical demand, the demand for shorter delivery times and 
fashion) exerts a positive pressure on organizational innovation. Long-term 
relationships with suppliers are on the negative side, as they work against the 
AtO-system. Competition was an important impetus to change as well (see figure 
7.1). ' 
The other boxes present the management of the Fokker 100 assembly line as the 
initiators of the system; the organizational innovation is the AtO-system (or rather 
the trajectory of AtO, including SSM etc.); lower cost and faster response to 
market changes (both quantitative and with regard to specification) are in general 
the competitive advantages that AtO contributes. As far as diffusion is concerned, 
some competitors have partly implemented similar AtO-systems, others lag 
considerably. Combined with the analysis on sustainability in table 7.9, diffusion 
seems to be relatively slow. 
Figure 7.8 AtO in the analytical schema 
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Exhibit I: List of persons interviewed 
The interviews took place in the period October-December 1994. A report was presented 
at the company on 8 February 1995. 
• A. Bolier, Manager Jetline Fokker 100/70 
• G. Hamers, Plant Manager Final Assembly Plant 
• A.C. Ledegang, Communication Partner Specification Changes 
• S. Paauwe, Production Preparation Propjet 
• R.J. Postma, Manager Interiors Procurement 
• G. Pronk, Vice President Corporate Affairs 
• C.A. Ruitenbeek, Manager Specification Changes 
• L.M. Schot, Manager Logistics Procurement 
• A. Schouten, Manager Final Assembly 
• T. de Smit, Support Services Final Assembly 
• J. Verbeek, Manager Support Services Final Assembly 
• R.A. de Wit, Fokker 100 Program Manager 
• J.W. Warners, Project Manager AtO 
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Exhibit II: List of consulted Fokker-documents 
• Make or Buy-beleid en vertikale integratie, November 1991 (including appendices) 
• Begrippenapparaat Projectbesturing, February 1992 
• Project management binnen programma management FAC, April 1993 
• Trapped between supplier and buyer, October 1993, (bundle overhead sheets) 
• Doorlooptijdreductie eindlijn, December 1993 
• Assembly-to-order binnen de Fokker Jetline, January 1994 
• AtO SPECFLEX processchema, January 1994 
• British Midland evaluatie, May 1994 
• Het FEBS in een veranderende omgeving, June 1994 
• AtO-beslisstructuren, June 1994 
• Position Paper van het Fokker-bedrijf Schiphol, September 1994 
• Annual reports 1985-1994 

8 
European distribution centres: 
a case in the port of Rotterdam1 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe a trajectory of organizational innovation in the 
distribution sector, namely the emergence of European Distribution Centres 
(EDCs), and analyse which factors have determined the course of development 
of this trajectory. It will also show the impact an organizational innovation can 
have on the competitiveness of firms (and regions). 
EDCs are companies (or parts of companies) in which not only the distribution 
of products for a large geographical area is concentrated, but also secondary 
production activities (like assembly, quality control etc.) are performed and 
information processing takes place. The emergence of EDCs has led to remarkable 
shifts in activities along the entire value system of distribution. They will be 
analysed in this chapter. 
From the inside-out perspective the development towards European distribution 
will be described in terms of routines. A trajectory of development can be found 
along which repeated changes in the value system eventually lead to full-blown 
European Distribution Centres. As to the influence of the business environment 
on the emergence of EDCs (the outside-in perspective), again Porter's diamond 
framework will be used. Specific attention will be directed at the role of 
quantitative and qualitative changes in demand, in order to research the 
proposition put forth in chapter 5. This proposition identified changing demand 
as an important impetus for organizational innovation. More specifically it stated 
This case is based on interviews with employees of the Rotterdam Port Authority, 
managers of the case company and designated literature. On request of the case company 
its name and the names of its clients have been disguised. Exhibit 1 at the end of the 
chapter gives an overview of the persons interviewed. The facts of the case were checked 
by the managers of the case company. The interpretation is the author's responsibility. 
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that increasing demand fluctuations would lead firms to replace organization-like 
linkages by market-like linkages. 
Section 8.2 will present the picture of EDCs which emerges from theory and 
several research reports. It paints a generic picture of changes in the distribution 
industry. Section 8.3 will look into detail at the implementation of an EDC in a 
specific firm, which specializes in organizing European distribution. The case of 
an innovative distribution company in the port of Rotterdam will serve as an 
example. Section 8.4 summarizes the main findings of this chapter. 
8.2 EDCs as organizational innovation: the general picture 
8.2.1 The function of EDCs 
In European Distribution Centres stocks of products are centralized in few dis-
tribution centres, each having a large market to serve. This concentration of 
inventories is not the only characteristic of EDCs: they also perform various other 
tasks like secondary production activities and information processing. Regarding 
production activities, figure 8.1 shows which activities are performed in EDCs in 
the Netherlands. The value-added connected to these production activities is 
substantial, which is why both firms and governments are interested in the 
development towards European distribution. 
Figure 8.1 Activities performed by EDCs in the Netherlands 
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A detailed analysis of the organizational innovation characteristics of EDCs will 
be given in section 8.2.4 and section 8.3.3. It will be shown that there are not only 
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intriguing organizational innovations inside EDCs, but that important innovations 
take place along the entire distribution chain. 
8.2.2 Determinants of the development of EDCs 
Several reasons are offered in the literature for the rise of European Distribution 
Centres. If these are related to the diamond framework, the most elaborately 
discussed determinant is demand. Next to that government, firm strategy and 
information technology (as part of the determinant factor conditions) are the most 
frequently cited determinants of European distribution. 
Demand 
Pertaining to demand the literature on EDCs has defined three relevant factors: 
• increasing influence of fashions (Saitua et al., 1988) and shortening product life 
cycles (Van Schijndel, 1993), which stimulate firms to limit stocks of finished 
products (Saitua et al., 1988) and to increase the speed of delivery. 
• individualization of demand (Saitua et al., 1988; Nederland Distributieland, 
1991; Vermunt 1993; Saitua and Koet, 1987). This leads to market fragmentation: 
smaller amounts of goods have to be distributed. Similarly, Saitua and Koet 
(1987) conclude that EDCs are particularly useful in case of non-concentrated 
groups of clients. 
• the shift from a supplier market to consumer markets (Van Schijndel, 1993; 
Vermunt, 1993), in which the reliability of deliveries is important (De Jong and 
Vethman, 1990). 
These factors on the demand side have important implications for firms. First of 
all because of these developments, firms are inclined to reduce inventory in order 
to prevent being stuck with inventory that cannot be sold because it dropped out 
of fashion. Next, the increasing influence of consumers makes that organizations 
will be geared to satisfying their wants and needs. Swift and customized delivery 
becomes a necessity, while quality levels must be maintained. The requirement 
of customized delivery is especially interesting in Europe because of the cultural 
differences on the continent. Adapting products to different European markets is 
a complicated matter and a European distribution centre should have extensive 
knowledge about the product specifications for different national markets. 
This fact, combined with the role of fashion, causes a reallocation of secondary 
production activities from producers to EDCs in order to facilitate customization. 
In this way products can be tailored to individual tastes and new fads in a rather 
late phase. Above that, products manufactured in Asia or America are transported 
to the European market before they are sold. By doing so, swift delivery is 
possible when an order materializes. 
Government 
The new requirements from the side of consumers direct the attention to changes 
in the distribution channels. The preferred centralization of distribution, leading 
to lower inventory, was less feasible in a Europe that was fragmented in different 
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national entities with their own rules and regulations. Bordercrossing procedures 
were so time-consuming, that speedy and reliable deliveries could not be 
guaranteed. The development of the common market stimulated the growth of 
EDCs as open borders and new ways of handling taxes on traded goods, elimi-
nated barriers to European distribution. Developments at the supra-national level 
(EU and GATT/WTO) were therefore a powerful impetus for the concept of Euro-
pean Distribution (Cooke, 1992). Without them the speed of developments would 
have been inconceivable (Kuipers and Van Mourik (1993) state that the cashflows 
from American and Japanese EDCs established in the Netherlands to their home 
countries rose from 0.5 billion guilders in 1986 to 14 billion guilders in 1991). 
Firm strategies 
A third influential variable which is of interest for outsourcing distribution is the 
back-to-the-core-business strategy (Saitua et al., 1988, p. 10; Gemeentelijk 
Havenbedrijf Rotterdam, 1991, p. 4). Many firms have decided not to establish 
EDCs themselves, but to contract their European distribution out to specialized 
logistics providers. The popularity of the back-to-the-core idea has opened up a 
market for these specialized distribution firms. Of course this strategy cannot be 
seen in isolation from the demand side developments previously discussed. The 
focus on competences and capabilities is an inside-out factor that lies at the basis 
of this strategy: firms will focus on those aspects of their business where they can 
gain competitive advantage. In markets where short product life cycles and 
fashions are the rule, some firms direct their attention towards their manufac-
turing capabilities. Above that, there is a general tendency to eliminate invento-
ries, caused by the rather strong organizational trajectory of JIT. 
Information technology 
Finally, information technology increases in importance as a linkage. It does not 
so much effect the form of the reconfiguration of activities in the value chain (as 
demand did in the direction of elimination of the inventory function and 
reallocation of secondary production activities, government in centralizing 
distribution and the back to the core strategy in contracting out), but was an 
enabling factor. Many of the changes in organizational structures would have 
been possible without information technology, but the accuracy of data inter-
change would have been much less without it. Information technology not 
necessarily refers to advanced on-line connections between firms as in the case of 
EDI. Some EDCs can be very successful with fax and telephone. 
In section 8.3 the relation between these (and other) determinants and EDCs will 
be discussed more elaborately for the case of one firm. 
8.2.3 The trajectory of EDCs 
EDCs can be of an intra- and interorganizational nature. Some large manufac-
turers or importers posses their own distribution network. Other firms contract 
their European distribution out to specialized distribution firms, thus establishing 
an interorganizational innovation. 
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The latter EDCs have developed out of other forms of distribution by a process 
of reallocation of activities from the principal to the EDC. Coopers and Lybrand 
and Nehem (1989, p. 12) have depicted this development and some intermittent 
stages as in figure 8.2. They distinguish the following stages: 
• storage: space is rented to a tenant, who stores his goods and is responsible for 
them himself. 
• loose transport: the firm puts a truck and driver at the disposal of its customer. 
Planning is done by the latter. 
• transport centre: the customer offers products to be transported and the trans-
port centre takes care of planning the transport. 
• distribution centre: products are under the supervision of the distribution 
centre. The distribution centre is not only responsible for the transport of goods, 
but also for inventory control, inbound logistics, storage and picking orders. 
• logistic centre: the customer transfers the complete information function to the 
centre. The logistic centre takes care of order-entry and billing. The centre's 
computer system provides information for the customer. Long-term contracts 
form the linkage between centre and customer. Often transport is contracted out 
by these firms to transport companies. 
• transport network: a collection of transport centres at which different goods can 
be transferred and grouped. The hub and spoke system is a model that is often 
used in this form of organization. 
• logistic network: a transport network, which at minimally one point executes 
several logistic functions, as collecting orders, making products clientspecific, 
organizing information flows. An EDC is such a logistic network (Nehem, 
1993). 
Figure 8.2 The trajectory of development towards EDCs 
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Source: Coopers and Lybrand and Nehem, 1989. 
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This description clearly shows the reallocation and creation of activities, which 
characterize the trajectory of development of EDCs. The focus is on activities here, 
although information technology and long-term contracts are mentioned as a 
linkage in the logistic centre. Again, the case described in section 8.3 will give a 
detailed application of this trajectory in a specific situation of an individual firm. 
The general description here does not provide enough detail to research the 
specific proposition on path dependence developed in chapter 4. 
8.2.4 EDCs: the general picture of value chain reconfigurations 
The trajectory of figure 8.2 shows the dynamics of the developments in 
distribution. Figure 8.3 shows the comparative statics: it gives a general overview 
of the value system at the beginning of the trajectory and at the phase of a 
complete EDC. This picture shows the major reconfigurations of activities and 
linkages in the value system. 
Figure 8.3 The value system of distribution with and without European distribution 
Old Situation 
Producer National N. 
Distributor / 
Wholesale/ 
importer 
Shops 
European Distribution 
" EDC Importer 
(national) Shops N client 
LEGEND FIGURE 8.3 
Activities 
1. Assembly 
2. Warehousing 
3. Distribution to shops 
Linkages 
a. Single order 
b. Long term contract + i.t. 
c. Delivery/order 
In a typical way of working in the old situation a producer would have his 
products transported by a forwarder to a national distributor somewhere in 
Europe. From there the products would be transported to a wholesaler or 
importer, who would distribute them to the shops in order to be sold. In most 
cases, there were no long-term relations between firms. Often transport was 
arranged per order on an ad hoc basis. This is a general picture and it is not 
necessarily so that all function are performed by different companies. Some 
companies may for example be producer and importer at the same time. 
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Comparing this to the case of European distribution, the following organizational 
innovations can be found: 
• First of all, an elimination of the function of national distributor and wholesaler 
can be observed. All products for the European market are concentrated in the 
EDC and often distributed to final outlets from that point. This makes national 
distribution and wholesale activities superfluous. Firms possessing a network 
of national distribution centres will not find it easy to switch to European 
distribution. In practice national sales organizations are not always willing to 
give up their logistic control (Nederland Distributieland, 1991). 
• Next some activities are reallocated. The figure depicts assembly and ware-
housing (no stocks are kept by the producer: they are transported to the EDC), 
but these activities can include repacking, labelling, quality control etc. as well. 
In general all these secondary production activities can be performed by the 
EDC. Formerly these activities of preparing goods for the final market were the 
final part of the production process. In European Distribution Centres they have 
become part of the distribution process. Thus client specific activities take place 
closer to the consumer. The neologism of "industiibution" (Saitua, 1995) has 
been created to denote this mingling of industrial activities and distribution. 
Another wellknown term for this is "value added logistics". 
For American and Asian producers operating their own EDCs, this reallo-
cation of activities towards the EDC can end up in their establishing their 
European headquarters near the EDC (Nederland Distributieland, 1990). This 
is one of the reasons why EDCs have drawn the attention of national govern-
ments, as they see an opportunity for attracting high level employment. 
• Of great importance is that information flows are coordinated by the EDC as 
well. Increasingly, EDCs take over activities like billing, inventory control, and 
providing information to governments (trade and tax figures etc.). This last 
tendency can be observed in the linkages. Not only are single orders replaced 
by long-term contracts, but often information technology is used as a linkage 
as well. Orders and inventory levels can be faxed or communicated by means 
of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange). It even occurs that orders are no longer 
communicated to the EDC through importers or producers, but go directly from 
shops to the EDC. The importer often maintains his risktaking role (he invests 
in buying the inventory of products) and generally is responsible for marketing 
as well. The shops however do no longer have to be in contact with the 
importer, as they can order the required goods directly at the EDC. This system 
is depicted in the figure: there is no direct linkage between shops and 
producers. 
Like in the old situation, these functions are not by definition performed by 
different companies. In some instances a producer can have its own EDC and be 
the importer of its own product. 
These are the main organizational innovations for the entire value system of 
distribution. This picture however obscures much of the change that takes place 
in the European Distribution Centre. Hence, section 8.3 will give a much more 
detailed analysis of a specific firm, which developed from a forwarding company 
to a complete EDC. 
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8.2.5 Competitive advantages connected to EDCs 
National and regional competitive advantage 
The tendency to switch to central European distribution for products has as a 
consequence that firms tend to concentrate their logistic activities in one place in 
Europe. For overseas products this place usually is a port. This concentration of 
logistic activities leads to what has become known as the "main port effect": firms 
will choose one main port in which all their logistic operations are managed. It 
goes without saying that European ports compete vigorously to attract European 
Distribution Centres. Especially among those ports that are located near each 
other in the Hamburg-Le Havre range the battle to attract this value-added is 
fierce. 
In this competitive battle the port of Rotterdam discovered in the course of the 
1980s that its position was not particularly strong. Even though the port had been 
the largest port in the world for quite some time, it had some disadvantages 
which made it less attractive as a site for European distribution. The port has 
traditionally concentrated on the transport of bulk goods: the transport and 
processing of large quantities of oil, iron ore and grain are at the core of the ports 
activities. There has always been less attention for the transport of smaller 
quantities of goods and general cargo. As a consequence the value added of the 
port is relatively low (Kuipers and Van Mourik, 1993, find this is typical for the 
Dutch distribution sector in general) and little attention was paid to the creation 
of an infrastructure for these higher value added activities. Even for container 
transport this holds: the focus is at the quantity of containers transported and not 
on the possibilities of doing something with the contents of containers. Other 
ports, specifically Rotterdam's biggest competitor the Belgian port of Antwerp, 
attempt to fill this niche by trying to attract higher value added transports and 
actively create possibilities for activities related to these transports to take place. 
For European Distribution Centres this is of special interest: they usually focus on 
general cargo container loads with which more has to be done than simply 
arrange further transport. 
To remedy these drawbacks Rotterdam began to develop the idea of introducing 
"Distriparks": parks near to container terminals on which distribution companies 
are assembled. In 1990 the first of a total of three of those Distriparks was opened. 
Attracting EDCs was one of the main aims of these parks. The Distriparks are 
especially suited for sea-sea transports (goods which come in by sea, and which 
also will be transported further by sea), and goods which have to be transported 
to non-concentrated groups of clients (if clients are concentrated in a region it 
would be more convenient to arrange the distribution in that region; of course if 
clients are concentrated in the Rotterdam region distribution can take place at 
Distriparks as well) (Saitua and Koet, 1987; Saitua et al. 1988). Also firms which 
have to make use of long distance transport services and other parts of the 
transport cluster in Rotterdam will find Distriparks a good site (Saitua, 1995). 
On a national scale the availability of companies that can offer European 
distribution to American and Japanese firms can create a competitive advantage. 
The Netherlands had a market share of 40% of EDCs of big Japanese and Ameri-
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can companies in 1990 (Nederland Distributieland, 1990), a share which grew to 
45% in 1993 (Nederland Distributieland, 1993). In the total number of EDCs 
(including the smaller ones) this figure was almost 25% of a total of 2400 EDCs 
in Europe. In the Netherlands a relatively high level of warehousing and 
distribution is contracted out: about 30% of the big companies make use of a 
distribution firm instead of performing these activities themselves. In neighboring 
countries this figure is 22% (Nederland Distributieland, 1993). Hence, the 
competitive position of the Netherlands in distribution is strong. 
As far as regional competitiveness is concerned almost 50% of the EDCs in the 
Netherlands is located in one of the two mainports: Schiphol Airport and the Port 
of Rotterdam. These are mainly independent EDCs (not belonging to another 
company). The increasing use of EDCs may strengthen the already well-developed 
Dutch transport-cluster (Jacobs, Boekholt and Zegveld, 1990; Vermunt, 1993), 
which in turn attracts foreign direct investment (Jagersma, 1993). In 1993 
employment was estimated at 20.000 people working in EDCs directly (Nederland 
DistribuHeland, 1993). 
The contributions of an EDC to firm competitiveness 
There is considerable agreement in the literature on the advantages connected to 
European distribution for firms which start to use an EDC (Van den Bossche, Van 
Oosterhout and Radstaak, 1991; Nederland Distributieland, 1990; Van Schijndel, 
1993). Van den Bossche et al. (1991) give the following overview: 
• lower cost: a.o. because of lower stocks as stocks are concentrated in one place; 
lower storage costs etc. Cost savings of 20 to 40% on total logistics costs can be 
reached (Kuipers and Van Mourik, (1993, p. 216) give an average of 29%). 
Unisys for instance claims to have saved $35 million dollar in centralizing its 
European Distribution and contracting out other logistics related operations 
(Cooke, 1992). 
• quality improvement caused by increased control of the distribution process. 
This control of the distribution process results in a reduction of errors, which 
enhances the quality of deliveries. 
• shorter communication lines and simpler communication. Connected to these 
points is that the speed of deliveries has substantially augmented, as stocks are 
shipped to Europe before they have been sold and as parts of the value system 
have been eliminated. 
Disadvantages of European distribution are: 
• transport costs in the last phase of delivering goods to the final consumers or 
shops are higher, as on average the distance from the EDC to these will be 
further than in the case of separate national distribution centres. The relatively 
expensive road transport will have to take place over longer distances. 
• the value added of EDCs will only be clear in the long run. The gains cannot 
easily be translated into monetary terms, but are mainly to be found in an 
increased quality of the services rendered. 
• it is more difficult to adapt products to local markets than in the case of 
national distribution. Different preferences and requirements regarding 
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products can naturally more easily be dealt with close to the market of 
destination than in more remote places. The information requirements for 
customizing and tailoring products to individual markets are quite high. Of 
course it must be noted that customization was even more difficult in the 
situation where secondary production activities were performed by the 
manufacturer. 
• the demands on organization are rather high. The quality of coordination and 
planning are pivotal to the success of European distribution. 
These advantages and disadvantages pertain to the overall distribution system. 
They accrue to individual firms working in that system and of course to the 
customers. The next section (8.3) will look at the competitive position of an 
independent EDC (a firm which offers European distribution services to other 
parties). 
Sustainability 
About 50% of big American and Japanese companies have centralized their Euro-
pean distribution (Nederland Distributieland, 1993), so there seems to have been 
a fast diffusion. This group of 50% is however not homogeneous. It includes quite 
some companies which have centralized their European distribution and ware-
housing in one or two centres, but which have not made the move to more 
advanced logistic concepts like value added logistics and information processing. 
Next, the group of big firms may include the innovators and early adopters, while 
the laggards may be found in the group of small firms. There are no detailed 
figures available as to the amount of firms that have really gone all the way with 
European distribution. The speed and extent of the diffusion of EDCs as organi-
zation form can thus not be ascertained. Hence, based on this figure it is difficult 
to conclude whether the form can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Specific attention must be paid to the role of information technology in European 
distribution and the sustainability of the competitive advantage connected to it. 
More and more firms switch to electronic integration: "a specific form of vertical 
quasi-integration achieved through the deployment of dedicated information 
systems between relevant actors in adjacent stages of the value chain" (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1994). The impact of information technology on the distribution 
sector cannot be denied, but the single fact that it has an impact does not mean 
that it leads to a competitive advantage. If every firm installs i.t.-systems, no 
competitive advantages can be obtained. In this case, i.t. becomes a necessity and 
a prerequisite for being able to compete at all, not an extra (Cooper, Browne and 
Peters, 1991). According to Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) and Cooper, Browne 
and Peters (1991) i.t. will only lead to a competitive advantage if it is a unique or 
specific system and not a common one: when it is tailored to the specific 
organization(s) and makes use of information unavailable to others, it may lead 
to a competitive advantage. 
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8.2.6 Conclusion 
On the basis of the literature reviewed, some conclusions can be drawn. First of 
all, there is agreement on the role of demand in the emergence of European 
Distribution Centres. Other determinants identified are the back to the core 
strategy of firms, information technology and the impact of government. Secondly, 
the historical development of EDC's suggests a path dependence process of 
transferring activities from producers to distributors may be present. Yet, the 
evidence was not sufficiently detailed to allow an indepth study of path 
dependence. The specific case studied in 8.3 will shed more light on this question. 
Finally, attention has been paid to the increasing organizational complexity of 
distribution: a number of changes in activities and linkages in the value chain 
takes place. A detailed analysis of how these changes and determinants work out 
on the level of individual distribution centres has however not been given. In 
order to get a more detailed picture, section 8.3 will study one innovative 
company that provides European distribution services. 
8.3 Case company: the development of an EDC in a specific firm 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The case company is a distribution firm, established at one of the Distriparks in 
Rotterdam, offering European distribution services to companies. The company 
was founded in 1966 (see table 8.1 for some key facts). About 31 people work in 
the office-building and warehouses the company has established on the Distripark 
in 1989. A further 23 people are active in other parts of the company. It was one 
of the frontrunners in the distribution sector as far as European distribution is 
concerned: it implemented innovations earlier than others. This led to a con-
siderable growth in warehouse space: from 500 m2 in 1989 to 9.600 m2 in 19952. 
Its main activities, next to distribution of goods all over Europe are in the 
handling of customs and information flows surrounding the distribution process. 
Information handling has received increasing attention in the last few years. 
Table 8.1 Some key facts about the case company 
• 
• 
• 
• 
year of foundation: 
number employees 
growth warehouse 
1966 
56 in 
space: 
1995 
500 m2 in 1989, 9,600 m2 in 
main activities: distribution, customs and information 
1995 
handling 
Source: interviews and company brochure. 
Section 8.3.2 will describe and than analyse the path dependence of the develop-
ments of the EDC in the case company. Hence the inside-out elements which play 
a role in the development of the company's EDC will be defined there. Section 
8.3.3 will mainly be descriptive and show what reconfigurations of the value chain 
Company brochure. 
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the firm has gone through and how these have lead to a sustainable competi t ive 
advantage. Section 8.3.4 looks into some relationships wi th clients into more detail 
and it is this discussion that lies the foundation for the outside-in analysis in 
section 8.3.5. 
8.3.2 Ins ide-out : the h i s tory of the case f i rm as a p a t h d e p e n d e n t process ; 
attr ibute-table 
Table 8.2 briefly summarizes the history of the case company, looking specifically 
at the activities performed by it. This table illustrates the gradual deve lopment 
towards a European Distribution Centre. 
Table 8.2 History of the case company 
1966 
1973 
-1980 
1982 
1985 
1988 
1989 
1992 
1993 
1995 
foundation: activities are clearing goods, storing them and arrange 
further transport (forwarding) 
the company also becomes a ship broker 
continued growth and expansion in the direction of forwarding towards 
total logistics (e.g. including airfreight) 
start-up of software-department: Client 1 becomes a client 
repacking becomes an activity 
in the years after 1985 distribution is added to the value chain and a 
start is made with the creation of a network of agents 
around this year the company begins with final assembly activities 
(value added logistics) 
the firm gets an entrepot E license 
Client 2 as a client, leading to a considerable expansion in the number of 
activities a.o. with quality control. Client 2 employees are located at the 
firm. Consolidation of freight takes place in the Far East. Information 
flows get more emphasis: on-line connections come into being and 
billing is done by the company as well. 
next to production activities the firm increasingly becomes an advisor 
for its clients 
Client 3 starts working through the entrepot E. The case company limits 
its activities for Client 3 to information flows and custom-activities; 
software for this is developed jointly, 
extension of the global network 
Client 1 opens a factory inside the European Union. The case company 
increases its information processing for Client 1. 
the company arranges the transfer to the new GATT rules for its clients 
and investigates the opportunities these rules offer: this kind of con-
sultancy services has become normal, 
introduction barcodes in relation with Client 3 
regarding production there are requests for quality management, instal-
lation and reparation of products 
Source: based on interviews. 
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The firm's EDC originates from its activities as a forwarder. Until 1981 the 
company followed a path of growth, basically within these activities of for-
warding and storing. Any extension of activities was closely related to the 
activities that were performed already. From 1982 till 1988, the number of 
activities in the firm's value chain grew also with activities outside the field of 
distribution, viz. with secondary production activities (assembly, repacking etc.). 
These activities pertained to the physical handling of products. 
In the years from 1989 onwards the tendency of adding activities to the value 
chain continued, with the qualification that the focus shifted towards handling the 
information flows around the products. There were two reasons for this. First of 
all the company wanted to limit its production activities as it did not want to be 
responsible for product quality: product liability had to remain with the producer. 
Secondly, the firm found that it had a capability in information processing: it is 
better in dealing with logistic information than its principals and its competitors. 
The software in use is developed in-house and hence it is firm specific. No use is 
made of standard software packages. Accordingly, it extended its activities in 
information processing. 
Two other points are to be mentioned. First of all, the table shows that the growth 
in number of activities is initiated by customers, whether the producer or the 
importer of the products. Secondly, the rapidity of the developments has clearly 
augmented since 1982; the steps towards European unity and the development of 
information technology have contributed to this. 
Following Van den Bosch and Warmerdam's (1995) method of identifying stra-
tegic events in longitudinal studies as starting points of different periods in a 
firm's history, three events can be found in table 8.3, which relate to three 
strategic periods (see table 8.3). The first period was characterized by growth of 
the firm roughly within the same activities with which it started in 1966, viz. 
forwarding. The start-up of a software department in 1982 was the first of a series 
of extensions of the number of activities in the company's value chain, also 
stimulated by a new client, Client 1. The focus remained however on the tangible 
side of distribution: production activities were added to the value chain. An 
important third event in the firm's history is that it was granted the entrepot E 
license in 1989, which allowed it to perform various activities previously done by 
customs. This license is an important competitive advantage as the case company 
can offer clients faster and cheaper services by making use of this license. This, 
together with a new client which stimulated changes in the case firm, was the 
beginning of the third period, in which the EDC came into being. This period is 
characterised by the shift towards information processing. 
In each of the strategic periods activities were added to the value chain which 
were a prerequisite for competing in the subsequent stage of development. This 
development of the firm towards an EDC, building on previous experiences may 
point to the existence of path dependence: for example the resource of the 
software department begun in the second period proved to be of great value in 
the EDC period because it facilitated the shift towards information processing. In 
the next paragraphs the possibility of path dependence in the development of the 
case company will be analysed further. 
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Table 8.3 Events and strategic periods in the history of the case company 
Event 
2966 
Foundation 
1982 
Software-department 
and Client 1 as a client 
1989 
Entrepot E license and 
Client 2 as a client 
Period 
1966-1981 
Forwarding period: growth in existing activities, mainly 
in forwarding 
1982-1988 
Value added logistics period: growth in the number of 
activities a.o. with secondary production activities 
1989-present 
EDC-period: increasing focus on information processing 
Source: see text. 
Static and dynamic routines 
Table 8.2 provides an illustration of the path dependence in the trajectory of 
development of the case company's EDC (see chapter 4). Different dynamic and 
static routines in this process can be found in table 8.4. The table describes four 
dynamic routines which in combination led to the emergence of the EDC in the 
case firm. For each dynamic routine, the old static routine is given as well as the 
new static routine which replaced it. Some practical examples taken from table 8.2 
are provided as well. The upper part of table 8.4 describes routines which deal 
with the physical handling of products, whereas the lower part deals with 
routines aimed at processing the information flow around these products. 
The first dynamic routine is the reallocation of activities from producer and 
importers to EDCs. The static routine of performing these activities (e.g. assembly, 
repacking) at the producer's plant is replaced by the routine of having these 
activities executed at the EDC. A second dynamic routine is taken from the JIT-
trajectory, viz. the elimination of inventory. Instead of having inventories at 
different places, in EDC's inventories are concentrated at one single place. The 
inventory function is eliminated from the producer's value chain, as well as from 
the national distributors' and wholesalers' value chains. 
The third routine is partly induced by the first one: transfer of activities between 
firms requires enhanced communication between the companies involved. A con-
siderable number of these new linkages has the form of an information technology 
relationship. Much of the communication that previously took place inside 
individual organizations in the distribution system, now is of an interorga-
nizational nature. The fourth and final routine refers to the extension of the 
number of support activities aimed at supporting the capability of the firm to 
process the information flow for clients. Here creation of activities takes place: the 
activities mentioned were not performed before (or only on a very limited scale) 
by producers and importers. 
CASE 2: EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION CENTRES: A CASE IN THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM 207 
Table 8.4 Dynamic and static routines in the emergence of the EDC in the case company 
< 
u 
in 
OH 
z 
o 
< 
o 
2 
1-1 
Dynamic routine: 
Static routine: 
Examples: 
Dynamic routine: 
Static routine: 
Examples: 
Dynamic routine: 
Static routine: 
Examples: 
Dynamic routine: 
Static routine: 
Examples: 
Reallocate activities from producer or importer to EDC 
Perform activity at producer/importer (old) 
Perform activity in EDC (new) 
Assembly, repacking, distribution 
Eliminate inventory 
Stock products in different places (old) 
Stock products centrally (new) 
No inventory at producers, no national distributors, no 
wholesale 
Implement (i.t.-)linkages for interorganizational coordi-
nation 
Communicate internally (old) 
Communicate with other organizations (new) 
— i.t: inventory control, declare goods, receive orders, 
bar codes 
— personal linkages 
— long term contracts 
Create support activities aimed at information pro-
cessing 
Perform support activity (new) 
Tracking & tracing, maintain knowledge on trade and 
tax regulations, software development 
Source: see text. 
In general, the static routines are changed which entails an organizational 
innovation as shifts in activities and linkages take place. The direction in which 
these activities and linkages are reconfigured is determined by dynamic routines. 
These new dynamic routines shape the organizational trajectory of EDCs (see 
section 4.3.1 for the theoretical discussion of routines). 
The proposition on path dependence 
The analysis of routines supports the view of organizational innovation presented 
in chapter 4 as a process of search based on routines. In table 8.5 the attribute 
table on path dependence for the case presented is given. The following entries 
have been made: 
• table 8.4 showed that dynamic routines influenced the form of the organiza-
tional innovation: they directed the search towards certain solutions. Above 
that, speed was influenced in that, as table 8.2 showed, similar organizational 
innovations followed each other very fast. Finally, the repeated application of 
similar routines completely changed the organization of distribution. One look 
at figure 8.3, which largely is consistent with developments in the case firm, 
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shows that the innovation is considerable. Hence, the extent of the innovation 
is influenced by dynamic routines as well; 
• information processing is a capability that influenced the form of the organiza-
tional innovation. This is a capability because the software used is firm specific 
and the firm performs the activity more effectively than its competitors (see 
section 4.5). The case company deliberately specialized in adding information 
based activities to its value chain. Its lead in information technology enabled it 
to implement farreaching innovations, by using information technology as a 
linkage and facilitating the implementation of diverse information related 
activities. Hence this capability positively influenced the extent of the 
innovation; 
• the presence of the software department as a resource, influenced form 
(especially the use of information technology as a linkage) and speed of the 
development of the EDC. It made it possible for the firm to increase its 
information processing activities rapidly. For example, the entrepot E license 
would not yet have been obtained if there had not been a software department. 
Table 8.5 Attribute-table on path dependence 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Dynamic Routines 
Y 
+ 
+ 
Capabilities 
Y 
+ 
Resources 
Y 
+ 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = The independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
8.3.3 Organizational innovations in the case company 
Main reconfigurations of the value chain 
To show the extent of the changes in the firm's value chain, figure 8.4 depicts two 
value chains: the upper one shows the firm around 1980, the lower one shows the 
complete EDC package it can offer in 1995. The services it can deliver with these 
value chains are not used by all its clients. Most of them make use of only some 
of the options the company can offer. The depicted value chains are nonetheless 
representative of the firm's possibilities in the mentioned years. 
The first value chain shows the emphasis on forwarding which characterized the 
company in the beginning of its existence. Whenever after the required marketing, 
a new customer was attracted and goods had been received and declared, further 
transport was arranged, for instance to a wholesaler. The supporting activities 
(procurement, human resource management) were not of great importance com-
pared to the primary process. Noteworthy in relation to the linkages is that orders 
more often than not were one time events. Long-term relationships were few in 
number. Physical control ensured the coordination with customs: a customs officer 
had to be present when foreign cargo was opened. 
CASE 2: EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION C E N T R E S : A CASE IN THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM 2 0 9 
Figure 8.4 Value chains of the case company in 1980 and 1995 
Typical Value Chain Case Company around 1980 
Single order Firm infrastructure 
Human resource management 
Procurement 
Marketing Inbound 
logistics 
Declare 
goods 
Ware-
housing 
Arrange 
transport 
to 
wholesaler 
Customs check in person 
Customs 
Complete EDC-package Case Company in 1995 
(producer as principal) 
Contract (long term} 
Personal 
linkage 
i.t. 
(inventory 
control) 
Firm inf ras t ruc ture 
H u m a n resource m a n a g e m e n t 
Tracking and tracing 
Mainta in k n o w l e d g e on t r a d e a n d tax r egu la t ions 
Software d e v e l o p m e n t 
Marke-
ting 
Inbound 
logistics 
Ware-
housing 
Assembly 
Repacking 
Quality 
control 
Order 
picking 
Declare 
goods + 
pay 
Invoi-
cing 
Arrange 
trans-
port to 
shops 
i.t. 
Customs 
i.t. (order) 
The 1995 value chain is considerably more complex. The most important changes 
are: 
• the firm's activities are extended: not only warehousing is part of the value 
chain, but goods can be processed as well (assembly, repacking, and quality 
control). This can be done even before the goods are declared: the company 
brochure states that the firm is able "to sort, to pick and to pack, to clean, to 
repack, to test and to label your cargo in the warehouse". Billing and transport 
to the retailer can be arranged as well. The company does not run any financial 
risk on the inventory of goods in its warehouses. This risk is borne by the 
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importer. The firm is responsible, however, for the payment of import duties 
and taxes to customs. 
There is of course some logic in which activities are added to the value chain. 
When warehousing is offered, order picking logically follows and the step 
towards invoicing is not so big, as these activities inevitably follow each other. 
It is relatively easy to coordinate these activities as a group, so that placing 
them in one company is efficient. 
• Support activities have increased in significance. Software-development for 
example enables the company to develop specific applications for every client; 
tracking and tracing makes it possible to tell every customer where his 
transport is at any moment. Maintaining knowledge on trade and tax regula-
tions is an important specialisation of the company, which has developed in the 
course of time. This activity allows it to advise clients as to the way they can 
benefit from new treaties (as for example the new GATT (WTO)) and how they 
should deliver their products to minimize the amount of import duties payable. 
These activities have a high information content and do not pertain to the 
physical handling of goods. In this regard, the company brochure states that the 
computer systems can provide the customer instantly with input for: "e.g. 
reviewing your (the customer's, APdM) stock, reviewing your sales, reviewing 
your duties payable, making statistics, debtors records control, invoicing, 
preparing forecasts, etc.". Finally, human resource management has increased 
in importance. In order to satisfy the wishes of clients, personnel sometimes has 
to be educated and trained e.g. in quality control. 
• As to the linkages, the first thing to be noticed is the use of information 
technology. This is specifically interesting in relation to customs, as no physical 
control by customs officers has to take place. The entrepot E license allows the 
firm to clear goods itself and inform customs through the information system. 
An important cost advantage can be obtained: import duties do not have to be 
paid until the month after goods have been taken out of the warehouse, 
whereas formerly duties were due as soon as goods entered the warehouse. 
Moreover, because goods can be assembled etc. before they are declared, an 
important gain in time can be obtained as well. Other interesting linkages are 
the long-term contracts which replace single orders and the personal linkage, 
which refers to the possibility of locating the principal's personnel at the case 
company in their own office. This co-located personnel can review processes or 
perform additional activities (like checking returned goods). These last two 
linkages show that the reallocation of activities towards the EDC entails a 
further intertwining of the organizations involved. 
The case company is able to perform any activity for an importer which lies 
between procurement and sales but there is no standard way of operating. Every 
client has its wishes and picks those activities from the firm's value chain which 
it wants. Hence, the case company can make customized value chains for each of 
its customers (three examples will be given in section 8.3.4). In the majority of 
cases transport is arranged for customers, but not done by the case company. The 
availability of all kinds of transport in the Rotterdam port guarantees that the case 
company will always be able to find a transporter, whether a haulier, shipowner 
or other transporter. 
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Table 8.6 summarizes these changes, distinguishing between inter- and intra-
organizational innovations. 
Table 8.6 Organizational innovations at the case company 
Inlerorgan iza tional 
Activities: 
• reallocation of secondary production activities to the case firm 
• integration of inventory in the case firm 
Linkages: 
• long-term contracts 
• information technology 
• personal linkage 
• entrepot E license (i.t.) 
Intra-organizational 
Activities: 
• reallocation: goods can be processed before customs clearance 
• creation of support activities: extension of information related activities 
Source: see text. 
Competitive advantages of the EDC in the case company 
The company has witnessed a considerable growth in the last years. This can best 
be seen in the growth of the size of warehouse space. The area augmented from 
500 m2 1989 to 9.600 m2 in 1995. The main competitive advantages of the EDC 
system are connected to (1) lower cost, (2) speed and (3) flexibility. 
1. Lower cost. The elimination of links as distributors and wholesalers can lower 
the cost of distribution considerably as the margins calculated by them do no 
longer add to the costs. In the case of the firm studied, to this cost saving is 
added the postponement of payment and lowering of import duties made 
possible by the entrepot E system. As the cost connected to maintaining the 
entrepot E system and the knowledge on trade and tax regulations can be 
spread out over the various clients, the case company can offer its clients 
lower costs compared to the situation in which clients would try to perform 
these activities themselves. On the other hand transport from the EDC to the 
final destination is more expensive, as the relatively expensive fine-grained 
distribution has to take place over longer distances. The company's location 
at the Distripark is also relatively expensive, certainly compared to competi-
tors outside the port of Rotterdam. In short, the cost position of the firm vis-a-
vis its competitors is not that distinctive. Above lower costs, the next two 
elements of speed and flexibility are also important in attracting and keeping 
customers. 
2. Speed. Because of the fact that the entrepot E license allows the firm to process 
and transport goods before they are declared, an important gain of time can 
be obtained. Moreover, the abolishment of links in the distribution chain 
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speeds up the process as well. Especially in those market segments where 
fashion plays a role, the reduction of delivery times that can be obtained 
contributes substantially to the company's competitive advantage. It has a 
number of clients in this fashion segment, two of which (dealing in sports 
equipment) will be discussed in the next section. The company can deliver 
products within a day in the Benelux-countries, within two days in the 
European Union and Scandinavia, and within three days in Eastern Europe. 
3. Flexibility. Finally, the capability to customize its activities for specific clients 
is an important competitive advantage. This capability is rooted a.o. in the 
knowledge of software development and of trade and tax regulations. The 
repertoire of secondary production activities also simplifies this customization. 
In the demanding and changeable market of distribution, this is an essential 
advantage. 
The advantages of an EDC are evident. It can however be doubted whether these 
advantages are sustainable. The cases in the next section will show that the case 
company has lost one big client (Client 2) and performs a smaller amount of 
activities than before for another client (Client 3). Even more important is the fact 
that the developments in the distribution sector have an unprecedented pace. The 
rapidity by which innovations which first distinguished firms from one another, 
become generally accepted and even a prerequisite for survival, is astounding. 
One of the company people said with regard to value added logistics (adding 
secondary production activities to the value chain): "Value added logistics has 
become a precondition to be able to compete at all. Above that you have to take 
care of information flows as well in order to differentiate from your competitors, 
and even that is getting normal". The sustainability of competitive advantages 
seems therefore to be limited. Whereas the requirements for EDCs are getting 
higher and hence the threat of new entrants diminishes, the rivalry among 
incumbents is still fierce. Subject to these qualifications table 8.7 relates the 
characteristics of sustainability defined in chapter 1 to the current case. 
The imitability of the case company's way of working is relatively low for the 
sector. First of all because the benefits (lower cost, higher speed) of the entrepot 
E license cannot be reaped by other firms. The unique historical condition is in 
this case the law, which forbids companies not having such a license to implement 
the organizational innovation of transporting and processing goods before they 
are cleared by customs. Less than ten of the firm's competitors in The Netherlands 
possess such a license. As Dutch customs is advanced in implementing the 
possibility of awarding the entrepot E, the case firm also has an advantage over 
foreign competitors. The low number of licensees is caused by the fact that the 
organizational and financial requirements for the license are high, because the 
organization receiving it is responsible for the payment of taxes and duties. Above 
that the information management of the firm must meet strict standards. The 
license is a barrier to competition especially vis-a-vis incumbent competitors. 
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Table 8.7 The sustainability of the case company's EDC 
Characteristics of sustainability 
Imitability 
• unique historical conditions 
• causal ambiguity 
• social complexity 
Substitutability 
Tradeability 
• geographical immobility 
• systemic interdependencies 
Lock-in of imitators 
• set up cost and organizational disrup-
tion 
• feasibility of piecemeal change 
Application to the case 
• entrepot E license 
• learning 
• many shifts in linkages and activities 
• lowered by license 
• high, for firms outside big ports 
• high, important implications for 
producer/importer; port cluster 
• high: a.o. close national distribu-
tors / wholesalers 
• limited, high demands 
Source: the attributes of sustainability can be found in table 1.4. 
Another historical condition lies in the software department built up in the course 
of the years. Many competitors offer standard software packages to clients, which 
are not so flexible. The case company on the other hand is able to deliver custom 
made packages, because of the choice it made in 1982 to take care of software 
itself. As described in section 8.2.5 this is a more sustainable strategy, as unique 
systems are harder to imitate than non-specific systems. 
Causal ambiguity is hard to identify. The flexibility of the case firm and the 
accumulated knowledge on how to deal with changes in regulations, seem to be 
grounded in know how that will not be easy to copy. Clearer is the issue of social 
complexity: the number of shifts of activities and linkages is considerable and the 
ways of cooperating between organizations have become more complicated. 
Various coordination mechanisms are required to ensure the smooth performance 
of activities. The organizations involved have become increasingly intertwined. 
This complexity is a barrier to imitation, especially for possible new entrants. 
Because of the entrepot E license part of the organizational innovation cannot be 
substituted, as will be clear from the discussion above. Other ways of organizing 
the distribution process more efficiently have not yet come up. 
The geographical immobility of the EDC system is high insofar that the EDC 
system as it has materialized in the current case is dependent on the presence of 
a large flow of containers and a variety of transport companies in its vicinity. This 
condition is satisfied in the Rotterdam Port. Any firm not located in the presence 
of such a main port where different distribution activities are concentrated, will 
be at a disadvantage when trying to start up an EDC. The presence of the port 
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cluster is of course also a systemic interdependence . Another systemic inter-
dependency lies in the fact that for the real benefits of European distribution to 
arise, it is necessary to involve the entire distribution chain. 
Pertaining to lock-in the disruption EDCs cause can be considerable, certainly 
along the distribution chain, as wholesalers and national distributors have to be 
closed. For individual companies similar to the one studied here, it will not be 
easy to start operating as an EDC overnight, especially because they will lack the 
necessary capabilities. 
If a competitor would like to start an EDC it cannot do so by means of a process 
of incremental change. In order to compete in European distribution it will have 
to offer the complete package of activities as depicted in figure 8.4. The discussion 
of the speed of diffusion of novelties already showed that such a package has 
become a precondition to compete in the European distribution sector. The 
gradual trajectory the case firm followed, may therefore perhaps not be repeated 
by its followers as the demands on firms offering European distribution have 
become very high. The investments made by the company in warehouses and 
knowledge act as a barrier to entry for new competitors, but do not limit the 
competition among incumbents. 
Concluding the discussion on sustainability, the threat of new entrants has 
decreased with the evolution of European distribution towards more complicated 
forms. Next, for firms removed from major transport clusters implementation of 
European distribution will be a more difficult task. Regarding the current 
competition, the company's entrepot E license distinguishes it from competitors 
in a rather durable way. However, the high speed of diffusion of innovations 
makes that the sustainability of any competitive advantage will be limited. The 
case company clearly finds itself in a hypercompetitive environment that is 
characterized by fleeting competitive advantages (Volberda, 1996). Managers of 
the firm recognize this volatile characteristic: one of them stated: "At this moment 
it cannot be predicted what the market needs will be". The sustainability of 
competitive advantages in this sector is always limited. Having a competitive 
advantage for a year is already a long time. 
8.3.4 The relation with three important clients 
Below three cases will be described to show how out of the general menu of EDC-
options offered by the case company, different firms pick what they need in order 
to ensure a European distribution tailored to their specific desires. The first case 
concerns the distribution of a chemical used in the food industry; the two other 
cases are on sports equipment, a sector in which The Netherlands is well 
represented as far as European distribution is concerned (Nederland Distributie-
land, 1993). 
The next section will show that one of the case company's clients (Client 1) continues to 
make use of the company's EDC, despite the fact that it is now situated in the European 
market itself. The reason for this is exactly that at its current site there is no well-developed 
transport cluster. 
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Client 1 
In 1982 Client 1, a producer of a chemical used in the food industry, was the first 
client interested in the possibilities the case firm's information system offered. 
This interest triggered the case company to continue down the path of informa-
tion processing for clients. 
The main activity Client 1 contracted out to the case company is distribution. As 
of 1982 Client 1 transported containers with its product from the United States 
and Japan. The case company unloaded these, cleared them with customs and 
distributed them. Some years ago a European company started producing the 
same product at a higher cost than Client 1. An anti-dumping measure was 
enforced against Client 1 with which a levy was imposed of 52 dollar per kilo of 
the product. As a consequence Client l 's sales dropped substantially. In a reaction 
to this situation, Client 1 opened a plant inside the European Union, but outside 
The Netherlands, in 1993. 
Since Client 1 established itself in the European Union, the case company has 
considerably extended the activities it performs for it. Next to its function as a 
distribution centre, the case company is now the fiscal representative of Client 1 
for the entire European Union. Declaring goods is no longer necessary, because 
in the EU goods can move freely to Holland from any country. But the value 
added taxes (VAT) owed by Client 1 on the deliveries inside the Union are 
handled by the case firm, as are some other administrative tasks. It also registers 
the stock and mutations in it; it receives orders from Client 1 by fax and arranges 
the deliveries. 
The case company registers the exports to Eastern Europe as well. Now that 
Client 1 is established in the EU it can benefit from the treaties the EU has 
concluded with several Eastern European countries. Lower and in some cases 
even zero tariffs for certain goods have been agreed upon between the EU and the 
former Eastern bloc. The interesting point is that it was the case firm which 
initiated these exports to Eastern Europe by pointing Client 1 at the possibilities 
offered by these new customs treaties. The export to Eastern Europe is a growing 
part of the work the case company does for Client 1. 
Finally, some small productive activities as wrapping boxes in plastic and 
covering them are also performed by the case company. Occasionally, it weighs 
the boxes to check whether Client l's filling machines are well tuned. 
The product is a highly concentrated chemical. Because of this characteristic, only 
small amounts of it are ordered. This poses a problem for distribution: small 
boxes have to be delivered at different places all over Europe. Moreover, Client 
1 is actively searching for possibilities to differentiate the product. Next to a pure 
form of it, it is developing different products using this pure form as an 
ingredient. The case firm distributes these as well. The fragmentation of the 
market and the increased differentiation of the product, put high demands on the 
distributor's capabilities. Client 1 has contracted out it's distribution for this 
reason; it was unable to meet these demands itself. Similarly, the fiscal representa-
tion has been brought to the case company, as Client 1 was not able to keep up 
with the speed and complexity of developments in the fiscal field. 
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Figure 8.5 depicts the value chains of the case company and Client 1 before and 
after the product ion in the European Union was started. The most impor tant 
changes are in the pr imary activities: despi te the fact that declaring goods is no 
longer necessary, the number of activities in the value chain has been extended, 
by adding control activities and fiscal representation. The advices the case 
company gives Client 1 are g r o u n d e d in the knowledge of t rade and tax regu-
lations. Changes in linkages are absent; coordinat ion takes place by phone and fax 
as Client 1 is not so advanced in the field of information technology. 
Figure 8.5 The relation with client 1 in 1982 and 1995 depicted in the value system 
1982 
Client 1 Case Company 
Case Company 
LEGEND FIGURE 8.5 
Activities Linkages 
1. firm infrastructure a. contract 
2. production b. fax orders 
3. inventory 
4. marketing and sales 
5. outbound logistics 
6. inbound logistics 
7. declaring goods 
8. warehousing/inventory control 
9. arranging further transport 
10. repacking, weighing etc. 
11. order picking 
12. fiscal representation 
13. maintain knowledge on trade and tax regulations 
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Client 2 
Client 2 became a client in 1989 and the relationship the companies entered into 
would become the most farreaching the case company encountered. In the 
beginning, Client 2 was mainly interested in the possibilities offered for 
consolidating freight and the advantages of the entrepot E license. The former 
could lead to substantial cost savings. Client 2 used to send small shipments of 
sports goods to Europe from a number of factories in Taiwan. The case company 
on the other hand was able to collect these small shipments of the various 
Taiwanese producers and group them into one big shipment, which was cheaper 
to send to Europe. This system worked so well because the case firm had another 
customer (Client 3) who also ordered products from Taiwan, which could be 
transported in the same container as Client 2's. Next to lowering the costs of 
transport, consolidated freight is easier to track than piece-goods and it has a 
lower risk of theft, because containers are transported from door-to-door (Van 
Horssen, 1989). 
In the course of the negotiations with the case company, Client 2 appeared to be 
interested in a better inventory control. In order to meet this wish, the two parties 
jointly developed a purchasing and forecasting programme, which linked Client 
2 with the EDC on-line and enabled it to look into the inventory stored in it. From 
this point other activities were started, like collecting orders, billing (in different 
currencies) etc. Client 2 basically used the complete EDC system as depicted in 
figure 5, with the exception of assembly. 
Another request made by Client 2, was whether it was possible for two of its 
employees to be located at the EDC, whose duty it would be to check returned 
goods. The case company met this wish. In practice this worked out very well, as 
the presence of the employees simplified communication with Client 2. As a result 
the coordination between the firms improved. 
Client 2 clearly was a demanding client, but this has helped the case company to 
create a broader package of services, thereby leading it to become a complete 
European Distribution Centre. "Client 2 states its wishes and you see what you 
can do", one of the managers stated. The fierce competition in the market more 
or less forced the case firm to comply with Client 2's demands. "When you say 
no against such a wish, the competitor will do it", says one of the case company's 
employees. 
As depicted in figure 8.6, Client 2 delivers goods at the EDC before they are sold. 
Client 2 receives the orders and communicates these through the on-line 
connection to the EDC, which takes care of fulfilling the remaining activities. 
One of the reasons for this client to contract out activities to this extent, is that a 
considerable part of its product offering is sensitive to fashion. Speedy delivery 
of fashionable items is a prerequisite to stay ahead of competition and the case 
company can realize this. 
After Client 2 was taken over by an Italian firm, the case firm lost it as a client in 
1995. The break up of the relationship was rather complex, because the firms were 
so much intertwined. Despite this less fortunate ending, Client 2 has played an 
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important part in the case firm's development because it pointed the way to a 
more advanced concept of European distribution. 
Figure 8.6 The relation with Client 2 depicted in the value system 
Client 2 Case Company Shop 
4 5 6 
LEGEND FIGURE 8.6 
Activities 
1. firm infrastructure 
2. outbound logistics 
3. sales 
4. inbound logistics 
5. repacking etc. 
6. order picking 
Linkages 
a. long-term contracts and personal linkage 
b. delivery 
c. information technology 
d. order 
Client 3 
Next to the growth in number of activities realized in the case of Client 2 and 
Client 1, there are also companies for which the case firm's value chain is 
practically hollow. Client 3, just like Client 2 specialized in sports equipment, is 
such a company. Client 3 only uses the case company's entrepot E license; the 
products do not even pass the EDC. Figure 8.7 shows the way the system works 
since 1991. 
Client 3 orders goods from a producer. These are sent to Client 3. There they are 
stored in a separate warehouse for non-declared goods. As soon as goods are 
shipped from this warehouse, this is communicated electronically to the EDC, 
which clears the goods through customs. Since 1995 barcodes are used to dis-
tinguish between the different products. Software for this system has been 
developed jointly by the parties. 
In this system the flow of goods has been completely separated from the 
information flows. The activities performed by the case company's EDC are 
minimal and mainly done by making use of information technology. Except the 
declaration of goods, the supporting activities of software development and 
knowledge of tax and trade regulations play a role. 
The advantage for Client 3 of this way of working is that import duties are not 
to be paid until goods are sent from the warehouse, while no delays in the 
distribution process occur. Without the entrepot E license duties would have been 
owed as soon as the goods had arrived. 
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Figure 8.7 The relation with client 3 depicted in the value system 
LEGEND FIGURE 8.7 
Activities 
1. sales 
2. outbound logistics 
3. declaring goods 
4. software development 
5. maintain knowledge on trade and tax regulations 
6. procurement 
7. inbound logistics 
8. warehousing 
9. order picking 
Linkages 
a. order 
b. delivery 
c. information technology 
d. long-term contract 
e. cooperation 
8.3.5 Outside-in: determinants of the development of the EDC in the case 
company; attribute-table on demand 
Where the Fokker case was mainly picked in order to analyse the role of networks 
in organizational innovation, the current case is mainly directed at analysing the 
role of qualitative changes in demand. The inside-out analysis was given in 
section 8.3.2, the outside-in analysis is given in this section. In chapter 5 it was 
shown that not only demand plays a role, but that many environmental factors 
interfere in the process of organizational innovation as well. The diamond 
framework (Porter, 1990) was suggested as a framework which can be helpful in 
analysing these outside-in determinants. In figure 8.8 the diamond framework 
contains entries for the specific situation presented here. The different determi-
nants will now be discussed, with the emphasis on demand. It will be shown that 
demand conditions are the major driving force behind the development of the 
EDC in the case company. 
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Figure 8.8 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Determinants of Porter's diamond influencing the development of EDC's 
competition 
producers: back to the core 
growth container 
focus on information of 
the case company 
• information technology 
- fashion 
- fragmentation 
• presence of port: 
container and transport 
companies 
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
Treating these three elements individually the following picture emerges: 
• Rivalry. Rivalry between firms offering European distribution is fierce. Entry 
barriers are rather high (see the discussion on sustainability in section 8.3.3), 
because the capabilities needed for European distribution are considerable. Yet, 
competition among incumbents is strong. This competition makes companies 
more amenable to accept changes in their value chain, as became clear in the 
Client 2 case where a manager of the case company stated that saying no to a 
client was as good as impossible, as there would always be a competitor ready 
to oblige the client. 
• Strategies. Firm strategy should be looked at from two sides in this case. First 
of all there are the strategies of the case company's clients, secondly there is the 
strategy of the company itself (an inside-out aspect in the diamond model; see 
Van den Bosch and Warmerdam, 1995). In the strategies of clients (and certainly 
the producers among them) the element of back-to-the-core business is relevant. 
Some firms tend to concentrate on their core activities. The augmenting 
complexity of distribution causes them to contract this out, in order to be able 
to pay full attention to their core. This means a growth of demand for 
distribution services. 
The second aspect is the case company's strategy to focus on information 
flows, which has led to the creation of predominantly support activities 
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(maintain knowledge on trade and tax regulations, software development, 
tracking and tracing) in the value chain. The firm studied was an early 
innovator in seeing the possibilities of information technology: already in 1982 
the software department was set up (see table 8.2). By means of this strategy 
the firm attempts to escape rivalry. Other companies at the three Distriparks, 
which are developed in Rotterdam, have tried to attain the same goal by 
implementing niche-strategies for example by stressing production activities, or 
specializing in certain goods as chemicals, glass or frozen products. The strategy 
of the case firm is depicted in the lower part of the determinant of firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry to show that this is an inside-out factor (Van den 
Bosch and Warmerdam, 1995). 
• Structure. The role of structure has been discussed in section 8.3.2: the way the 
EDC emerged as a structure by application of a number of dynamic routines 
was described there. Another important organizational innovation was the 
container (Van Someren, 1991). The standardization of the transport unit makes 
it possible to transport a small amount of cargo as if it were bulk, by combining 
several small loads into one big container. The continued growth of container 
transport created a demand for several new activities, as stuffing, stripping and 
cleaning containers. 
Demand 
The quantitative development of demand has been mentioned above when the 
strategy of producers was discussed. The growth and expected further growth of 
container transport is an impetus for the case firm to implement organizational 
innovations. Table 8.2 showed that it was the client's demand which formed the 
basis for the extension of activities in the case company's value chain. The reason 
for this demand lies in qualitative market developments. Based on the discussion 
so far these can be summarized as fashion, speed and fragmentation. 
• Fashion. It is attractive to customize fashionable products as close to the final 
consumer as possible, in order to be able to adapt to the client's wishes in the 
latest possible phase. The reallocation of secondary production activities aims 
exactly at doing this. Placing activities closer to the market allows the market 
to steer the process of customization. As the clients of the case firm contract out 
these production activities, this reallocation illustrates the proposition on 
demand: a market-like linkage replaces an organization-like linkage. 
• Speed. As fashion becomes more important, the pressure on firms to deliver 
their products fast increases as well. The products of Client 2 and Client 3 
undergo this pressure: many sportswear items are fashionable. Speedy delivery 
is ensured by the case company by means of a number of organizational inno-
vations: 
— First transport than sales. Goods are transported to Europe first and sold next 
instead of the other way around (see figure 8.3). In this way delivery times 
can be shortened: delivery can take place directly from a European ware-
house. The time-consuming transport from other continents to Europe has 
been done previously. 
— The elimination of links in the distribution chain. Figure 8.3 also shows that 
time-consuming links (wholesale etc.) are deleted from the distribution chain. 
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— The processing and transport of goods before declaring them is a time saving 
organizational innovation as well (figure 8.6). Information technology (in-
cluding fax, EDI and telephone) speeds up the distribution process as well, 
as orders can be communicated quickly through the value system. 
• Fragmentation. Fragmentation refers to the phenomenon that small quantities 
of products have to be distributed to different places. Fragmentation compli-
cates the distribution process considerably. It is hardly economically feasible to 
transport these small amounts of products and planning of such transports is 
cumbersome: the number of points at which goods have to be delivered draws 
heavily on the organizational capability of the firm organizing the transport. 
Especially Client l's product moves on a fragmented market: small amounts are 
ordered by a considerable number of clients. 
The case company deals with the fragmentation of markets by contracting out 
transport to other specialized firms. The presence of a network of transport firms 
in its environment enables it to find transport for every route needed: fragmenta-
tion is dealt with by offering the products to a specialized trucking company, 
which assembles cargo for a certain destination. It would be impossible for the 
company to cover all the transport routes itself. 
Individualization of demand is another example of fragmentation. The indivi-
dualization of demand is reflected in a proliferation of product offerings which 
contributes to a further complexity of the distribution process. In the past it 
occurred regularly that products ended up in the wrong distribution centre. As 
a wider range of product offerings came into being, the mistakes augmented. By 
concentrating products in only one warehouse this problem is avoided. Hence 
European distribution is a reaction to this element of market fragmentation as 
well. 
The changes in the value system initiated by demand, require more interfirm 
control and coordination activities than the old situation, because the firm which 
contracts out still wants to control its partner. Hence the transfer of activities leads 
to new organizational innovations in the linkages, in this case the main ones being 
long-term contracts and co-location of staff (a personal linkage). 
Analysing this case, the proposition on the role of demand in organizational 
innovation is illustrated several times. A number of organization-like linkages are 
replaced by market-like linkages: 
• contracting out of distribution by producers or importers replaces an organiza-
tion-like linkage by a market-like linkage: first distribution was an activity 
inside the firm, now the activity is governed by means of a contract. 
• the case company itself contracts out transport. The emphasis on transport 
declines (see also the discussion around figure 8.2, where the logistic centre 
contracts out transport), because the fragmentation of markets makes it 
impossible for the firm to serve all transport routes itself. 
• secondary production activities are brought closer to the market, thus ensuring 
that consumer wishes can be reacted to quickly. For similar reasons different 
links in the entire chain of distribution are eliminated (also see figure 8.3). 
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There is an important interference between demand and strategy: producers and 
importers often do not have the capabilities required to arrange distribution 
because of the complexity of distribution resulting from the volatility of demand 
in the sectors discussed. Above that, the volatility of demand requires producers 
to invest more in their manufacturing capabilities, which may prevent them form 
keeping up with recent developments in the distribution sphere. Hence, the back 
to the core strategy and demand conditions are related: changes in demand direct 
a firm's attention to its manufacturing capability and draw heavily on their 
distribution capabilities, leading them to contract out the latter. This is one of the 
reasons why the case company has been able to expand its activities for Client 1. 
The findings in relation to the proposition on demand are summarized in attri-
bute-table 8.8: 
• as to fundamental changes in demand, the fast growth in demand for European 
distribution has speeded up the process of organizational innovation. No 
influence on the form of the innovation was found; 
• both differentiation and fragmentation have influenced the form of the 
organizational innovations: both have led to an increased use of market-like 
linkages over organization-like linkages, thus confirming the proposition. This 
use of market-like linkages is among others evident in the contracting-out of 
distribution to the case company; 
• in the discussion above, the influence of differentiation (speed and fashion) on 
the extent of the innovation is evident (see also table 8.9 further below): most 
shifts in activities and linkages are related to differentiation. Likewise, 
fragmentation has led to important innovations. Client 1 for example contracted 
its transport out to the case company and this company in its turn contracted 
it out to smaller transport firms. The extent of the innovation also becomes clear 
in figure 8.3. 
Table 8,8 Attribute-table on demand in the case 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Fundamental 
N 
+ 
Cyclical Differentiation 
Y 
+ 
Fragmentation 
Y 
+ 
N = No, the independent variable does not influence the dependent variable 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = The independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
Related and supporting industries 
The network of firms in the Rotterdam transport cluster is of key importance to 
the success of the case company. Without the presence of diverse, specialized 
transport companies it would not be able to arrange transport to any destination 
in Europe as fast and as cheap as now. Because these transport companies 
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specialize in certain routes and destinations, the case firm is able to tackle the 
observed fragmentation of markets by contracting out its transports. If this 
network was not available it would have had to provide transport itself, which 
would mean higher costs and lower speed. Now, these transport companies are 
hired when they are needed. As the number of possible destinations is extremely 
large, further transport is arranged on an ad hoc basis. If necessary, the case 
company can make use of special delivery services. Hence, the relation with the 
transport companies is mainly a short-term one (in terms of chapter 5). 
The presence of a large and regular flow of containers is of course another factor 
allowing this kind of specialized service companies to exist. It is not a coincidence 
that the three Distriparks in the port of Rotterdam are located directly behind 
container terminals. 
Factor conditions 
An important factor condition, next to the excellent geographical location of 
Rotterdam, is the advanced telecommunication infrastructure. This stimulates the 
use of information technology as a linkage. 
The Distripark at which the firm is established is another example of a factor 
condition. It lies directly behind container terminals and is well connected to the 
rest of the port infrastructure. The cost of the Distripark as a site is rather high 
compared to sites in other ports and in-land terminals (terminals further from 
sea). This means that in order to cover costs the case firm has to search for higher 
value added activities. 
Government 
Government was one of the key actors in bringing about the EDC in the form it 
has taken at the presented case. First of all the free movement of goods in the 
European Union (1992) lifted a number of institutional barriers for EDCs, like 
control at the borders. 
The form of the value chain is also partly determined by developments at the 
governmental level. Firstly, customs in Holland has gone quite far in transferring 
activities to companies when the entrepot E was implemented (Kuipers and Van 
Mourik, 1993). Several organizational innovations were the consequence of this: 
the decoupling of information from good flows (Client 3); processing and 
transporting goods before they are declared (Client 2); a new i.t.-linkage with 
customs. Secondly, government is responsible for the changes in trade and tax 
regulations, which become increasingly complex and are subject to considerable 
dynamism. The last GATT-round and the collapse of the Eastern bloc created an 
array of new possibilities for companies. These developments make that the case 
company is increasingly turning towards a consultancy role as specialist know-
ledge is required to be able to figure out all the consequences of these changes. 
The activity of maintaining knowledge on tax and trade regulations is a reflection 
of this. The increasing complexity of trade and tax regulations is also a reason for 
companies to contract out their distribution activities, as they lack the capability 
or resources to keep up with developments in this field themselves. 
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As was pointed out in the discussion on the d i amond framework in chapter 5, the 
role of government may at times be more direct in br inging about innovations 
(Van den Bosch and De Man, 1994). The emergence of EDC's in The Nether lands 
is an example of this: governmental policy was one of the de terminants shaping 
the form of the value chain. 
8.3.6 C o n c l u s i o n o n the e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e t e r m i n a n t s of the case c o m -
pany's EDC 
In table 8.9 the different environmental determinants of the EDC are related to the 
various reconfigurations of the va lue chain. Demand conditions (especially 
qualitative aspects of demand) have played the most impor tant role in the 
emergence of European distribution as an organizational concept. 
Table 8.9 Organizational innovations in the case company and the distribution chain related 
to elements of the diamond 
Demand 
Fashion 
• reallocation of secondary production activities, leading to enhanced need for 
communication: personal linkage and long term contracts 
Speed 
• reallocation: 
— first transport to Europe than sales 
— some activities can be performed before goods are declared (also related to 
government) 
— delete links in distribution chain (wholesale etc.) 
• information technology as a linkage (also related to factor conditions) 
Fragmentation 
• contract out transport (also related to related and supporting industries) 
• concentrate inventory in one European warehouse 
Strategy 
• creation of support activities: tracking and tracing, software development, 
maintain knowledge on trade and tax regulations (also induced by government) 
• back to the core strategy of producers and importers 
Rivalry 
• forces the company to expand the value chain 
Government 
• enabling factor and influenced reallocation (see under speed above) 
Source: see text. 
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More specifically related to the hypothesis, the increased use of market-like over 
organization-like linkages has been clearly established in the sense that intra-
organizational linkages have been replaced by interorganizational linkages, which 
contain more market-like features. For example, secondary production activities 
are no longer performed by the production firms but are contracted out to the 
EDC. In this way the influence of demand on the production process has grown. 
Demand was however not the only factor of influence. The innovative process can 
best be described as a complex process in which many different (occasionally even 
interacting) factors act to shape and mould a new organizational form. 
8.4 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter the organizational innovation of the European Distribution Centre 
has been analysed by making use of the tools developed in the previous chapters. 
The case presented but also the general discussion in section 8.2 illustrate some 
of the propositions from chapters 4 and 5. The general conclusions with regard 
to the propositions are: 
• there is path dependence in the way the EDC emerged in the case company. 
Dynamic routines, capabilities and resources influenced several attributes of 
organizational innovation. Most clear were the first ones: specific dynamic 
routines were found which described the development of EDC's as an 
organizational form. 
• especially qualitative demand changes had an impact on the form and extent 
of organizational innovation. Specific changes in linkages and activities were 
connected to qualitative changes in demand. Speed could be related to 
fundamental quantitative changes. 
Figure 8.9 summarizes the case in the analytical schema developed in the 
introduction. Two of the main determinants in the business environment are 
demand and government. On the inside-out side of the schema, the current 
capabilities and strategy are taken as an input by management in their decision 
to reconfigure the value chain. These reconfigurations lead to an EDC. The 
European Distribution Centre is a combination of inter- and intra-organizational 
innovations. Flexibility in dealing with clients and a high speed of delivering 
products anywhere in Europe are the major competitive advantages connected to 
these innovations. The diffusion of novel combinations in the organization of 
distribution is however quite rapid. Hence, competitive advantages are relatively 
shortlived. 
EDCs have some major effects on the environment: they not only increase 
customer satisfaction, they have quite some implications for clients/principals as 
well. Especially the interorganizational changes (e.g. transfer of activities) are 
referred to here. Even more importantly, EDCs are truly innovatory in that they 
change the rules of the game in the distribution sector: like elsewhere in the 
distribution sector many traditional relations are replaced (De Jong and Vethman, 
1990). Therefore EDCs require a reaction from competitors (Baden-Fuller (1994) 
identified this as one of the main characteristics of strategic innovations). 
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Figure 8.9 The EDC of the case company in the analytical schema 
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For the case company internally the gradual development of its EDC was 
connected to changes in its organizational structure and confirmed its strategy of 
focussing on the information component of distribution. The good results obtained 
with that strategy strengthened its dynamic routine of creating support activities 
aimed at information processing. 
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Exhibit I: List of persons interviewed 
This chapter is largely based on interviews with members of the case company staff, who 
are responsible for its European Distribution Centre. Further information was obtained 
from representatives of the Rotterdam Port Authority, who were involved in the 
development of Distriparks. The interviews took place in the period June 1994-January 
1995. 
In the company interviews were held with: 
• the manager of the distribution center 
• the adjunct manager of the distribution center 
• the head of customs affairs 
In the Rotterdam Port Authority interviews were held with: 
• T.C. Dekker 
• P.J. Jongman 
• R. Saitua 
all three of them working in the department of social and economic development of the 
directorate of port innovation. 
9 
Organizing for competitiveness: 
summary, conclusions and implications 
9.1 Summary 
The research question of this thesis is how new organizational forms come into 
being. Put differently: 
What are the determinants of organizational innovation? 
Research into organizational forms has mainly been directed at the efficiency or 
effectivity of existing forms and not at the way new forms are generated. Insight 
in the process of development of new forms, can eventually contribute to an 
increased managerial control over organizational innovation. However, because 
of the limited amount of work done in this field, quite some fundamental research 
is required before our understanding of organizational innovation has improved 
so much that managerial guidelines can be developed. As a result, the research 
reported on here is of a theory-building nature. 
Figure 9.1 An analytical schema of organizational innovation 
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To answer the main research question, the analytical schema depicted in figure 
9.1 is used. The determinants of organizational innovation can be found inside 
and outside the firm. They will lead management to implement an organizational 
innovation which brings a competitive advantage with it. In the course of time, 
diffusion of the form can take place to the competitors. The different feedback 
loops show how the innovation can change the firm internally (e.g. because of 
reorganization or shifting power balances) as well as its environment (e.g. by 
changing the network or creating new customer demands). Diffusion of organi-
zational forms changes the environment in which the firm operates. For example: 
not only will competitors more closely resemble the innovating firm, but if the 
organizational innovation is of an interorganizational nature, new networks may 
come into being as well. 
Point of departure of this study is that new organizational forms can be viewed 
as innovations. For as far as new organizational forms have been studied, this has 
normally been done by making use of organization theory. Here, it was assumed 
that by applying innovation theory to organizational issues, new insights in the 
development of new organizational forms can be obtained. This choice for inno-
vation theory also serves as a guide in narrowing down the number of determi-
nants of organizational innovation to be looked at. Naturally, not all conceivable 
factors which have an impact on innovation can be studied; some choices have 
been made based on innovation theory. The inside-out approach will use the con-
cept of routines; the outside-in approach will focus on two well-known deter-
minants of innovation: networks and demand. 
The relevance of organizational innovation for the competitive process is shown 
in chapter 1. New organizational forms can contribute to firm competitiveness in 
several ways and for a long period of time. Theoretical and empirical evidence 
shows that the diffusion of organizational innovations is a relatively slow process, 
even when the profitability of the new organizational form is clear. Organizational 
innovations may also contribute to country competitiveness. Theory (and some 
empirical research) has found that organizational forms differ per country and 
that forms diffuse slower across countries than among firms. Accordingly the 
conclusion is that organizational innovations have an important impact on com-
petitiveness. But the question what determinants cause organizational innovations 
to emerge, has not yet been answered. 
A review of literature on organizational innovation showed that no clear defi-
nition and analytical tool have been developed, which can help in identifying 
organizational innovations. In this thesis it is proposed that the value chain can 
be helpful in defining organizational innovation and in providing a way of de-
scribing and analysing new organizational forms. From a value chain perspective, 
organizational innovations are characterized by changes in activities and linkages 
in the value system, which contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage. As 
organizational innovations can also be of an interorganizational nature (e.g. 
networks, alliances), the emphasis in this definition lies on the value system, 
instead of only the value chain: the organization of the value system can be 
renewed as well. It is especially this element of interorganizational innovations 
which has been insufficiently addressed in existing theories. Because of the 
increasing use of interorganizational coordination mechanisms, this omission 
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increasingly limits the applicability of existing theories. The reference to 
competitive advantage is necessary, because innovations are (by definition) 
successful new things and have an impact on the competitive process. By using 
the concept of the value chain, a way to describe and analyse organizational 
innovations is provided as well. 
Next to form, speed and extent are also relevant attributes of organizational 
innovations. With speed is meant the velocity with which the form is imple-
mented. Extent refers to the number and size of the shifts in the value chain. 
These attributes of organizational innovation are used in the empirical research 
and will be related to attributes of independent variables. Using attributes to 
operationalize variables eases the process of tracing these variables in cases. 
Theories on organizational innovation have not consistently incorporated all four 
of the following elements required for analysing the emergence of organizational 
innovations: 
• an outside-in perspective: organizational innovation is context dependent: the 
business environment influences organizational innovation; 
• an inside-out perspective: organizational innovation is historically contingent: 
the characteristics a firm has acquired in the course of its existence have an 
impact on the way a firm changes; 
• pluriformity of organizational forms: both intra- and interorganizational 
innovations should be incorporated in the theory; 
• a focus on competitive advantage: as organizational innovations can contribute 
to competitiveness in many ways, a broad definition of company goals should 
be chosen. 
In order to understand the process of organizational innovation, these four 
elements must be combined in one framework, as in figure 9.1. 
The definition of organizational innovation incorporates intra- and inter-
organizational innovations, as well as a competitive advantage perspective. Only 
the inside-out and outside-in perspective remain to be analysed. As to the former, 
the evolutionary and resource-based view of the firm are good starting points, 
because they provide concepts to analyse firm specific circumstances. Specifically 
the concept of path dependence may illuminate the inside-out perspective. Path 
dependence has three attributes: 
• dynamic routines: dynamic routines are routines which operate to modify firm 
characteristics, whereas static routines replicate previously performed tasks; 
• capabilities: firm specific knowledge and resources, competences etc.; 
• resources: non-firm specific goods, materials as well as labour. 
Based on these three attributes a proposition is developed that organizational 
innovation is path dependent: the organizational characteristics (in terms of 
dynamic routines, capabilities, resources) at time t influence the organizational 
form at t+1. 
In technological innovation theory, path dependence is found in the existence of 
trajectories and paradigms within which innovations develop. Along these tra-
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jectories, existing (ideas about) technologies define the next possible stages of 
technological development. Kogut (1991) and Nelson (1991) suggested that this 
description of technological innovation might also be applicable to organizational 
innovation, but they did not present an analysis of this. This research suggests 
that by studying the role of routines in organizational innovation, trajectories and 
paradigms in organizational innovation can indeed be found. Connecting the 
difference between innovations and trajectories to the distinction between static 
and dynamic routines, allows us to trace innovations and trajectories in practice. 
On the broadest level, paradigms represent general ways of thinking about 
organizing. Three organizational paradigms have been distinguished: the craft 
paradigm (small companies producing customized products), the unitary 
paradigm (big companies working in mass production, with clear functional 
distinctions inside the firm) and the networked paradigm (firm boundaries 
become fuzzy, while inside companies functional boundaries are crossed). Within 
each of these paradigms various trajectories can be found along which different 
organizational forms develop. An organizational trajectory is defined by the 
occurrence of similar reconfigurations of the value system (dynamic routines), for 
example repeated elimination of inventory as in the JIT-system (chapter 6) or 
ongoing reallocation of activities from producers to a European Distribution 
Centre (chapter 8). 
Briefly, the inside-out perspective finds that organizational innovations emerge 
from the existing situation in companies in terms of capabilities and resources. 
They are also influenced by the dynamic routines developed inside the company 
for reconfiguring its value chain. These reconfigurations are rarely implemented 
simultaneously, but normally take place over an extended period of rime. The 
trajectory concept describes this. Organizational innovation is therefore best 
described as a continuously developing and historically contingent process. 
The business environment has an impact on this process as well. It is known that 
various aspects of the environment can influence technological innovativeness 
(Porter, 1990a). Two variables in the business environment have been singled out 
for further study, among others based on the fact that these have been defined in 
innovation research: interorganizational relations and demand. Both these factors 
are supposed to enhance technological innovation. Theoretical considerations lead 
to the proposition that there is a possibility that long-term interorganizational 
relationships may limit organizational innovation. This proposition is consistent 
with recent research on the drawbacks of networks (as for instance in Grabher, 
1993a,b). Interesting attributes of long-term relations are: 
• externalities: an innovation has consequences beyond the innovating firm so 
that other firms must be able and willing to cooperate with the implementation 
of an innovation; 
• entrenched routines: it is difficult to break through standard patterns of 
behaviour; 
• independence: if firms are independent it may be harder to cooperate in 
implementing an innovation if one firm is unwilling, because there are no 
means to force that firm to collaborate. 
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Pertaining to demand a choice has been made to study both quantitative and 
qualitative changes. A proposition was developed claiming that changes in 
demand stimulate reconfigurations of the value chain. Based on other studies it 
was also possible to specify this effect in more detail: increased volatility of 
demand may increase the use of market-like linkages in the value chain. 
Demand conditions have been divided in quantitative demand and qualitative 
demand, each having two attributes. Quantitative changes in demand can be: 
• fundamental: a lasting change in the quantity demanded or 
• cyclical: repeated fluctuations in demand. 
Qualitative changes can be: 
• differentiation: for example increased customization or 
• fragmentation: smaller amounts of products must be delivered to dispersed 
geographical areas. 
Table 9.1 gives an overview of the research questions and the relevant variables. 
These variables (organizational innovation, path dependence, long-term relations 
and demand) have been operationalized into various attributes, as described 
above. This way of working simplifies the translation of the theoretical variables 
into the practical findings of the case studies. 
Table 9.1 Research Question and Propositions 
Research Question 
What are the determinants of organizational innovation? 
Relevant attributes of organizational innovation are the form the value chain takes, 
the speed of implementation and the extent (number and size of changes) of the 
organizational innovation. 
Propositions 
The process of organizational innovation is path dependent in that new configu-
rations of activities and linkages build on their precursors. The reason for this lies in 
such firm specific attributes as dynamic routines, capabilities and resources. 
The presence of long-term interorganizational relations limits the process of value 
chain reconfiguration both within and between firms. The reason for this lies in the 
following attributes of these relations: externalities, entrenched routines and 
independence. 
Changes in demand stimulate changes in the value chain. The relevant attributes of 
demand are fundamental and cyclical changes in the quantity of demand, and diffe-
rentiation and fragmentation. 
Source: see the previous chapters. 
By means of a review of existing empirical material supplemented by two new 
case studies, the propositions from table 9.1 are tested. The details of the empirical 
analysis are presented in section 9.2 below. The general picture emerging from 
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this is that on various points the propositions are corroborated, but that some 
influences are more clearly discernable than others. 
In the Fokker Aircraft case it was shown how an organizational innovation in the 
assembly line of the Fokker 100 aircraft, had repercussions for Fokker's network 
of suppliers. The system could only be a complete success if the suppliers 
changed the organization of their production processes as well. For various 
reasons not all suppliers were able or willing to do so. This has limited the speed 
of implementation and the extent to which the new organizational form could be 
developed. Fokker implemented a kind of pull system (called Assembly-to-Order 
or AtO) which contributed to relieving some parts of the crisis Fokker faced, 
caused by the fall in demand for aircraft and Fokker's high production costs. The 
organizational innovation itself was a complicated reconfiguration of activities and 
linkages, both inside Fokker and in the relationship with its suppliers. Various 
consultative structures were devised to coordinate Fokker's production schedules 
with those of its suppliers. The AtO-system led to a cost reduction, while 
maintaining flexibility in specification and delivery time. As such it contributed 
to a competitive advantage. Despite the success of AtO in reaching these goals, 
the depth of the crisis in the European aircraft industry continued to pose a 
problem for Fokker. 
The case of the distribution firm in the Rotterdam port shows how developments 
on the demand side influence the organizational form of the value system of 
distribution, eventually leading to a European Distribution Centre (EDC). In a 
complete EDC structure not only distribution is organized, but secondary pro-
duction activities and information flows are managed as well. Formerly, these 
latter activities were performed by the producers of goods. To achieve this new 
way of working, various new linkages between firms were implemented along the 
chain of distribution. In combination with several reallocations of activities 
between firms, this completely altered the value system of distribution. The aim 
of these reconfigurations of the value system was to better react to changing 
market demand, especially customization, fragmentation and the demand for 
speedy deliveries. This case also emphasizes the path dependence of organi-
zational innovation: a trajectory of development could be described which shows 
how a repeated transfer of activities between firms took place over a period 
spanning more than a decade. 
Several key points of the cases must be highlighted (see table 9.2). Firstly, 
organizational innovations can contribute to a competitive advantage. They can 
lead to cost savings, flexibility, etc. A number of competitive advantages can be 
connected to the implementation of a new organizational form. Secondly, the 
importance of mferorganizational innovations is clearly established. For example 
the innovation implemented inside Fokker, had consequences for its network. 
Organizational innovations were developed to enable the network to cooperate 
with the new system for assembling aircraft. The EDC case in chapter 8 shows 
how the organizational innovation of European distribution led to a complete 
reconfiguration of an entire value system, involving several companies. This also 
corroborates the idea of the emergence of a network paradigm of organization. In 
addition, the use of a value chain perspective to describe new organizational 
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forms proved its value here. The cases showed that with the concepts of activities 
and linkages, changes in organization form can be adequately described. 
Thirdly, the cases show the historical contingence and, fourthly, the context 
dependence of organizational innovation, as well as its trial and error rather than 
planned character. Historical and firm specific circumstances played a major role 
in determining the reconfiguration of the value system in these cases. Some 
organizational routines (e.g. Toyota's consistent elimination of inventory and 
Fokker's lead time reduction) were induced by environmental or internal pressure, 
but they remained in place till long after the initial reason for implementing them 
had lost its relevance (inflation and the collapse of military demand led to 
elimination of inventory in Toyota; the expected high production level in Fokker 
stimulated lead time reduction which was a precursor to AtO). In this way 
however a competitive organization form came into being. It follows that local 
and temporary circumstances can have a long-term impact because of their 
influence on the kinds of routines which develop. Thus the applicability to 
organizational innovation of David's ideas on path dependence is shown: "A path-
dependent sequence of economic changes is one in which important influences 
upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including 
happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces" (David, 
1986, p. 30). Trial and error is characteristic of the process of organizational 
innovation as well, but this does not prevent competitive organizational forms 
from emerging. Instead, this evolutionary nature of organizational innovation can 
lead to effective new organizational designs. The EDC case also shows the 
dynamics of competition: organizational innovations followed each other quickly 
in the course of rime. Each value chain reconfiguration was replaced by another 
one. There does not seem to be an optimal way of organizing that is lasting, 
rather less adequate organization forms are succeeded by superior ones (compare 
with Gould (1988) and the description of the role of innovation in chapter 1), 
which in their turn are temporary. 
Table 9.2 Key results 
• organizational innovations can contribute substantially to competitive advantage 
• interorganizational innovations must be incorporated in the study of new organi-
zational forms as well; a value system perspective is useful 
• historical contingency: 
— the development of organizational forms is path dependent 
— trial and error can lead to competitive new organizational forms 
— no optimal forms emerge only temporarily superior ones 
— local and temporary circumstances can have a long-term impact on the develop-
ment of organizational forms 
• context dependence: 
— demand is a key determinant of organizational innovativeness 
— the presence of long-term interorganizational relations can limit organizational 
innovativeness 
Source: see text. 
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The environment impacted on organizational innovation in various ways as well: 
some factors stimulated organizational innovation others limited it. The analysis 
of the role of demand has shown that superior forms are developed when the 
value chain reconfigurations are in line with the changes in demand. The ability 
to react swiftly to developments on the demand side can be strengthened by 
implementing market-like linkages. Changing demand was the most important 
stimulating determinant of organizational innovation. By being embedded in a 
network however, firms may become constrained in their ability to implement 
organizational innovations independently. The other side of this is of course that 
once an organizational innovation in a network comes about, the imitability of the 
innovation may be low. The time period for which such an innovation can bring 
benefits to the organization may then be long, as the competition may not be able 
to follow suit. 
9.2 Conclusions on the propositions and attribute-tables 
This section will discuss the conclusions on the propositions advanced in chapter 
5 and studied empirically in the chapters 6, 7, and 8. Per proposition conclusions 
will be drawn and questions for further research will be put forth. The approach 
taken is one of theory-building by means of theoretical sampling: cases have been 
chosen on their relevance for extending or replicating emerging theory. For each 
proposition an attribute-table will be presented, which shows which relationships 
between the attributes of dependent and independent variables have been literally 
replicated (Yin, 1989, p. 53) in the cases. This means that the attribute-tables 
presented below only show those relationships which were predicted by theory 
and found in the embedded cases. When appropriate, proposals to extend the 
emergent theory by filling in other boxes of the attribute-table will be put forth. 
These extensions are only proposed when in more than one of the embedded 
cases the relationship between the attributes appeared to be interesting. Hori-
zontally, the attribute-tables show the attributes of the independent variables. 
Vertically, the attributes of the dependent variable (organizational innovation) can 
be found. 
Proposition 1: Path dependence 
The first proposition stated that routines, capabilities and resources present in an 
organization will direct the path of development of the organizational innovation. 
The findings reported below, show that there is path dependence in the develop-
ment of organizational forms: routines, capabilities and resources influence the 
form the organizational innovation takes. Further confirmation of this finding is 
found in the description of the trajectory of the JIT-system in Toyota and the 
trajectory of development of European Distribution. The cases show that the 
search for organizational innovations is local. Firm specific circumstances 
influence the search process to a large degree. Trial and error, which is also a 
characteristic of the innovations studied here, has led to effective organization 
forms. Hence, the idea that an organizational innovation has to come about by 
design does not find support in this study. The result of confronting the empirical 
attribute-tables with the findings in the theoretical attribute-table, is presented in 
table 9.3, which contains the literal replications. 
ORGANIZING FOR COMPETITIVENESS: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 237 
Table 9.3 Literally replicated relations between attributes of path dependence and 
organizational innovation 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Dynamic routines 
Y 
+ 
Capabilities 
Y 
Resources 
Y 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
LITERAL REPLICATIONS 
• Dynamic routines (patterns in the change of organizational form) influence both 
the form and the extent of the innovation. The form is determined by routines 
because organizational routines guide the reconfiguration of the value chain in 
a certain direction. As these dynamic routines are repeated over and over again, 
they exert a positive influence on the extent of the innovation as well: the 
repetitive nature of dynamic routines increases the number of changes in the 
value system. For example: elimination of inventory was a dynamic routine 
which, through repeated application, led to the JTT-system. Other dynamic 
routines have been identified in the cases presented in chapter 7 and 8. 
• Capabilities and resources influence the form of the organizational innovation. 
As theory predicted the form of an organizational innovation corresponds to 
the resources and capabilities present in an organization. The cases do not show 
a clear result as to the influence on speed and extent of capabilities and 
resources. This influence seems to depend on their specific nature and on the 
specific situation. 
EXTENSION 
In the cases presented in chapter 7 and 8, there was a relation between dynamic 
routines and the speed with which the organizational innovation was imple-
mented. Perhaps this is an extension of the theory. A theoretical reason for 
extending theory with this relation is that routines shorten the period of search 
for a solution (see chapter 4) and thus can speed up the process of innovation. 
Proposition 2: Long-term relations 
On the longevity of relationships, the proposition stated that innovations in long-
term interorganizational relationships can be inhibited, because of externalities, 
entrenched routines and independence. In general the cases showed that long-
term relations can indeed have a negative effect on organizational innovation, but 
some of the attributes of long-term relations proved to be more important than 
others. Table 9.4 gives, in detail, an overview of the more important relations 
between the attributes. 
238 CHAPTER NINE 
Table 9.4 Literally replicated relations between attributes of long-term relations and 
organizational innovation 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Externalities 
-
-
Entrenched routines 
-
-
Independence 
-
— = the independent variable influences the dependent variable negatively 
Source: see text. 
LITERAL REPLICATIONS 
• Externalities have been found to limit the speed and extent of organizational 
innovation. Two important aspects of externalities played a role. First of all the 
costs an innovation implemented in one company may have for another firm, 
can reduce the will of the other firm to cooperate. Secondly, the other company 
must be able to cooperate. If the other company does not have the required 
capability to do so, the implementation of the innovation may be inhibited 
(extent) or delayed (speed). 
• According to both theory and cases, entrenched routines limit the speed and 
extent of the innovation. Having to break entrenched routines is a time 
consuming task, which if it fails or succeeds only partly, limits the extent of 
organizational innovation as well. 
• As to independence, this attribute was found to slow down the process of 
organizational innovation. Obviously, the time needed to negotiate a new way 
of working between firms, lowers the speed of implementation of a new 
organizational form. 
Especially the role of externalities is interesting. Their impact was clearly 
discernable in the cases. Both costs and other impediments (especially the lack of 
capabilities to implement a new organizational form) could be traced and were 
readily observable. As these two aspects of cost and capabilities are the most 
tangible of the attributes, they may also be most relevant to management. From 
a practical perspective the management of externalities may be one of the key 
challenges in managing organizational innovations. 
EXTENSIONS 
A general remark on these replications should be made. As was shown in chapter 
5, theory predicted a negative effect of longevity on organizational innovation. A 
division between speed and extent was however not made. In the cases this 
difference was observable: e.g. externalities led to neither a fast nor a complete 
implementation of Fokker's new way of assembling. The distinction between 
speed and extent of organizational innovation seems to be a useful extension of 
theory. 
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The cases suggested that externalities can also influence the form of organizational 
innovations. Firms can design organizational mechanisms specifically aimed at 
coping with externalities. The consultation structures in which knowledge and 
information are transferred in the Fokker-case are an example of this. They are 
aimed at creating suppliers' capabilities and at diminishing some of the 
disadvantages suppliers encountered after the implementation of AtO. In this 
way, externalities had an impact on the eventual form of the organizational 
innovation. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research should especially be directed at the role of externalities in 
networks in limiting organizational innovativeness. From the perspective of 
network theory, the findings in this thesis are very interesting because they give 
detailed empirical evidence on a drawback of networking. This supplements the 
work of Grabher (1993a,b) and Miles and Snow (1992) who also pointed to dis-
advantages of networks. Surprisingly, in not a single case a positive effect of long-
term relations on organizational innovation was found. With the increasing 
importance of networking, the interest in the difficulties of managing a network 
will and should augment. Important topics also include whether the one dis-
advantage found in this thesis is important enough to offset, in the long run, the 
numerous advantages of networks and whether it is possible to find ways of 
managing a network which avoids lock-in into a certain organizational form. 
Finally, it should be researched whether the impediments to organizational 
innovation in a network also apply to technological innovation. Teece (1980) 
seems to imply that organizational innovation leads to more disruption than 
technological innovation because it is more difficult to confine organizational 
change to a limited part of the company. This may mean that the disadvantage 
of networks found above may be of particular relevance for organizational 
innovation. On the other hand, Tushman and Romanelli (1990) imply that it is the 
magnitude of change which is of relevance here: incremental changes are possible 
in networks, while radical changes are not. If we accept this view, the impedi-
ments to change in networks may also pertain to larger scale technological 
change. 
Proposition 3: Demand 
For research purposes demand conditions have been divided in quantitative 
demand (fundamental and cyclical) and qualitative demand (differentiation and 
fragmentation). The proposition states that increased fluctuations in demand will 
lead firms to abandon organization-like organizing mechanisms in favour of 
market-like and interfirm organizing mechanisms. Thus a firm is able to profit 
best from its resources and capabilities: the increased contact with the market 
helps to ensure that resources and capabilities will not become obsolete and are 
kept up-to-date. General confirmation of this proposition was found, but not all 
attributes of demand impacted on all attributes of organizational innovation. Table 
9.5 looks into the relations between the various attributes in detail. 
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Table 9.5 Literally replicated relations between attributes of demand and organizational 
innovation 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Fundamental 
+ 
Cyclical 
Y 
Differentiation 
Y 
Fragmentation 
Y 
Y = Yes, the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
+ = the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively 
Source: see text. 
LITERAL REPLICATIONS 
• In the cases, fundamental changes in demand were especially related to the 
speed with which innovations were implemented, as theory predicted. Both 
growth in demand and a collapse in demand induce reconfigurations in the 
value chain. 
• Cyclical changes influence the form an organizational innovation takes. Fokker's 
new way of organizing, especially the coordination with its suppliers, is 
designed to meet fluctuating demand. 
• Differentiation and fragmentation influenced the form of innovation. They lead 
to an increased use of market-like linkages in the organization of the value 
system. For example: fragmentation led the EDC-firm to contract out transport. 
EXTENSIONS 
Differentiation and fragmentation also enhance the extent of the innovation. Most 
shifts in activities and linkages in the EDC case were related to these two 
attributes of demand. The importance of these attributes may be considerable and 
hence we should look into the use of extending theory by incorporating them. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The general picture emerging from this study is the following. Qualitative trends 
have no influence on speed but do influence the form and, possibly, the extent of 
organizational innovation. Innovative activity is speeded up especially when 
fundamental quantitative changes occur. The supposed trend towards an 
increased penetration of market-like organizational concepts in organizational 
forms as a consequence of volatile demand was corroborated in the case studies 
as well. Increased volatility of demand has been met more successfully by a 
loosening of organization-like principles to the benefit of market-like principles, 
rather than with attempts at exercising increased control over more activities in 
the value system. The reallocation of activities from producers to EDCs is an 
example of this, as is the introduction of a new, flexible coordination mechanism 
in the relation between Fokker and its suppliers, which replaces the rigid long-
term planning. 
ORGANIZING FOR COMPETITIVENESS: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 2 4 1 
In general, demand was a very important variable in enhancing organizational 
innovativeness. Most reconfigurations of the value chain could be related to 
changes in demand. Further research may be conducted into the role of a third 
attribute of demand defined by Porter (1990a), namely the internationalization of 
demand. The key idea behind this is whether innovations which are developed 
to meet one kind of demand can also be transferred to the demand of other 
clients. The point here is that an innovation aimed at satisfying a specific 
customer is more interesting for a firm when the innovation is relevant for other 
(potential) customers as well. It may be possible that firms consciously form their 
innovation in such a way, that it is easy to adapt it for other customers. 
Evaluation 
The general conclusions emanating from the cases are that (1) there is path 
dependence in the development of organizational forms (history matters), (2) 
long-term interorganizational relationships limit organizational innovativeness 
mainly because of the existence of externalities and (3) demand is an influential, 
environmental determinant of organizational innovation. The last two 
determinants show that organizational innovation is not only historically 
contingent but also context dependent. 
As to the attributes of the three independent variables, the most interesting are 
routines for path dependence, and externalities for long-term relationships. 
Regarding externalities emphasis should not only be on the will of the network 
to cooperate but also on its ability to do so. All attributes of demand appeared to 
be of more or less equal interest. Further research into organizational innovation 
may take these results into account. 
The method of the attribute-tables (described in the Appendix) ensured that the 
operationalizations of the variables remained fixed across cases. This made it 
easier to draw cross case conclusions and also clarified the translation of the 
theoretical concepts to the practical situation. It seems that some of the 
disadvantages of working with cases identified by Eisenhardt (1989b) can be 
remedied by using attribute-tables. 
9.3 Implications for research and practice 
This final section will derive some research questions and practical implications 
from the research reported on in this thesis. 
Research implications 
One conclusion is that it is fruitful to look upon new organizational forms as 
being innovations and to analyse them with the tools provided by innovation and 
strategy theory (including Porter's diamond framework as a model for the 
business environment). Moreover, new organizational forms can contribute sub-
stantially to competitive advantage. Consequently the study of new organizational 
forms as innovations merits attention. New organizational forms should not only 
be judged as a handmaiden to technological change (Nelson, 1991), but should be 
judged and studied as a separate category of innovation, with many different 
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kinds of competitive advantage attached to them, to a large extent independent 
from the technologies used. Such a view is consistent with Schumpeter's broad 
conception of innovation. His view on innovative activity has been impoverished 
by limiting research in the Schumpeterian tradition to technological innovation 
only. This is not to say that technology doesn't matter. It does mean however that 
there are many ways to organize around a given technology and that the orga-
nization form chosen does matter in creating and sustaining competitive 
advantage. The cases underline this point. They show that almost without invest-
ments in new technology, cost savings and increased flexibilization can be 
realized. 
In addition, it has been shown that innovation theory is applicable to organi-
zational innovation. This refutes Van Someren's (1991) contention that the 
approach of evolutionary economics can not contribute to our understanding of 
new organizational forms and supports Nelson's (1991) and Kogut's (1991) ideas 
on this subject. The application of innovation theory is however not straight-
forward: the definition of paradigms and trajectories in organizational innovation 
differs from those in technological innovation, even though the mechanism lying 
behind these two kinds of innovation is similar: dynamic routines direct 
innovation. Another difference lies in the role of networks in organizational 
innovation: these do not stimulate organizational innovation like they do 
technological innovation. 
Secondly, the distinction between outside-in and inside-out proved valuable in 
this thesis. Some relations have been found between the two as well. Inside-out 
factors may determine outside-in factors for example because firms shape demand 
in their industry. The impact can also run in the opposite direction: the history of 
experiences with the environment lies embodied in a firm's routines and capa-
bilities (see e.g. David, 1986; March, 1994). Table 9.2 already pointed at the impact 
that temporary events can have through their impact on routines. Further research 
may shed light on this issue of the mutual relation between a firm and its 
environment on a detailed level (also see Van den Bosch and Warmerdam, 1995). 
Further reflection on the basic scheme depicted in figure 9.1, suggests that this 
simple scheme encompasses many of the aspects of organizational innovation and 
hence seems to be a good and surveyable point of departure for further research. 
Some parts of the box have however not been explicitly studied. The managerial 
component of organizational innovation for example requires more research. 
Interesting questions are e.g. how management can smooth the implementation 
of a new organizational form, whether management consciously uses dynamic 
routines or not, and how management tries to assess the effect of an 
organizational change before actually implementing it. 
Thirdly, in explaining organizational forms it is not sufficient to look at their 
efficiency characteristics. In order to grasp how the precise form of the 
organizational innovation is shaped, longitudinal analysis is required as well. 
History matters a great deal when one attempts to explain the exact configuration 
of activities and linkages in a firm. Efficiency characteristics may contribute to an 
explanation of the survival of an organization form, but cannot explain its initial 
derivation. Put in evolutionary terms: a framework like Williamson's (1975) 
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organizational failures framework defines the selection environment, whereas in 
the previous chapters more emphasis has been put on the process of variation. 
Fourthly, this research shows the feasibility and importance of incorporating 
interorganizational innovations in theory. It is not necessary to develop a 
completely separate set of tools to realize that. The tools used in the case studies 
proved to be applicable to intra- and interorganizational innovations alike. The 
modified model of the value chain, which includes a wide array of linkages, 
proved its value in describing organizational innovations too. 
Turning back to the questions put forth by Grandori (1993) as discussed in the 
introduction, the following answers can be provided: 
• Are there common logical features in organizational innovations? 
Yes, there are. The main point to be made here is that organizational innovation 
is best defined as a configuration of building blocks. The building blocks of 
organizational form (activities and linkages) are combined and recombined into 
new configurations. Hence, an innovation consists of a number of recombina-
tions of building blocks, not just one. This configurative approach is charac-
teristic of several strategic issues (see for example Elfring and Volberda, 1994, 
and Baden-Fuller, 1994, for other examples of configurative approaches). 
• How do they emerge and do they use existing knowledge? 
The picture arising from the research is that several forces impact on the 
emergence of new organizational forms, which makes that the process is 
characterized by search and trial and error. Organizational innovation is context 
dependent. Yet, simultaneously existing knowledge is used. The historical 
contingency of organizational innovation shows that existing knowledge on 
how to organize serves as a basis for finding new organizational forms. 
Routines replicate this existing knowledge of organizing. 
• How are possible organizational solutions tested? 
This subject has not been researched here. The definition of organizational 
innovation suggests that management will try to assess the impact on com-
petitive advantage of a certain innovation. The trial and error found in some of 
the cases suggests that the real test takes place in practice and not before 
implementation. None of the testing procedures defined by Grandori (1993) 
(viz. quasi-experiments, predictive case studying, simulations) have been found, 
but it must be noticed that a search for these methods was not part of the 
research. In conclusion, there is ample opportunity for further research into this 
question. Perhaps depicting different design options by means of the value 
chain model can give management insight into the chances an innovation will 
succeed. Perhaps the test of feasibility of an organizational form is embodied 
in dynamic routines, for routines are also a way of narrowing choice sets and 
simplifying decision-making (see chapter 4). 
• Can guidelines be developed on how to create new organizational forms (can 
the process be rationalized)? 
The aim of this study has mainly been to build theory and hence to describe 
organizational innovation and not to develop prescriptions. The reason for this 
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approach is that the knowledge we possess on this subject is limited. Hence, the 
focus has been on trying to understand. Nonetheless some possible guidelines 
may be put forth. The first one is that building on existing structures by means 
of applying similar dynamic routines may be a rational approach. This reduces 
the impact of uncertainty and lack of legitimacy (see table 2.7), which are 
endemic to innovative approaches (Machiavelli, 1513). Firstly, the uncertainty 
surrounding the organizational innovation is reduced because the new 
organizational form will not be completely unfamiliar to the firm, if it builds 
on the existing structures. Secondly, building on an existing structure heightens 
the legitimacy of the changes made, for the same reason. A more radical step 
into unknown territory in which all existing knowledge becomes superfluous, 
will be subject to much questioning and resistance. Staying close to what is 
accepted usually has a higher degree of legitimacy in the eyes of those who 
have to change, than throwing existing practice completely overboard. The 
second rational guideline is to look at the impact organizational innovation has 
on the demand side. This, after all, is where a competitive advantage has to 
materialize. If the reconfiguration of activities and linkages has no benefit for 
customers, the viability and necessity of the change can be questioned. 
Implications for governmental policy and strategy 
The analysis of organizational innovation corroborates the idea that not only costs 
matter in competitive processes, but that innovation can contribute to competitive 
advantage as well. The view on innovation taken in this thesis shows that not 
only technological innovation should be on the agenda of firms. Looking beyond 
existing trajectories of organizational forms can fundamentally alter the 
competitive game as well. Lock-in of the development of an organizational form 
is however a barrier to change. The theory developed above can help to make 
explicit managers' mental models (Senge, 1990) or dominant logic (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986) of organizing. According to Senge (1990) clarifying the mental models 
is a first prerequisite to change. In relation to this, depicting different organi-
zational design options with the modified value chain perspective developed in 
chapter 2 may point the way to innovative organization designs. Attention for 
innovative organization designs lying outside the territory of current conceptions 
of organizing, can contribute substantially to competitive advantage. 
A new organizational form emerges out of a relatively messy process. For firms 
this implies that attempts to implement comprehensive innovative organization 
designs should be avoided. As the process of organizational innovation is very 
complex, it will be unlikely that in these grand designs all problems are 
anticipated. Unanticipated consequences are the rule rather than the exception in 
innovation and they limit the chances of success of quantum leap changes. Search 
and trial and error are unavoidable and put even greater strain on organizations 
when they venture into completely unknown territory. Accordingly, successful 
innovations build on their precursors thus limiting the extent of newness and 
reducing organizational disruption in comparison to radical departures from 
prevailing practice. Of course in the process of diffusion of a new organizational 
form, characteristics of the form will become increasingly better known, enabling 
larger-scale changes to take place. In this diffusion process firms like consultancies 
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which build up experience in implementing new forms may acquire extensive 
knowledge about them. The application of this knowledge can speed up the diffu-
sion of a new form (and thus contribute to the destruction of its competitive 
advantage). In this way larger-scale changes from an existing form to a new one 
will be possible in the diffusion process of an organizational innovation, whereas 
the emergence of the innovation is characterised by search and trial and error. 
As the emergence of new organizational forms is a highly local process, sti-
mulating organizational innovation does not seem to be a feasible governmental 
policy. Rather governments may direct their attention to the diffusion of new 
organizational forms. Starting point here can be the obstacles to cross country 
diffusion of organizational innovations, as identified by Kogut (1991) and 
discussed in section 1.6.1. Diffusion can be stimulated by governments for 
example by funding research into the characteristics, advantages and drawbacks 
of the form, thus increasing the identifiability of the organizational innovation (see 
Kogut, 1991, or section 1.6.1). In the case of European distribution, government 
was an important influencing factor among others by allowing new ways of 
handling customs to be implemented. Governments may look at other insti-
tutional barriers to change and try to alleviate these in order to stimulate (the 
diffusion of) new organizational developments. In this way institutional lock-in 
(Kogut, 1991, see section 1.6.1) can be prevented. Within the networked paradigm 
several governmental policies have been devised in practice to create inter-
organizational networks (an overview is given in Jacobs and De Man, 1995 b,c). 
Some governments play a role as a matchmaker between firms to bring about new 
interorganizational relations. For example, small and medium-sized enterprises 
are coupled to larger firms, which transfer their managerial knowledge to the 
SME's. These, in return, can thus upgrade the quality of products delivered to the 
mentor firm. Government can fund and support the different phases leading up 
to such a collaboration. This in fact contributes to an economy-wide dissemination 
of network structures and thus strengthens the networked paradigm of organi-
zation. 
A final point of attention is that in the idea of organization, interorganizational 
forms are to be incorporated as well. Interorganizational relations can exhibit a 
variety of complex organization designs, which do not have to be limited to 
contracts and equity stakes. Instead managing a network can require as much 
effort as managing the firm internally. The Fokker and distribution cases show the 
importance of knowledge transfer and communication mechanisms to coordinate 
production processes throughout the value system and to secure smooth imple-
mentation of a new organizational form. When the management of interorganiza-
tional aspects of an organizational innovation is taken into account explicitly, a 
substantial contribution can be made to the success of an organizational 
innovation. 
From the Fokker case several options emerge which can smooth the introduction 
of a new interorganizational form. These options are: 
• knowledge transfer: if a firm is not able to implement a new organizational 
form, it may be possible to alleviate this problem by means of transfer of 
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knowledge. This knowledge transfer can give that firm the capabilities required 
to cooperate. 
• information sharing: next to transfer of knowledge, information is of interest in 
implementing an interorganizational innovation. The Fokker-case showed for 
example that providing sales information to suppliers, allowed these firms to 
make their own planning. This made it possible to abolish the old linkage of 
long-term planning and replace it by a more flexible arrangement. 
• reallocations of activities: transfer of activities between firms can help in solving 
problems of the new way of working. Activities may have to be reallocated 
according to the logic of the new organizational form. Naturally, elimination, 
creation or integration of activities can be useful as well. 
Research agenda 
Out of the presented discussion an agenda for further research can be constructed. 
The main points are assembled in table 9.6. 
The first question must be which managerial implications can be distilled from 
this research. In figure 9.1 management was incorporated as the initiator and 
implementor of change. Yet, as was said in the beginning of this chapter, before 
any guidelines can be developed, fundamental research into organizational 
innovation is required. Based on the research presented above the key managerial 
questions are: 
• is management necessarily the initiator of change or do organizational inno-
vations also come bottom-up? 
• can management consciously use routines to develop a new organizational 
form? 
• what ways of organizing have the best fit with demand? 
• what are the managerial processes by which transition from one form to 
another is achieved? 
• can the process be managed more effectively or is trial and error inherent in the 
process? 
Table 9.6 A research agenda 
1. What can the role of management in organizational innovation be? 
2. Can hypothetical organizational arrangements be tested? 
3. What are the causes of failure of organizational experiments? 
4. How can networks be managed to avoid lock-in? 
5. Does large-scale empirical research confirm the relations between the attributes? 
Source: see text. 
Grandori's question whether the process of organizational innovation can be 
rationalized, also referred to the need for managerial guidelines. Based on the 
research presented however, the question can be asked whether it is necessary or 
even possible to rationalize the process, because the trial and error with which the 
search for a new organizational form takes place, does not necessarily lead to an 
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ineffective form. Instead, trial and error can lead to highly competitive 
organizational innovations. This is also recognized by managers. Unilever's former 
CEO for instance, described the process by which the transnational structure of 
Unilever emerged as "not the outcome of a conscious effort" (Maljers, 1992, p. 46). 
Instead, "our actual progress was not made by the application of theory but 
through a much messier evolution of trial and error" (Maljers, 1992, p. 51). 
Similarly, in the case of Fokker, management consciously avoided to come up 
with a complete organizational blueprint, because it realized that the innovative 
process was too complicated to foresee all eventualities. Management chose the 
trial and error approach. Perhaps this approach is very effective in bringing about 
organizational innovation, but at least the conclusion is warranted that it can be 
effective. In developing managerial guidelines this result should be taken into 
account. The guidelines should perhaps be aimed more at speeding up and 
reducing the errors of the process, than at attempting to design detailed 
organizational blueprints. The next research question deals with finding ways to 
reduce the errors. 
The second question addresses the issue whether management develops different 
organization designs and next tests these on their feasibility. Grandori (1993) 
identified some mechanisms for this. The use of routines can also be an implicit 
way of judging whether a particular organizational form will be successful or not. 
Likewise, if a trajectory of organizational innovation exists, the existence of 
precursors of an organizational innovation, may be sufficient for management to 
believe that a specific new innovation will work in practice. The previous 
paragraph showed that trial and error is important in the innovative process as 
well. Does this mean that management only tests new organizational forms in a 
very general way? Or are there other situations in which organizational forms are 
tested extensively? The theory and the cases presented here point in the direction 
of the first idea, but no in-depth research has been undertaken into this issue and 
hence these questions are still awaiting answers. 
The third question (what are the causes of failure of organizational experiments) 
can also contribute in answering the second one. Organizational experiments 
which have failed can provide interesting lessons for management and theorists 
alike. Are the causes of failure to be found inside or outside the organization? Are 
organizational errors defined by intra-organizational problems or by their misfit 
with the business environment? Causes of failure suggested by this research are: 
• the new organizational form does not build on precursors, so that too many 
unforeseen problems and a low legitimacy work against it; 
• organizational innovation is seen as incidental, not as part of a continuous 
process; 
• no attention is paid to network externalities; 
• the effect of the innovation on demand is ignored. 
The fourth question is actually a subquestion of the first one. The growth in the 
number of interorganizational relations observed by most researchers justifies its 
separate discussion here. The more networks develop, the more interesting it 
becomes to look at the disadvantages of networks and at ways to manage these. 
As especially externalities are of interest as a drawback of networks, research 
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should look into the question of how firm strategies can aim at preventing or 
coping with externalities. Based on the Fokker-case some managerial options 
(transfer of knowledge and information, reallocation of activities) have been 
mentioned. It may be interesting to see if these can be generalized and found in 
other cases as well. 
Finally, the fifth question points to extension of the research into the variables of 
path dependence, demand and networks. In some cases, we can move from 
theory-building to theory-testing. Large-scale empirical testing can be feasible 
based on the various attributes of the variables. This can extend our insight in the 
relative importance of the variables and attributes. In other cases, extensions of 
the emerging theory have been put forth in section 9.2. Interesting work can also 
be done into the disadvantages of networks and the analysis of organizational 
trajectories. The latter point requires longitudinal analysis based on the analytical 
schema depicted in figure 9.1. 
In the introduction of this thesis the observation was made that most theorizing 
about organizational forms is aimed at explaining the legitimacy of existing 
organizational forms and not at analysing the development of new ones. This gap 
in research constrains managers in their ability to handle the process of orga-
nizational innovation effectively, as our knowledge of this process is at best 
superficial. Broadly speaking, the contribution of this thesis is threefold: 
• it focuses on the dynamics of organizational forms and describes organizational 
innovation as subject to forces inside and outside the firm, whereas existing 
theories have mainly used comparative static methods; 
• it shows the possibility and importance of using innovation theory instead of 
organization theory to describe and analyse new organizational forms. Limiting 
the concept of innovation to technological innovation neglects the breadth and 
scope of innovative activity; 
• it incorporates both inter- and infra-organizational forms, while most research 
focuses on either one of these. Inter- and infra-organizational forms do not 
require a different set of tools and analyses, but can be studied by the same set 
of concepts. 
The way in which new forms come into being still requires a considerable amount 
of fundamental research, before it is understood to such a degree that managerial 
guidelines can be developed. The research agenda presented above is indicative 
of the kind of problems to be tackled before we truly understand how firms go 
about organizing for competitiveness. 
Appendix 
Qualitative operationalizations in case studies1 
1.1 Introduction 
Though the method of the case study receives increasing attention, the problem 
of operationalizing the often general variables used in qualitative case studies is 
absent from otherwise good discussions of the case method like Eisenhardt 
(1989b) and Yin (1989). Yin for instance merely states that operationalizations 
should be "correct" (Yin, 1989, p. 40). When operationalizations are discussed in 
more detail, this is usually for quantitative studies only (see for example Van der 
Zwaan, 1990, p. 46). Operationalizations in that case refer to developing measures 
which can be expressed in numerical terms. Qualitative operationalizations are 
never discussed, while these are necessary for the kind of theory-building studies 
as done in this thesis. 
The problem of qualitative operationalizations gets more complicated the more 
complex the phenomena under study are: complex concepts can seldom be 
reduced to one operational measure, without loosing much of the content of the 
concept. Several characteristics (or attributes) of the concept will have to be used. 
In the increasingly popular pluralist approach of research (Mahoney, 1993; De 
Man, forthcoming) this problem poses itself with even more vigour. The emphasis 
on firm specific circumstances (as capabilities, routines etc.) which plays a large 
role in the pluralist tradition, should not lead to unsystematic analysis. It must be 
avoided that operationalizations are guided by individual cases. Otherwise the 
chance of developing narrow and idiosyncratic theories gets too big (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Furthermore, despite the complexity inherent in real life cases, usually the 
aim remains to test some relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. This kind of analysis can become complicated or even impossible if 
qualitative operationalizations are not stable across cases. 
Thanks to Professor van den Bosch for providing some of the first ideas for working with 
attribute-tables. The way these ideas have been incorporated in this Appendix remains the 
author's responsibility. 
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Hence a balance must be struck between on the one hand leaving open enough 
room for the search for and extension of an emerging theory, and, on the other 
hand, the need to be clear and specific about what relation between variables is 
looked for. In theory-building studies some freedom must be allowed with respect 
to the concepts used, but the search for a theory should simultaneously be con-
strained by the scientific need for clarity. Put differently: it is necessary to 
operationalize variables in a way which is specific enough to be able to trace the 
variables in cases and general enough to prevent idiosyncratic operationalizations. 
Hence operationalizations useful for cases should not be too theoretical (because 
than they cannot be related to the real life facts), and not be too practical and 
idiosyncratic (because than they cannot contribute to developing a more general 
theory). Especially in the case of theory-building this is relevant, because shifting 
between theory and empirical material is characteristic of many theory-building 
approaches and this requires good operationalizations (see for example Glaser and 
Strauss, 1976). 
How then to operationalize variables in such a way that the relations between 
dependent and independent variables can be made clear while also staying close 
to the observations made in the case? In the chapters 6, 7 and 8 a technique has 
been used, based on operationalizing dependent and independent variables by 
means of attributes of these variables. The method is depicted in figure A.l. 
Figure A.l A method of working with operationalizations in qualitative, theory-building case 
studies 
Theoretical trajectory Empirical trajectory 
Proposition 
i 
Dependent and independent 
variables 
1 
Operationalize as; 
- attributes of dependent variables 
- attributes of independent variables 
m 
Attribute-table containing 
theoretical propositions 
Description 
Relate to: 
- attributes of dependent variables 
- attributes of independent variables 
Attribute-table containing results of 
empirical research 
Confrontation attribute-tables: 
similarities, contradictions etc. 
1 
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In figure A.l the formulation of a proposition based on an emergent theory is 
taken as a starting point. This proposition will relate some broadly defined 
independent variable (e.g. demand or long-term relations) to a dependent variable 
(e.g. organizational innovativeness). Based Gn the literature a broad statement can 
be made as to the relation between the dependent and independent variable . For 
example: demand stimulates organizational innovativeness and the presence of 
long-term relations does not. 
When this statement is put next to a case study, some problems will become 
evident. It will for instance become clear that demand is not an unambiguous 
variable, which can be easily traced in the case. Therefore operationalizations are 
needed in order to say something about whether the predicted relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables holds. This operationalization 
can be done for cases by picking out some of the key characteristics of the 
dependent and independent variables. These key characteristics are called the 
attributes. 
Normally these attributes will not completely describe the variable they pertain 
to, but by grounding them in theoretical developments or other cases, the chance 
that they are important attributes of the variable augments. Moreover, because the 
same attributes are used in both the theoretical and the empirical part of the 
research, it becomes easier to draw clear cross-case conclusions than when the 
variables are defined broadly. In the latter case the interpretation of the variable 
can shift from case to case, thus reducing the possibility to draw unambiguous 
conclusions. A list of attributes used in chapters 6, 7 and 8 is given in table A.l. 
Note that it is assumed here that some theories are available which can be used for defining 
propositions. When this is not the case and even the first rudiments of concepts have to be 
developed, Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory can be a useful method (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1976). In the later phases of grounded theory research, the method presented here 
can be useful as well. 
252 APPENDIX 
Table A.l Overview of attributes used for operationalizing variables 
Organizational innovativeness (see chapter 2): 
Form refers to the way in which the value chain is reconfigured. The question is whether the 
independent variables influence the direction of change. The answer to this question is yes or 
no: no value judgement can be given. This attribute can be found in Grandori (1993). 
Speed refers to the velocity with which the innovation is implemented. An independent 
variable can e.g. stimulate the innovation (+) or slow down the process (—). This attribute can 
be found in Wolfe (1994). 
Extent refers to the importance and number of the innovations implemented. This attribute can 
be found in Wolfe (1994) and Downs and Mohr (1976). 
Path dependence (see chapter 4): 
Dynamic routines are repeated patterns of changes in activities and linkages. 
Capabilities are firm specific, non-transferable skills. 
Resources are non-firm specific, transferable assets, including things as money and labour. 
Long-term relations (see chapter 5): 
Externalities refer to the phenomenon that infra-organizational change will have inter-
organizational consequences the more companies are intertwined. These consequences can 
refer to costs (another company has certain costs connected to the change and as a con-
sequence is unwilling to cooperate with the innovation) and to other impediments (the other 
company is unable to work with the change). 
Entrenched routines refer to the difficulty of breaking through standard patterns of behavior. 
They become manifest when behavior is continued despite attempts to change it. 
Dependence comes in various forms: independence, interdependence and dependence. In the 
case of independence there is no dominance in the relation between parties, so that a firm 
cannot dictate change to another one. In dependent relationships one party is dominant: the 
dominant party has more degrees of freedom to change than the dependent party. In inter-
dependent relationships there is no dominance, but firms are mutually dependent. In these 
relationships the common interest of the parties may facilitate organizational innovation. 
Demand (see chapter 5): 
QUANTITATIVE 
Fundamental changes are lasting changes in the quantity of demand 
Cyclical changes are temporary fluctuations in demand 
QUAUTATIVE 
Differentiation is the phenomenon that products and services are increasingly tailored to the 
wishes of consumers. Main examples are fashion, the demand for speed and product diversity. 
Fragmentation refers to the phenomenon that different geographical markets have to be served 
with a limited number of products. 
Source: chapters 2, 4, 5. 
When the attributes have been defined they are ordered in an attribute-table. In 
this table the attributes of a dependent variable are arranged vertically, and the 
attributes of an independent variable are arranged horizontally (of course it is 
possible that for a variable only one attribute is used). In table A.2 a practical 
example of an attribute-table can be found (table 4.7 is reproduced). Each relation 
between the attributes can than be studied. Based on the theory used or 
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developed, theoretical predictions can be entered in the table with the following 
symbols: 
• yes (Y) or no (N): there is a relation between the variables (Y) or there is none 
(N); 
• minus (-): the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
negatively; 
• plus (+): the independent variable influences the dependent variable positively. 
Table A.2 Example of an attribute-table 
Form 
Speed 
Extent 
Routines 
Y 
+ 
Capabilities 
Y 
Resources 
Y 
Source: table 4.7. 
The first function of this attribute-table is that it shows the gaps in the theory as 
far as used in the research. The boxes in which no entries occur, may require 
further study. The attribute-table closes the theoretical trajectory of the research. 
The empirical trajectory starts with the choice of cases and the design of the case 
studies. Eisenhardt (1989b) and Yin (1989) provide extensive guidelines for this. 
Important are the number of cases and the kind of cases. 
As to the number of cases Eisenhardt claims that one case usually is insufficient. 
Dyer and Wilkins (1991) attack this idea: they claim that several wellknown 
authors have limited themselves to a single case study. Eisenhardt (1991) however 
points to the fact that these authors have made use of an embedded design (Yin, 
1989): within one case they look into several mini-cases. Following this embedded 
design, in Fokker and the distribution company several mini-cases have been 
researched in order to corroborate the propositions on long-term relationships 
(two cases in Fokker next to the overall case of the implementation of AtO) and 
demand (three cases in the distribution company) . It appeared that in these 
cases also some things could be said on the other propositions and hence in each 
case the attribute-tables for the other propositions have been reproduced as well. 
The overall picture then, is that of an embedded multiple-case design (Yin, 1989, 
p. 46) for the propositions on long-term relations and demand. The proposition 
on path dependence builds on the two cases in chapter 6 (Just-in-Time and ABB), 
as well as on the cases of European distribution and Fokker. As a result each 
proposition is researched in at least three or four cases. 
Pertaining to the kind of cases, Eisenhardt (1989b) proposes to use theoretical 
sampling. She states that "it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme 
Above that in chapter 6 existing empirical material was reviewed on its contribution to the 
propositions. 
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situations and polar types in which the process of interest is "transparently 
observable". Thus, the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases which are 
likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory" (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 537; also 
see Glaser and Strauss, 1976). Translated to the propositions on long-term 
relations and demand, a choice was made for the cases of Fokker and European 
distribution. Based on a preliminary discussion with persons in the field as well 
as a quick literature study, it was expected that in these two firms the process of 
interest would indeed be transparently observable and hence replication might 
take place4. This is important as "in replication logic, cases which confirm 
emergent relationships enhance confidence in the validity of the relationships" 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 542). Hence the theory drives the choice of cases to be 
studied. This relation is depicted by the arrow between theory and cases in figure 
A.l. 
In the Fokker and distribution case use was made of multiple data collection 
methods. This triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 538) meant for Fokker that 
company documents were studied, interviews were conducted in Fokker with 
people occupying different positions in the firm, and use was made of newspaper 
and magazine articles. In the case of the distribution firm in the Rotterdam port, 
interviews were held inside the company as well as with experts outside the 
company. Also various research reports issued by consultancies and the archives 
of the Rotterdam Port Authority contributed information to the case. 
In the next phase, the case description is related to the same attributes of the 
variables as used in the theoretical trajectory. As a list of operationalizations of the 
attributes has been made in the theoretical trajectory (see table A.l), this should 
be rather easy to do (see among others section 7.4.4/7.4.5 and 8.3.5/8.3.6). Closing 
the empirical trajectory, an attribute-table is made in which the attributes of the 
independent variable are related to the attributes of the dependent variable, based 
on the case study evidence. This table contains the main findings of the case and 
is the end of the empirical research trajectory. 
The last step in the method used was to compare the attribute-table of the 
theoretical trajectory, with the attribute-table of the empirical trajectory for each 
of the propositions studied. Putting these tables next to each other, helps in 
determining which theoretical relations are corroborated by the data, which are 
not and which are inconclusive. 
From this conclusion there can be various feedback loops to the different stages 
of the research trajectory. The conclusions drawn can extend and confirm a theory 
For Fokker the 1992 Annual Report announced the possible introduction of a new way of 
assembling aircraft (see chapter 7). A first discussion with the company made clear that 
long-term organizational relations had had an impact on this organizational innovation, 
when it was implemented in 1993 and that at that time the new way of working with 
suppliers was still crystallizing out. This increased the researcher's interest in Fokker. In the 
case of the distribution company, research reports showed the role of demand in the 
emergence of EDC's (see chapter 8 in which some of these reports were quoted) and talks 
at the Rotterdam Port Authority identified the case company as an innovative and success-
ful company. This triggered the interest for the cases, as possibly suitable research objects. 
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or they can be final conclusions regarding the question whether a specific 
proposition is confirmed or not. The researcher can also be guided back to earlier 
stages of the research. For example, the attribute-tables can show that some 
variables are not worth studying further, or that the operationalization of 
variables can be improved by eliminating an attribute. This latter point may be 
very important as better operationalizations can break the ground for a 
quantitative operationalization, thus not only facilitating quantitative empirical 
research but also sharpening the theory. 
It goes without saying that not only in the theoretical trajectory mistakes can be 
made which can explain contradictions between the theoretical and the empirical 
attribute-tables, but that in the empirical trajectory mistakes can be made as well. 
For example the case studied may not be chosen wisely, in the description of the 
case unclarities may be present etc. This stresses the requirements pointed out in 
the discussion of the empirical trajectory above, that the way of working with 
empirical material should be correct. The feedback loop in figure A.l from the 
conclusion to the various stages of the empirical trajectory depicts the possibility 
that the research may be guided back to the empirical material as well. 
As the procedure outlined above is specifically aimed at theory-building, it will 
probably not lead too often to clear confirmation or rejection of a complete theory. 
Rather it will show which are fruitful routes for further research and which are 
not. This conclusion can be reached by a replication logic, which can either 
involve literal replication (in which a proposition is confirmed) or theoretical 
replication (in which contrary results are found, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 
1989, p. 53)) of a proposition. In this way the emerging theory is amended based 
on confirmation or rejection of propositions. Some directions for research are 
closed and others can be opened up. A useful by-product of this method is that 
it increases the construct validity as in the course of the research some attributes 
will prove to be more important than others. Hence, the contribution to the 
emerging theory is twofold: it points to interesting research directions (it fills gaps 
in theories) and improves constructs. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the method used have been assembled in 
table A.3. The first advantage is that the method is systematic. Most important in 
this respect is that when a multiple case or embedded design is used, there is 
consistency across cases with regard to the attributes used. The attributes defined 
force the researcher to use a rather specific operationalization of the variables he 
wants to study and to make this operationalization clear. Consequently, it 
becomes more difficult for him/her to shift the interpretation of the variable 
depending on the case. This not only prevents an opportunist way of opera-
tionalizing, but also simplifies the search for cross-case patterns which is always 
a cumbersome task in case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 540). 
Another major problem identified by Eisenhardt is that it is often difficult for the 
reader to track in how far the actual data collected relates to the conclusions, "...a 
huge chasm often separates data from conclusions" (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 539). 
The current method of operationalization narrows this gap between data and 
conclusions and at least makes it easier for the reader to see which translations 
the researcher had to make in order to get from his data to the theoretical 
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variables. Not only does this make the translation of data into variables more 
tractable, but the way the operationalizations are obtained is tractable as well: for 
they should be grounded in either existing or emerging theory, or be distilled 
from existing cases. 
A third advantage is that the attribute-tables can help to identify the gaps in 
literature and theory. On each spot where a question mark appears theory or 
empirical material have not yet shed light. Of course this remark only pertains to 
the theories and cases studied in the research at hand. Naturally, the researcher 
may have missed a theory (or misinterpreted one) or he may have looked over 
some facts in the empirical material. 
Table A.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the operationalization method used 
Advantages 
• Systematic (simplifies search for cross-case patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 540) and 
cross-case consistency of the attributes) 
• Tractable (smaller chasm between data and conclusions, see Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 
539; also operationalizations tractable to literature: either theoretical concepts are 
used or more practical ones drawn from other case studies) 
• Clarifies gaps in literature and empirical research 
• Orders material in cases; otherwise the amount of facts can be overwhelming 
• Improved constructs 
• Easier to replicate the study in other cases by other researchers 
Disadvantages 
• Restricts number of variables: not usable for studies which are completely 
inductive, only when the contours of a theory is established and initial 
propositions can be formulated which extend or develop the emerging theory 
• Attributes are connected to attributes, not independent variables to dependent 
variables 
Source: see text. 
Fourthly, when one does a case study the amount of diverse data collected in a 
relatively short period of time can be overwhelming. The attribute-tables provide 
a surveyable means to order these data, without loosing much of the richness of 
the case study data. 
A fifth advantage is that the method can further develop the constructs used. 
Based on the findings of the research, the choice and definition of the attributes 
can be evaluated. The research can show for example that one attribute of a 
variable might just as well be eliminated in future research or should be defined 
differently. In this way the validity of constructs can be improved. 
The sixth and final advantage is related to replication of the study. The tractability 
of the method not only allows other researchers to judge the way of working of 
the researcher who performed the study, but it also makes it easier for them to 
do a similar study themselves. 
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A major disadvantage is that the attributes have to be defined rather narrowly. 
This limits the things the researcher observes. As a result, for completely inductive 
studies (like Hamel (1991)) it is not possible to use this method. The method will 
probably work best in emerging theories, where some general relations have been 
found or can be hypothesized, but further extension of details or core attributes 
is necessary. In the cases in chapter 7 and 8 this was the case: concepts from 
different theories could be used to formulate a rather detailed proposition, but the 
different aspects of that proposition were not yet clear enough to allow other, 
large scale research methods to be used. 
A second disadvantage lies in the fact that not independent variables are related 
to dependent variables, but attributes of independent variables to attributes of 
dependent variables. Of course this is true for every operationalization of a 
variable: it is impossible to include in that operationalization every aspect of the 
variable. Hence this drawback does not exclusively pertain to this method. Only 
when a variable is directly observable in practice, this problem is avoided. 
Concluding, the method for operationalization of qualitative variables in 
qualitative case studies has some distinct advantages and disadvantages. The 
method seems to be applicable in those situations where theory has developed 
beyond the phase of induction, but is not yet so far developed that deductive 
testing by means of statistical techniques is possible. The method is aimed at 
theory building and extension. Further research into this method may suggest 
some refinements. These can for example deal with ways to use this method with 
some alterations in inductive research. Another interesting question is how the 
quality of qualitative operationalizations can be raised even further. This is a 
question that so far has been insufficiently addressed and at which this method 
only provides a first tentative answer. The importance of this is clear: if we want 
to learn from cases we must move beyond story telling in order to generate better 
constructs and theories (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). 
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Samenvatting: Concurreren door organiseren 
Onderzoek naar organisatievormen is vooral gericht op het analyseren en ver-
klaren van de efficiency of effectiviteit van bestaande vormen. De vraag hoe nieuwe 
organisatievormen tot stand komen is in de literatuur nog nauwelijks onderzocht. 
Het gaat bij het laatste bijvoorbeeld om de vraag of nieuwe organisatievormen 
bewust worden ontwikkeld en in een keer gei'mplementeerd of dat zij in de loop t 
van de tijd onder invloed van bepaalde determinanten uitkristalliseren. Dit 
onderzoek richt zich op de vraag hoe nieuwe organisatievormen zich ontwikkelen 
en welke determinanten op deze ontwikkeling van invloed zijn. Naast deze 
nadruk op de dynamiek van het ontstaan van organisatievormen, zal daarbij niet 
alleen aandacht worden besteed aan intra-organisatorische vernieuwingen maar 
ook aan interorganisatorische (nieuwe wijzen van organiseren van de relatie 
tussen bedrijven). Een derde kernpunt betreft de gebruikte theorie: om het 
ontstaan van organisatievormen te verklaren, wordt innovatietheorie gebruikt in 
plaats van organisatietheorie. 
Inzicht in dit ontwikkelingsproces kan bijdragen aan de formulering van strate-
gieen ten aanzien van de meest geeigende wijze waarop succesvolle nieuwe 
organisatievormen tot stand kunnen worden gebracht. Gedetailleerde prescripties 
voor management kunnen gezien de beperkte hoeveelheid onderzoek die naar het 
ontstaansproces van organisatievormen is gedaan, echter nog niet worden gege-
ven. Derhalve is het onderhavige onderzoek vooral theorievormend: het beoogt 
voomamelijk een bijdrage te leveren aan de kennis over het ontstaan van nieuwe 
organisatievormen, eerder dan te komen tot voorschriften die tot direct nut 
kunnen zijn voor managers. 
Uitgangspunten voor een theorie van organisatorische innovatie 
Uitgangspunt is dat een theorie over het ontstaan van nieuwe organisatievormen 
aan vier voorwaarden dient te voldoen: 
• de theorie moet historisch contingent zijn. Dat wil zeggen dat verklaard moet 
worden hoe ontwikkelingen in de loop van de tijd hebben bijgedragen aan de 
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wijze waarop de organisatievorm tot stand is gekomen. De in de loop van de 
geschiedenis van een onderneming ontwikkelde vaardigheden en gewoontes, 
kunnen bijvoorbeeld een organisatorische vernieuwing vergemakkelijken of 
tegenwerken. De karakteristieken die een onderneming in de loop van de tijd 
verworven heeft, bepalen derhalve mede de wijze waarop een nieuwe organi-
satievorm in die onderneming tot stand komt. 
• de theorie moet context afhankelijk zijn. De aanleiding voor een organisatorische 
innovatie hoeft niet alleen voort te komen uit interne organisatorische ontwik-
kelingen, maar kan ook liggen in de bedrijfsomgeving. Druk uit de omgeving 
van een bedrijf kan een vernieuwing afdwingen, maar ook de implementatie 
ervan belemmeren. 
• de theorie moet er vanuit gaan dat nieuwe organisatievormen worden gei'mple-
menteerd om een concurrentievoordeel te bereiken. Een dergelijk strategisch 
perspectief erkent dat de door de organisatie nagestreefde doelen veelvormig 
kunnen zijn. Concurrentievoordelen kunnen bijvoorbeeld liggen in verlaging 
van kosten, vergroten van de produktdifferentiatie en een snellere reactie op 
vraagveranderingen. 
• de theorie moet de pluriformiteit van organisatievormen kunnen verklaren. Zowel 
organisatievormen binnen een bedrijf (intra-organisatorisch) als nieuwe orga-
nisatievormen tussen bedrijven (interorganisatorisch, bijvoorbeeld in netwerken 
en allianties) behoren in de theorie te zijn opgenomen. Het toenemende gebruik 
van interorganisatorische dwarsverbanden vereist dat een theorie van organisa-
torische innovatie deze kan beschrijven en verklaren. 
Het blijkt mogelijk te zijn aan deze vier vereisten te voldoen door het vraagstuk 
van nieuwe organisatievormen niet te definieren als een organisatietheoretisch 
probleem, maar als een probleem van innovatie: er wordt hieronder dan ook 
gesproken van organisatorische innovatie. Een combinatie van strategie- en 
innovarietheorieen blijkt licht te kunnen werpen op de wijze waarop organisatie-
vormen zich ontwikkelen. 
Organisatorische innovatie en concurrentievoordeel 
Het belang van dit onderwerp (en het belang van het strategisch perspectief) 
wordt duidelijk wanneer de bijdrage van organisatorische innovaties aan con-
currentievoordeel nader wordt bekeken. Die bijdrage is namelijk aanzienlijk. Met 
behulp van nieuwe organisatievormen kan een breed scala aan onderscheidende 
concurrentievoordelen worden bereikt: lagere kosten, snellere levering, betere 
produktdifferentiatie etc. Bovendien geeft een theorerische analyse van de 
duurzaamheid van deze voordelen aan dat organisatorische innovaties moeilijk 
te imiteren zijn. Bestaand empirisch onderzoek heeft dit bevestigd: de versprei-
ding van nieuwe organisatievormen naar concurrenten verloopt traag. 
Organisatorische innovaties dragen niet alleen bij aan concurrentiekracht op het 
bedrijfsniveau, maar hebben tevens effect op nationale concurrentiekracht. In de 
literatuur is een begin gemaakt met zowel de theorerische als empirische analyse 
van de samenhang tussen organisatievormen en nationaal concurrentievoordeel. 
Hoewel literatuur hierover nog niet talrijk is, geven de huidige resultaten aan dat 
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de rol van organisatorische innovaties op het nationale vlak niet te verwaarlozen 
is. Zo lijkt de diffusie van organisatievormen langzamer te verlopen tussen landen 
dan binnen landen. Dit betekent dat bedrijven in een bepaald land een concurren-
tievoordeel op kunnen bouwen ten opzichte van bedrijven in het buitenland, 
omdat de implementatie van een innovatie bij de laatsten later plaats vindt. 
Definite 
Na het belang van organisatorische innovaties aldus te hebben vastgesteld, doet 
de vraag zich voor wat precies organisatorische innovaties zijn en hoe deze 
kunnen worden beschreven. De afwezigheid van een bruikbaar concept dat het 
begrip organisatorische innovatie hanteerbaar maakt, wordt in de literatuur 
genoemd als een van de belangrijkste beperkingen voor onderzoek naar nieuwe 
organisatievormen. Het blijkt in hoofdstuk 2 dat een waardeketenperspectief 
(value chain) bruikbaar is voor het definieren en analyseren van het begrip 
organisatorische innovatie. Met behulp van de bouwblokken van de waardeketen, 
te weten activiteiten en de verbindingen tussen de activiteiten, blijkt het tevens 
mogelijk te zijn organisatorische innovaties op een zodanige wijze te beschrijven, 
dat recht wordt gedaan aan de pluriformiteit van organisatievormen. Een organi-
satorische innovatie wordt gedefinieerd als een nieuwe combinatie van activiteiten 
en/of verbindingen in het waardesysteem, die bijdraagt aan een duurzaam con-
currentievoordeel voor de betrokken onderneming(en). Enkele elementen van deze 
definitie vragen om verduidelijking: 
• de term "verbindingen" wordt in deze definitie vrij breed gedefinieerd. Het gaat 
niet alleen om kostenrelaties, zoals in Porter's definitie van de waardeketen. 
Hier worden onder dit begrip ook andere coordinatiemechanismen opgenomen, 
zoals autoriteit, sociale normen, standaardisering en informatie-technologie. 
• de nadruk op het "waardesysteem" (value system) is opgenomen om recht te 
doen aan de pluriformiteit van organisatievormen. Door de rol van het waarde-
systeem te benadrukken, maken ook interorganisatorische relaties deel uit van 
het begrip organisatorische innovatie. 
• het duurzaam concurrentievoordeel is een demarcatiecriterium dat verband 
houdt met het woord innovatie. Innovaties zijn succesvolle vernieuwingen, die 
het concurrentievoordeel van het bedrijf dat de innovatie implementeert, 
vergroten. Kleinere innovaties zonder impact op concurrentievoordeel vallen 
hier dus niet onder het begrip organisatorische innovatie, evenmin als de 
opvatring waarin alles wat nieuw is voor een bepaalde organisatie als een 
innovatie wordt aangemerkt. 
Tot zover zijn twee van de vier vereisten voor een theorie van organisatorische 
innovatie besproken: de rol van concurrentievoordeel en de pluriformiteit van 
organisatievormen zijn opgenomen in de definitie van het begrip organisatorische 
innovatie. Er resteren derhalve twee van de hierboven besproken vereisten, 
namelijk historische contingentie en context afhankelijkheid. Beide worden 
ingevuld met behulp van concepten uit de strategic- en innovatietheorie, waarbij 
wordt gekeken naar de vraag of concepten uit de technologische innovatietheorie 
ook toepasbaar zijn op organisatorische innovaties. 
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Historische contingentie 
Historische contingentie kan worden teruggevonden met behulp van het concept 
padafhankelijkheid (path dependence), dat voomamelijk in de technologische 
innovatietheorie is ontwikkeld en hier wordt toegepast op organisatorische 
innovatie. In het kort betekent padafhankelijkheid dat nieuwe organisatievormen 
zich ontwikkelen uit voorgaande vormen en uit situatiespecifieke omstandig-
heden. Zoals reeds vermeld, is met name deze dynamiek in de ontwikkeling van 
organisatievormen in de literatuur onderbelicht. Drie begrippen spelen een rol bij 
de toepassing van het concept padafhankelijkheid op organisatorische innovatie: 
• dynamische routines. Organisatievormen ontwikkelen zich volgens een proces 
waarbij in de loop van de tijd soortgelijke veranderingen in de waardeketen 
worden aangebracht. Dit proces laat zich beschrijven in termen van routines: 
een routine-matige wijze van werken (statische routine) wordt doorbroken 
doordat de waardeketen wordt veranderd. Deze veranderingen in de waarde-
keten zijn echter zelf vaak gelijksoortig (dynamische routine): dat wil zeggen 
de ene verandering lijkt op de andere. Een voorbeeld verheldert dit: bij de 
ontwikkeling van het JTT-systeem in Toyota werd telkens een bestaande werk-
wijze (statische routine) doorbroken door middel van het elimineren van 
voorraad op verschillende plaatsen in het produktieproces. Eerst gebeurde dit 
op een plaats in het bedrijf, maar in de loop van de tijd werden door herhaalde 
toepassing van de dynamische routine van voorraadeliminatie in het hele 
bedrijf de tussen- en eindvoorraden uitgebannen. Vervolgens gebeurde het-
zelfde in de relatie met de toeleveranciers. 
• resources. Naast padafhankelijkheid op het vlak van organisatorische routines, 
kunnen ook de in het bedrijf aanwezige verhandelbare en niet-bedrijfsspecifieke 
hulpbronnen (resources) de organisatorische innovatie bepalen. De huidige door 
het bedrijf vergaarde resources kunnen immers bepaalde wijzen van innoveren 
in de organisatiestructuur aantiekkelijker maken, of eenvoudiger. Voor een 
tekort aan bepaalde resources geldt naruurlijk ook dat dit de richting van de 
organisatorische innovatie kan beinvloeden. 
• capabilities. Capabilities zijn de niet-verhandelbare en bedrijfsspecifieke 
vaardigheden die een onderneming bezit. Voor de invloed van capabilities op 
het proces van organisatorische innovatie geldt hetzelfde als wat is opgemerkt 
met betrekking tot resources. 
Context afhankelijkheid: de rol van netwerken en vraag 
De context afhankelijkheid van een organisatorische innovatie kan worden bestu-
deerd door gebruikmaking van raamwerken voor omgevingsanalyse. Een voor-
beeld hiervan is het diamant-raamwerk van Porter. Uit deze diamant worden 
twee determinanten gelicht wederom omdat die bekend zijn uit de innovatie-
theorie, te weten de rol die netwerken en vraag spelen bij het ontstaan van 
innovaties. 
In het geval van technologische innovatie worden netwerken veelal positief 
besproken: er wordt van uit gegaan dat zij bijdragen aan de snelle ontwikkeling 
en verspreiding van nieuwe technologieen. In dit proefschrift wordt echter op 
basis van bestaande theorieen de propositie geformuleerd dat netwerken en in het 
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bijzonder de langdurige relaties daarin, organisatorische innovatie belemmeren. 
De redenen hiervoor zijn: 
• het bestaan van externe effecten: een verandering in een bedrijf dat ingebed is 
in een netwerk, heeft ook een effect op de andere bedrijven in dat netwerk. 
Naarmate ondernemingen meer met elkaar verweven zijn, zal het sneller voor-
komen dat een organisatorische innovatie een dergelijk effect heeft. De andere 
bedrijven in het netwerk moeten zowel in staat zijn om mee te veranderen als 
de wil daartoe hebben. Indien aan een van deze voorwaarden niet is voldaan, 
wordt de implementatie van de organisatorische innovatie belemmerd. De wil 
tot medewerking kan onder andere beperkt worden door het feit dat bepaalde 
kosten moeten worden gemaakt; het vermogen om mee te werken kan beperkt 
worden door het ontbreken van kennis en vaardigheden. 
• ingesleten routines: in langdurige relaties kunnen gewoontes en standaard-
gedragspatronen ontstaan die eerst moeten worden doorbroken voordat een 
nieuwe organisatievorm kan worden geimplementeerd. Het doorbreken van die 
ingesleten routines in een relatie kan tijdrovend zijn, of zelfs onmogelijk. 
• onafhankelijkheid: bij bedrijven die van elkaar onafhankelijk zijn of in een 
gelijkwaardige positie verkeren kan de dwang afwezig zijn een organisatorische 
innovatie van de partner te volgen. Een bedrijf dat van een innovator afhan-
kelijk is zal daarentegen eerder geneigd zijn zich in te spannen om de innovatie 
tot een succes te maken. 
De tweede bestudeerde omgevingsfactor is de rol van de vraag. Bij het tot stand 
komen van technologische innovaties speelt deze vaak een belangrijke rol. Hier-
onder zal blijken dat dit ook voor organisatorische innovaties geldt. Ontwikkelin-
gen in de vraag vallen uit een in kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve veranderingen. 
Kwantitatieve veranderingen kunnen cyclisch zijn of blijvend; belangrijke, in de 
literatuur besproken kwalitatieve veranderingen zijn differentiatie (toename van 
het aantal produktvarieteiten) en fragmentatie (verspreiding van de vraag over 
kleinere en geografisch verspreide eenheden) van de vraag. Een analyse van 
vraagontwikkelingen maakt duidelijk dat naarmate schommelingen in de vraag 
vaker voorkomen, bedrijven in toenemende mate organisatie-achtige verbindingen 
vervangen door marktachtige verbindingen. Praktisch gezien betekent dit bijvoor-
beeld dat er meer activiteiten van de waardeketen worden uitbesteed en dat 
bedrijven intern zich ook op zodanige wijze organiseren, dat zij sneller in staat 
zijn op marktontwikkelingen te reageren. De toename van marktachtige verbin-
dingen is tevens een aanduiding van de opkomst van zogenaamde netwerkvor-
men, zowel in organisaties als tussen hen. 
Tot zover zijn dus drie uit de innovatie-literatuur bekende variabelen gedefinieerd 
die van invloed zijn op het proces van organisatorische innovatie: padafhankelijk-
heid, netwerken en vraag. De proposities dat deze variabelen van belang zijn, zijn 
geconfronteerd met de empirie met behulp van gevalstudies. Daarbij is het begrip 
organisatorische innovatie geoperationaliseerd aan de hand van de vorm van de 
innovatie (de wijze waarop de variabelen invloed hebben op de configuratie van 
de waardeketen), de snelheid waarmee de innovatie wordt geimplementeerd 
(bevorderen de onafhankelijke variabelen een voorspoedige implementatie of juist 
niet) en het belang van de innovatie (bevorderen de onafhankelijke variabelen de 
280 SAMENVATTING 
totstandkoming van belangrijkere en verscheidene innovaties of staan zij slechts 
een gering aantal kleinere veranderingen toe). 
Om deze proposities nader te onderzoeken is gebruik gemaakt van al bestaand 
empirisch materiaal aangevuld met twee nieuwe gevalstudies: de ontwikkeling 
van een nieuw organisatiemechanisme in Fokker en de ontwikkeling van Euro-
pese Distributiecentra. Beide cases tonen belangrijke interorganisatorische 
innovaties, naast enkele intra-organisatorische aspecten. Het blijkt dus nuttig te 
zijn om ook de eerste soort innovaties in de definitie van organisatorische 
innovatie te betrekken. 
Case 1: Fokker Aircraft 
De Fokker case laat zien hoe een organisatorische innovatie in een onder druk 
staande onderneming een bijdrage levert aan het verminderen van een aantal 
financiele en logistieke problemen. In 1993 voerde Fokker het Assembly-to-Order 
(AtO) systeem in op de eindlijn van de Fokker 100. Dit systeem vertoont gelijkenis 
met de van uit de auto-indusrrie bekende Just-in-Time systemen. Voor de vlieg-
tuigbouw moet dit systeem echter zo ver worden aangepast, met name op het 
interorganisatorische vlak (in de relatie met de toeleveranciers), dat hier toch 
sprake is van een originele innovatie. Bovendien was Fokker de eerste vliegtuig-
fabrikant die een dergelijk systeem implementeerde. De in hoofdstuk 7 van dit 
proefschrift gepresenteerde analyse van het systeem laat zien dat hier inderdaad 
sprake is van een majeure vernieuwing in de organisarie van het produktieproces 
en de relatie met toeleveranciers. Het AtO-systeem moest twee doelen in zich 
verenigen, bijdragend tot vergroting van het concurrentievoordeel van Fokker. 
Het moest enerzijds leiden tot kostenverlaging door daling van het onderhanden 
werk en de voorraad white tails (afgebouwde, maar niet verkochte of geleaste 
toestellen) en anderzijds tot een kortere levertijd en minstens handhaving van de 
specificatieflexibiliteit (het vermogen om aan klantenwensen tegemoet te komen). 
Het eerste punt is bij Fokker gerealiseerd door de assemblage van toestellen na 
een bepaald punt te staken, wanneer verkoop of leasing van het toestel niet 
verzekerd is. Dit leidt echter wel tot de opbouw van voorraden bij de toeleveran-
ciers. Om dit te verhelpen en om een zodanige produktieplanning te kunnen 
maken dat een kortere levertijd mogelijk is, is een nieuw afstemmingsmechanisme 
met de toeleveranciers ontwikkeld. Dit is de Strategic Suppliers Meeting (SSM), 
waarin aan de belangrijkste toeleveranciers de verwachte verkopen voor een 
bepaald kwartaal worden meegedeeld en verdere afstemming plaats vindt ten 
aanzien van de produktie in de komende kwartalen. Dit stelt de toeleveranciers 
in staat een zelfstandige produktieplanning te maken, waar zij voorheen werkten 
op basis van een voornamelijk door Fokker opgestelde lange-termijnplanning. In 
termen van de waardeketen laat de SSM zich beschrijven als een nieuwe ver-
binding in het waardesysteem, tussen de activiteiten van Fokker en die van zijn 
toeleveranciers. De geschiedenis van het AtO-systeem illustreert een aantal punten 
uit de proposities: 
• ten eerste is er sprake van padafhankelijkheid. In de periode voordat er van het 
AtO-systeem sprake was, werkte Fokker al aan doorlooptijdverkorting. Door 
een groot aantal organisatorische en technologische vernieuwingen in het 
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assemblageproces, zoals het parallelliseren van activiteiten en het later 
inbouwen van dure delen in een toestel, konden kortere levertijden en lagere 
kosten op het onderhanden werk worden gerealiseerd. Doorlooptijdverkorting 
was niet alleen een voorwaarde voor het AtO-systeem (het maakte het bij-
voorbeeld mogelijk om kortere produktietijden te realiseren), maar AtO was 
ook een meer radicale toepassing van doorlooptijdverkorting (bijvoorbeeld: in 
plaats van het later inbouwen van dure delen, werden ze helemaal niet 
ingebouwd). De bestaande routines van doorlooptijdverkorting bepaalden dus 
mede de vorm van het AtO-systeem. 
Interessant in dit verband is ook dat de doorlooptijdverkorting in eerste 
instantie onder meer was ingegeven door een verwacht hoog produktieniveau, 
terwijl zij in het AtO-systeem wordt gebruikt bij een laag produktieniveau. Dit 
was een onverwacht effect. Fokker vermeed ook opzettelijk een blauwdruk van 
het nieuwe systeem te maken. De verwachting was dat het beter was het 
systeem in de praktijk te laten uitkristalliseren. Deze twee punten laten zien dat 
organisatorische innovarie een zoekproces is, waarbij via een proces van "trial 
and error" met soms onverwachte effecten een effectieve organisatievorm tot 
stand komt. Ook in de relatie met de toeleveranciers deden dit soort effecten 
zich voor. 
• ten tweede werd de implementatie van het systeem bemoeilijkt door de aan-
wezigheid van toeleveranciers. Een gedetailleerde analyse van de relatie met 
een tweetal toeleveranciers maakt dit duidelijk. Bij een van deze ontbrak de wil 
om mee te werken, vanwege de kosten die met een verandering gepaard gaan, 
de onafhankelijkheid van deze toeleverancier en ingesleten routines. De andere 
toeleverancier had weliswaar de wil om mee te werken, maar was intern niet 
in staat goed in het AtO-systeem te participeren, voornamelijk vanwege de 
beperkte flexibiliteit van het eigen produktieproces. Door verdere organisato-
rische innovaties, te weten het overdragen van activiteiten tussen de bedrijven, 
is aan deze problemen gedeeltelijk tegemoet gekomen. Een extra beperkende 
factor voor het invoeren van organisatorische innovaties in langdurige relaties, 
bleek het verschil in industrietak te zijn waarin bedrijven werken. De 
gewoonten in de civiele luchtvaartindustrie wijken bijvoorbeeld aanzienlijk af 
van die in de militaire vliegtuigbouw. 
• ten derde spelen vraagontwikkelingen een rol. In het bijzonder de cycliciteit van 
de vliegtuigbouw heeft bijgedragen aan een snellere invoering van het AtO-
systeem. De vorm van het systeem is hier ook door beinvloed: de produktie-
planning in de SSM is zodanig georganiseerd dat specifiek wordt ingespeeld op 
schommelingen in de vraag. Kwalitatieve vraagontwikkelingen speelden ook 
een rol, in het bijzonder de vraag naar kortere levertijden. 
De organisatorische innovarie bij Fokker heeft een aantal aanwijsbare bijdragen 
geleverd aan de oplossing van enkele van de problemen waarmee het bedrijf 
kampt. Zoals de case laat zien zijn er twee hoofdredenen waarom het systeem nu 
en niet eerder werd ingevoerd. De belangrijkste reden is de diepte van de crisis, 
waardoor het systeem is afgedwongen (ook al had het in principe deels eerder 
kunnen worden ingevoerd). De tweede reden is dat de doorlooptijdverkorting 
eerst vergevorderd moest zijn alvorens AtO mogelijk was. Er geldt echter ook dat 
Fokker in het verleden een hogere prioriteit aan technologische vemieuwing heeft 
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toegekend dan aan organisatorische vernieuwing. De conclusie lijkt dan ook 
gerechtvaardigd dat verdere organisatorische vernieuwingen kunnen bijdragen 
aan betere prestaties van Fokker. Dit geldt niet alleen binnen de organisatie, maar 
ook op het interorganisatorische vlak. 
Case 2: Een Europees distributiecentrum in Rotterdam 
De tweede case analyseert de ontwikkeling van Europese Distributiecentra 
(EDC's) in de Rotterdamse haven. In EDC's komt een aantal activiteiten samen. 
Allereerst wordt er de distributie van produkten door heel Europa georganiseerd. 
Daarnaast vinden er echter ook secundaire produktie-activiteiten plaats (zoals 
assemblage, verpakken en klantspecifiek maken van produkten) en in toenemende 
mate wordt ook de informatiestroom rondom de goederendistributie behandeld. 
Hierbij worden bijvoorbeeld voorraadbeheer, facturering en douane-formaliteiten 
in een EDC uitgevoerd. Er is dus sprake van een reallocate van activiteiten van 
producenten naar een distributiecentrum. De belangrijkste concurrentievoordelen 
die hiermee gepaard gaan zijn verlaging van de kosten van het distributieproces 
en vergroting van de snelheid van levering. 
Een analyse van een EDC dat zich in toenemende mate op de verwerking van 
informatie heeft geconcentreerd, levert de volgende conclusies op ten aanzien van 
de hypothesen over padafhankelijkheid en vraag: 
• een historisch overzicht van de ontwikkeling van het bedrijf toont het belang 
aan van routines en capabilities in de ontwikkeling van het EDC. Deze ont-
wikkeling laat zich beschrijven in termen van de herhaalde toepassing van 
enkele dynamische routines; de belangrijkste daarbij is de gefaseerde overname 
van activiteiten van de producent door het EDC. In elke fase die de onder-
neming doormaakte, werden de voorwaarden gecreeerd om in de volgende 
periode te kunnen concurreren. Dit laatste was echter niet een van te voren 
gepland proces, maar bleek voornamelijk een consequentie van het volgen van 
de vraag van klanten. 
• ontwikkelingen aan de vraagkant, in het bijzonder de differentiatie en frag-
mentatie van markten, hebben de belangrijkste impact gehad op de ontwikke-
ling van het systeem. Het dichterbij de consument brengen van de secundaire 
produktie-activiteiten is een voorbeeld van de wijze waarop door middel van 
organisatorische innovatie wordt getracht sneller op veranderingen in de vraag 
te reageren. Wijzigingen in produkten kunnen dan immers dichtbij de con-
sument worden aangebracht, zodat de consument niet lang op zijn bestelling 
hoeft te wachten. 
De ontwikkeling naar EDC's is een snel doorzettende trend met een belangrijke 
impact op de concurrentiekracht van ondernemingen en de Rotterdamse haven. 
Interessant in deze case is dat EDC's niet alleen ontstaan bij de gratie van 
informatie-technologie, maar dat zij ook zeer belangrijke organisatorische 
wijzigingen in zich bergen, waardoor de gehele distributieketen fundamenteel 
verandert. Net als in de vorige case zijn dus de interorganisatorische aspecten van 
belang. 
CONCURREREN DOOR ORGANISEREN 283 
Conclusies 
De cases tonen aan dat een historisch perspectief nodig is om organisatorische 
innovaties te kunnen verklaren. Het blijkt dat de wijze waarop een organisatie-
vorm tot stand komt in belangrijke mate wordt bepaald door de er aan vooraf-
gaande organisatievorm, door bedrijfsspecifieke omstandigheden en door een 
aantal omgevingsinvloeden, waarvan de vraag een van de belangrijkste is. Een 
verklaring voor het ontstaan van nieuwe organisatievormen vereist dan ook altijd 
een contextuele en historische analyse. Daarbij valt op dat er naast verandering 
van organisatievormen ook in belangrijke mate sprake is van continuiteit: zoals 
gezegd bouwen organisatievormen op elkaar voort. 
Het uitsluitend benadrukken van de efficiency of effectiviteit van een nieuwe 
organisatievorm verklaart niet het ontstaan ervan. Deze dissertatie toont aan dat 
het proces van organisatorische innovatie er eerder een is van zoeken naar een 
oplossing dan van een geplande activiteit. Ten einde organisatorische innovatie 
te verklaren dient eerder dan de efficiency van organisatievormen, de zoektocht 
naar concurrentievoordeel centraal te staan. 
De implicatie hiervan is dat innovaties door de met hen samenhangende onzeker-
heden en onverwachte voor- en nadelen stapsgewijs tot stand komen en dat de 
implementatie van grootschalige, innovatieve organisatie-ontwerpen waarschijnlijk 
een beperkte slaagkans heeft. Succesvolle innovaties bouwen juist voort op hun 
voorgangers, waardoor de afbreukrisico's worden beperkt. Naarmate de 
karakteristieken van een organisatorische innovatie beter bekend worden 
(bijvoorbeeld doordat meer ondernemingen de innovatie hebben gei'mplemen-
teerd), worden grootschaliger veranderingen in de richting van de innovatie 
eenvoudiger, omdat de onzekerheid omtrent hun effect dan afneemt. 
Samenvattend zijn de belangrijkste bijdragen van dit onderzoek: 
• de focus ligt op de dynamiek van organisatievormen. Organisatorische innovatie 
wordt beschreven als een proces, waarop zowel krachten in als buiten orga-
nisaties van invloed zijn. De meeste bestaande theorieen maken daarentegen 
gebruik gemaakt van comparatief statische methoden. 
• het onderzoek toont de mogelijkheid en het nut van het gebruik van innovatie-
theorie in plaats van organisatietheorie, bij het beschrijven en analyseren van 
nieuwe organisatievormen. Hieraan gerelateerd geldt dat het beperken van het 
concept innovatie tot technologische innovatie geen recht doet aan de veel-
vormigheid van innovatieve activiteiten. Het is in overeenstemming met de 
opvatting over innovatie van Schumpeter om ook de andere vormen van inno-
vatie meer aan bod te laten komen in onderzoek en praktijk. 
• inter- en mfra-organisatorische innovaties zijn in het onderzoek meegenomen, 
waar de meeste onderzoeken zich op een van deze concentreren. Het blijkt dat 
inter- en intra-organisatorische innovaties met dezelfde analyse-methoden en 
theorieen kunnen worden geanalyseerd en geen verschillende concepten ver-
eisen. 
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I 
In het begrip organisatorische innovatie dienen niet alleen intra-
organisatorische innovaties te worden opgenomen, maar ook 
interorganisatorische. 
II 
Innovatietheorie is meer dan organisatietheorie een nuttig 
instrument voor de beschrijving en analyse van het ontstaan van 
nieuwe organisatievormen, omdat de organisatietheorie zich 
voornamelijk heeft bezig gehouden met de analyse van de effec-
tiviteit van bestaande organisatievormen in plaats van met het 
ontstaansproces van nieuwe. Juist dit laatste proces kan met 
innovatietheorie worden bestudeerd. 
I l l 
r l e t feit dat nieuwe organisatievormen niet ontstaan uit een 
lineair en gepland proces, maar uit een deels ongeordend zoek-
proces, betekent niet dat de resulterende organisatievormen 
ineffectief zijn. Eerder het tegendeel is waar. 
IV 
H e t succes van McDonald's en Ikea wordt in de EZ-nota Kennis 
in Beweging (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1995) ten 
onrechte geheel toegeschreven aan een "breder concept" en 
"goede marketing". In feite is de innovatieve wijze waarop deze 
bedrijven zijn georganiseerd de basis van het succes, dat daarom 
ook duurzamer is dan het geval zou zijn geweest indien uit-
sluitend goede marketing de sterke concurrentiepositie had 
veroorzaakt. 
V 
Anders dan het Nederlandse overheidsbeleid doet vermoeden, 
ligt concurrentiekracht niet uitsluitend in technologie besloten. 
VI 
Cjrezien de onmogelijkheid de toekomst te berekenen, behoort de 
besluitvorming over grote infrastructure^ projecten niet in de 
eerste plaats een kwestie van calculatie op basis van cijfers van 
het CPB of Nijfer te zijn, maar een van visie. 
VII 
Oelet op de weerstand die diverse ideeen van Machiavelli al in 
zijn eigen tijd opriepen, lijkt Machiavelli's beschrijving van de 
innovator (De Heerser, VI) vooral ingegeven te zijn door zijn 
persoonlijke ervaringen. 
VIII 
D e grote aandacht die in de literatuur nog altijd wordt gegeven 
aan Adam Smith' analyse van de speldenproduktie, staat in schril 
contrast tot het economische belang van deze activiteit (zie: 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776). 
DC 
D e universiteitsromans van auteurs als David Lodge en 
Kingsley Amis dienen niet zozeer gelezen te worden als gewild 
komische fictie, als wel als fel-realistische weergaven van de 
moderne wetenschapspraktijk. 
X 
JVlet het verscheiden van W.F. Hermans op 27 april 1995 vervalt 
de belangrijkste reden om te promoveren: namelijk doctor te 
worden om te voorkomen door hem te worden aangemerkt als 
"iemand die zijn studie niet heeft afgemaakt". 
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